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Corruption is a local and global problem which has been exacerbated by neoliberal capitalism. 
One of the institutions available for curbing it is the media. This thesis examines the impact of 
democratisation and press freedom on transparency and accountability in the conduct of public 
affairs following Nigeria’s return to “civil rule” in 1999. Largely qualitative, and nominally 
quantitative, in nature, the study covers some of the major socio-economic and political issues 
affecting the Nigerian media, and the inherent unethical conduct that has portrayed the fourth estate 
of the realm as a lapdog. The fieldwork involved the content illustration of news stories, focusing 
on features; newspaper headlines; editorials; opinion articles; and cartoons. My interviews were 
with twenty-five select-stakeholders in the anti-corruption sector in Nigeria, including former 
heads of anti-corruption agencies, politicians, legal practitioners, civil society activists, faith based 
leaders and media practitioners who had completed the instrument used for the study. The 
analytical framework deployed for this study is critical discourse analysis, which involves 
analysing responses from the twenty-five stakeholders, who were picked using a purposive 
sampling technique. These interviews formed the primary data for the study, and documentary 
research consisting of newspapers reports, official reports and in-house magazines published by 
two of the anti-corruption agencies formed the secondary data. A major finding of the study is that 
the current Nigerian media industry is structurally deficient in the credibility needed to perform its 
role as a watchdog, because its integrity has been compromised, following incidents of bribery and 
corruption, which are commonly subsumed into the derisive phrase, “brown envelope.”  
 
Fifteen years of “civil rule”, and anti-corruption measures, such as the adoption Freedom of 
Information Act 2011, have not significantly been translated into reduction of corruption, since the 
press has been largely adjudged to be equally corrupt. Corruption has permeated the media sector, 
and it seemingly enjoys the connivance of the media proprietors, who often encourage reporters to 
use leverage on sources for pecuniary rewards by urging them to abuse their professional identity 
cards for “survival”, since their salaries and emoluments are not paid on time. Moreover, the 
concept of “cash-for- news- coverage,” where journalists only publish positive news in exchange 
for cash from the source(s), the suspect(s) or the aggrieved, is very common. The widespread 
practice of taking the “brown envelope” describes an unethical form of news commercialisation 
and, coupled with the bias of media houses towards adverts, this compromises their critical roles 
of advocacy and as the watchdog in society. Following the perpetuation of this perversion by the 
media, crooks are often portrayed as saints and falsehood overshadows truth. The findings 
therefore suggest that corruption is growing, rather than diminishing, in Nigeria, because the media 
are very weak. Essentially, the argument is that to overcome some of the challenges facing the 
media industry in Nigeria, there is an overwhelming need for media practitioners to establish a 
pool of resources, to gain majority control of newspapers (a virile organ of thought and an opinion 
shaper) and, invariably, to curtail political inference in their editorial contents and, eventually, to 
run their newspapers professionally. Broadly, this study contributes to extant literature on 
democratisation; it offers new paradigms for, and perspectives on media transparency. It 
establishes that political corruption is the negative outcome of the connivance and collusion 
between the mass media and the civil society in a transitional democracy. In specific terms, it 
reveals that there is need for a clear distinction to be made on the kind of media tradition that will 
aid the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria and in other growing democracies. The research 
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contributes to work on media and accountability in the context of neoliberal corrupt behaviours 


















































1.0 Background to the study 
Corruption has both local and global dimensions and it arguably exists in all societies to various 
degrees. The neoliberal capitalist environment in Nigeria, with its local and international 
institutions, has introduced economic reforms that have entrenched capitalist policies and 
predatory competitive behaviours. This thesis examines the role of the media in enhancing the 
culture of accountability and transparency in Nigeria. Public perceptions of corruption in public 
offices and in the private sector in Nigeria are staggering. The late Sani Abacha, the former 
Nigerian Head of State, was said to have embezzled $34billion and stashed it in Swiss bank 
accounts (Adebanwi, 2010: 118). The former Governor of Delta State, James Ibori, allegedly 
misappropriated $90 million (22.5 billion Naira), (Ibid: 118), the former Governor of Bayelsa 
State, Solomon Peter Alamieseigha illegally amassed 1.8million pounds and $10million. One-time 
Inspector General of Police in Nigeria, Tafa Balogun, allegedly stole $20 billion (Ayittey, 2006: 
2-8). The looting of the national treasury is worrisome. Indeed, Ribadu (2009: 2) asserted that 
“between 1960 and 1999, Nigerian officials had stolen or wasted more than $440billion”. How did 
Ibori, who has just completed a jail term in UK prisons, and others, steal so much from the national 
purse? Although, successive Nigerian governments have attempted to curb corruption, it appears 
that their efforts have not yielded adequate reparation, because the integrity and transparency of 
public officials remain unsatisfactory.  
Globally, scholars state that the mass media potentially play a crucial role in the anti-corruption 
drive (Tanzi, 1998; Harsch, 1993; Stapenhurst, 2000; Ojo, 2003; Chowdhury, 2004; Flanary and 
Watt, 1999; Franche, 1995; Skolnick and McCoy, 1984; Norris, 2006; Esipisu, and Khaguli, 2009; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Fox, (1988). Stapenhurst (2000: 4), specifically notes, “The media play a 
critical role in promoting good governance and help to curb corruption by investigating and 
reporting incidences of corruption in a professional and ethical manner”. Rodney (2012: 15) argues 
that the media can act as a force against corruption in both tangible and intangible ways. He further 
notes (2012: 16) that the media can curb corruption in an intangible way by identifying the flaws 
and weaknesses in laws and regulations that create a climate that is favourable to corruption. In so 
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doing, the authorities are prompted to change, or to consider changing, those laws and regulations. 
Brunetti and Weder (2003: 1821) argue that press freedom is an important check on corruption. 
Similarly, Ojo (2003) argues that the media are the watchdog of government; helping to expose 
illegalities and to redirect governments onto the right track.  
In tangible ways, the media can help to curb corruption in public life. Simon (1998) cited examples 
from Latin America where a surge in media reporting on corruption helped force no fewer than three 
Heads of State out of office, namely, Ecuador’s Abdala Bucaram, Venezuela’s Carlos Adres Perez 
and Brazil’s Fernando Collor De Mello. In Nigeria, examples also abound of public officials who 
have been forced from office based on the exposure of their corrupt acts by the media. Tafa Balogun, 
a former Inspector General of Police; Salihu Ibrahim, Folake Etteh, Adenike Grange, Evan 
Enwerem, Chuba Okadigbo, Haruna Abubakar and Adolphus Wabara, (all politicians) lost their 
positions due to media coverage of their corrupt activities while in public office (Adebanwi 2010: 
118). This study investigates how the media are framing corruption-related stories under a 
democratic Nigerian society that operates a “free/active press” (Ronning, 2009). 
Incidences of corruption in pre-colonial African societies were rare, and where they occurred they 
were quickly contained through the checks and balances that are inherent to the African traditional 
systems. Shortly after Nigeria attained political independence from the British in 1960, a new crop 
of indigenous rulers came to power. However, the anticipation and zeal of proceeding to a society 
that was free of corruption, and which was predicated on transparency and accountability, was 
truncated by the new rulers with their ostentatious life styles. The social crusaders, (novelists, 
playwrights, poets and musicians) captured the rot and they warned of the imminent collapse of 
values and virtues. One of the most popular social crusaders against the problem was the Nigerian-
born Afro beat King, the late Fela Anikulapo Kuti. In two of his records, “Teacher don’t teach me 
nonsense” (1984) and “Authority Stealing” (1980), he satirizes the version of democracy that is 
practised in Nigeria. Using very sarcastic tones and deploying features of linguistic analysis, he 
invested his lyrics on democracy with innuendoes, depicting the bastardisation of democracy and 
the warped sense of its practice, reiterating that a symbolic form of craziness was being foisted on 
the psyche of the Nigerian people by their leaders. He captures it succinctly: 
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Democrazy, democrazy, Crazy demo. Demonstration of craze, crazy 
demonstration, if e no be craze, why for Africa as time dey go, things just 
dey bad, poor man dey cry, rich man dey mess. Democrazy, Crazy demo 
(Fela, LP 1984). 
Literal translation to English: Demonstration of craziness, demonstration of craziness, Crazy 
demonstration, demonstration of craziness, Crazy demonstration, 
  If it is not madness, would it happen in Africa? 
  As times pass, things get worse, the poor cries, 
  The rich spoils the society, 
Demonstration of craziness, crazy demonstration. 
 
You be thief/I no be thief 
You be rogue/I no be rogue 
You be thief/ I no be thief 
You be rogue/ I no be rogue 
You dey steal/ I no dey steal 
You be robber/ I no be robber. 
    Argument about stealing (Fela, LP 1980). 
Literal translation to English: you are a thief, no; I’m not a thief, 
 You are a rogue, no; I’m not a rogue, 
You have stolen, no, I have not stolen, 
You are an armed robber, no; I’m not an armed robber, 
Sharp argument about stealing, 
Somebody has taken, what belongs to another person. 
Fela Anikulapo Kuti’s lyrics, above, depict undemocratic practices and corruption in Africa and, 
particularly, in Nigeria. The songs remain relevant, almost three decades after he sang them. 
Essentially, the twin problems of maladministration and corruption straddle democratization in 
Nigeria and the situation has degenerated since the early 1990s. Several countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, for instance, have remained at the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI), while 
several other regions of the World, sharing a similar colonial heritage, have begun experiencing 
double digit growth rate in their economies and development.  
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     17 | P a g e  
 
 
Social scientists have identified several factors relating to Africa’s plight, but concur that 
corruption is the foremost obstacle to economic development. This emanates from the weaknesses 
of the institutions in Africa, with their attendant informalisation of infrastructure and social 
redistribution. It has been established, on the basis of observations by analysts, that those public 
officers who carry with them a commitment to serve the nation use such offices to serve their own 
private interests (Tignor, 1993: 176).  
Available information reveals that corruption constitutes the most pressing governance challenge 
and is a major impediment to development on the continent today. A Transparency International 
(TI) Report showed that between 2007-2015, only three countries, Mauritius, Botswana and Cape 
Verde, met the minimum threshold of five points, the cut-off point for a tolerable level of 
corruption in any country. Similarly, the 2015 Global Corruption Barometers showed that Africa, 
as a region, is considered to have suffered most from public corruption (UNECA and AUCPCC 
working document).  
Although, corruption is a global phenomenon, and it is not peculiar to any country, including 
Nigeria (Smith, 2008; Ribadu, 2007; Ribadu, 2006a; Ribadu, 2006b and Obasanjo, 1999), the bone 
of contention is its enormity in Nigeria. It should be stated that not all Nigerians are corrupt, and 
corruption has not always been condoned, particularly at the local and community levels. Smith 
(2008) describes corruption in Nigeria as a culture, and Adebanwi (2011) argued that it is a state 
policy. These scholars hinge their positions on the fact that from relatively mild manifestation at 
the country’s independence in 1960, corruption of various kinds has snowballed since Nigeria’s 
second attempt at democratic rule (1979-1983), but it spread rapidly during the military regime 
from 1983 to 1999. However, since independence, successive governments have made concerted 
efforts to tackle the vexing issue of corruption through campaigns. Despite structured efforts to 
boldly tackle the menace, the result has always been dismal failure. 
What has emerged over the past 20 years has been a culture of impunity among both the elite and 
the generality of the people. By 1999, when the nation returned to democratic rule, the level of 
corruption had become frightening, as social and official ills pervaded the society. One of the 
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greatest expectations of Nigerians, in particular, and Africans, in general, was that on the return to 
civilian administration after 15 years of uninterrupted military rule, corruption would be reduced, 
if not eradicated. 
Similarly, the third wave of democratisation in Africa (Huntington, 1993) had seen some scholars 
seeking to establish close links between the process of democratisation and the decline in 
corruption in public life. A key line of their argument is that democracies encourage respect for, 
and the expansion and deepening of, the freedom of the press and civil society. Seen in this light, 
the practices of the democratic ethos are assumed to ensure the accountability of political 
institutions (Ansah, 1988; Suphachalasai, 2005; Brunetti and Weder 2003; Ahred, 2002). This 
study critically investigates the universal generalisations, above. It also interrogates the view that 
democracy and press freedom result in economic development and reduce corruption in public 
life.  
This research tests and examines the assumed interplay of democracy and press freedom in the 
anti-corruption drive in Africa, especially in the last decade of civil rule in Nigeria. It also examines 
the outcome of the interface of the media and civil society in the effort to proffer a solution, rather 
than being caught in the web of corruption. It appears that the mass media are not playing their 
advocacy role credibly under democratic rule because the culture of impunity that was experienced 
under the military appears to have worsened in Nigeria after 15 years of uninterrupted civil rule 
(Ajibewa, 2008: 267). Several unresolved cases of alleged corruption by senior public office 
holders are still pending in the courts as at June, 2015, after bail was secured (Nwokeoma, 2009), 
and these cases are not followed up properly by the media.  
The strategic role of the media in all societies cannot be more stressed than Thomas Jefferson puts 
it: 
Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a 
government without newspaper, or newspaper without 
government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter 
(Jefferson, 1787). 
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The media are seen as being important in all societies. Ansah (1988:13-14) similarly notes that 
there can be no democracy without the press. Traditionally, the media perform the articulatory role 
of linking the government with the populace through informing and educating the citizenry on the 
policies and programmes of the government. The press, in particular, serves as a form of police 
with which to check government in order to minimise the abuse of public trust or to instil a sense 
of probity and public accountability in governance. The press also makes deliberate efforts to 
influence the public by setting a political agenda. In this way, the press serves as the guardian of 
the public conscience. The question is: how credibly and efficiently have the media performed 
under democratic rule in Nigeria, especially, in their role as a watchdog? 
Investigative journalism, which was the hall-mark of the press during military rule and at the 
advent of civilian rule in 1999, is declining, while the magnitude, in monetary terms, of stolen 
public funds continues to increase. The media are believed to be implicated in corruption as 
incidences of the brown envelope are common phenomena among Nigerian media practitioners. 
This unethical conduct is believed to be affecting the advocacy duty of the media. There is thus a 
need to re-examine the concept of democratic rule and the free press as antidotes to corruption in 
Nigeria, and this is the focus of this study.     
1.1  Brief history of Nigeria 
Corruption in Nigeria can also be understood in the context of the history and make-up of the State. 
It is the most populous Black nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an ethnically diverse population 
of about 167 million with 250 ethno-linguistic groups and well over 400 different languages 
(Maathai, 2009: 184; Dowden, 2005: 1 and Meredith 2006: 2). Nigeria has three major ethnic 
groups; the Yoruba in the West, the Igbo in the East, and the Hausa-Fulani in the North, together 
with several minority groups, which are spread across the length and the breadth of the country. 
The three major ethnic groups constitute about 68% of the population (Hausa-Fulani 29%, Yoruba 
21%, and Igbo 18% (The World Fact Book, 2014). 
As a former British colony, it is unsurprising that English is the official language. However, 
Pidgin—an admixture of local languages and English, and indigenous languages are also in use. 
Nigeria is also a multi-religious society, with about 50% of the Muslim population concentrated 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     20 | P a g e  
 
 
in the North, 40% Christian in the South and Middle Belt areas, and the remaining 10% practise 
indigenous religions while the Yoruba, in the Southwest, are evenly split between both religions. 
Ethnicity and religion have been invoked in the fierce struggle for political power (Falola, 1999: 
5-9, Falola and Heaton, 2008). 
For administrative convenience, the country has been divided into six major geo-political zones: 
(i) the North-East (ii) the North-West (iii) the North-Central (iv) the South-East, the South-South 
(V) and (VI) the South-West zones. In addition, there are 36 states and 774 local government 
councils, and a Federal Capital in Abuja (the seat of power) spread over the six geo-political zones 
(NDHS, 2013). 
The divisive ethno-regional rivalries that existed in the country were always a matter of public 
concern for scholars and the country’s leaders (Meredith, 2006 and Adebanwi, 2012). On October 
1, 1960, Nigeria had pockets of independent empires, states and communities, and these existed 
even before the British amalgamated the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria to become 
the Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. The various ethnic and linguistic groups that made up the two 
protectorates were amalgamated by colonial fiat in 1914, without the inputs of the citizens (Ade-
Ajayi and Ekoko, 1988). The various ethnic groups existed and operated as separate entities; each 
with its own origin, custom, tradition and language (Udo, 1984:14). These attributes were 
completely disregarded at the time of the amalgamation in order to form one political entity 
(Ayodele, 2006, Ade Ajayi, 1982).  
Meredith (2006) notes that a prominent Northern Nigerian leader, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 
remarked in 1948 that “Since 1914, the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into 
one country, but the Nigerian people, themselves, are, historically, different in their backgrounds, 
in their religious beliefs, in their customs and do not show any signs of willingness to unite… 
Nigerian unity is only a British invention”. Similarly, the Yoruba leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, 
wrote: “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression”. There are no, ‘Nigerians’, 
in the same sense as there are “English”, “Welsh”, or “French”. The word, “Nigerian” is merely a 
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distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those 
who do not (Meredith, 2006: 8 and Ezeani 2013: 187).  
Some have persistently argued that Nigeria, as a country, is a false entity, as the name given to the 
nation state had no input from the citizens. The name, Nigeria, was suggested by Flora Shaw, the 
mistress of Lord Lugard, a Governor-General of Nigeria during the colonial period (Ezeani 2013: 
16). Indeed, owing to the political instability and security challenges facing the nation, some are 
questioning whether Nigeria is a country. Dawodu posits that Nigeria is a not a country but a 
“conspiracy”. He asserts that “Nigeria is the playground of the elite, a volatile, ruthless place, 
where the haves leverage the have-nots and the have-nots let it” (Dawodu 2014:1). 
Scholars and media observers believe that the complex and heterogeneous nature of the emergent 
Nigerian nation has resulted in an acute competition for, and conflict over, resource allocation, 
thus, breeding corruption and other social vices in the country (Ayoola, 2009). The manifestations 
and contradictions of these differences were at the heart of the processes that led to the collapse of 
Nigeria’s First Republic, and corruption was said to be the salient factor that propelled the military 
to stage the first coup in the country (Joseph 1987, and Adebanwi, 2012;). Since 1966, successive 
military rulers and their civilian collaborators in Nigeria often cite the high level of corruption to 
justify their incursion into politics. Equitable allocation of the nation’s natural and human 
resources remains a major challenge that confronts the country. Rose-Ackerman (1999:133), 
succinctly, argues thus that, “where ethnic divisions have not been well-handled, the result can be 
a state focused on sharing the spoils, not promoting overall prosperity”. For some, this aptly 
describes the current situation in Nigeria after fifteen years of civil rule. 
As the largest nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a population of 167 million (National Population 
Commission, (NPC) official figures in November, 2013), Nigeria has been in a perpetual flux and 
has suffered pervasive crises in the last three decades. Several academic studies have shown that 
corruption and other related offences have deprived the citizenry of the basic necessities of life. 
In-spite of Nigeria’s abundant endowment of mineral resources and its being one of the top 12 oil 
producing nations in the World, an estimated 80 million Nigerians live below the poverty line 
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(Donnelly, 2008; Soola, 2009). The nation has the world’s fourth largest reserve of natural gas, 
and yet poverty is pervasive in the country (Esan, 2009: 19).  
Political corruption and its attendant consequences have resulted in non-credible elections. Elected 
political officers were thus more like rent seekers than statesmen. Corruption has therefore become 
a key instrument of state policy in Nigeria (Adebanwi, 2012). The 2015 Human Development 
Index (HDI) ranked Nigeria in the 152nd position, while the 2015 MO Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance ranked the country 38th out of the 54 countries assessed (MO Ibrahim Foundation, 
2015). In 2011, 2010, 2009 and 2008, Nigeria was ranked 41st, 40th, 35th and 39th, respectively by 
the same foundation. The Foundation Report on Good Governance noted that between 2011 and 
2014 Africa witnessed a steady decline in overall governance progress. 
Not only has the trend persisted, it has been noted globally. According to Lewis (1996:98), 
Nigeria’s position in the international economy has substantially deteriorated, she was 
marginalized in global trade and capital markets and this provoked civil unrest. The agitation for 
a return to civilian rule received the backing of the International Community, giving birth to scores 
of civil society groups which served as platforms for the change of government. Eventually, on 
May 29, 1999, there was a transition to civilian government in Nigeria. Prior to this period, 
corruption had become ingrained in Nigerian culture (Smith, 2007).  
To structurally address corruption and to redeem the country’s image, the former President, 
Obasanjo, a one-time military leader and later a civilian president (1999-2007), established two 
anti-graft agencies: the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC) in 2000, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2002, in addition 
to several statutes on corrupt practices. Following their establishment, there was a slight 
improvement in Nigeria’s perception index ranking (2002-2004) until the government’s focus 
shifted to other issues. The 2015 perception index released by Transparency International, ranked 
Nigeria as the 36th most corrupt nation in the world (TI Annual Reports 2015). A former US 
Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, in a (2011) publication, entitled Nigeria: Dancing on the 
Brink, opines that despite Nigeria’s return to civilian governance in 1999 after years of military 
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dominance, the country remains divided along ethnic and religious lines with crippling corruption 
and a weak government.  
The slow pace of development, coupled with the overwhelming rate of corruption under 
democratic rule, has stood in the way of a democratic government effectively reducing corruption. 
Some scholars have stated that Nigeria is not into real democracy. According to Omotoso 
(2006:35),  
There is civilian rule without democracy in Nigeria, as all known 
principles and attributes of democracy are not adhered to. 
Democracy emphasises accountability, good governance, probity 
and transparency, but, all these, are lacking in Nigeria’s democratic 
experience.  
These remarks fit into what Robert Dahl describes as polyarchy, the system where countries satisfy 
the basic conditions of democratic governance, but are not practising the ethos of democracy (Dahl, 
1991) 
There have been critical calls questioning the justification for a democratic government where 
citizens die of starvation. Diamond et al (1999: 1) respond by stating: 
There is perhaps no more common and profound obstacle to the 
consolidation of new democracies than widespread corruption, 
human rights violation, illegality and abuses of authority by the 
holders of state power at all levels. 
The implication of the current events in Nigeria is that the democratic experiments may be 
truncated by maladministration and corruption, as experienced in the First, Second and Third 
republics (Osoba, 1996 and Joseph, 1987). This study interrogates the kind of media that are 
capable of acting as an external control mechanism on corruption and bad governance, as well as 
helping to promote accountability under a democratic government. 
1.2  Historical development of the media industry in Nigeria 
Anti-corruption campaigns require robust media. Nigeria has one of Africa’s freest, bravest and 
most outspoken media, but the media have faced challenges and constraints too (Rønning, 2009). 
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The history of the Nigerian mass media, especially the print media, has been a combative one since 
1859, when the first newspaper, Iwe Iroyin Yoruba, was established in Abeokuta, in the present-
day Ogun State by Henry Townsend. The establishment of other newspapers, like The Comet by 
Duse Mohammed Ali, an Egyptian, in 1933, the West African Pilot by the late Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe, in 1937 and, later, the Nigerian Tribune by the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo in 1949, 
among others, provided the platform for challenging colonial rule, especially any of the perceived 
undue dominance, bad governance, injustice and corruption at the time (Duyile, 1987 and Omu, 
1978). Indeed, from the outset, politics remained central to Nigerian journalism, with an element 
of advocacy as its driving force (Babasola, 2009: 14). The peculiar nature of the media history is 
such that virtually all the newspapers that existed between 1880 and 1900 were political in nature 
(Omu, 1978: viii).  
With a vibrant press that pre-dated the colonial era (Agbaje, 1992:41), the mass media in Nigeria 
played a significant role in the narrative of the social, political and economic landscape in the 
country. The political history of Nigeria is intertwined with that of its media, which commenced 
in 1859, even before the birth of the Nigerian state (Omu 1978). Indeed, Oso and Ibraheem (2014: 
35) noted: 
From the struggle for and attainment of independence, to the 
struggle for the return to democratic rule during the period of 
military intervention in Nigerian politics, and the sustenance of the 
nation’s nascent democracy, the Nigerian mass media have featured 
prominently in setting the agenda and charting the course for 
Nigeria’s political development. 
More importantly, the history of Nigeria’s struggle for political independence cannot be complete 
without reference to the prominent role of print journalists, such as Horatio Jackson, Herbert 
Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe, A.Y.S Tinubu, Anthony Enahoro, and this, perhaps was why 
Babatunde Jose argued that the war for Nigeria’s independence was fought and won on the pages 
of newspapers (p.35). Most of the leading lights of the anti-colonisation movements had their roots 
in the media industry (Babasola, 2009: 14). Similarly, Golding and Elliot (1979:21) argue that “the 
Nigerian press was created by anti-colonial protests, was baptised in the waters of nationalist 
propaganda, and was matured in party politics”. 
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Furthermore, Oso and Ibraheem also lauded the role that was played by the media during the 
military era: 
During the era of military dictatorship, the Nigerian media also 
gallantly rose to the occasion as the major opposition and 
dissenting voice to the various military governments that seized 
political power, intermittently, between 1966 and 1999. The 
country’s vibrant media played an influential role in 
championing the struggle for the return to democratic rule and 
in challenging the excesses of the various dictatorial military 
regimes that held sway in power within that period (Oso and 
Ibraheem, 2014: 35-35).  
It can be conveniently concluded that three distinct eras have emerged in which to situate the 
significant role played by the media in Nigeria: The first era, 1859-1966, is, generally regarded as 
the era of the “nationalist press” (Ibraheem et al 2013). The second era, between 1966 and1999, 
refers to the era of “guerrilla journalism” in Nigerian media history (Olukotun, 2004: 9). This study 
is of the view that the third era, 1999- 2015 can be likened to the “cheque-book journalism” period 
of Nigerian media history. Consequently, the media have shaped the structure, tone and tenor of 
the anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria. It can, however, be argued that the growth and 
development of the media has not been even between the Southern and Northern parts of the 
country. While missionary activities, Christianity and Western education aided the rapid expansion 
of literacy and the emergence of critical elite newspapers in the South, the case was different in 
the Northern part of the country. The first newspaper in the Northern part of the country, Gaskiya 
Tafi Kwabo, was established in 1938, almost 78 years after the first newspaper in the Southern part 
of the country (Duyile, 1987).  
This evolution of the Nigerian press is partly responsible for the ways in which political and 
ideological issues are treated in the media (Oyovbaire, 20001). At their inception, newspapers were 
mostly owned by indigenous and foreign entrepreneurs, while television and radio started as 
government ventures (Eribo, 1997:59). Most of the newspapers of the 1960s and 1990s are extinct. 
As Olatunji (2013) has observed, Nigeria has always been a graveyard for newspapers and this is 
why Nigeria has the highest rate of newspaper mortality in the World. The media sector is sharply 
divided along the lines of the Southern and Northern regions of the country. Most of the nation’s 
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newspapers and electronic media houses are located in Lagos, the former federal capital of Nigeria, 
and a few in Ibadan, the largest city in Africa. The media in the South are generally referred to as 
“the Lagos-Ibadan axis” of the Nigerian press, and they have always been in the opposition -from 
colonialism through to the military regimes.  
Danjuma Goje, a former Governor of Gombe State (2003-2007), has argued that the press reflects 
the perspectives and ideological attitudes of the South-West political elite class (Daily Independent 
Newspapers, 21 May, 2009). He further said that the attitude largely influences the opposition 
stance that the press takes against any government that is headed by a Northerner, starting with 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari in the Second Republic. The Nigerian press entered a new era after the 
country gained independence from its colonial masters. The nation is now standing on a tripod that 
is formed of the North, East and West. Each of the regions, at independence, had at least one 
newspaper published in either English or in the local language (Eribo, 1997: 53). The Western 
region government, led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, established the first television station in 
Black Africa, in Ibadan, in 1959 (Agbaje, 1992).  Bolawole noted that ethnic considerations 
started to find their way into the media in the early 1960s (Author’s interview 2009).  
However, between the 1980s and now the mass media have made quantum leaps by attracting 
practitioners with high educational and professional skills. In the early days of journalism, most 
of the early practitioners, such as Alhaji Babatunde Jose, of the Daily Times; Alhaji Lateef 
Jakande; Chief Segun Osoba; Chief Abiodun Aloba; Chief Bisi Onabanjo, and others, were non-
university graduates, (Babasola, 2009:18). It differed from what obtains in Britain, where the 
majority of journalists in the BBC and the print media were Oxbridge arts graduates (Webster, 
2006: 172). The majority of the first generation journalists in Nigeria were self-made people and 
private students. 
At the early stage, the profession was regarded as a calling for those who were not doing well in 
the society. Consequently, they are rated as low grade and they are not adequately paid. Today, 
however, there have been remarkable changes, with many journalists holding Bachelor degrees, 
Masters and Doctorates, and professionals from other disciplines are doing well in the field. 
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Bolawole, the former Editor of Punch Newspapers said, “It is no longer a profession for drop-outs. 
Nigerian journalists are academically sound; they are not inferior to any profession again”. Segun 
Osoba and the late Bisi Onabanjo, both trained as journalists, both became civilian governors of 
Ogun State. Several media practitioners served as senators in the fourth National Assembly. Some 
of them include Chris Anyanwu, Ayogu Eze, Smart Adeyemi and Babafemi Ojudu.  
The contemporary Nigerian mass media practitioners are better equipped, both academically and 
professionally, for the job than were those of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, because better training 
facilities, technology and tools are available to them; thus the process of information gathering is 
relatively easier, simpler and faster, than it was in the early 1970s and 1980s, when journalists 
deployed manual efforts. 
As will be shown in this study, one can argue that the present crop of media practitioners is better 
placed than the older generation. However, the journalists of old adhered more strictly to the ethics 
of the profession than the present crop of journalists (Femi Soyinka, personal interview 2014). The 
widely held perception is that the early journalists were more honest, since they belonged to the 
class of those who were fighting for independence, and whose sole aim was to chase out the 
colonial masters. 
One of the major challenges being faced by the leadership of the Nigerian Media bodies – the 
Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ); the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE); the Newspapers 
Proprietors’ Association of Nigeria (NPAN), is the issue of bribery in the media. The syndrome of 
the brown envelope started in the 1960s and, as Bolawole rightly said, the question of graft had 
existed since the colonial era and only became deeper in recent times. In practice, he explained, 
there are two manifestations of the brown envelope in Nigeria. The first category is the gifts that 
are handed down to media personnel after an assignment; these are usually not requested. The 
second type of brown envelope is when the journalist(s) actually requests that the organisers of an 
event offer some perk in order that their stories and photographs be published.  
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Under the first kind of brown envelope, there is no demand, and journalists may or may not be 
influenced by the gifts. In the second category, there is a kind of contractual agreement, as the 
public relations staff of organisations that are forced to part with money always put pressure on 
the journalists when their stories/photographs are not published in the newspapers or are not aired 
by the electronic media. Bolawole (author’s interview) argues, “this is a criminal act, but so far, in 
the history of the media in Nigeria nobody has been caught or jailed for collecting or demanding 
brown envelope”. In spite of the shortcomings occasioned by the issue of the brown envelope, the 
Press has remained an integral part of Nigerian society. The media played a prominent role in 
ending Military rule and in the installation of democracy in 1999.   
In fact, most people form their opinions, either on governance or democracy, on the basis of the 
agenda set by the mass media. Today, major events are seen by millions of people on television, 
listened to on radio, read in newspapers or surfed on the Web. The internet has also offered an 
information super-highway to journalists and researchers, and all of these sources have promoted 
the media and so there are over 393 media houses, (both electronic and print) operating in the 
country. The National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), the official regulatory organ of the 
broadcasting industry, has stated that 288 electronic media were functionally in operation in 
Nigeria as at June, 2015. 
The Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) has its five national stations in Lagos, Abuja, 
Enugu, Kaduna and Ibadan. FRCN is also served by a network of 37 stations around the country. 
Similarly, there are 68 privately- owned Frequency Modulation (FM) radio stations and 37 state 
owned television stations, including that of the Federal Capital Territory. Those not in the popular 
stream include private television stations (twenty-two); National Network public radio stations 
(two); National Network television, (two); Campus radio stations (twenty-seven), and others. As 
at October, 2014, Nigeria had 25 Direct-to-Home (DTH) television stations; 35 cable stations using 
MMDS channels, and two Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) stations (NBC: 2014 interview). As at 
2015, there were over 105 newspapers and magazines in circulation in Nigeria; about 90 of these 
publications are privately owned, while the rest are owned by the government, at both federal and 
state levels (NPC Reports 20015). 
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1.3  Objectives of the Study 
The major objective of this study is to assess the role of the media in the anti-corruption initiatives 
in post-1999 Nigeria. Specifically, the study seeks: 
1. to critically investigate how the mass media have dealt with corrupt practices in Nigeria; 
2. to evaluate reports on corruption in the mass media; 
3. to identify the challenges of the media’s reporting of corruption cases; 
4. to investigate and analyse how the anti-corruption agencies have used the media in their 
campaigns. 
1.4 Research questions 
The thesis uses some research questions to explore the political, economic, ethnic and social 
context of the mass media in combating corruption in Nigeria. Questions One and Two are used 
as the focus of this study. This enables the researcher to examine the legal and para-legal 
relationships between the anti-corruption agencies and the media. The Remaining Three Questions 
serve as sub-questions. 
I. How have the anti-corruption agencies, such as the Independent Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) and the Code of Conduct Bureau, used the media in their 
campaigns? 
II. What roles have the mass media and other non-state actors played in the anti-corruption 
drive? 
III. How do journalists perceive their roles in the anti-corruption drive and, by extension, 
what are the impediments to their work? 
IV. What has been the impact of the growing linkages between the media class and the 
political class in Nigeria’s anti-corruption drive? 
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1.5  Purpose of the Study 
Social scientist scholars believe that democracy encourages respect for, expands and deepens the 
freedom of the press and the civil society, and have concluded that a democratic ethos can be 
assumed to ensure the accountability of political institutions (Ansah, 1988; Suphachalasai, 2005; 
Brunetti and Weder 2003; Ahred, 2002). This study empirically and critically interrogates such 
universal generalisations, especially, in the transition to becoming a democratic regime. It also 
interrogates the view that democracy and press freedom result in economic development and 
reduced corruption in public life. Why, then, are the media in a democratic dispensation in Nigeria 
unable to overcome a legacy of corruption?  
This study examines the interplay of democracy and press freedom on the anti-corruption effort in 
the last decade of civil rule in Nigeria, in particular, and in Africa, in general. It also attempts to 
analyse the outcome of collusion and connivance on democracy, the mass media and the civil 
society, since it is not solving but is, instead, complicating the problem. The rationale for studying 
Nigeria as a case study is premised on the following: 
 Anywhere that corruption is mentioned among the global community of nations, Nigeria 
often comes up as one of the world’s most corrupt nations (World Development Report 
2014). 
 It is a nation that is blessed with all the natural resources, yet the majority of the citizens 
live in poverty. 
 It is a nation in which some of its leaders have been linked with a high degree of public 
looting, yet, in the same country, successive governments create ad-hoc committees and 
statutory bodies with which to curb the menace of corruption. 
 It is a nation in which the media survey (broadcast and print) in the month of February 
2014, reported 180 stories and news analyses on corruption. (Author’s survey and ICPC, 
2014 Weekly Newspapers Review) 
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 It is a nation where corruption appears to be pervasive. 
 It is a nation that has experienced uninterrupted civilian rule for 16 years, is in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and has one of the most vibrant and free presses in Africa. 
1.6  Significance of the Study 
This study will contribute to media/cultural studies and political science by developing the body 
of research on the relationship between democracy and anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria. It 
will take, as its departure point, the recognition amongst researchers and anti-corruption agencies, 
the importance of the mass media, in the fight against corruption in the country.  
Furthermore, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that the universal generalisation of democracy 
and press freedom as a panacea for the socio-economic, and political problems of modern states, 
should be revisited in view of the growing incidences of corruption under democratic rule in most 
African countries. Specifically, this study seeks to provide empirical findings to show that 
although, a concept may be universal, it does not, in any way, suggest that it will be consistent or 
predictable in its consequences. This study fills the gap in research on the kind of the media system 
that is capable of helping the cause of anti-corruption drives. One major finding of this study is 
that it is only uncompromising media that will aid the anti-corruption drive in both Nigeria and 
other fledgling democracies. Furthermore, its will provide the anti-corruption agencies with the 
requisite knowledge on how to better deploy the media in carrying out their mandates. 
This research will also fill the gap in the literature on why Nigeria, both in reality and in perception, 
remains a corruption-ridden country, despite the exposure of such grand corruption by the Press 
(Babasola, 2009). It will provide an important analysis that can be used by non-state actors and 
civil society organisations to help them develop effective anti-corruption strategies.  
The theoretical and methodological framework (the political economy theory, critical discourse 
analysis and In-depth interviews), that are deployed in the course of this thesis, remains the 
strength of its originality. The previous studies on this topic have used Social Responsibility 
Theory (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956), and Agenda Setting Theory (McCombs and Shaw, 
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1972) to justify and examine the roles of the media in society, in which the use of narrative analysis 
and in-depth interviews were deployed.  
For the methodology, mixed methods or a triangulation method were used to complete the three 
inter-related strands of the work, while the Political Economy Theory of the media, and the 
Market-Media Theory, were used to navigate and interrogate the data in the course of this study. 
This research work also engages with African theories of democracy, as postulated by Ake (2003), 
and Nyamnjoh (2001 and 2005), as its guiding objectives. 
In this regard, the research justifies the view that only a credible and strong willed media can aid 
the anti-graft campaigns, thus playing a small but crucial role in developing the democratic ethos 
in Nigeria. 
1.7 Scope of the Study 
Broadly, this study focuses on, and interrogates why, investigative journalism appears to be 
declining, together with its impact on the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. It examines the 
engagement of the Nigerian media with the three anti-corruption agencies: the ICPC, EFCC and 
the Code of Conduct Bureau. It reviews the historical backgrounds of the anti-corruption fight in 
Nigeria since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, demonstrating the media’s role in the configuration 
of a new course of action for transparency in the country.  
The roles of religious bodies, youth, NGOs/ CBOs, professional bodies and traditional institutions 
are treated sparingly. This study limits itself to investigating the roles of the media, and it did not 
delve into the activities of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, and the details of the 
economic cost of corruption to the citizens of the country.  
As will be discussed later, the respondents pointed out that what is lacking in Nigeria’s efforts to 
reduce the incidences of corruption, is a strong political will to fight corruption in the land. Ayogu 
(2011) argues that politicians will not create the needed will; so they must be forced to do it. The 
role of the media therefore remains crucial to the success or failure of the anti-corruption agencies 
of the government in their fight against the vices in the country. 
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The study covers the period 1999-2015: 
 Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999, and the establishment of the first major anti-
corruption agency through an Act of Parliament in September, 2000. 
 Many of those who headed the anti-graft agencies are alive, accessible and disseminate 
information on the anti-corruption war in the country.  
 The ICPC, EFCC and CCB were established and became fully functional during this 
period. The researcher is therefore able to have sufficient information to draw valid 
conclusions. 
 2015, the terminal date of this study, offers the required span of 15 years for a sustainable 
investigation of this nature.  
1.8  An Overview of the Chapters 
This study is divided into eight chapters. 
Chapter 1 provides the background and outline of the study. This is written to rationalise the need 
for, and timing of, the study. This chapter contains the introduction, the history of Nigeria, 
conceptual clarification and the place of the mass media in the society. 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature to identify theoretical frameworks and to establish the 
gaps which the study will fill.  
Chapter 3 sets out the methodologies that guide the study and the ways in which data will be 
collated and analysed.  
Chapter 4 discusses press freedom and anti-corruption efforts under democratic rule from the 
global, African and West African perspectives. It discusses the interplay of press freedom, other 
non-state actors and democracy on the anti-corruption drive.  
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Chapter 5 provides an insight into the relationship between the press and the anti-corruption 
agencies in Nigeria, emphasising the constitutional significance of the media, and it draws out the 
legal framework on press regulation content and the effects these have on the anti-corruption drive, 
from African/Nigerian perspectives. 
Chapter 6 considers case studies (high profile cases) and how these cases were treated and 
reported in the media. 
Chapter 7 provides a detailed account of the semi-structured interviews that were conducted and 
the findings drawn from the information given in them by the respondents, notably, media men 
and managers, anti-graft staff/management, civil society groups and key personalities in the 
country. It presents discussions on, and the narratives of, the media coverage.  
Chapter 8 contains concluding reflections, observations, makes recommendations, draws 
conclusions and suggests further research areas that may arise from the study. 
1.9  Conceptual Clarification/Definition of Terms 
1.9.1  The Media 
In this study, the “media” or the “press” refer to…. publicly owned print media, privately owned 
media, online and offline publications, and I use the terms loosely to cover regional and community 
press also. Defleur and Dennis (1981: 148) view the media as “devices for moving messages across 
a distance or time to accomplish mass communication. These devices are classified into five groups 
to include the newspapers, magazines, films, radio and television. Hiebert et al (1974: 26) classify 
the media into seven divisions: newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, radio, television, books 
and sound recording. Blake and Haroldsen, in their Taxonomy Concepts of Communication, have 
grouped the media into two distinct parts: the print media and the electronic media of mass 
communication.  
According to them, the print media include newspapers, magazines, books, pamphlets, direct mail 
circulars, billboards, skywriting, and other technical devices that transmit messages to the masses 
by appealing to their sense of sight, while the electronic media include radio and audio recording; 
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television, which comprises motion pictures and video recording. The primary focus of the 
electronic media is their appeal to the senses of sound and sight. The latest branch of the media 
are the social media, which include E-mail, internet systems, Twitter, Facebook, etc. The media 
perform five basic functions in any given democratic society and these include: Reporting the 
news, Interpreting the news; Setting an agenda for government action, Serving as a watchdog over 
the government and other powerful institutions in the society, and Playing an active role in public 
debate (Ojo, 2006: 13 and Sadeeq, 2006: 251). Most importantly, the media have been dubbed the 
‘Fourth Estate of the Realm’ because of these functions.  
1.9.2  Corruption 
Corruption, like its twin sister, terrorism, is a very difficult concept or social phenomenon to define 
in the contemporary global environment (Oni, 2007:259). It should thus be noted from the outset 
that one overall definition of corruption may be impossible if we are to fully understand the word 
(Igwenyi, 2010). Williams (1991) notes that corruption, like obscenity, is more readily condemned 
than defined or explained. He posits that, like obscenity or beauty, it can exist only in the eye of 
the beholder (Williams 1991: 11).  
In effect, researchers tend to view the concept from their own perspectives, disciplines and field 
experiences. However, it is important to have a fair understanding of the term. The word Corrupt 
comes from the Latin stem Corruptus which means “broken to pieces”, or “destroyed” (Nwolise. 
2006: 105).  
The World Bank (1997) defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The Black 
Law Dictionary (1994) defines corruption as the act of doing something with the intent to give 
some advantages with official duty and right of others or official’s use of a station or office to 
provide some benefits either personally or for someone else contrary to the rights of others. Sen 
(1999) notes that corruption or corrupt behaviour involves the violation of established rules for 
personal gain and profit.  
In Colin Nye’s classical definition, corruption is behavior that deviates from the formal duties of 
a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private 
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clique) wealth or status gains (Nye 1967:416). Updated versions with the same elements of the 
definition have been offered by Mushtaq Khan (Khan, 1996:12), and Osoba (1996: 372). 
From the foregoing definitions, it is clear that the possible meanings of the word are endless, but 
certain key words are common; benefit, which need not necessarily be in “cash”. It may be in kind 
or as sexual favours. Another phrase is behaviour --- behaviour which may be regarded as bad, 
deviant or as an illegal act. More importantly, most of these definitions were based on the 
perception and disciplines of the individual writers. As Andvig et al (2000) rightly put it, “recent 
political science classifications and definitions have tended to place corruption and the fight 
against it within the broader agenda of democratisation. 
Also of interest to this researcher is the classification offered by Heidenheimer (1989) that reflects 
societal tolerance of corruption and other social vices. He classifies the degree of societal tolerance 
of corruption as black, gray or white. Heidenheimer notes that black corruption is a situation where 
there is “a majority consensus of both elite and mass opinion that would condemn” the practice in 
principle, and that wants to see it “punished”. Gray corruption signifies that some elements, usually 
the elite, may want to see corrupt acts punished, but others may not support this, and the view of 
the majority may be “ambiguous”. White corruption, on the other hand, according to him, is well 
accepted and is tolerated by both the majority of the elite and mass opinion. Both the majority elite 
and the masses may not vigorously support an attempt to punish offenders (Heidenheimer, 1989: 
61).  Going by these classifications, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to state where Nigeria, 
which is the focus of this study, belongs. If we take into consideration black corruption, as defined 
by the scholar, both the elite and mass opinion want corrupt acts punished but, in reality, nobody 
has served the prescribed punishment for their infractions in the country. The failure on the part of 
those in power to enforce the necessary laws on illegal acts may force one to tempt to classify 
Nigeria as practising white corruption.  
However, the situation at hand, particularly as it is reflected in the media, is not anywhere near 
white corruption. Incidences of corruption and the daily wrongdoings of public officials are 
reported, while some opinions, both among the elite and the mass, demand the punishment of the 
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corrupt. For instance, the several laws that have been enacted to confront the menace of corruption, 
including those of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC), the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), the Code of Conduct, the 
Criminal Code and Penal Code, and the Public Procurement Acts, signify that these arrive from 
the will to punish the corrupt. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) also 
recognises the need to prevent corrupt practices and to abuse of power as one of the political 
objectives of the nation. The only conclusion one may draw from the analysis, so far, is that Nigeria 
is not practising gray corruption, since both the elite and the majority are very resolute that the 
corrupt must be punished.  
So, there is a need to rethink these classifications in view of the current trends in Nigeria and other 
developing countries, where the establishment of various anti-corruption agencies has seen an 
upsurge in corrupt acts among citizens (Riley, 1998; Szeftel, 1998; Doig & Riley, 1998; Kpundeh, 
2004; Johnston, 2005). 
Indeed, in Nigeria, the enabling laws that established the two anti-corruption agencies did not 
define, in clear terms, what corruption is. For instance, the Independent Corrupt Practices and 
Related Offences Act (2000) merely glossed over the definition of corruption. Section 2 of the Act 
defines it as to “include bribery, fraud and other related offences” (ICPC Act, 2000). The 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), on the other hand, barely defines economic 
and financial crime, including offences such as “fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money 
laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices (EFCC Act 2004).  
In fact, most of the definitions have failed to make clear the distinction between fraud and 
corruption, this study contends that fraud is deception, while corruption is the deliberate and 
determined abuse of the power and advantage that is conferred by office. It is the contention of 
this researcher that the ICPC and EFCC Act definitions of corruption are vague, scanty, and that 
they are inadequate to fully explain the meaning of the social phenomenon to a large proportion of 
Nigerian society. What the Act has done is to describe the conduct and decisions in terms of the 
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motive of the decision maker or the actor. Olanipekun (2013) also notes that a reflection on the 
name of the ICPC indicates that something is missing. He opines that:  
The commission was established to fight corrupt practices and not 
for corrupt practices, as the name seems to suggest. Every time I 
read the sign board “Independent Corrupt Practices Commission”, I 
become more convinced that we may be sending a wrong signal that 
the commission is established for corrupt practices. I, therefore, 
suggest that Section 3 (i) should be amended to read: There is 
hereby established a commission to be known as Independent Anti-
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
(Olanipekun, 2013, p: 10-11). 
What Olanipekun is stressing is that the name of the anti-corruption agency is a misnomer which 
should be re-addressed. 
In his analysis, Williams (1991) notes that the various definitions mentioned can be grouped into 
three main areas: Organic or Biological Corruption; Moral Corruption, and Legal or Public Office 
Corruption. He explains that the utility of the organic or biological meaning of corruption lies less 
in explaining its nature than in underlining or over-emphasising the threat it poses to the survival 
of the polity in some prescribed form (Williams, 1991:12). 
Moralists’ definition of corruption, he argues, hinges on the premise that corruption means to 
pervert, degrade, ruin and debase integrity, virtue or moral principle. This set of analysts is more 
interested in an explanation than in condemnation and prescription (Ibid.13-14). He asserts that 
the moralists do not offer a means of identifying and explaining specific instances of corruption in 
different societies and, secondly, they do not admit the possibility that what is meant by corruption 
may vary from society to society, nor do they take any account the perceptions of participants. 
His argument on the views of moralists may appear to be far from the truth. It is the contention of 
this researcher that most moralists tend to rely on the doctrines offered in the Holy Bible and the 
Quran for Christians and Muslims, and the unwritten code of practice of the traditional religion to 
justify their argument on the evil of corruption in the society. Legal corruption, on the other hand, 
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he explains, involves the observance of basic rules and laws governing any particular act. The 
destruction of integrity is crucial to both the legal and moral meanings of corruption (Ibid.15). 
1.9.3 Anti-corruption 
This generally means all efforts that are geared towards stiff fights against corruption. These 
include international conventions, treatises, protocols and agreements, as well as local laws and 
committees that are set up by nation states to fight corruption. It also includes bodies that are set 
up to implement the conventions and laws. For instance, in Nigeria, there are seven anti-graft 
agencies with the mandate to fight corruption and other social vices. They are:  the Independent 
Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Code of Conduct Bureau, the Technical Unit on Governance and 
Anti-Corruption Reforms (TUGAR), the Public Complaints Commission (PCC), the Nigerian 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiatives (NEITI), the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP), 
the Office of the Auditor-General of the Federation (TUGAR, annual reports 2011). 
1.10 Summary 
This chapter has set out the broad objectives of the thesis, and it provides a justification for the 
dissertation, establishes the rationale and stresses how compromised mass media are incapable of 
aiding the war against corruption. By extension, it also provides clues on the kinds of media 
systems that can help the cause of the anti-graft drive in Nigeria and elsewhere. A brief history of 
Nigeria is given, to situate and understand the challenges relating to ethno-religious divisions and 
to the installation of a culture of accountability and transparency. Finally, the polarisation of 
politics and the economy and the pursuits of the economic interest of the Nigerian mass media, 
appear to undermine the advocacy role of the media and of other non-state actors, in providing the 
platform for the much needed social change and development that is expected in the country after 
the military was ousted from governance.  
  




DEMOCRATISTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE   
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the relationships between media and democracy, deploying a 
comprehensive framework to look not only at the impact of democracy on corruption, but also 
how corrupt media industry influences democratisation. There is a paucity of qualitative studies 
on media and corruption in Nigeria; although, the works of Adebanwi (2011), Obianigwe (2009) 
and Adeyemi and Okoriwe (2009) are relevant, they are insufficient. Several studies have been 
carried out around the problem of corruption in Nigeria, but, none of them has focussed, 
specifically on assessing the impact of a corrupt media on democracy and, by extension, on the 
anti-corruption drive in the country. 
The last 10 years have witnessed an upsurge in the literature on the role of the media in the 
democratisation of Sub-Saharan Africa, but very little has focused on the kind of media system 
that is capable of helping the on-going anti-corruption campaigns in African countries. This 
research attempts to fill the gap. This chapter proposes to do three things: Section One seeks to 
make conceptual clarifications, while the second section reviews the relevant literature on 
democratisation, non-state actors, notably, the media, and corruption in Africa, with a particular 
focus on the last decade of democratic rule in Nigeria. The third section outlines a theoretical 
framework for the entire study. The main argument is that a corrupt media is capable of 
undermining democratisation in transitional regimes. There are several theoretical frameworks for 
understanding the media but, for the purpose of this study, political economy theory will be 
adopted for the entire work. 
The chapter will also attempt to provide empirical findings that suggest that African societies in 
the pre-colonial era had elements of democratic culture and that the Western concept of democracy 
was not completely alien to African tradition and political organisation. Evidence from various 
literature also shows that the rule of law, checks and balances, formed part of the governance in 
most African states in the pre-colonial era. 
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2.2 The Definitions of democracy: from the West to the Rest: The contestation of 
democracy 
The concept of democracy, as a system of government that is universally adopted, is a widely 
contested concept, because democracy means different things to different people. Overtime, the 
meaning of democracy has changed more than once and in more than one direction (Wiredu, 2000: 
182). These definitions can be grouped into two schools of thought. One school argued that 
democracy involves the struggle for control of the society. Mikula (2008: 46) described democracy 
as a system of government in which power is said to reside with the people, who can rule either 
directly or through freely elected representatives. Schmitter and Karl (1991:4), on the other hand, 
have described democracy as a unique system for organising relations between the rulers and the 
ruled. They contend further: 
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which 
rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by 
citizens, acting, indirectly, through the competition and cooperation 
of their elected representatives. 
Schmitter and Karl (Ibid: 4-8) also offered criteria that must be present in a democratic state as 
follows: rulers; the public realm, citizens; competition; regular elections; majority rule cooperation 
among the political actors; and representatives. Similarly, Dahl (1989: 221) listed the attributes of 
modern and thriving political democracy: elected officials; free and fair elections; inclusive 
suffrage; the right to run for office; freedom of expression; alternative information and 
associational autonomy. Schmitter and Karl (1991: 9) added two conditions that are needed to 
make democracy thrive; First, popularly elected officials must be subjected to overriding powers 
of opposition from unelected officials, such as military officers, entrenched civil servants and state 
managers, and, second, the polity must be self-governing. Ayedun-Aluma (2011: 66) has defined 
democracy as “a political system or style of government which vests power in the people, 
operationalized as the majority of the people”. The second school of thought believes that 
democracy is a ‘vehicle’ for organising the society for the benefit of all. Diamond, Linz and Lipset 
(1993) define “democracy” as a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social 
system to which it is joined, as a system of government that meets three essential conditions: 
meaningful, regular and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     42 | P a g e  
 
 
Similarly, Vanhannen (1997: 31) asserts that “democracy is a political system in which different 
groups are legally entitled to compete for power and in which institutional power holders are 
elected by the people and are responsible to the people”. However, for the purposes of this study; 
the researcher will align himself with the definition of democracy offered by Ake (2003), who 
defined the concept as “a political process where the real decision-making powers reside with the 
people”. He argues that a democracy suitable to Africa would have the following four 
characteristics: 
 A democracy in which people have some real decision-making power, over and above the 
formal consent of electoral choice. This will entail, among other things, a powerful 
legislature, decentralisation of power to local democratic formations, and considerable 
emphasis on the development of institutions for the aggregation and articulation of 
interests. 
 A social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social and economic rights, 
as opposed to a liberal democracy that emphasises abstract political rights. It will be a 
social democracy that invests heavily in the improvement of people’s health, education 
and capacity, so that they can participate effectively. 
 A democracy that puts as much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual 
rights. It will have to recognize nationalities, sub-nationalities, ethnic groups and 
communities as social formations that express freedom and self-realisation, and it will 
grant these different groups the rights to cultural expression and political and economic 
participation. This could mean, for instance, a second legislative chamber, “a chamber of 
nationalities”, with considerable power, in which all nationalities, irrespective of their 
numerical strength, are equal. It could mean convocational arrangements, not only at the 
national level, but also at the regional and community levels. It will also entail such 
arrangements as proportional representation and an electoral-spread formula, like the one 
used in Nigeria, by which a party must secure a stipulated minimum percentage of votes 
over a large part of the country in order to win. 
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 A democracy of incorporation. To be as inclusive as possible, the legislative bodies 
should, in addition to nationalistic groups, have special representation of mass 
organisations, especially the youth, labour movement and women’s groups, which are 
usually marginalised, but without whose active participation, there is unlikely to be 
democracy or development (Ake, 2003: 132). 
In-spite of a lack of unanimity in relation to meaning, the consensus among scholars is on the 
origin of the concept of democracy. Ancient Greece is widely reported to be the origin of Western 
democracy, and the word democracy was coined from the Greek words demos, “the people and 
kratia to rule” (Nwauwa, 2003; Wiredu, 2010; Mikula, 2008; Sen, 2009).  
2.3  Origin of Democracy: Divergent Views  
Hornblower (1993: 2) expressed divergent views noting that the history of European democracy 
begins, arguably, not in Athens but in Sparta, where the popular assembly met at regular intervals. 
He argued that Athens was regarded as the root of democracy because the early political innovation 
was developed much further than in Sparta, and in an orderly and amazingly rapid sequence of 
reforms (p. 2). He also asked whether European and, specifically, Greek democracy really was the 
first democracy. Citing the works of Bernal (1987; 1991), Hornblower noted that the Phoenicians 
in Western Asia had something comparable to the self-regulating city-state, or polis, of archaic 
and classical Greece. “Since it is now agreed that the Greeks took their alphabets and their methods 
of colonisation, perhaps even the city-state concept itself, from the “Phoenicians”, “we should be, 
similarly, prepared for the possibility of Phoenician origins for some of the Greek political 
arrangements we most admire.” Strikingly, he queried what was special about democracy in 
Greece and provided a detailed account of events in Athens and Attica in 594 BC. He argues that, 
it was because of gaps in economic and social status amongst the people of Attica that the first 
great European reformer, Solon, legislated in 594 BC, which gave rise to democracy” 
(Hornblower, 1993: 2-3). As he rightly puts it, “the Athenian state, before Solon, was an 
aristocracy and he replaced this by the principle of eligibility by wealth” and “this is”, he said, “a 
far cry from democracy”. Later theorists would call it “timocracy”, after the word for census-
ratings, “timai”, and Solon introduced a council of 400 members (p.4).  
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Indeed, Hornblower (1993: 1) noted that this council’s institution was the first conscious, definite, 
and debatable political innovation in European history. It was the first concrete attempt to create 
what has been called a “third force, the first and second being the intellectual few and the masses” 
(Ibid: 5-6). Solon, he argued, also created a popular law court, “heliaia”, to which there was a right 
of appeal against unjust decisions by magistrates, and to which the magistrates were made 
accountable.  
If gathering citizens in a space for the purpose of discussing the affairs of their community is one 
of the criteria for crediting Greece as being the origin of democracy, it may be possible then to 
consider what had been described as the “Palaver House” in Duke Town (now in Nigeria) in the 
14th century, where the citizens met to discuss state matters, and laws were enacted as being 
democratic in nature. Akinjide (2001:2) noted that “Ekpo”, as a system, included the executive, 
legislative and police arm of the state, with the King presiding. The British, he noted admitted that 
“Ekpo”, as a system, was the fairest and most effective instrument of government in the pre-
colonial kingdoms and republics. 
Furthermore, when the concept was first introduced in Athens, only male citizens were allowed to 
participate in the art of governance (Mukila, 2008: 46), excluding women, children, slaves and 
foreign residents. In reality, it is thus possible to contest whether the Athenian democracy from 
which the West draws its inspirations, can actually be referred to, in the real sense of the meaning, 
as democratic. Going by the way and manner in which it was first practised, it may well be referred 
to as an oligarchy, because equality and voting rights were not extended to a large majority of the 
citizens. Nevertheless, the West has consistently and over many decades, been promoting the 
concept as the best form of government, which should be embraced by all governments. 
Indeed, most, if not all, countries now championing the cause of democracy were either under 
totalitarian, autocratic or monarchical rulers in the past. At this juncture, Keane’s submission that 
democracy does not imply that representative or parliamentary democracy “is the alpha and 
omega” of political forms, may sound plausible (Keane, 1991: 169).  
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On the other hand, Hendricks (1997: 21) noted that although the word “democracy” has its origins 
in Ancient Greece, “Western Societies have no exclusive right to the term as a label for their own 
version of rule by the people or government in accordance with the will of the majority of the 
people, because African societies, before colonialism, had a similar form of government. Soola 
(2009) also posited that the powers of the African King or Chief were limited by certain rights of 
the people. “The councils of traditional African societies imposed checks and balances on the 
rulers and provided a balance of power”.  Hendricks (1997: 23), stated that the authority of the 
rulers was derived from the sovereign will of the people. He argued that Africans did not have to 
learn to rule themselves; they had been doing so for centuries before the Europeans arrived. 
Africans knew that democracy was, primarily, a doctrine of equality and self-rule and did not 
include ideas of racial discrimination. There was thus no need to “borrow” ideas of democracy 
from alien sources (Ibid: 27). Similarly, Wood (2004:11-12) argued that “many Western observers, 
in their eagerness to claim the invention of democracy, forget that its early appearance in the 
‘West’ was not only temporary but also categorically different from its modern form”.  
Echoing a similar argument, Takaya (1997) noted that “democracy is African because centralised 
dictatorship is basically alien to the continent”. Soola (2009: 29) argued that consultative decision-
making and freedom of expression, which are key elements in Western democracy, were not alien 
to Africa. He noted that there were checks and balances in African traditional systems, as any chief 
who failed, “to respect human rights and rule of law could attract severe sanctions such as 
ostracism, destoolment or dethronement”. Supporting this line of argument, Nwoko (1988) noted 
that democracy was part and parcel of the pre-colonial African state, in the sense that decisions 
were based on communal discussions. Nwolise (interview, 2014) explained: 
In my own village in Igbo land when you hear Ohanaeze, it means 
the people and their king taking decisions in the village square. In 
Ohanaeze meetings, a little child can make comments; you can call 
that direct democracy. So the white man did not teach us 
democracy, we have had democracy before they came. 
Maathai (2009: 55-57) described the African traditional stool as being democratic in nature and in 
its functions. She argued that the African stool is comprised of a seat and three legs, with the first 
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leg representing democratic space where citizens’ rights are respected. The second leg symbolises 
the sustainable and accountable management of natural resources, while the third leg stands for a 
culture of peace, fairness, respect, compassion, forgiveness, recompense and justice. She, however, 
admitted that the concept of democracy, as practised in the West, is merely, theoretical or abstract 
(Ibid: 60). Several examples from Asian countries, notably India and China, also cast doubt on 
Greece as the origin of democracy. For instance, Wood (2004: 33-34) noted:  
Indeed, there is some reason to believe that early India enjoyed 
democratic institutions, comparable to those of Greece. In the 
period from about 600 BC to AD 200, India consisted of republics, 
in many of which there existed a form of political participation that 
was eventually adopted by the Buddhist Monastic institutions, 
whose affairs were governed by periodic meetings of the monks 
themselves…. Village Councils, known as Panchayats, were, 
typically, composed of elected representatives with rather wide 
executive and judicial powers, including the responsibility for 
distributing land and collecting taxes. At some point in the past, 
women served on this body. 
Supporting this line of argument, Jaffrelot (2000: 354) noted that India had always been a 
democratic society, even before the foreign invasion. He argued that “democracy was born in 
India; it was, merely, returning via the British after a long journey”. Wood (2004: 63) argued 
further that China, with her Confucian style of governance, has a considerable degree of local 
autonomy, which is one of the underlining principles of the Western concept of democracy. 
Invariably, what Wood and others have said is that the Asian countries also have their own model 
of democratic systems, which seems to work better than what is operated in the West.  
It is instructive to note that the political systems in most African states, before the scramble and 
eventual partition of the continent in 1884 by five European countries; Britain, France, Portugal, 
Germany and Belgium, were, somewhat, similar to the Athenian classical society, which is widely 
reported as being the birthplace of the democratic system of administering modern nation-states 
(Binns, 1994; Hargreaves, 1996; Pakenham, 2003; Meredith, 2006; Diamond, 1999; Kpundeh, 
1992; Lewis, 1996).  
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Chazan, et al (1999) argued that when the Europeans arrived in Africa, they encountered 
indigenous states alongside well-organized segmentary societies with no overarching leadership 
structures. They cited the examples of the Kikuyu and the Igbo structures, in Kenya and Nigeria 
respectively (Chazan et al, 1999:27). They further argued that, in pre-colonial Africa, a variety of 
political forms were established, ranging from village headmen and councils, through chiefdoms 
that included a number of villages, to elaborate state entities such as Asante and Benin in West 
Africa, or Buganda and Zulu in East and Southern Africa. In each political unit, specific concepts 
of governance and methods of acquiring and using communication were developed. (Chazan et al, 
1999: 81-84) Oromo political systems in Ethiopia and the Ovimbundu in Angola were further cited 
as examples of democratic political systems in the pre-colonial era in Africa.  
An immense literature has been written on the democratic system in pre-colonial African societies. 
For instance, Roberts (2004) noted that in pre-colonial Nigeria, elders convened various forms of 
democratic dialogue under the tree. Africans, he argued, were successful in governance in the past 
but it was colonialism that successfully destroy the traditions of governance through conquest and 
statutes. (Roberts 2004: 26-27).  Indeed, the British Foreign Office, in the record marked FO 
84/1527, accepted the fact that most of the towns in Nigeria “lived separately, each under its own 
laws and government and that the city state was the focus of power politics”. In addition, Davidson 
(1992: 86-87) argued that most traditional African societies were “segmentary societies where 
delegation of powers to titled persons was limited or minimal or non-existent. The community met 
as equals and decided things accordingly”.  
He cited the cases of the Igbo communities of Eastern, and the Yoruba communities of Western 
Nigeria, where checks and balances were found in the pre-colonial African states (Davidson, 1992: 
86-87). He noted that the Asante system functioned on principles of constitutionalised delegation 
and devolution of power, and the inherent checks and balances, which form the pillars of a modern 
democratic system of government, such as may be seen at work under different guises in the history 
of a whole range of contemporary polities. 
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Following the same line of argument, Thomson (2000) has posited that stateless African societies 
did not lack political organization. Indeed, in most African communities, political structures 
overlap with communication patterns. Wilson (1982) argued that it is the traditional institutions 
that are usually authoritative sources of information. He further asserted that the medium of 
particular information is determined by the type of message to be sent, which, in turn, depended 
on the final authority of the king. Essentially, it is the village head and his council that constitute 
themselves as “gatekeepers” in the traditional communication process, because no information 
would be transferred without the authority of the chief. 
Ugboajah (1980) noted that the leaders of African traditional socio-political systems recognised 
the need to control information output and specifically appointed certain persons who acted as 
information officers cum public relations officers, who were usually known as the village 
“gongmen”. The concept of gatekeeping as part and parcel of the modern communication 
processes is thus not new to Africans. He argued that passing messages usually goes through 
several chains. From the source – Oba, Emir, and Council of Elders, whose deliberations 
occasioned the order, to the village square meeting: this is equivalent to the referendum in modern 
democracy, then to the gongman, who, in a timely way, reminds the people of the messages and 
accelerates people’s co-operation. 
The gongman, Ugboajah noted, is a trusted confidant, and is usually picked from one of the age-
grade groups in the society. His task of news dissemination is not carried out for economic gain, 
as with the modern mass media, and thus it is imperative that the chosen gongman discharges his 
duties efficiently and effectively (Wilson, 1982). It can be argued that in the various African 
communities, age-grade groups, market men’s/women’s associations, etc., are part of the social 
institutional structures of the society and are also part of the political or traditional structures. From 
available records, therefore, political structures overlap the traditional structures and consequently, 
determine the communication patterns in a given traditional setting.  
However, Thomson (2000: 8) has noted that Westerners, steeped as they are in state traditions, 
often regard the lack of state institutions as a sign of backwardness. “This, simply, was not the 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     49 | P a g e  
 
 
case. The political systems that these societies developed were well- adapted to the environment 
they served”. He also observed that considerable evidence of sophisticated forms of representation, 
justice and accountability existed among these communities, and that some of these grand 
civilisations were in advance, technically and socially, of their European contemporaries. Peter 
(2004: 25) observed that the denunciation of African civilisation as being primitive, backward, and 
therefore inferior to the superior civilisations of Western Europe, was untrue, as the history of pre-
colonial independence was replete with rich examples of political and economic sophistication. 
He noted, though, that while some of these political systems degenerated into authoritarianism and 
economic stagnation, others embodied the blossoming of democratic practices and economic 
expansion. 
The Western system of government, with the checks and balances between the arms of 
government, was part of the features of ancient African society.  Peter argued that in ancient Oyo 
Town, the Alaafin enjoyed several formal powers, such as the appointment of provincial governors 
and the ability to declare war, in addition to an equally important set of informal powers, such as 
public persuasion, which grew out of the sacred nature of his office. The Oyo Mesi, he noted, 
likewise, enjoyed numerous formal powers: the selection of the Alaafin’s successor from a list 
provided by the royal clan in the case of death or incapacitation; control over the process of 
choosing the Bashorun, the supreme Yoruba military leader, who was drawn from the ranks of the 
Royal Council; and, most importantly, the ability to impeach the Alaafin, should he stray from the 
accepted norms of Yoruba culture. As a result, a delicate balance of power existed between the 
two branches of government that fostered the maintenance of a relatively democratic society 
(Peter, 2004: 31).  
Similarly, Freund (1998) argued that Igbo villages have been described by historians and 
anthropologists as being democratic communities where each household head was capable, 
through individual effort, of earning any coveted title, position and wealth. Davidson (1978: 139) 
also argued that intensely democratic, “mostly believing in equal opportunities for all to have their 
say, the Igbo have ruled themselves in a multitude of very small village sized governments”. 
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Providing further insight, Reader (1998: 360) argued that archaeological evidence indicated that 
while communities throughout Africa maintained strong kinship and trade links over a wide area 
prior to their contact with external influences, the centralised and coercive regional control that is 
so typical of early state-formation elsewhere was not a feature of African social development.  
Asking rhetorically, ‘could Africa have developed differently? He argued that “were it not for the 
importuning of Europe, Africa might have enlarged upon its indigenous talents and found an 
independent route to the present that was inspired by resolutions from within, rather than examples 
from without” (Reader, 1998:361). This perfectly squares with the argument of Onadeko (2008) 
Rodney (1986) and Wamba-dia-Wamba (1996) that Africa’s development was thwarted by 
colonial masters.  
Steward (1986) and Olaniyan (1985) have also attested to the democratic system of government 
by the Borno Empire, before the arrival of colonial masters. Indeed, Davidson (1992: 63) noted 
that if one were to make a comparative listing of political structures in pre-colonial Africa, the 
result would confirm that pre-colonial political cultures undoubtedly displayed a great diversity, 
and an even greater unity. 
Davidson (1992:63) draws a resounding conclusion on African democratic values, noting that, “its 
seeming eccentricity or inexplicability or unpredictability has existed only in the eyes of those who 
have not really looked.” Ayittey (2012) argued that the components of indigenous African systems 
may seem, “Byzantine,” put together with the others, they may produce, “beautiful music.” Indeed, 
Smith (1969) concluded that, despite imperfections in Yoruba society, the system in operation in 
Yoruba Land was, in practice, “surprisingly democratic”, with all the accountability and 
transparency ethos in place. Pinkney (2003:21) and Kpundeh (1992: 5) also provide practical 
elements of a democratic pre-colonial African societies. In fact, Kpundeh (1992: 7) stated that 
Colonialism was not a democratic system, and that the so-called colonial masters were not teachers 
of democracy because they took self-governance away from Africans. 
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In reviewing traditional African social, cultural and political settings, one can easily conclude that 
there is a presence of some of the features of democracy. Therefore, using Dowden (2009), one 
could suggest that most African kingdoms exhibited a balance of authority and democracy 
(Dowden 2009: 71) and so many of the important features of democracy can be located within 
African social, cultural and political settings. 
In essence, describing the recent political developments in Sub-Saharan Africa as waves of 
democratisation may not be a correct understanding and interpretation of the history of African 
states in the pre-colonial era. Instead of referring to the political events in Africa from the 
beginning of the 20th century until now as waves of democratisation, it would not be out of place 
to refer to the unfolding events as being the restoration of the democratic culture/values of the 
African settings that were destroyed by colonialism. This section has, so far, corrected the 
prevailing myth that colonial masters were capable of bequeathing democracy to African countries, 
rather, it is the legacy of authoritarian rule and plundering that the Europeans left behind in Africa 
with which successive African leaders are contending, after almost seven decades of independence 
under their own flags. 
2.4  Forms and Models of Democracy 
Essentially, while the origin and meaning of democracy are still the subjects of debate among 
scholars, yet, its various (democracy) forms and models are contributory factors to the several 
challenges underpinning the understanding of democracy as a system of administering modern 
states. Pinkney (2003) has listed a fivefold classification of democracy which includes: radical 
democracy, guided democracy, liberal democracy, socialist democracy and consociation 
democracy. He defines Radical Democracy as a situation in which society is seen as an aggregation 
of undifferentiated individuals, and the democratic ideal is for the individuals to exercise their 
rights and protect their interests as active participants in the political arena (Pinkney, 2003: 10). 
Examples, he noted, can be found in Ghana, under Kwame Nkrumah, and in Guinea, under Ahmed 
Sekou Toure. Guided Democracy, on the other hand, is a society that is seen as an organic whole 
with common interests and leaders who claim to know what constitutes the interests of the general 
public (the will). Citizens only enjoy equality, whether politically or economically, to the extent 
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that their rulers deem this desirable. Kenya, Tanzania, Brazil, Indonesia, China, India, and Pakistan 
provide a variety of this system. He also noted that colonial rule might be regarded as guided 
democracy. In Liberal democracy, the society is seen as an aggregation of diverse citizens acting 
as both individuals and members of groups.  
 
The state exists as a referee to ensure the representation and protection of diverse interests. 
Inequalities are perpetuated under this system as inherited wealth is allowed (Pinkney 2003: 12). 
This is mostly found in the Western and the advanced countries of the world. In fact, Kuper (2004: 
1) puts it in a correct perspective when, he notes that liberalism and modern democracy are now 
the most widely accepted forms of official justification for political rule. In Socialist Democracy, 
society is seen as an organic whole with common interests and the state exists to allow for an even 
distribution of wealth and resources. Kuper (2004: 13) argued that examples are found in 
Nicaragua and Tanzania. In Consociation democracy, society is seen as being a culturally diverse 
country. Kenya and Nigeria are often cited as examples of this kind of democratic system, simply 
because of the heterogeneous population of these states.  
The state exists not to promote any utopian ideal, such as socialism, the will of the majority, or the 
general will, but to act as a referee in the process of intergroup conflict. Citizens’ participation in 
politics will mainly be on a regional basis. Immobilisation is a major problem of this system, with 
political change moving at the slowest pace. This system, he notes, encourages the emergence of 
a ‘few privileged’ people, thus promoting a political system that reinforces cultural divisions. 
Minorities may have some measure of influence, and this is a basic pre-requisite of this type of 
democracy with well-established institutions and procedures, a spirit of compromise, and an 
overarching sense of national loyalty. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland have this type in Europe. 
This study believes that it is the lack of these requirements in Kenya and Nigeria that has left them 
with a loose marriage of convenience, rather than with a durable form of democracy. 
It is the contention of this study that experience with Liberal Democracy in the last two decades in 
nearly all of the African states has revealed the emergence of a formal/electoral system with 
nothing to show for the agitation for real democracy. As Pinkney correctly observes:  
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The justification for democracy has never been, simply, that it offers 
a better means of material advancement, but unless it can give voters 
something in return for their votes, no amount of philosophical 
argument about liberty, human rights or political choice will ensure 
its survival. That is the challenge facing both Third World 
governments and Western governments that proclaim a belief in 
democracy. 
To address this challenge, Held (2006: 304-305) advocated the concept of the cosmopolitan model 
of democracy that would establish an overarching network of democratic public fora covering 
cities, nation-states, regions, and the wider trans-national order. Such an arrangement, this 
researcher believes, will further undermine and worsen the ‘cosmetic’ democratic governments in 
Africa. Africa must be allowed to work out a model of government that suits its peculiar needs. As 
Pinkney (2003:2) puts it aptly:  
The West enjoyed the right preconditions, such as material 
prosperity, urbanization, cultures that encouraged tolerance and 
participation, and political institutions that had developed accepted 
ways of resolving conflicts. Third World countries lacked most of 
these preconditions and were, therefore, much less likely to be able 
to establish or maintain democratic political structures. 
Moreover, an ideal of the cosmopolitan model of democracy is not likely to produce even results 
if one takes into consideration the fact that the unit of analysis in the West is based on individuals, 
while the unit of analysis in the Africa context, is still based on community. Nyamnoh (2005: 17) 
argued that the conventional notions of liberal democracy that focus on individual and citizens are 
not appropriate in an African context. More importantly, most Third World countries have not 
enjoyed the economic development and the civic cultural virtues that promotes democracy in 
advanced countries of the World (Pinkney 2003). This researcher’s perspective tallies with the 
argument of Pinkney, that the sequences of development that are conducive to democracy in the 
West have not generally occurred in the Third World, and the developmental crises have, 
frequently, crowded in on one another over a short period of time (Ibid: 37). Indeed, Schmitter and 
Karl (2009: 13-14) offer what democracy is not: 
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1. Democracies are not, necessarily, more efficient economically than other forms of 
government. 
2. Second, democracies are not, necessarily, more efficient administratively. The 
decision-making process is sometimes slower and the cost of getting things done may 
be higher than in the regime they replace. 
3. Third, democracies are not likely to appear more orderly, consensual, stable or 
governable than the autocracies they replace. 
4. Finally, democracies do not, necessarily, lead to the opening of more economic 
opportunities. 
They concluded that the notions of economic liberty that are currently put forward in neo-liberal 
economic models are not synonymous with political freedom, and may even impede it. 
Accordingly, they stress that what democracies can do more than other systems is to have the 
“capacity to modify rules and institutions consensually in response to changing circumstances” 
(Schmitter and Karl, 2009: 14-15).  
Scholars are also sharply divided on the impact of democracy on economic development. Pastor 
(1999),) noted that based on the results of a survey carried out in 100 countries in the 1990s 
democracy performs better, economically, than dictatorship. He insisted that “democratic regimes 
grew seven-tenths of one percent faster than their non-democratic counterparts”. More established 
democracies in the developing world outperformed both new democracies and authoritarian 
governments. 
Pastor (1999: 137) asserted that on the margin, and in the long term, democracies do better 
economically. However, Sen (2009: 310) also faulted the claim that non-democratic systems are 
better at bringing about economic development. She noted that the high economic growth of 
Singapore or China cannot be taken as “definite proof” that authoritarianism does better in 
promoting economic growth, nor is the economic growth recorded in Botswana under a democratic 
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regime an indication that democracy works better economically. Sen (2009: 310-311) concluded 
with a word of caution: 
There is, in fact, no convincing general evidence that authoritarian 
governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are 
really beneficial to economic development. Indeed, the general 
statistical picture does not permit any such induction… If all 
comparative studies are viewed together, the hypothesis that there 
is no clear relation between economic growth and democracy in 
either direction remains extremely plausible.  
Sen (2009: 319) argued that what democracy offers includes its intrinsic importance in the human, 
instrumental role of generating political incentives and a constructive function in the formation of 
values. It therefore means that there is the need for more multi-country surveying before an 
accurate evaluation can be reached on the impact of democracy on economic development. The 
unrelated link between democracy and economic development can be further explained, since most 
European countries were under democratic rule when they were hit by the “suffocating economic 
recession” of the 1930s and that of 2008.  
In-spite of the fact that there was no convincing evidence to support the impact of democracy on 
economic growth, the International Financial Institutions, represented by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), have tied the granting of aid to developing countries to the 
installation of democracy. “Since 1991, the EU had insisted on ‘a democracy clause’, in each trade 
agreement with a Third World government”, (Pastor, 1999: 136). Moreover, debates are ongoing 
on the economics of democracy and corruption. There are two schools of thought on this issue. 
Some suggests that democracies will not deter corruption but will actually promote it (Shleifer & 
Vishny 1998:4) while others believe that democracies with an independent/free press will deter 
corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, Ades & Di Tella, 1997: 497-499; Treisman, 2000:1; Norris, 
2006: 11). Chowdhury, (2004: 27), in particular, noted that “democracy and press freedom can 
play an instrumental role in making a country less corrupt. Sen (1999: 38-40) supports this school 
of thought, but with a word of caution. She notes that democracy may be a solution to the economic 
and political challenges of a state.  
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In view of the problems associated with democracy in Africa, such as corruption, ineffective 
leadership, political instability, as well as the growing decline in the economic prospects of most 
nations, it may well suit Africans to consider governing themselves through a “Trusteeship form 
of Government”, which will be devoid of the excessive wastage of public funds that are usually 
spent for the conduct of the Western type of elections. Moreover, the money saved through this 
means can then be channelled for developmental purposes, which are begging for attention on the 
continent (Kuper, 2008). 
2.5 The Media in the Democratic Process 
The phenomenal rise of new media, and their convergence with the traditional media, has led to a 
series of political events around the world between 2009-2012 and has lent credence to the 
traditional liberal theorists’ arguments around the democratic role of the media in modern society. 
Media scholars have argued that the media have a greater role to play, and that they even have 
greater responsibility in a democracy (Keane; 1991, McChesney and Nichols; 2010, Curran & 
Seaton; 2003, Murdock and Golding; 2005, Esipisu and Khaguli 2009:107, Chowdhury 2004). 
Voltmer and Rawnsley (2009) noted that the media is a dominant actor in political life across the 
world. The Internet and mobile telephony, supported by social networking media such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, are believed to have played a major role in the political events in 
the Northern part of Africa, generally referred to as the Arab Spring. 
The ease and availability of these means of communication have allowed for increased public 
mobilisation and political activism since 2000. Examples abound of the growing influence of the 
media as an agent of political change. The 2009 anti-fraud protests in the Eastern European nation 
of Moldavia were organised by activists using Twitter. The Arab Spring of 2010-2011 witnessed 
the birth of a democratic government in Tunisia and a change of guard in Egypt, Yemen and Libya, 
while the on-going Syrian uprising is attracting international attention due to the power of the 
media, particularly the power of citizen journalism powered by social media.  
Scholars have argued that the spate of protests induced regimes change across the North of the 
African region is due to the close relationship between the media and politics (Stokes 2008; Pintak 
2011, Stack, 2009, Mudhai 2007). Pintak (2011) noted that the Arab Spring is one of the fallouts 
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of the media revolution that started with the deregulation of the media sector in the region in 1997, 
and that the authoritarian governments could not stop it. He declared that the electronic dam had 
burst, and with it their ability to control the flow of information, along with crusading journalists 
and digitally armed activists, this facilitated the move towards the democratisation of the region. 
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have also experienced some level of democratic change, 
particularly in the last decade, with the increased role of the social media (Adejumobi, 2000: 2).  
This study therefore shares Tettey’s (2001: 28) view that “the media and democracy are 
symbiotically related and so, mutually, reinforcing”. Gunther and Mughan (2000), Higgins (2008), 
Hallin and Mancini (2004), Chomsky (1989) and Esipisu and Khaguli (2009) have supported this 
line of argument. In his analysis, O’Neil (1998:1) and Ansah (1988: 13) have noted that a strong 
connection exists between mass communication and democracy. They argue that the media are 
viewed as a vital conduit of relations between state and society. Akinfeleye (2012) argued that the 
media is the lubricating oil for democracy, as well as the propeller of an active democratic 
government, the world over. Voltmer and Rawnsley (2009) contend that the media fulfils two main 
functions in democratic life: they provide a forum where all voices can be heard, and they engage 
in a dialogue with each other. This argument is in tandem with the theory of the public sphere 
postulated by Habermas (1989).  
Kelly and Donway (1990) note that one important role of the media as the “watchdog of the 
society”. However, Berger (2002) has noted that since much of the African media has played a 
political propagandist role or a developmentalist role, its watchdog role is nothing to write home 
about.  
The roles of the media in the wave of democratisation have also caught the attention of African 
scholars. Notable scholars, such as Eribo and Jong-Ebot (1997) and Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu 
(2007), have provided empirical evidence linking media to democracy. Hyden, et al (2007: 1) note 
that communication shapes democratisation, but that the causal link between the two variables 
would be dependent on the extent to which political actors in the states allow freedom of 
expression, which would influence the behaviour of journalists.  
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Hyden and Okigbo (2007) argued that the relationship between the media and democracy was not 
a linear one but one that is influenced by a number of intervening variables, e.g., the degree of 
state control, media representation of people’s interests in society and the media’s international 
connections. Making recourse to the past, they contend that the current wave of democratisation 
spreading on the continent is not the first attempt of African states to democratise. 
According to them, the first attempt at democracy took place during the struggle for independence, 
with democracy as an integral part of the political agenda, and that the media were active 
participants (p.31). The first wave of democracy was at independence, but, this soon fizzled out 
with the military taking over the reins of government in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Hyden and Okigbo, (2007) and Adebanwi and Obadare (2011) have described this period as a neo-
patrimonial and hegemonic era (1960 to 1989) in which African leaders were co-opted into the 
formal institutions of state in order to serve personal needs. Bratton (2009) opined that a new wave 
of transition to multi-party rule began with the Namibian decolonisation in the 1990s, and it 
subsided only after Nigeria returned to civilian government in 1999.  
This is the period Huntington (1991) termed the third wave of democratisation in Africa. It should 
be noted that Bratton did not refer to Nigeria as returning to democratic rule but to civilian 
government. Africans experienced a long period of colonial government between 1885 and 1960, 
and they barely partook in the second wave of democratisation that accompanied the break-up of 
Communist rule in Europe in the middle 20th century.  
Scholars have argued that the current democratic rule in most African states was due to the mass 
political action of the 20th century, which started in the European colonial empires, the economic 
crises plaguing African states, the end of the Cold War, and pressure from domestic civil society 
groups (Bratton, 1994, 2009, Huntington 1991, Haynes 1997, Maathai 2009). Thomson (2000: 
217-220) wrote that what was taking place in Africa was the second liberation of the continent and 
they attributed the wave of democratisation to four factors. These are the state’s loss of authority 
occasioned by economic crisis, a new international political environment, the rejuvenation of civil 
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society, and precedents such as the election of Nelson Mandela as president and the dismantling 
of apartheid in South Africa, all of which were responsible for the culture of multi-party politics 
in Africa. 
Haynes (1997:77) provided a better scenario relating to the intervening variables that have 
facilitated the current democratic rule in Africa: 
Collectively, the demonstration effects provided by developments 
in Southern and Eastern Europe served as a catalyst for the later 
generation of calls for enhanced human rights and, by extension, 
greater democracy in the Third World. 
At this juncture, critical remarks are inevitable: This research will attempt to validate the 
assumption that the street protests might not lead to truly democratic government, as recent 
developments in Egypt that pertain to the presidential election have revealed. The results of the 
electoral processes do not move in tandem with the aspirations of those who planned the series of 
protests that forced Hosni Mubarak out of government after 33 years in office. Second, it is the 
contention of this study that the waves of democratisation may not have brought the much 
anticipated dividend that was expected by scores of Africans in the last one and half decades of 
democracy on the continent. Indeed, this study intends to investigate the extent to which 
democracy and free Press had helped the cause of anti-corruption in Nigeria. Going by the verdicts 
of Neild (2002: 13), “the introduction of democracy that is commonly said, nowadays, to be a way 
of suppressing corruption may be far from the truth, as history from France, Germany and the 
United States point to the fact that democracy may result in more corruption”. He cautioned that 
there was a need to keep an open mind on the relationship between democracy and clean 
government. 
2.6 Media as an Instrument of Democratic Accountability 
Proponents of democratic rule, as a system of governance, globally, accorded the media the 
position of a critical element that is needed in a democratic regime. This section will attempt to 
provide a theoretical explanation of the media’s role as instruments of accountability in 
governance. In conceptualising accountability, Schedler (1999:14) has argued that the notion of 
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political accountability rests on two basic pillars: answerability, the obligation of public officials 
to inform about, and explain, what they are doing; and enforcement, the capacity of accounting 
agencies to impose sanctions on power-holders who have violated their public duties. Schedler 
concluded that the main aim of political accountability is to ensure that the exercise of power is a 
rule-guided enterprise. 
O’Donnell and Sklar (1999) expanded the concept of accountability into two different parts, 
namely, horizontal and vertical accountability. Diamond et al, defined horizontal accountability as 
the capacity of state institutions to check abuses of other public agencies and branches of 
government. Invariably, the horizontal accountability consists of state actors, such as of the 
judiciary, executive and legislative arms of government. Vertical Accountability, on the other 
hand, refers to control exercised by citizens, mass media and civil associations, “to enforce 
standards of good conduct on public officials” (Diamond et al, 1999: 3). For the purpose of this 
study, the elements of vertical accountability belong to the class of non-state actors (Schelder, 
1999: 340). Similarly, O’Donnell (1999) argued that regular coverage by the media of the wrongful 
acts of public authorities is a dimension of Vertical Accountability (p.30). He noted that when the 
media report on the acts of wrongdoing of those in public offices, and when there are no 
appropriate sanctions from the state, the media tend to become surrogate courts. 
O’Donnell defined horizontal accountability as the existence of state agencies that are legally 
enabled and empowered, and that are, factually, willing and able to take action that spans from 
routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other 
agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful (Ibid: 38). He contended that 
effective horizontal accountability is not the product of isolated agencies but of networks of 
agencies that include top government functionaries (Ibid: 39). O’Donnell noted that there were 
two main directions in which horizontal accountability can be violated: 
1. Unlawful encroachment by one state agency upon the proper authority of another; and 
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2. Unlawful advantages that public officials obtain for themselves and /or their associates. He 
noted that this second category can fit into the term “corruption” (Ibid: 41). 
He concluded that the effectiveness of horizontal accountability is dependent, to a large extent, on 
the kind of vertical accountability that only the political system existing in a state provides (Ibid: 
45). In essence, O’Donnell establishes that an active vertical accountability is required before a 
state can be said to be operating an effective horizontal accountability. This dovetails into the 
submission of Schelder (1999: 334), who suggests that horizontal and vertical accountability are 
interconnected. Schmitter, however, defined horizontal accountability as the existence of 
permanently constituted, mutually recognized, collective actors at multiple levels of aggregation 
within a polity, that have equivalent capacities to monitor each other’s behaviour and to react to 
each other’s initiatives. These powers may be made up of mixes of public and private 
organisations, and they may act out of purely political, as well as legal, motives (Schmitter, 1999: 
61).  
Schmitter (1999) in The Limits of Horizontal Accountability, has argued that horizontal 
accountability is a necessity if democracy is to protect itself from its own potential for self –
destruction (p: 59). He contended that horizontal accountability may not work in some countries, 
especially those with a strong state tradition, “there is every reason to suspect that state agencies, 
no matter how formally independent from each other, will tend to collude, all in the name of “the 
national interest”, (p: 60). However, Bonner (2009) argued that the media do not always provide 
social accountability, simply because of their political and economic interests which may affect 
what issues are covered or how they are covered.  
Indeed, the political and economic interests of most newspapers affect the vertical accountability 
role of the media. Harber (2014 209), for instance, noted that the capacity of the media to cover 
everyday news is on the decline, as most newspapers in South Africa are cutting their staff strength 
and others are merging. Camaj (2013: 316) has also noted that the vertical accountability of the 
media, as an external control on corruption, is dependent on the freedom that is provided by the 
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political system of a state. Moreover, Pastor (1999) described the role of the international 
community in election monitoring as the third dimension of accountability. 
Interestingly, Diamond et al (1999) have argued that some political systems work perfectly with 
horizontal accountability, while others do not. To them, the democratic tradition is, essentially, 
hostile to horizontal accountability, while Republicanism and Liberalism are more supportive of 
horizontal accountability. Though they were silent on which system works harmoniously with 
vertical accountability, it is the contention of this study that all three political traditions are 
complementary to vertical accountability. This study investigates how the concept of vertical 
accountability, as discussed above, has impacted positively on the level of transparency and 
probity in public life in Nigeria. 
2.7  Critical Approaches/Theories of the Media 
Several attempts have also been made by scholars to justify the relationship between politics and 
media in society. One of the early exercises in this regard was made by Siebert and three others in 
1963, but rapid global changes and the rise of new media have since confined their theory to the 
archives. First, Hallin and Mancini (2004) note that the theory postulated in the 1960s can no 
longer be used to understand the way the media now operate in an information age. Baker (2002) 
argued that the social responsibility theory lacks any systematic critique of capitalist media 
ownership and funding.  
Rejecting the social responsibility theory of Siebert et al, (1956) in analysis of the media, 
Nordenstreng (2006) noted the Four Theories of the Press had been valuable for setting in motion 
discussion on the role of the media in society, but that the problem of the classic was that it 
collapsed into one level of consideration and at least three levels of analyses: “philosophical 
doctrines, political systems, and the press systems were needed”. Berger (2002: 23) notes that 
“today only die-hard neo-Hegelian idealists would accept this kind of explanation offered by social 
responsibility theory”. However, Momoh (2012) wants the social responsibility theory of the 
media to be revived. He argued that the theory should be revived in view of the perceived social 
and communication changes of the 21st century. This idea needs further research. For the purpose 
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of this study, three theories were reviewed and these are: The Normative Theories of the Press, 
The Market-Driven Theory and The Political Economy Theory. 
The social responsibility theory is one of the normative theories of the press. Baran and Davies 
(2003) have described normative theory as an ideal way for a media system to be structured and 
operated. McQuail (2005, 2007) noted that normative theory addresses the issues relating to media 
structure, conduct or performance. Normative theories, therefore, have important consequences 
for media practitioners, because they are predominantly used to guide and legitimise the conduct 
and operations of media systems in all democratic and free societies (Ferre et al, 2002; Baker, 
2002; Bourdieu, 1998, Gans, 2003; and Habermas, 1989). For a very long period, the normative 
theories provided the basic setting of the standard for professional practice in the media industry. 
Haerpfer et al (2009) took a nuanced approach to the normative theory of the media, emphasising 
three separate levels of analysis: philosophical doctrines, economic systems and political systems, 
for the media roles, but showing their interconnectivity and linkages: In the philosophical 
traditions, issues such as the corporatist, libertarian, social responsibility and citizens’ participation 
were analysed with different models of democratic systems, e.g., pluralist, administrative, 
deliberative and direct systems. The role(s) of journalism were treated separately as monitorial, 
facilitative, collaborative and radical, in any given society. 
Similarly, Hallin and Mancini (2010: 104-116) argued that the comparative analysis of media 
systems is crucial in preventing false generalisations and in helping to sort out the relationship 
between media systems and their social and political settings in any given society. Using the three 
media system models they covered 18 different countries of Western Europe and North America 
in order to analyse the workings of the media in relation to the existing political systems, and they 
argued that the early development of the press in all the three models was strongly connected with 
the world of politics and further justified the linkage between media and politics. 
They analysed the three models by employing four variables: political parallelism, professionalism 
of journalism; state control; and the influence of the market, but they were silent on how 
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cultural/social factors are likely to impact upon the media. This is the major flaw of their models. 
While conceding that they deliberately refrained from universalistic theory in their analyses, they 
argued that other analyses should be based on a deep familiarity with particular media systems and 
their historical contexts, and how particular forms of economic and political development shaped 
the media system. (Hallin and Mancini, 2010:119). They noted: 
We believe that, in fact, of the three models we examine, it is 
actually the polarised pluralist model, with its high degree of media 
partisanship, for example, and strong history of state intervention, 
that will have the most relevance for understanding media systems 
in other parts of the world. 
This study believes that the best approach for African states, at this stage of their development, is 
to come up with a refined model of the democratic corporatist system in which a strong commercial 
press, developed alongside a strong party press and public service media, is connected to organised 
social groups, with the last media serving the interests of the poor and marginalised segments of 
society.  
This model will serve the democratic needs of African society, in view of the prospects it offers, 
as Hallin and Mancini (2010: 112-114) note: 
There is a high level of political parallelism with a high level of 
journalistic professionalization. Journalistic autonomy is relatively 
high in the Democratic Corporatist System. There are laws to 
protect the autonomy of journalists against intervention by media 
owners and protections for journalists in public broadcasting are 
also strong…. They also have strong press councils to monitor the 
press activities and the media are seen as institutions serving society 
as a whole. 
The model appears to be an ideal system that can serve the interests of a democratic society with 
a free press, but the status quo in Nigeria is quite different. There are no laws that protect the 
autonomy of journalists against intervention by media owners. Media practitioners are at the mercy 
of their owners. The Nigerian Press Council exists, but is not active. This is because members of 
its Council are hand-picked by the government. The passage of the Freedom of Information Act is 
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yet to have an impact on the media’s role as the watchdog of the society. Lagos State is already in 
Court challenging the constitutionality of the Act in its domain. 
Taking a different view, Schudson (2010), in his four approaches to the sociology of news, argued 
that there were four distinct approaches to explain how news production occurs: political, 
economic, sociological and cultural perspectives. He particularly omitted the influence of 
technology. This position is flawed in several respects because of the growing influence of ICTs 
in the media industry across the globe (Castells, 2009; Webster, 2006). It may be argued that to 
exclude the influence of technology on the media in this information age can be likened to a car 
without any engine oil.  
Furthermore, Curran (2010: 128-129) has asserted that concern should no longer be confined to 
the media’s link to big business: “the media are big business and that the market cannot give rise 
to independent watchdogs serving the private interest but to corporate mercenaries which adjust 
their critical scrutiny to suit their private purpose”. His verdict was that practical steps should be 
taken to shield the media from the corruption generated by both the political and economic 
systems, as the market does not guarantee critical scrutiny of either public or private power, which 
are crucial to democracy. 
Gunther and Mughan (2000: 403) argued that the media are strongly shaped by the interactions 
among macro and micro level variables, and this interaction can take different forms in different 
countries. To them, the macro factors are political culture; the structure of society; media and 
government institutions; norms governing the relationships between journalists and politics; 
regulatory practices, and the level of technological development of the communication industries, 
which shape the media’s messages and their patterns of circulation. At the micro level, issues such 
as the attitudinal or cultural proclivities; the degree of exposure to each communication medium; 
the level of education, the cognitive complexity; the degree of embeddedness in an autonomous 
subculture or network of secondary associations, are crucial in determining the political nature of 
the media in any given society. Gunther and Mughan (2000:404) revealed: 
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Thus, the proper focus for studies of the relationship between the 
media and politics is not the search for universal generalisation, but 
the search for more middle-level and contingent theoretical 
propositions. 
They asserted that democratisation and media freedom have a symbolic relationship. This 
somewhat aligns, with the argument of Ogundimu (2007:207), that the relationship between the 
media and democratisation is multi-disciplinary, straddling four variables—political, cultural, 
economic, and technological. He argued that, in the cultural and political domains, the relations go 
in both directions, that is, the media influences democratisation, and vice versa. In the economic 
and technological domains, it is a one-way direction, that is, economic and technological factors 
shape the media, but not vice versa.  
This submission underscores the need to re-think the universal generalisation of the concepts of 
democracy and press freedom as panaceas for economic growth and development. The wide gap 
in technological advancement and economic growth in the West and the developing world made 
it imperative for media scholars, particularly those in Sub-Saharan African countries, to stop using 
concepts developed in the West to analyse and interrogate issues in their locality. As Gunther and 
Mughan (2000) rightly observed, sub-cultural norms of the professional ethics of a journalist, 
regulatory structures, and the conscious choices made by media and the political class that exist in 
the West, differ to what is operating in the South. 
Gunther and Mughan (2000) conclude that the behaviour of the elite will, to a large extent, 
determine the effects of the media, and not the technology, as postulated by some scholars. 
Ogundimu (2000) has argued that the media alone are not enough to sustain democracy. Agbaje 
(1992) noted that attempts to conceptualise the role of the media in contemporary politics, outside 
of the state, economic forces, international relations, and social movements, are prone to futility. 
The attitude of the political class, not that of the media, remains crucial, and this is what Ogundimu 
(2007: 234) described as being a paradox: 
We are faced with the paradox in Africa that democratisation is, 
itself, a threat to democracy, because it unleashes forces that tend to 
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spur political instability. The media may be able to play a stabilising 
role, but it would be wrong to assume that they alone can make the 
difference as far as democracy goes. 
Essentially, Ogundimu admitted that the media remained weak in most countries in Africa, but 
that the media have been instrumental in bringing about regime change in a few cases; and can 
very rarely perform the advocacy, watchdog and agenda-setting roles that are associated with the 
press in the West. Ogundimu (2007) was quick to suggest that the media in Africa must be creative 
and imaginative in order to solve the problem of disjuncture with the publics, where one tends to 
rely on foreign media rather than on the local media.  
The question is: how can the media attain these creative and imaginative roles advocated by 
Ogundimu, when the incentive to be creative is lacking, and the economic well-being of an average 
journalist is dwindling rapidly? Second, the political class has total control of the media in most 
countries in the continent. This suggestion may appear unrealistic in view of the economic 
challenges facing most African states. An important point to note is that theorising on African 
media must take note of the frequent political insecurities on the continent (Banda, 2010: 282). 
The ever changing media industry is now being analysed from the political economy theory 
perspective. This theory is relevant to the focus of this study and it will be deployed in analysing 
this research.  
2.7.1  The Political Economy Theory of the Media 
In the last decade, many scholars have analysed media from the perspective of political economy 
theory and, primarily, they have focused on the economic determinant as the crucial factor in the 
production, consumption and dissemination of media products (Golding and Murdock, 1991; 
Mosco, 2009; Hesmondhalgh, 2007). The emphasis is on making a profit, while serving the 
interests of citizens is secondary in the operations of the media, whether in the North or the South. 
Hardy (2010) argued that the communication industry has moved to the centre of global capitalism, 
and public media are thoroughly integrated into capitalist production. Mosco (2008), adopting the 
same line of argument, noted that political economy is the study of social relations, particularly of 
the power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of 
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communication resources. Ojo (2007:106) asserted that political economy is the tool for 
understanding the material production in societies and in the building of social forces and classes. 
McChesney (2008: 12) further explained the political economy of the media as:  
A field that endeavours to connect how media and communication 
systems are shaped by ownership, market structures, commercial 
support, technologies, labour practices, and government policies. 
In other words, media practitioners must not only understand their discipline, they must know how 
politics, economic interests, conflicts and passions interact with, and affect, their subject.  
Merlo (2012:1) traced the metamorphosis of the theory to over 200 years, starting around the late 
1700s, with the work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, but it did not gain recognition until 
around the 1950s:  
In fact, it was not until the 1950s that the term “political economy” 
started to have a different and more precise, meaning, separate from 
the general notion that politics and government policy are intimately 
interrelated. 
The theory of political economy owes its epistemological root to a French historian, Fernand 
Braudel. However, Thussu (2012: 2) and Murdock and Golding (2010) differ on the root of the 
political economy approach, noting that the theory emerged as a result of the critique of capitalism 
postulated by Karl Marx (1818–83). Ojo (2007) also noted that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 
were generally regarded as the founders of scientific political economy. Golding and Murdock 
argued that the Marxist’s interpretation of communication was based on the question of power, 
which, ultimately, was seen as an instrument of control by the ruling class (Thussu, 2012). 
Thussu’s position goes in tandem with the argument of Hardy (2010), which described the media 
as being an instrument of class power.  
Golding and Murdock (1997) have noted that the starting point of a political economy of mass 
media is the recognition that the mass media remain, first and foremost, an industrial and 
commercial organisation, which produces and distributes commodities. They argue that the 
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advances in technology have attracted capital into each medium (Golding and Murdock, 2007: 4-
7). 
Hardy (2010) stated that the presumption of the theory is that media content is influenced by a 
combination of media ownership, finance and support mechanism, such as advertising and 
government policies. Mosco (1996:73) further argued that the transformation of the Press, the 
electronic media and telecommunications from modest, often family-owned, enterprises into large 
businesses of the 20th century industrial order, was a major impetus for the development of the 
theory. 
Reviewing the concept from a different perspective, Hardy (2010) argued that critical political 
economy shares many of the aspirations of liberal accounts of a citizens-serving media, but it 
challenges the ability of corporate owned media to create the more diverse outlets that are needed 
in a democratic media system.  
More importantly, the critical political economy of the media focuses on the fact that culture is 
produced and consumed under capitalism as a fundamental issue in explaining the inequalities of 
power, prestige and profit (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 34). Hardy (2010) opined that critical political 
economy is concerned with the examination of the transformation of media, together with “big” 
questions about the relationships between the media, capitalism and democracy.  
Murdock and Golding (2010:61-64) assert that critical political economy is different from the 
mainstream economy in many respects. For them, the critical political economy approach is 
holistic, historical, and is centrally concerned with the balance between capitalist enterprise and 
public intervention, and it goes beyond technical issues of efficiency to engage with basic moral 
questions of justice, equity and public good. They have argued that five historical processes were 
central to a critical political economy and these are the growth of the media; the extension of 
corporate reach; commodification; the universalisation of citizens; and the changing role of state 
and government intervention. Pointing out the distinct feature of a critical political economy to the 
study of the media, Murdock and Golding (2010: 65) noted: 
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Classical political economists believe that public intervention ought 
to be minimised and market forces given the widest possible 
freedom of operation. Critical political economy, on the other hand, 
points to the distortion and inequalities of market system and these 
deficiencies can only be rectified by public intervention. 
Furthermore, Murdock and Golding (2010: 65-73) noted that what constituted public good was a 
subject of debate within the critical political economy of the media, in which issues linking the 
constitution of a good society to the extension of citizenship rights and the right to participate fully 
in social life are discussed. 
Dwayne and Yong (2011:11) identified four perspectives of the political economy of the media. 
They concluded that all approaches to the political economy of the media “take it as axiomatic that 
the media industries, the structure of the markets they operate in, the patterns of owners, the 
strategies of key players, trajectory of development and so on, are important objects of analysis”. 
They argued that in-spite of the rise in mass communication and media conglomerates in the last 
decade, recent events, particularly the examination of media concentration by governments in 
Europe and the United States, are showing signs that indicate that “we may be witnessing the return 
of the State and standing on the cusp of a post neo-liberal era” (Dwayne and Yong, 2011:15). This 
aptly captures the high level of information management by several governments.  
McQuail (2010: 96) argued that the political economic theory of the media is an offshoot of the 
Marxist analysis of the modern media system. He pointed out that, “political-economic theory is a 
socially critical approach that focuses, primarily, on the relations between economic structure and 
the dynamics of the media industries and the ideological content of the media. From this point of 
view, the media have to be considered as part of the economic system, with close links to the 
political system”. In what appeared to be a major critique of the concept of the political economy 
theory of media, McChesney (2008: 287), argued that because the media are treated as a business, 
the media have become significant anti- forces, particularly in the USA. He noted that democracy 
and capitalism cannot co-exist.  
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While admitting that the media were not the sole or primary cause of the decline of democracy, 
McChesney (2008: 427) argued that media concentration accentuated the core tendencies of a 
profit-driven, advertising-supported media system, hyper-commercialism and the denigration of 
journalism and public service. ‘‘It is poison posting for democracy’’. He further argued that a 
corporate commercial media system has dire implications for politics and broader culture. This is 
what Robert Entman (1986), described as “we are living in a democracy without citizens”. 
McChesney (2008) noted that political economy of the media has always been about the task of 
promoting participatory democracy; and media and communications systems are a means to an 
end, and the corruption of journalistic integrity is always bad, but it becomes obscene under 
conditions of extreme media concentration, as now exist (p: 432). 
Journalism, he argued, needed democracy. “Its survival, as a credible entity, depends upon the 
media being democratic” (Ibid: 151). He, however, lamented that neo-liberalism is altering the 
democratic roles of the media. He noted that “neo-liberalism works best when there is a formal 
electoral democracy, but when the population is diverted from the information, access and public 
forums necessary for meaningful participation in decision making are not in place” (Ibid: 285). 
McChesney (2008: 287) rejected the arguments of the neo-liberal guru, Milton Friedman, who 
noted that profit-making is the essence of democracy, and that any government that pursues anti-
market policies is being anti-democratic, no matter how much informed popular support it might 
enjoy. Instead, McChesney asserted that, in view of the extraordinary importance of media and 
communications in society, the subject of how the media is controlled, structured and subsidised 
should be at the centre of democratic debate (McChesney 2008: 427). 
Taking a different view on the issue, Keane (1991:192) noted that there was a need to rethink the 
relationship between the media and democracy, contending that absolute liberty of the Press, in 
any given society, is not possible, as it has been advocated by free press advocates. He further 
argued that the market-led media, championed by the likes of Rupert Murdoch, does not provide 
a better alternative. Keane therefore advocated a revised public service model that accommodates 
a free press and market-led media forces. Keane correctly observed: “a society that is drugged on 
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either money or political authority, and contains no controversies over freedom of expression and 
representation, is a society that is surely dying or dead”. 
McManus (1994) explained that market-driven values and journalism cannot co-exist, because 
they are mutually exclusive. The market phenomenon, Curran and Seaton (1991:39) argued, gives 
the advertisers a ‘de-facto licensing authority’ over the media since, without their support, many 
newspapers would fold. The end result of this market-driven journalism is that the ratio of the 
editorial content of the media is on the decline. This is what Cronkite (1997) described as sound 
bite journalism where too many stories were dictated by spin doctors and media experts resulting 
in an obsession with sound bites and pictures while issues that matters were neglected and 
investigation journalism suffered. Golding and Murdock (2005) opined that the media, especially 
public service broadcasting, operate in the context of capitalism, and this encourages the 
concentration of ownership, conglomeration and media imperialism.  
. Although the commercialisation of the media allows the availability of more information, the 
quality of this information, as well as the public understanding of it, is declining. This, according 
to Williams, poses a “threat to democracy; public ignorance and apathy is growing as the serious, 
challenging and truthful are being pushed aside by trivial, sensational, vulgar and manipulated 
stories” (Williams, 2003:230).  
On the contrary, Doyle (2006: 13) believed that the commercialisation of the media industry is not 
all bad. According to her, media commercialization is a kind of fresh air that is needed in the news 
market. She argued that, with commercialisation, the media would have access to more resources 
for innovation, and would have an increased range of output, as well as providing a chance for 
previously media-deprived communities to receive news. However, McChesney and Nichols 
(2010:96-97) argued that the media should be funded by the State to save the industry from total 
collapse, thus deepening the cause of democracy.  
Adebanwi and Obadare (2011) argued that, in Africa, particularly Nigeria, where the ruling elite 
is corrupt and runs the state for its own interests, the political economy theory of the media will 
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suffice, because the elite class need the market to introduce new institutions. All these theories are 
relevant, but the Political Economy Theory is very useful to this study and it will be deployed in 
assessing the impact of a corrupt media on democracy, as well as the anti-corruption drive in 
Nigeria. The Political Economy Theory is useful to this study because its sees the content, style 
and form of media products, whether news, features, films, cinema or drama, as being shaped by 
the structural features of ownership, advertising and audience spending (Williams, 2003:56). 
2.8 Theories of Corruption 
To fully understand the existence and persistence of corruption in some states, a conceptual and 
empirical perspective is needed. Some theoretical postulations have attempted to explain this 
global malaise. Shah (2006: 236) posited that these ideas can be broadly grouped into three 
categories: the Principal–Agent Model, New Public Management Perspectives, and Neo-
Institutional Economic Models. 
2.8.1  Principal-Agent Model 
Shah (2006) noted that the most widely used modelling strategy is the Principal-Agent model. He 
argued that a common thread in this model is that the government is led by a benevolent dictator 
(Principal), who is out to encourage government officials (Agents) to use public resources in a 
judicious manner and in the interest of the larger society. Under this Principal-Agent Model, 
several variants have been postulated to explain the phenomenon of corruption. 
 The Crime and Punishment Model was developed by Gary Becker (1968). This model 
stated that scores of public officials will engage in the corrupt practices of accepting or 
demanding bribes as long as the expected gains of their acts exceed the expected costs of 
detection and punishment. To tackle this kind of corruption, it was suggested that the 
discretional power of the public official should be reduced and this would thus increase 
the probability of detection and the penalty for corrupt activities. Klitgaard (1988) later 
re-modelled this view thus: unrestrained monopoly power and the discretionary authority 
of government officials are responsible for corruption in the public sector. He states that: 
Corruption=Monopoly +Discretion- Accountability 
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Similarly, Rose-Ackerman (1978) deployed this model to explain corruption among elected 
officials and petty bureaucrats. To curtail corruption, strong internal controls should be introduced. 
Shah’s model gained wide acceptance in public policy circles and it served as a foundation for 
empirical research and policy design in combating administrative, bureaucratic and petty 
corruption in Asian countries in the 1990s. However, he cautioned that this model was not 
appropriate in highly corrupt countries (Shah, 2006: 236-237). 
 The Legislators and Elected Public Officials. While Becker and Klitgaard’s variant of 
the Principal-Agent Model focused on public officials, this model stated that lawmakers 
and other elected public officials institute or manipulate policy and legislation in favour 
of particular interest groups and in exchange for “rents” or side payments. Legislators 
seek monetary gain from corrupt practices and assess their chances of being re-elected 
against the probability of being caught, punished, and losing an election, and doing so 
with their reputation battered. This conceptual framework is used to analyse political 
corruption or state capture, as in the case of Nigeria.  
 This model was later re-designed as the agency model of corruption (Jain, 2001: 86). Jain, 
citing the work of Rose-Ackerman (1978), noted that legislative corruption cannot survive 
in a world of perfect information. He concluded that there was potential for corruption 
and legislators would balance increased income from corruption against reduced chances 
of re-election (2001: 86). Under this model, it is foreseen that the level of corruption 
within a society would result from an interaction of economic and political pressures 
within the society. Several variants of this agency model also exist, with the conclusion 
that policy-makers are viewed as predatory agents who are able to ignore the interests of 
their principals, almost completely. 
 Three–tier Principal-Supervisor-Agent Model: This is an extension of the 
conventional Principal-Agent Model and was developed by Guriev (1999: 2). In Guriev’s 
three-tier model, the mid-level official supervises the agent and reports to the principal. 
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He concluded that there was co-habitation of the top-level and bottom-level corruption, 
thus leading to a higher degree of corruption (Guriev, 1999: 23). 
 Industrial Organization Model. This model was postulated by Shleifer and Vinhny in 
1993. This model explains how governments function under centralised and decentralised 
forms of corruption. They concluded that, under centralised corruption, bureaucracies act 
like a joint monopoly, whereas, under decentralised corruption, bureaucracies behave as 
independent monopolies. To Shleifer and Vinhny, when bureaucracies acted as 
independent monopolies, the cumulative bribe burden tends to be higher (Shleifer and 
Vinhny, 1993:615). 
 Centralised and Decentralised Corruption Model.This is another variant of the 
Principal-Agent Model. Waller, Verdier, and Gardner (2002: 689-690) distinguished 
between centralised and decentralised forms of corruption. They defined decentralised 
corruption as a system in which higher-level officials collect a fixed amount of bribe-
income from each public official who takes bribes, without knowing the amount of bribe 
collected by the lower-level bureaucrats, while, in a centralised system, the bribe size 
collected by the lower-level officials is determined by the higher level of government, 
and this bribe is later redistributed between the two levels. For them, decentralised 
corruption is less harmful to the economy than a centralised form of corruption. Shah 
(2006) admitted that the effects of these forms of corruption varies widely in regimes. 
Enweremadu (2013), for instance, noted that Indonesia experienced more rapid economic 
development than Nigeria, partly because the country experienced a more centralised or 
organised form of corruption, while Nigeria experienced a decentralised form of 
corruption. 
These variants of the Principal-Agent Model have been widely criticised. Groenedijk (1997: 210) 
posited that the Principal-Agent Theory has not been fully used to enhance our understanding of 
corruption. He argued that, contrary to the view held by advocates of the Principal-Agent Model, 
there was a divergence of interests between the principal and agent, “the actions of the agent do 
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not fully determine the outcomes, and the principal cannot, costlessly, monitor these actions. (Ibid: 
213). He revealed that the main weakness of this model is that it lumps together the dis-utilities of 
different individuals (Ibid:213-214). Groenendijk noted that a related criticism is that “it is unclear 
whom the ‘agency problem’ concerns: the principal or the agent? Much of the earlier agency 
literature focused on the normative aspects of the principal-agent relations, from the angle of the 
principal” (Ibid: 214).  
While re-designing the Principal-Agent Model, he insisted that an agent can decide not to be 
cooperative with the principal, contrary to the view of Klitgaard and Rose-Ackerman. He 
concluded that the principal of these individuals, has the advantage that he can prescribe the pay-
off rules, and that, supposing he is the agent’s superior, he can use directives to control the agent. 
On his part, the agent can take advantage of the fact that the principal is faced with a lack of 
information about the agent’s actions and also with uncertainty about the link between these 
actions and the outcomes. He argued that, in his model, that the principal and the agent are equally 
matched is no repudiation of the possible hierarchical character of the relationship between the 
principal and the agent, as is shown by the possibility that the principal, as the agent’s superior, 
uses directives to curb the agent’s behaviour (Ibid: 214). 
2.8.2  New Public Management Frameworks (NPM) 
This focuses on the fundamental discord within the public sector, especially, with its authorising 
environment, operational culture and capacity. Shah (2006: 240) noted that this discord contributed 
to such a level of impunity in government that the bureaucrat engages in rent-seeking behaviour, 
while citizens lack the necessary powers to constrain them. To tackle the discord, it was suggested 
that fundamental civil service and political reforms should be pursued to create a government that 
is under contract and is accountable. Shah (2006) argued that the fundamental goal of this 
framework was to ensure a greater emphasis on government accountability to the citizens through 
voice and exit mechanisms. Consequently, NPM is expected to reduce the opportunities for 
corruption (Ibid: 240). This model was later re-modelled as concept of the Citizens-centered 
Governance Model. Shah (2006) contended that citizens should be empowered to hold the 
government accountable and, thus, to reduce the opportunities for corruption. However, some 
scholars have rejected this model, arguing that NPM is capable of leading to higher corruption 
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rather than greater accountability (Batle.y 1999. Von Maravic and Reichard, 2003, and Scharpf 
1997). 
2.8.3 Neo-Institutional Economic Frameworks 
This approach argues that corruption results from the opportunistic behaviour of public officials, 
as citizens are not empowered to hold public officials accountable for their corrupt acts or they 
face high transaction costs when doing so. Under this model, citizens are treated as principals, and 
public officials as agents. Principals are faced with incomplete information, while agents (public 
officials) are better informed. Owing to the difference in access to information, public officials 
indulge in opportunistic behaviour that goes unchecked and, in the process; the principals face 
high transaction costs. The end result is that there is a lack of the adequate countervailing 
institutions through which to enforce accountability on those in positions of authority. 
Due to several inadequacies, e.g., a weak judiciary, a lack of public safety and weak enforcement 
mechanisms, in corrupt countries, those who are victimised by corruption are afraid to seek legal 
redress for fear of retaliation from the interests of the powerful. It is therefore recommended that 
citizens’ empowerment, (through devolution, citizens’ charters, bills of rights, credible elections, 
and other forms of civic engagements), be given priority in order to reduce corruption (Shah, 2006: 
242). This model predicted that most of the anti-corruption programmes are unlikely to succeed, 
because they have failed to address the opportunities for corruption in the existing systems.  
2.8.4 Patron-Client System 
Anthropologists have used the culture of gift exchange to explain how social interactions amount 
to corruption, while others have stressed the importance of “solidarity networks and the logic of 
patron-clientism through which power and prestige depend on the redistribution of accumulated 
wealth that, in logic, encourages corruption”, (Olivier de Sardan, 1999, Smith, 2001). This model 
stated that corruption, especially in Africa, can be explained through patronage between Africans 
and their leaders. Corruption is fueled by informal obligations and demands. These obligations are 
often fulfilled through corrupt enrichment. Under this model, corruption existed through mass 
participation and cultural toleration in the society. Richard Joseph, in a 1987 book, Democracy 
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and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and the Fall of the Second Republic, appeared to have 
provided empirical evidence for this model.   
The above models reaffirm the widely held view that the incidence of corruption cannot be 
understood though a single model. However, for the purposes of this study, a combination of the 
Principal-Agent Model and the Patron-Client Framework would be deployed to explain the 
incidences of corruption and other public abuses in Nigeria. The variants of the Principal-Agent 
that are used to explain corruption are the crime and the punishment, as well as the legislators and 
the elected public officials. They are adopted because the models provide useful information with 
which to develop an understanding of corruption in Nigeria. 
2.8.5 Theoretical Framework of the Media 
For a credible study on attitudes towards corruption, it is imperative to provide a theoretical 
foundation through which to gain a knowledge of the nature of corruption and the expected role of 
the media in the fight against corruption. Ekundayo (2012: 3) identified three key theoretical 
foundations upon which an understanding of press freedom and anti-corruption in a democracy 
can be built. The theories include: the behavioural approach, modernisation theory and institutional 
theory.  
Behaviourial Theory: Corruption cannot take place without human interactions. Some scholars 
have argued that the human nature is inherently prone to corruption and it is therefore necessary 
to have rules and regulations governing human interaction, even in the Stone Ages. Kpundeh 
(1995) posited that a personal or individual level analysis of corruption is simply a consequence 
of human nature, and that human beings are all subject to greed and can behave corruptly to 
“rationally maximise their gain”. Ekundayo (2012) argued that the values peculiar to a society will 
influence its perception and understanding of corruption and, by extension, the place of the media. 
He stressed that the behavioural basics of a society, to a large extent, will determine the role of the 
media in anti-corruption in a democratic setting. It can thus be deduced that the value systems of 
a society will not only be a constraint on the media, but will also provide the platform for both the 
media practitioners and the general public. 
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Institutional Influences: This approach is premised on the assumption that mass attitudes to 
democracy and its values are one of the results of well-enshrined principles of formal and informal 
institutions of the state. Kpundeh (1995) noted that corruption is a deep-seated problem, rather 
than merely the workings of a few bad individuals. He argued that most institutional corruption 
can be linked to structural problems, such as inefficient auditing procedures. This position tallies 
with the World Bank and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs), who label corruption the 
“new” arch-enemy of development in Africa (Brown & Cloke, 2004: 273; and Dahlstrom, 2002: 
1). Corruption is described as being endemic and systemic, due to the pressures, demands and 
influences that are brought to bear upon government officials by members of the public, and these 
are critical forces in shaping the actions and decisions of those in power (Kpundeh, 1995: 6).  
Ekundayo (2012) consequently stated that institutions remain the bedrock of a vibrant media in 
anti-corruption campaigns. He argued that it was “almost impossible” to have a vibrant media 
when critical state institutions are weak. The supporting institutions are the laws and the legal 
system, civic and religious bodies and educational institutions. He further noted that what must 
agitate the minds of researchers using this approach is finding plausible responses to the challenges 
of the ethno-religious lines of division in most of the African states, and the lack of a democratic 
ethos among the leaders. In essence, the ethno-religious divisions and the type of political system, 
(be it one-party, two-party, or a multi-party state) will be likely to influence the corruption index 
of a society. 
Modernisation Theory: This theory explains the factors that facilitate social mobility and promote 
the adoption of mass attitudes (McQuail, 2008: 84). Barker (2008) defined modernisation as a 
post-Middle Ages, post-traditional order that is marked by change, innovation and dynamism. It 
encourages industrialisation, but one major feature of modernisation is the promotion of capitalism 
as a means of organising modern states (Barker, 2008: 178). It comes with the destruction of 
traditional ways of doing things and allows for the greed of the few. Modernisation theory 
underpins the assumption that the ideological and political systems of developing countries would 
be harmonised with those of the liberal West (Mikula, 2008: 128). To those in the West, developing 
countries’ lack of democratic progress is due, largely, to widespread poverty, a small middle class, 
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gender inequality and violence, all of which have limited the level of the public that shows an 
interest in democratic governance (Mamdani, 1996). As Ekundayo (2012) puts it, the economic 
conditions of a country can be a major factor in knowing the operations of the media and the anti-
corruption efforts in such a country. Corruption and the role of the media in the anti-corruption 
campaigns in Africa, as this research will attempt to show later, can thus be explained in one of 
these ways.  
2.8.6  The Theory of Globalisation and its Impact on the Media 
The enthronement of global capital by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), through 
policies of liberalization, privatization and deregulation, seriously erode the democratic role of the 
media. What is globalisation, and its impact on the media in Africa, especially in Nigeria?  
McChesney, (1998: 2) has defined globalisation as “the process by which economic activity, 
political values and culture have ceased to be constrained by geography and territory”, and this 
blurring of borders is facilitated by the media. 
Concretely put, William (1994; 224) notes that the media are seen as ‘the shock troops’ of the 
global cultural revolution as millions of people living far away from their countries of origin are 
easily connected to their roots through global media. Ampuja (2004) also argues that the essential 
feature of the globalisation of the media is the ongoing commodification of culture, which allows 
the emergence of a worldwide capitalistic system that promotes the interests and values of the 
powerful corporations which give rise to the ubiquitous brands.  
This is what Watson and Hill (2003: 173) term media imperialism. To them, media imperialism is 
the process whereby the western capitalist media dominate ‘Third World’ countries with the aid 
of communication systems. Similarly, Richstad (2000: 277) has described this phenomenon as 
both cultural imperialism and communication imperialism. He notes that the influx of Western 
media products and the Western way of life, through programming such as Big Brother, were 
eroding indigenous cultures and values. Richstad concludes that there is no even dissemination of 
communication between the West and the Third World nations, stressing that only a one-way flow 
of information exists from the West to the Third World. News from the Third World is rarely 
reported in the West, except for the negative stories. 
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Narrowing the concept of media imperialism down to Nigeria, Umechukwu (2001: 135) posits that 
media imperialism is responsible for the ethnic prejudice system that pervades the Nigerian press. 
He notes that this affects the capacity of the media to perform credibly in the society, as issues of 
national importance in the media are framed from ethnic and religious perspectives. 
More importantly, Williams (1994:224) argues that globalisation allows the audience to engage in 
two-way communication through the inter activity of technologies, such as the internet, email and 
the World Wide Web. Like every such concept, there are optimistic and pessimistic globalisers. 
The pessimists emphasise that new technologies increased the gap between the rich and poor, as 
well as corporations’ control over global culture and the media. In fact, Akindele, Gidado and 
Olaopo (2002: 9) have argued that globalization is a form of entrapment for Africa, noting that 
globalization will lead Africa to “increased penury”. 
The optimistic globalisers have emphasised that new technologies allow for the diffusion of 
Western institutions across the world through which cultures are crushed. The world now has 
interdependence and planetary consciousness (Williams, 1994), thus allowing for what the media 
theorist McLuham (1964) called a global village. Williams (1994) further argues that globalisation 
blurs the cultural identities of local people, which pessimistic globalisers believe to be a threat to 
the nation state and the national identity. The end result of globalisation is that national government 
cannot prevent, regulate or censor the traffic on the information superhighway that is brought to 
their countries, thus freeing local people from narrow national contexts (Ampuja, 2004:67-70). 
One thing that can be deduced from the globalisation theory is its logic of commodification, capital 
accumulation, profit maximization and competition, which permeates the world social order, 
including the media sector (Wood, 1997). Although foreign technologies, facilitated by 
globalisation, engendered the free flow of news and information in Africa, they have not been able 
to guarantee press freedom due to corruption and the lack of participatory democracy.  
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Globalization is increasingly widening the gap between the rich and the poor in the society and, in 
the process, the capacity of the media as a vehicle for social mobilization and participation, which 
are essential ingredients of democracy, is declining across the globe.  
2.8.7  Relevance of These Theories to the Study 
This study has adopted the Patron-Client and the Principal-Agent Models because they provide 
deeper insight into a knowledge of the drivers of corruption in Nigeria. First, the Principal-Agent 
Model variants (the crime and punishment, and two of the variants are based on the following 
premises: 
 
 They seem to best explain the grand and legislative corruption in Nigeria. 
 There are excessive discretionary powers for bureaucrats in Nigeria. 
 Citizens lack the necessary adequate information to hold the state agents accountable. 
 Amoral legislators easily and quickly find themselves re-elected into public offices. 
 The chances of being caught for corrupt acts are far less than the benefits to be gained and 
there is no adequate punishment for the corrupt persons in the society. 
 The type of electoral system appears to favour only the affluent, and thus rent-seeking is 
high. 
 There is a general lack of democratic institutions and traditions in place, and the 
institutions of accountability of governance are non-existent. 
 There is a weak judiciary. 
 There is a lack of political will on the part of those in authority to fight corruption and 
other social vices. 
More importantly, this study also deployed the Patron-Client Model on the following premises: 
 A typical Nigerian politician faces much financial pressure from family, clan, and ethnic 
constituents. 
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 In Nigeria, corruption seems to be a connivance activity, since almost every sector is 
involved. 
 The absence of state welfare institutions forces citizens to rely on politicians and 
bureaucrats for basic social facilities, with informal obligations and demands at the heart 
of politics. 
 Corruption appears to be well tolerated in Nigeria. 
 There are the solidarity networks which seem to justify robbing the state at the expense of 
one’s kith and kin. 
2.8.8  Basic Assumptions of These Theories  
a. Corruption flourishes when the institutions of government are weak. 
b. Corruption will flourish where there is a giver and a taker. 
c. The absence of adequate sanctions for corrupt practices promotes corruption in society. 
d. Unregulated monopoly and unbridled impunity enable corruption to flourish in the society. 
e. Clientelism and prebendalism facilitate corruption. 
f. Corruption is pervasive in all societies, but to various degrees. 
2. 9 Summary 
From the analyses so far, it is clear that the assumption that democratic rule is alien to Africa was 
an incorrect perception. Indeed, democratic virtues were inherent to most African societies’ 
cultures and it would therefore be wrong to describe the on-going process in Africa as being made 
up of waves of democratisation. First, it is the contention of this researcher that the correct 
description ought to be the ‘resuscitation of African democratic culture, which was destroyed and 
buried by colonialism.’ Second, scholars in Sub-Saharan Africa must come up with a democratic 
ethos that recognises the communal nature of most African societies, advocating the application 
of a Western concept of democracy which encourages individualism and that appears to be 
unwieldy and expensive for the continent. The idea of democracy without elections may be given 
serious consideration in view of the social and economic challenges that confront the continent. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     84 | P a g e  
 
 
Literature on the forms of democracy, the role of the media in strengthening democratic rule, media 
as an instrument of democratic accountability and theories of the media, were analysed in order to 
have an understanding of the various issues. The Normative Theory, the Market-Driven Theory 
and the Political Economy Theory of the Media were discussed, but emphasis was placed on the 
Political Economy Theory because it is best suited to explaining and understanding how the mass 
media are influenced by the political and economic factors.  
  
  





3.1  Introduction 
The methodologies employed for this study are largely qualitative and nominally quantitative 
research design. Qualitative methods were used to obtain the primary data for the entire study. A 
qualitative research method allowed the research “to share in the understanding and perception of 
others and explore how people structure and give meaning to their daily lives” (Berger, 2007: 8-
9). In specific terms, in-depth individual interviews, documentary research and discourse analysis 
techniques were used as research tools for this study. The advantages and disadvantages of using 
these methods are examined. Data drawn from major stakeholders in the anti-corruption sector of 
the Nigerian economy were used to complement the primary data gathered through the qualitative 
research methods. This chapter examines the types of research strategies used, the nature of the 
data obtained, the sources of data, the methods of collection, the ethical issues involved, the 
challenges encountered, and how they were resolved, as well as giving a brief background of each 
of the participants. On the whole, the main goal of this section is to demonstrate the data gathering 
and the experience of the researcher during the field research.  
3.2  Justification of Methodological Instruments 
One basic fundamental framework required for all research work, whether qualitative or 
quantitative, is the choice of the specific methods used in any study. Consequently, researchers are 
expected to be careful and to engage in intensive scrutiny of their methods before embarking on 
any exercise. The challenge is further compounded by the non-availability of a single method with 
which to conduct research in the media and cultural industries (Snipe and Spencer, 2000: 2). The 
subject area, the media and cultural studies, determines the best approach to be employed in 
carrying out research in the social sciences. Stokes (2003:19) has argued that the object of analysis 
and the theoretical approach will determine the method to be used. Silverman (2000) noted that 
the objectives of a study are critical to the choice of research method. This approach is also called 
research design. Burnham, Lutz, Grant and Layton-Henry (2008:46) defined research design as 
the logical structure of the research work. 
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This study deployed a mixed-methods approach. This allows for the combination of two or more 
methods in order to avoid the weaknesses that may be associated with one method. Stokes (2003) 
described this as a triangulation method. Stokes argued that the idea of triangulation is that one 
method confirms or reinforces another (Stokes, 2003:27). The triangulation method, as Ritchie 
(2000: 46) noted, involves “the use of different methods and sources to check the integrity of or 
extend, inferences drawn from the data”. The triangulation method deployed for this study involves 
the use of in-depth interviews, the analysis of newspapers, and critical discourse analysis. 
3.2.1 In-Depth Interviews 
An interview is a conversation between two people with the objective of collecting relevant 
information for the purposes of research. Interviews are particularly useful for getting the story 
behind a participant's experiences. The interviewer can pursue in-depth information around the 
topic. This study uses the in-depth interview, and it was deployed because of its usefulness. Kvale 
(2006: 841) puts it more correctly: 
The interviews give voice to common people, allowing them to 
freely present their life situations in their own words, and open for 
a close personal interaction between the researchers and their 
subjects. 
Kvale (1983: 174) notes that in-depth interviews are the best form of approach for qualitative data 
collections. Kvale (1996: 1-2) opined “if you want to know how people understand their world 
and their life, why not talk to them?” The qualitative research interviews used for this study attempt 
to understand the world from the subjects’ points of view, and to unfold the meaning of people’s 
experiences. Easterby-Smith et al (2012: 128) argued that there are three kinds of interviews: 
highly structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. According to Easterby-Smith et al, 
researchers ought to know the advantages and disadvantages of each of the methods before 
choosing the type of interview. The interview method used for this study was semi-structured, as 
“it often gives a higher degree of confidentiality and the replies of the interviewees tend to be more 
personal in nature”. Furthermore, it encourages the respondents to express themselves widely on 
issues raised. Denscombe (2003) and Easterby-Smith et al (2012) noted that interviewees’ answers 
are open-minded, and this permits them to respond to questions based on their life/work 
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experiences. Indeed, the semi-structured interview allowed this researcher to exercise control over 
the nature and length of the answers allowed for each interviewee, so as not to lose track of the 
whole exercise.  
This study used the in-depth interview method because it allows the interviewer to identify non-
verbal clues from the interviewees. Non-verbal cues, such as voice, intonation, body language, 
etc., always add to the verbal answer of the interviewee. Besides, Green and Thorogood (2014: 
125) argued that one major limitation of interview as a source of data was that ‘they only provide 
access to what people say, not what they do and it is difficult to know any ‘essential truth’ on their 
response. The interviewer and interviewee also directly react to what the other says or does during 
an in-depth interview session (Wengraf, 2001: 194). It is very easy to terminate an interview, if 
compared to other research methods.  
Similarly, in the course of an in-depth interview, a tape recorder may be permitted. Experiences in 
the field show that using a tape recorder ensures that the interview report is more accurate than it 
would be by merely writing out notes. The main disadvantage of using a tape recorder is that it is 
time consuming to transcribe the entire interview. Bryman (2001) notes that one hour of tape takes 
five to six hours to transcribe. 
Indeed, Easterby-Smith et al (2012) listed six practical issues that may affect the outcome of an 
interview. They include: obtaining trust; being aware of social interaction; using appropriate 
language; getting access; choosing the location for the interview; and recording interviews. All 
these were fully observed in the course of the interviews which took place in Abuja, Lagos and 
Ibadan, three major metropolises in Nigeria.   
Data was collected for the study primarily through detailed interviews with select- stakeholders in 
the anti-corruption sector in Nigeria. They include the former heads of the anti-corruption 
agencies, politicians, legal practitioners, civil society activists, religious leaders and media 
practitioners. Interviewees were chosen based on selective sampling. Sampling means the 
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“scientific” process of picking manageable population sizes that would enable a researcher to 
derive data for his study, as well as drawing inferences that are capable of findings.  
Twenty-five persons: two former chairmen of ICPC, one former member of EFCC staff, one 
former senior official at the Code of Conduct Bureau, two religious leaders, three practising 
journalists, two veteran journalists, one labour leader, two civil activists, two politicians, two legal 
practitioners, three staff from the anti-corruption agencies, two retired academics and two federal 
lawmakers, were selected for the interviews. The interviewees were chosen based on specific traits. 
These traits include work experience and their position on the integrity issues. This sampling is 
what, Wimmer and Dominick (2000: 84) have described as the purposive sampling technique. For 
them, a purposive sample is a “subject selected on the basis of specific characteristics or qualities”. 
This study deployed the In-Depth Interview (IDI) as the primary source of data collection for the 
study. 
Specifically, Sarantakos (2013: 55) noted that many researchers are opting for mixed-methods 
approach because the methods offered them the possibility of achieving high standard, validity, 
popularity and credibility.  Although mixed methods research have been criticized by some 
scholars but it remains an acceptable procedure in social research (Sarantakos 2013: 56). 
3.3  Methods for Qualitative Data Collection  
Easterby-Smith et al have argued that there are three basic approaches and tools for collecting 
qualitative data, and they have termed them natural language data, observation and interactive 
methods. The natural language data method involves using language to gain insight into social and 
organizational realities. Views, perceptions and opinions of the critical stakeholders in the field 
are discovered, and this is achieved through the in-depth interview (Easterby-Smith, 2012:126). 
The second grouping, which is termed the observation method, basically involves an ethnographic 
approach. This method deploys the examination and understanding of symbols, settings and 
observation in a context, achieved through, either participation, non-participation and, sometimes, 
visual methods, and the last tools are described as interactive methods, which involves such 
instruments as photographs or other visual metaphors. This study deployed in-depth interviews 
and documentary research. This qualitative research is explanatory in nature because it is 
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concerned with why the media are corrupt and what forces and influences these acts of corruption 
(Ritchie, 2000: 28). 
Archives, libraries and the Internet were also used as secondary sources. An enormous amount of 
data on the corruption in the country exists in the public domain, but this study focuses on textual 
information and analyses, which Easterby-Smith et al have termed archival research (Ibid: 50). 
Major sources for archival research deployed for this study include: newspaper stories, 
official/annual reports and the in-house quarterly magazines of the various anti-corruption 
agencies in Nigeria, where their activities and achievements are reported. Archival data are usually 
part of secondary data sources and these secondary data are used to complement the primary data 
sources. The main difference is that primary data is collected by the researcher who can frame the 
data collection after the research questions (Ibid.140).  
Having practised journalism for two decades, and as a member of staff in the media department of 
one of the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria, ICPC, my exposure to these two different 
professions has given me leverage and has thus created “a strong form of constructionism” 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2012: 51). It should be stated that the usage of mixed methods is still a 
subject of major debate among researchers, with those in favour arguing that using a range of 
different methods within the same study will increase the validity and generalization of results and 
the potential theoretical contribution, and those against the mixed methods doubting the 
competence of researchers to deploy different methods, and their possible ability to manage the 
contradictions that might emerge in the course of such an approach (Ibid: 61).  
Qualitative research is used for this study in order to address the five research questions that have 
been asked to facilitate an understanding of corruption within the media and its consequences for 
their advocacy role (Snipe and Spencer, 2003: 5). Qualitative research was deployed because it 
allows me, the researcher, to attach meaning to people’s actions, decisions, beliefs and values 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Bryman, 1988: 8 and Snipe and Spencer, 2003: 3). Quantitative 
research was sparingly used to make inferences from the data sourced from secondary sources. 
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All the interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2014 in Nigeria. Access to the interviewees 
was facilitated by the contacts that this researcher had earlier developed as a journalist. Since the 
issue of corruption is openly discussed in the country, as well as being widely reported in the 
media, it was not difficult for the respondents to state their views. However, in order to avoid any 
uniformity of opinions that may arise from members who belong to the same professions, efforts 
were made to contact people who were not working in the same office/organisation and, in the 
process, this study managed to tap into their reservoir of knowledge. This enabled the researcher 
to obtain access to a diverse range of views from various stakeholders.  
All the interviews were audiotaped with the permission of the respondents and they were 
transcribed in full soon after the interview-sessions. Notes were also taken copiously during the 
interviews and expanded in detail later. These written notes supplemented the recorded interviews.  
Each interview lasted about 45minutes. The venues/settings of the interviews were decided by 
each of the respondents. Most of the interviews were conducted in formal or informal settings, 
such as living rooms, a study, the press centre, while others were held in formal office rooms and 
news rooms. A few of the respondents, especially media practitioners, preferred to be interviewed 
at the weekend. As most of the stakeholders interviewed were fluent in English, the major part of 
the interviews was conducted in the English language. In the course of the interviews, some 
respondents resorted to their local languages to emphasise their arguments. The oral tradition was 
employed by this researcher to allow people to tell their own stories. Storytelling—narrative—is 
crucial to how people communicate their understanding of the world, and stories are seen as the 
primary means by which we articulate, store and communicate knowledge and experience (Mikula, 
2008: 133).  
The interviews centred on how the anti-corruption agencies deployed the media in their campaigns; 
the role(s) of the non-state actors in the drive to reducing corruption in the country; what role the 
journalists ascribed to themselves in the campaign, if any; the impact of democratic rule on the 
media and other non-state actors in the crusade against graft and other social vices, together with 
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other issues that emerged during the course of data collection. The interviews were aided by a 
semi-structured interview guide. 
Additional data on corruption were collected from: Constitutions of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (1960, 1966, and 1999); Freedom of Information Act (2011); ICPC Act (2000); EFCC Act 
(2004); Code of Conduct Act; ICPC Law Reports (2013); and ICPC Annual Reports (2002 to 
2015). A sample of the major accounts of corruption that appeared in newspapers during the period 
covered by this research work were collected. Opinion articles and news reports related to 
corruption during the Obasanjo regime (1999-2007) and the Yar’Adua/ Jonathan regime (2007-
2014) were collected mainly from four English Language newspapers: The Punch, The Daily 
Trust, the Nigerian Tribune and ThisDay. Occasionally, stories from online media, such as Sahara 
Reporter, Premium Times Online, and African Examiner, were used to complement newspaper 
reports on corruption. The Punch and Nigerian Tribune, both based in the South-West, were picked 
because of their circulation, while ThisDay and Daily Trust were picked in order to know how the 
location and ownership structure are reflected in the framing of stories. 
An important aspect of this thesis is the analysis of two cases: one involving former President 
Olusegun Obasanjo and his Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, in 2006, and the Otedola/Faroukfuel 
subsidy scam in 2012. The choice of two stories as case studies is based on their resounding impact 
on the well-being of the citizens of the country. The Obasanjo/Atiku scams exposed the depth of 
political corruption in the country, and the fuel subsidy scam showed the connivance of political 
elites and the deprivation caused to the basic social necessities of life.   
Finally, the proceedings of the Anti-Corruption Committee of the Nigerian Senate were observed 
during one of its sessions preceding the passage of the 2012 and 2013 annual budget of the ICPC 
and EFCC. The researcher also observed one of the visits of the House of Representatives 
Committee on Anti-Corruption and National Ethics in the course of its oversight functions to the 
ICPC Headquarters in Abuja, in 2013. This not only aided the political construction of issues that 
are related to corruption, but also allowed the researcher to assess the commitment of the two 
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committees to the anti-corruption campaigns. In the course of these sessions, notes and information 
distributed to the press were collected. 
3.4 Methods of Data Analysis 
This study is largely qualitative, and nominally quantitative, as it deployed frequency and 
percentage sparingly. Discourse analysis is also a form of collection of the data used in natural 
language data. Shaw and Bailey (2009) define “discourse analysis as the detailed study of language 
in use such as talk, written text and symbol. It is concerned with the technique and competencies 
involved in successful and unsuccessful conversation. They noted that this allow researchers to 
build up a model of social life from an empirical understanding of actual linguistic event (Shaw 
and Bailey, 2009: 7). This method is not limited to conservations, but it may combine other textual 
sources, such as newspaper articles, newspaper headlines, sign language, including non-verbal 
cues (Ibid:199). Gregen (1999) noted that there are three main ways of viewing discourse analysis 
and these involved structure, rhetoric, or discourse as process. Easterby-Smith et al argued that 
language and linguistic systems and practices are formative in shaping social and organization 
realities. Wodak and Meyer (2009) argue that Critical Discourse Analysis allow researchers to 
gain proper understanding of how language functions in articulating and transmitting of knowledge 
in a given situation. Mogashoa (2014) noted that written or oral messages convey meanings when 
analyse. Furthermore, Critical Discourse Analysis, Easterby-Smith et al argue, offered a useful 
tool for the social sciences, which enables an examination of aspects of power and persuasion 
within organisations to be considered in the context of a research study. Fairclough (1995); Lucke 
(1996); and Van Dijk (2006) also supported the use of Critical Discourse Analysis by researchers. 
Notwithstanding the shortcoming of Discourse Analysis, which Easterby-Smith et al (2012: 200) 
noted as being mainly inductive, this study deployed Critical Discourse Analysis because it is 
primarily concerned with analyzing the ways the four media houses that were picked for the 
research covered on anti-corruption issues within the period under study. Documentary research 
complements the in-depth semi-structured interviews and discourse analysis used in this study. 
Sample of stories on the two case studies were randomly picked within the period under study. 
The placement of the stories (front or inside page) in the newspapers was crucial in picking the 
stories for the analysis. 
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3.5  Ethical Issues 
Ethical issues in research have become a subject of intense debate among scholars, especially 
among those in the medical and social sciences. Recently, there has been a consensus (from the 
latter) on a common set of principles guiding the conduct of research (Easterby-Smith et al, 2012: 
95). Bell and Bryman (2011) identified ten ethical practices common that are to nine professional 
associations in the social sciences. The ten principles complied with in this study include: ensuring 
that no harm comes to participants; respecting the dignity of participants; seeking the full consent 
of each participant; protecting the privacy of subjects; ensuring the confidentiality of research data; 
protecting the anonymity of individuals/organisations, as the case may be; avoiding deception 
about the nature or aim of the research; full disclosure of affiliations; honesty and transparency in 
communicating about the research and avoiding any misleading or false reporting of research 
findings. The first seven principles protect the interests of participants and the last three ensure 
accuracy and a lack of bias in results. 
This study strived for conformity with all the ethical standards expected in a research project of 
this nature. All the legal conditions and the actual and potential effects of the Official Secret Acts 
and Freedom of Information laws operating in Nigeria were fully complied with in the course of 
carrying out this study. At present, there is no data protection law in Nigeria.  
All the participants involved in this study were adequately and properly briefed on the nature of 
the research, were treated politely and accorded due respect. The permission of all the interviewees 
was secured before the commencement of interviews. Almost Ninety-seven percent of the 
participants consented that data obtained from the interviews may be used. They also consented 
that their full identities, (especially their names) be disclosed while only three percent refused full 
disclosure of their identities. Those who gave their consent to use their names were reflected as 
such, but those who withheld consent did not object to being described. Samples of consent form 
endorsed by the participants are attached as appendix ix. 
In the course of the interview sessions, the research procedure and the purpose of the research were 
fully disclosed, both verbally and in writing. Written consent was also secured from each 
interviewee before the interview process, and assurance was given to them that all of the 
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information would be kept both anonymous and confidential. This researcher explained the 
purpose of the research by providing information sheets, written in the English language, which is 
the official language in Nigeria. It was also explained to them that the interview was strictly for 
academic purpose. 
Furthermore, each of the interviewees was informed that participation was voluntary and, more 
importantly, all of the documents and archival materials that were used in the study are public 
documents. No classified item was used, most especially because the nation recently passed the 
Freedom of Information Act. Similarly, all documents/facts whose accuracy could be potentially 
challenged or might provoke doubt were completely avoided in the study. Of course, concern for 
the jobs and personal security of the interviewees was given due consideration before choosing 
them, while the security of the researcher was also considered.  
3.6   The Experience of the Researcher 
The previous and current work experience of the researcher enhanced the fieldwork, as it was easy 
to gain access to different sources and personalities. It was also easy to book interview sessions 
with major stakeholders in the anti-corruption agencies in the country and to hear from former 
senior colleagues and friends in the media. My current status as a staff member of ICPC also 
provided the requisite access to the libraries where the archival materials that I needed were. As a 
media practitioner, my media background offered deeper insight, and this is one of the principles 
behind ethnography research. The researcher’s journalistic background was helpful, although it 
created hindrances in different ways. Having worked in the print media for almost two decades, 
the knowledge of the operations of the print media helped my interview skills and, paradoxically, 
this knowledge and my contacts, as well as being a staff member of ICPC, put me at a 
disadvantage, since some professional colleagues (journalists) were not completely disposed to 
being interviewed on the issue of the brown envelope. In fact, two of them, described my attempt 
to carry out a study on corruption within the media as an attempt to cast aspersions on my primary 
constituency. This comment, was later reflected in their manner and ways when I obtained 
responses from the media practitioners. I was very conscious of this throughout the interview 
period. This made maintaining an effective balance between being a trained journalist and an 
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academic researcher more tasking. However, I was able to overcome this challenge because the 
research was not funded by any organisation. 
One major drawback noticed in the course of the study is that most of the media respondents 
interviewed seemed to be economical with the truth in responding to the interview questions, while 
some were simply “patronising” as former colleagues. On seeing this trend, I took time to explain 
the purpose of the study to the practising journalists and reassured them that the research was 
purely being carried out as an academic exercise, and this had nothing to do with day-to-day work. 
This strategy later worked, as some interviewees relayed their experiences more freely. 
3.7  Personal Reflections in the Course of the Research  
After exhausting the nine-month Study Leave granted me at the commencement of this programme 
by my employers, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC) in 2011, it was difficult for me to secure another Study Leave (be it with or without pay) 
to return to London in 2013, in order to enable me to attend some seminars preparatory to the 
submission of my thesis.  
The politicisation of my Study Leave within the Commission, to a great extent, resulted in my 
inability to complete the programme within three years, and I was forced to apply for writing-up 
status twice. While battling to secure my release to go back to London to complete my programme, 
I was posted outside Abuja. I was posted to the Academy of the Commission located in Keffi, 
Nasarawa State. The distance is about 66 kilometres from where I reside. I thus had to travel 66 
kilometres each way daily, and, given the lack of public transport facilities, good road networks 
and the high cost of transport, this became a serious challenge to me. The stress of travelling daily 
and the financial implication of my studies and family took a huge toll on me, to the extent that I 
mooted the idea of abandoning the research and withdrawing from the programme. The situation 
was further compounded by the sudden death of my mother, this dealt huge blow on my capacity 
to concentrate and to reduce my academic work from 130,000 words to 90,000 words, as advised 
by my Director of Studies in the UK. It took me some time to regain my concentration level. 
However, with the encouragement of my immediate family and a couple of friends in Nigeria, I 
was able to carry my studies to completion. 
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3.8  Summary 
This chapter has delineated the main sampling techniques adopted in selecting the participants, 
their backgrounds, the nature and the quality of the data generated by the 25 stakeholders 
interviewed. The main method deployed was qualitative, using in-depth interviews with critical 
stakeholders in the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria, such as journalists, former top operatives of 
the anti-graft agencies, religious leaders and civil social groups. The ethical issues of this study, 
along with the challenges and shortcomings encountered in its course, were highlighted, including 
the ways in which they were resolved. The aim was to ensure that the methodological strategies 
employed did not in any way affect the outcome of the study. Data obtained from the respondents 
were used in the Critical Discourse Analysis framework of the study. Empirical results from 
archival research and newspaper analyses were highlighted in Chapters Five and Six, while 
findings from the interviews were captured and discussed extensively in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
  
  




HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION DRIVE IN NIGERIA:1960-
2015 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter attempts to provide a historical perspective on the problems of corruption in Nigeria 
and analyses the various efforts of successive governments to curb the menace. This section also 
attempts to provide answer to two questions: Is corruption inherent in African socio-economic 
systems? Is contemporary public corruption in Africa and Nigeria, in particular, a legacy of 
colonialism? Additionally, a brief review of the Acts that set up the three major anti-corruption 
agencies in Nigeria is undertaken, and the ways in which they have impacted on the level of 
corruption since the advent of democratic rule in 1999. 
4.2  Corruption: Not an African Disease 
The phenomenon of corruption is not a new concept in the world. The origin of the phenomenon 
is as old as man himself (Akpabio, 2005: 16; Obasanjo, 2014: 3). Fashola (2008) traced the origin 
of corruption as far back as the times of the Greek and the Roman empires. He noted that corruption 
was so pervasive during these periods that the Roman Empire had to privatise tax collection by 
auctioning the right to collect taxes to private citizens (Fashola, 2008: 6). Similarly, Stapenhurst 
and Sedigh (1999) argued that corruption existed in one form or another from the earliest days of 
social organisation. They revealed that the growth of the internet and media conglomerates have 
forced corruption out into the open (Stapenhurst and Sedigh, 1999: 2). Wraith and Simpkins (1963) 
noted that 19th century Britain was marked by great corruption. Africa, however, came under the 
searchlight during the post-colonial era, when scholars blamed the lack of development on the 
prevalence of corruption on the continent.  
Corruption is now regarded as the social malaise or disease of the entire world (Chazan, et al 1999; 
Osoba, 1996; Williams, 1991; Doig & Theobald 2000; Nwolise 2006; Johnson & Sharma, 2004; 
Dowden 2009). It is not restricted to race, ethnicity, gender, education or illiteracy. It is neither a 
Christian nor a Muslim issue. Indeed, Dike (2005: 281) argued that corruption is not only found 
in democratic and in dictatorial governments but also in feudal, capitalist, and social economies. 
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It is therefore difficult to genetically determine the nature of corruption (Andreski, 1968: 95). Its 
degree and extensiveness vary from one setting to another (Chazan et al, 1999: 188 and Stapenhurst 
& Sedigh, 1999: 1). Moreover, Bicchieri and Duffy (1997: 477) note that corruption should not be 
blamed on moral fault or cultural backwardness “but is found in the mixture of economic and 
political power”.  
The EU Home Affairs Commissioner, Cecilia Malmstroem, in a report on a survey carried out in 
28 countries of the EU, noted that the extent of corruption in Europe was "breath-taking" and it 
costs the EU economy at least, 120bn euros (£99bn) annually (BBC News Reports, 3rd February, 
2014). Dowden (2009: 446) explained that “corruption exists everywhere, not just in Africa. It 
happens in Europe and America, in India and China”. Equally, corruption also accounts for the 
changes of several regimes, or the defeat of certain strong political parties in some countries 
(Olojede, 2008:276). Neild (2002: 209) noted that the Western countries are implicated in 
corruption of various degree by encouraging corruption by their action rather than impeding it. 
Moisa (1995:188) and Heywood (1997) assert that corruption was a global problem. 
Nigeria has not been spared the scourge of corruption. There is hardly any area of Nigerian national 
life that has not been affected by the menace. Nigeria attained some form of notoriety for 
corruption in 1996, (during the military administration of Gen. Ibrahim Babangida), when she was 
regarded as the most corrupt nation in the world by Transparency International (TI). Nigeria was 
again ranked number one in the TI ratings between 1997 and 2000; it moved on the ranking to the 
2nd position in 1999, 2001, 2002 and 2003. Nigeria improved in her ranking by moving to the 3rd 
slot in the world in 2004 and 2005; 5th in 2006, the 9th most corrupt country in 2007 and the 16th 
in 2008, 36th in 2015 (TI annual reports). Nigeria has consistently been on the negative side of the 
TI reports from 2009 to date.  
Describing Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries is therefore questionable, taking into 
consideration that the bulk of Nigeria’s hard currencies are lying in private accounts in Europe and 
America. Dibie (2007: 2) argued that a country which condones money stolen from another 
country is as corrupt as the public leaders who stole the money. What Dibie is stressing is that the 
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countries in the West (Western Europe and North America), are hypocrites to accuse Nigerians of 
corruption when they are providing safe havens for looted funds from Nigeria. This is, however, 
not to admit that corruption is not a challenge in the country.  
The consequence and negative impact of corruption have also been widely treated in various 
studies in the field (Diamond, 1991; Doig & Theobald, 2000, Balogun, 2003: 130; Rose-
Ackerman, 2010, Nwolise, 2006; World Bank Annual Reports, 2002-2013; Obuah, 2010; 
Adeniran, 2008; Osoba, 1996, Dike, 2003; Joseph, 1987; Sen, 2000; Zowam, 2007; Donnelly, 
2008: 1; Ahuche 2013; Ayoola, 2007; Ellis, 2006). However, there are scholars who believe that 
corruption has a positive side which can be helpful to the society. Searle (1987: 3) noted that 
corruption is an endemic part of capitalism, but many businessmen think it is not an illegal one.  
Leff (1964) in his “Economic Development through Bureaucratic Development” paper argued in 
defence of the functional role of corruption. Huntington argued that corruption may be helpful to 
the maintenance of a political system in the same way that reforming it would be (Huntington, 
1968:64). Otite (1986: 12) also asserted that corruption is a lubricator of the social system, a means 
to overcome economic obstacles and bureaucratic red-tapism. Indeed, Wraith and Simpkins (1963) 
have argued that corruption speeds up economic or financial transactions, thereby acting as grease 
which oils the wheel of business. Often, the example of the Asian Tigers, namely, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Indonesia, are usually cited to support this argument. Jain (2001:93), 
however, has asserted that there was no concrete evidence that corruption aids development. This 
section attempts to undertake a historical overview of corruption and various anti-corruption 
efforts since the birth of the country over 100 years ago. 
4.3  Historical Overview of Corruption: The Nigeria Story 
4.3.1  Pre-Colonial Era 
It may not be out of place to claim that the partition of the African continent in 1884 by the West, 
at the Berlin Conference, without the consent of the people of the continent, was the beginning of 
corruption in African society. The logic is simple: Slavery, which was an integral part of 
colonization, which has been variously condemned and described as evil, may be, in the real sense 
of the word, called corruption, when the various definitions by scholars are taken into 
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consideration. If corruption is an abuse of power for private gain (Transparency International, 
1998), then the invasion and eventual partition of the African continent by Europeans is one. 
Iheukwumere and Iheukwumere (2002) argued that various laws and treatises forced on the 
Africans were part of the corrupt tendencies of the Europeans. Despite all the talk about colonialist 
exploitation, nobody has yet tried to make a statistical cost-benefit estimate; but it is certain that 
what was “taken out” far outweighed what was “put into” the colonies (Andreski, 1968: 22). It can 
be easily inferred that corruption is one of the legacies of colonialism in Africa (Ekeh, 1975; 
Osaghae, 1988; Falola, 1998, Tignor, 1993; Lawal, 2006, Ochapa, 2006; Agbaje, 2007; Adadu, 
2006, Aluko 2007). 
Ezeanya (2012) noted that administrative corruption, although it is rampant across Africa today, 
is an alien culture. She argued that pre-colonial Africa was founded on strong ethical values, 
sometimes packaged in spiritual terms, but with the end result of ensuring social justice and 
compliance. As Ezeanya bluntly remarked: 
Colonialism introduced systemic corruption on a grand scale across 
much of sub-Saharan Africa. The repudiation of indigenous values, 
standards, checks and balances and the pretensions of super-
imposing Western structures destabilized the well-run bureaucratic 
machinery previously in existence across pre-colonial Africa 
(Ezeanya, 2012:1). 
Even though most pre-colonial African communities may have been centralised or decentralised 
and with unwritten laws, heavy emphasis was placed on accountability and good governance 
across several of the pre-colonial African communities (examples in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, 
Zimbabwe), thus most of the anti-social behaviour was derived from British colonial rule (Osoba, 
1996: 372 and Aluko, 2006; 18-20). The Portuguese, French, German and Belgian colonies were 
also implicated in such anti-social conduct. In his own verdict, Ochapa (2006: 40) noted that 
corruption was an immigrant into Nigeria but, regrettably, it has been naturalised. Similarly, 
Olanipekun (2013: 3) argued succinctly: 
Indeed, the common values of every indigenous society that now 
constitutes Nigeria abhorred stealing, greed, avarice, bribery and all 
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the vices which constitute the bundle of crime against God and 
humanity, known as corruption. 
In Nigeria, among the Yoruba of South Western Nigeria, the institution of Oyo-mesi, the king 
making body, acted as a check against the abuse of power by the Alaafin (the Oba), or the King of 
Oyo. The Alaafin was constrained to rule with caution and respect for his subjects. When proven 
to have engaged in acts that undermined the interests of his subjects, such as gross miscarriage of 
justice for personal gain, the Oyo-mesi would, in the words of Yunusa Salami “present him with 
an empty calabash or a parrot’s eggs as a sign that he must commit suicide” since he could not be 
deposed, according to tradition (Ezeanya, 2012: 7). 
The warrant chieftaincy, which was introduced by the British in South Eastern Nigeria as an 
administrative policy, created a new and disproportionate playing field, and also the elusive culture 
of modern corruption in the Nigerian public life (Ahuche, 2013: 14). Andreski (1968) argued that 
in the ancestral villages Africans were taught the tribal code of behaviour, which was later derided 
by their British teachers, who preached something quite different (Andreski, 1968: 79-80).  
In the same vein, Olurode (2009: 15) opined that some proverbs and fables from the African value 
system provided a good framework for distinguishing between moral and immoral conducts, legal 
or illegal acts, in the pre-colonial era. Some Yoruba proverbs such as: “Ise ni ogun ise”, hard work 
is the only solution to poverty, “Oruko rere san ju wura ati fadaka lo”, a good name is better than 
silver and gold, “Bi iro ba lo ni ogun odun, ojokan l’ooto o ba”, no matter how long a lie may take, 
truth will prevail one day, “Bi enia bajale l’ogun odun seyin, to ba da aso aran bora, aso ole loda 
bora”, If one adorns a colourful dress, 20 years after having committed a theft, it remains a stolen 
dress. Some of the proverbs may not condemn outright, but they certainly do not communicate an 
automatic approval of corruption. 
While some may want to dispute the level of transparency and accountability in pre-colonial 
communities, it is the contention of this study that Chinua Achebe’s works, such as No Longer at 
Ease (2010), Things Fall Apart (2001) and The Anthills of Savannah (2001) as well as Olagoke’s 
work, The Incorruptible Judge (1972) explain in detail how the problem of corruption crept into 
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African culture and the attempts by the people to resist the new culture imposed on Africans. 
Ezeanya (2012: 12) insisted that ‘there is no genetic code that predisposes Africans to corruption; 
neither does the “C” shaped sickle cell in the African’s blood stream stand for corruption. The 
prevalence of corruption in Africa today is a process of socialisation, which commenced with the 
excessively corrupt colonial government’. Indeed, Achebe (2012: 54) described the pre-colonial 
era as “Era of Purity”.  
Furthermore, Hasty (2005: 281) argued that the contact of Africans with people all over the globe 
has contributed to the incidents of corruption. Olurode (2009: 17) submitted that Africa’s 
encounter with the West was responsible for the blurring of the threshold between ethical and 
unethical behaviour. Lawal (2006:24) asserted that the white man concocted and used corruption 
to foster materialism and used it as a subterfuge to disintegrate the traditional social structures that 
existed in pre-colonial African society. 
There are others who contend that corruption was part and parcel of pre-colonial communities in 
Africa, even before the arrival of the colonial masters. They believe that corruption was ubiquitous 
in complex societies from Ancient Egypt, Israel, Rome, and Greece, and so Nigeria cannot be an 
exemption (Fashola, 2008 and Ahuche, 2013). 
It is the contention of this study that colonial masters should not be blamed wholly for the culture 
of corruption in Nigeria. Several studies have shown that the intra- and inter-ethnic wars of the 
pre-colonial era were waged mainly to subjugate other communities and to extract slaves. Many 
such slaves were sold off in exchange for items such as mirrors and guns.  This study believes this 
to be correct just as it initially argued that colonialism is also corruption. 
It is the view of this researcher that the checks and balances systems put in place in pre-colonial 
African societies might have been modified to meet the challenges of the modern state had the 
colonial masters not intervened in the evolution of the Black race. This may be contestable, but 
available records support this argument as already discussed above.  
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Indeed, the cultural explanation for the high level of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa has also 
been faulted. Obasanjo (2014:3) argued that the culture of giving gifts in most African societies 
should not be blamed for the high level of corruption. He insisted: 
In our traditional life, there are hospitality and appreciation. These 
are distinguished, distinct and different from corruption in three 
significant ways. One, they are neither solicited for nor demanded. 
Two, they are not covert, they are open and transparent. Three, they 
are token items and not in terms of huge amount of money or 
obscenely kind. 
In essence, giving gifts should not be an excuse for the high number of incidences of corruption 
pervading the political landscape of Nigeria. 
4.3.2 The Colonial and Post-Colonial Periods 
Even though the origin of corruption in the pre-colonial era may appear to be controversial, it is 
clear however, that the same cannot be said of the colonial era in most African societies while the 
colonial masters were in control. Osoba (1996), for instance, asserted that the colonial rule, which 
ended after the Second World War in 1947, was essentially the unrestrained autocratic and 
authoritarian rule which allowed the perpetration of corruption by some British colonial officials, 
aided and abetted by their compatriots among the European Christian missions (Osoba 1996: 373). 
Osoba asserted: 
Thus, the colonial authorities and their collaborators presided over 
a fraudulent and corrupt accumulation system, which facilitated the 
appropriation of huge surpluses for shipment to the metropolis from 
Nigerian peasant farmers and other petty producers via unequal 
terms of trade. 
Osoba stated that this mode of colonial authoritarianism generated a crisis of accumulation 
whereby, in the favonian sense, “to be white was to be rich, and to be black was to be poor” (Ibid: 
373). The end result of this system is the desperation among Nigerians to cut corners in order to 
join in with the new life introduced by the colonial government. 
Similarly, Okonkwo (2007: 1) noted that, as early as 1947, Commissions of Inquiry were held in 
Nigeria to investigate cases of corruption. He asserted that the purpose of the inquiries was to 
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expose wrong-doing and punish the culprits. The colonial government report of 1947 indicated 
that “The African’s background and outlook on public morality is very different from the present 
day Briton. The African in the public service seeks to further his own financial interest.” 
Several cases of wrongdoing were reported in the three regions. In 1956, for example, the Foster-
Sutton Tribunal indicted the Premier of the Eastern Region, Nnamdi Azikiwe, for corrupt acts for 
his involvement in the affairs of the African Continental Bank (ACB) while still serving as a 
government official, which is contrary to the Code of Conduct for public officials. The tribunal, in 
its reports, felt that Zik did not sever his connections to the bank when he became a Minister, and 
he used his influence to further the interests of the ACB (Osoba, 1996: 375, Ahuche, 2013: 19).  
In the words of a colonial government official, “Were a UK minister to be involved in a series of 
transactions, the result of which was that public funds were used to support an otherwise shaky 
institution in which he was directly interested, he would be forced to leave public life.” However, 
Zik did not resign; instead he called for general elections in the region, which his party later won 
(Okonkwo, 2007). This sit-tight syndrome, as exhibited by Zik, still holds sway today in 21st 
century politics in Nigeria, as Nigerians are yet to witness their politicians resigning their positions 
for alleged indictment for corrupt practices. 
Okonkwo (2007: 1) argued that the colonial government did not prosecute Zik for his failure to 
observe the code of conduct for government officials because they believed the NCNC was the 
only party to embrace national unity. “Without Zik, the NCNC would collapse”. 
A similar but different corrupt act was reported in the Western Region, where Obafemi Awolowo, 
the first Premier, and Ayo Rosiji, E. O Okunowo and Abiodun Akerele, three members of his 
party, the now defunct Action Group, were found guilty of corruption by the G.B.A. Coker 
Commission of Inquiry of 1962. The Coker Commission, in its reports concluded that “We came 
across evidence of reckless and, indeed, atrocities and criminal mismanagement and diversion of 
public funds. We are satisfied that Chief Awolowo knows everything about the diversion of large 
sums of money…into the coffers of the Action Group”. The report stated that Awolowo, “without 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     105 | P a g e  
 
 
a doubt, has failed to adhere to the standards of conduct which are required for persons holding 
such a post,” (Okonkwo, 2007; Ahuche, 2013; and Osoba, 1996). The report of the commission 
was later described as a “spiteful document” because Chief Ladoke Akinola who had been premier 
of the region for more than two years was implicated severally in the investigation was exonerated 
by the commission, (Diamond 1988: 140 and Falola 2009: 82).  
Moreover, the Northern region was also not spared incidents of corruption during the colonial era. 
The then the Sardauna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello, was accused, in 1943, by his own cousin, 
Alhaji Abubakar Siddique, of misappropriation of tax revenue as District Head of Gusau. It was 
during this period that the Northern Government enacted the “Customary Presents Order”, a law 
to tackle allegations of corruption levelled against some of the native chiefs in Borno, which was 
reported to have been perpetrated in collaboration with the British officials in the district (Jibril, 
2010).   
Ayoola (2007: 9) also asserted that grand corruption was gradually introduced into Nigeria during the 
colonial period. This period, he argued, witnessed Western education, new religions, urbanisation, a 
monetised economy, formal international trade and exchanges. People were drawn from their 
traditional religions, beliefs and cultural practices and exposed to material demands and money as both 
a status symbol and social security. Dibie (2007: 554) noted that British people introduced corruption 
to Nigeria. 
Indeed, the Indirect Rule system in Southern Nigeria brought with its incidences of public office 
corruption, as Native Court Presidents, known as Warrant Chiefs, were accused of the abuse of 
office and corruption. Ayoola (2007) noted that Warrant Chiefs were appointed outside the 
established traditional community chieftaincy system and they misused the new powers vested in 
them, and considering the influence and power these chiefs wielded all kinds of tricks and activities 
were exploited to secure and keep such appointments. 
The above scenario is not an indication that pre-colonial African society was a perfect one, devoid 
of sharp practice. This researcher is of the view that the colonial masters contributed in no small 
measure to the vexed issue of corruption. Mulinge and Lesetedi (1998) argued that the colonial 
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masters systematically used material inducements to compel African chiefs/administrators to 
collaborate with them in the pursuit of their colonial project of dominating and exploiting their 
own peoples. The practices of post-colonial Africa's political and bureaucratic elite are merely an 
extension of such colonial policies and practices, and they have served to entrench it (Diamond, 
1988). 
Of course, it was not only Africans that were indicted for corruption related offences during the 
colonial era. Lawal (2006) asserted that some colonial officers were implicated in the 
embezzlement of public funds. According to him, between 1901 and 1902, three British officers 
in the colonial office namely, Captain Gonstedt, Major Hull and Captain MacLachlan, were 
accused of embezzling, three pounds, 28 pounds and 250 pounds respectively. Lawal (2006: 6-10) 
further explained that “between 1905 and 1906, a total sum of 942 British pounds was recovered 
from officers who were accused of various forms of financial fraud, while queries involving 640 
pounds were yet to be replied…. Up to the 1940s, the colonial office still received serious reports 
of financial fraud in the colonial administration system”. 
Despite the fact that the first set of acts of corruption were uncovered in 1947, nobody was charged 
in Court for alleged corruption until 1966. The only case that was sent to the Court in Nigeria 
during this period (1947-1966) was, “the State versus Odofin Bello” (Olurode 2009: 28). Indeed, 
Dowden (2009: 446) opined that no big man in Nigeria has ever been punished for theft. This 
shows a gross lack of the political will to confront corrupt acts. 
The period of de-colonisation was said to have witnessed an upsurge in corruption related offences 
in Nigeria. Osoba puts it in a proper perspective: 
It is to this period of decolonization that the pervasive phenomenon 
of 'ten per cent' kickbacks dates, as executors of a whole array of 
public policies insisted on a pre-payment to themselves of at least 
10 per cent of the value of the favour being sought by members of 
the public (contract, licence, scholarship, employment, etc.) before 
performing the duty for which they were already being paid 
generous salaries and allowances from the public treasury (Osoba, 
1996: 374). 
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Providing reasons why the British officers did not include the tackling of corruption as part of the 
de-colonisation process, the Governor of the Eastern Region, Sir Clement John Pleass asserted that 
“the aim of the colonial government was not to establish a standard of honesty in public life. Only 
time and education can do that. Eventually, sufficiently honest and enlightened people will be 
thrown up to rebuild the prosperity and good governance of the region” (Okonkwo, 2007). Have 
African leaders who governed after Independence fared any better on the issue of transparency and 
accountability in the First Republic and thereafter? 
4.3.3  The First Republic: 1960 – 1966 
The economic system bequeathed to most African countries coupled with the lack of private capital 
of those who took over the government at independence, have been blamed for the massive looting 
of public wealth from the State, which had previously been unavailable to them (Osoba, 1987: 
375). Osoba argued that those who were unable to meet their financial obligations previously saw 
their new positions as an avenue along which “to diversify their activities into new, often dubious 
and fraudulent forms of primitive private accumulation at public expense”.  
 
Osoba (1987) further explained that various forms of fraudulent awards (including the outright 
sale) of unsecured government loans, produce buying and import licenses, to their cronies; the 
inflation of government contract values (and the consequent enlargement of payable kickbacks to 
themselves); and the straightforward looting of the treasury by its very custodians, which had 
hitherto been unheard of in Africa, suddenly became part and parcel of the post-colonial era on the 
continent. Osoba (1987: 375) gives a graphic description of the situation in Nigeria:  
The attempt by each of the three major political groupings that 
dominated the politics of the First Republic to monopolise, or, at 
least, have the lion's share of the loot from this systematic 
plundering of the wealth of the nation was a major factor in 
intensifying and embittering the contest for political power along 
ethno-regional lines --- a process whose high points were the Action 
Group crisis (1962), census crisis (1962- 63), federal election crisis 
(1964), Tiv rebellion (1964-65), and Western Nigeria election crisis 
(1965), making the country, more or less, ungovernable and 
culminating in the Kaduna Nzeogwu military coup d’état of January 
1966 and the tragic and disastrous intrusion of the Nigerian armed 
forces into the political life of the country. 
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It can be inferred from the above that the post-Independence situation created an environment of 
political instability, the accumulation of wealth, and greed leading to an unstable Nigerian polity. 
Nwankwo (2001) and Igwenyi (2010) argue that the neo-colonial and dependent nature of the 
capitalism inherited from the British served as vehicle for mindless corruption and primitive 
accumulation of wealth. In fact, Ahuche posited that most of the political crises of the First 
Republic were a direct result of corruption in the country (Ahuche, 2013: 22). 
Furthermore, Okonkwo (2007) argued that the First Republic, with Azikiwe as the President, was 
marked by widespread corruption. Government officials looted public funds with impunity. 
Federal Representative, and Minister of Aviation, K.O. Mbadiwe, flaunted his wealth by building 
a palace in his hometown. When asked where he had gotten the money to build such a mansion, 
K.O. replied, “From sources known and unknown”. The Minister of Finance, Chief F.S. Okotie-
Eboh, responded to charges of accumulation of wealth by government officials by quoting from 
the Bible, “To those that have, more shall be given. From those that do not have, shall be taken 
even the little they have” (Okonkwo 2007). 
Achebe (1983: 82) insisted that the political thought of both Awolowo and Azikiwe, who were the 
two political leaders in the South West and South East regions at Independence, was based on a 
politics of material gain. “If we were a more discerning people, we should not have trusted them 
with our lives, even in the fifties and sixties”. 
The citizenry was said to have condoned the looting of the public wealth of the State in the First 
Republic. Olunloyo (2008) noted, for instance, that when Adegoke Adelabu was accused of 
mismanagement of public funds, Ibadan people picked up their talking drums and retorted thus: 
  Igunnu lo ni Tapa, 
  Tapa lo niIgunnu 
  Eje ki Adelabu o kowowana. 
Meaning that, Igunnu masquerade belongs to the Nupe 
The Nupe own Igunnu 
   Let Adelabu continue squandering our money (Olunloyo, 2008: 16). 
  




This kind of posture from the segment of the populace may have encouraged other politicians to 
engage in sleaze until the first military coup in the country on 15th January, 1966. Invariably, 
corruption was the hallmark of the First Republic, as undisguised personal enrichment by political 
office holders, through bribery, fraud, kickbacks, misappropriation and outright stealing, dotted 
the country’s political landscape. 
Indeed, Okonkwo (2007), Adebanwi (2010) and Ahuche (2013) opined that the military coup of 
1966 was a direct response to the corruption in the First Republic. The popular support of the coup 
showed that the people rejected corruption. Despite the brutal killings of First Republic politicians, 
there was a widespread embrace of the acts in the country. The assassinations of Okotie-Eboh, 
who was notorious for flaunting his ill-gotten wealth; the Premier of the Western Region, Samuel 
Akintola, Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of the Northern Region, were applauded 
by the masses (Okonkwo, 2007: 13; Ahuche, 2013: 23; Osoba, 1996: 375). Adegboyega Adewale, 
in his famous book, “Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigerian Coup”, described the 
politicians of the First Republic as a bundle of ‘ten percenters’, who engaged in widespread corrupt 
practices, especially kickbacks, at both the federal and regional levels (Adegboyega, 1984: 48). 
4.3.4 The Military Era: 1966 – 1979 
Okonkwo (2007) argued that the Aguiyi Ironsi government, which assumed power after the first 
military coup, instituted a series of Commissions of Inquiry into the affairs of the Nigerian Railway 
Corporation (NRC), the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN), Nigerian Airways (NA) and the 
Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA), but those indicted for corruption were released by Yakubu 
Gowon, who later became the country’s Head of State through the coup of July, 1966, thus killing 
the zeal to punish the corrupt. “Youths knew no other life than corruption.” “One could steal if he 
shared with those in the right places” (Okonkwo, 2007: 17). Ahuche (2013) argued that the Biafran 
civil war of 1967 contributed seriously to the high level of corruption, as the looting of public 
institutions, especially the offices of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) in some of the disputed 
areas were targeted. He asserted: 
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Many believed that corruption, for the most part of Gowon’s 
administration, was kept away from the public view until 1975, 
when the corruption scandal surrounding the importation of cement 
engulfed his administration. Many officials of the Defence Ministry 
and the Central Bank of Nigeria were involved in the scandal. 
Officials were accused of falsifying ship manifests and they inflated 
the amount of cement to be purchased (Ahuche, 2013: 24-25). 
It was during this period that two prominent individuals from the Middle Belt area of the country, 
Joseph Gomwalk and Joseph Tarka, the former Governor of the now defunct Benue-Plateau State 
and the former Federal Commissioner, respectively, were accused publicly of engaging in corrupt 
acts and were prosecuted to serve as a deterrent to others (Osoba, 1996: 376). Nwabueze (1992) 
noted that the Gowon administration, which came into power as the “corrective” regime, soon 
found itself entangled in a web of corruption that was more audacious and daring than the 
politicians that they overthrew. Military rulers, governors and their bureaucrats, or “super 
permanent secretaries”, notoriously became brazenly corrupt (Nwabueze, 1992: 161). The oil 
boom of the early 1960s also provided a fertile ground for corruption by the elite (Osoba, 
1996:379-380).  
It was in the light of this open knowledge of corruption by the Gowon administration that General 
Murtala Muhammed seized power on 29th July, 1975, and enacted the Corrupt Practices Decree 
of 1975 to probe the activities of all of the governors of the previous administrations, and all except 
two were found guilty of corruption and, consequently, had their property seized. The Murtala 
Muhammed regime embarked on a massive purge of the civil service and the military on account 
of corruption.  
The Murtala Muhammed regime had been described by some scholars as Nigeria’s first genuine 
experiment in ethical revival and cleansing (Ahuche, 2013: 25-26), but the euphoria that followed 
the massive purge of corrupt officials in the military and public service was short-lived, as Murtala 
Muhammed was killed in an aborted coup on 13th February, 1976. However, the second-in-
command (then Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters) General Olusegun Obasanjo assumed 
power and pursued the administration’s programme until 1979, when he handed over to an elected 
civilian government. Corruption was also reported during this period, especially during the 
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FESTAC 1977 festival. Moore (2010: 142) suggested that the 1976 Upside Down music by Fela 
Anikulapo-Kuti highlighted the confusion and corruption of the Gowon-Obasanjo period. 
Unfortunately, musicians like Fela, and Thomas Mapfunmo in Zimbabwe, who can use music to 
draw people’s attention to the abuse of those in public trust, are now absent from the music scene 
in Nigeria. 
Certainly, 1966 to 1979 was an era of sustained and uninterrupted military rule in Nigeria. It spans 
13 solid years of military governance, when the culture of impunity and secrecy crept into the 
political vocabulary of Nigeria. Osoba (1987: 376) opined that the military’s lack of respect for 
financial discipline contributed to the high level of corruption from the Gowon regime to the 
Abacha era. 
4.3.5  The Second Republic: 1979- 1983 
Nigeria was in a state of confusion and corruption when the civilian government, headed by Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari, was sworn in as the elected, democratic President of Nigeria on 1st October, 1979. 
Corruption continued unabated during his administration, and nothing substantial was done to 
tackle the increasing cases of corruption in the country (Okonkwo, 2007). The monetisation of the 
electoral system by the Murtala Muhammed-Obasanjo regime was such that only the highest 
bidder would get elected into public office in the country. Osoba (1987: 379-380) averred: 
The strategy used by the politicians of the Second Republic to 
recoup their losses, while extending and consolidating their 
accumulative base, amounted to the refurbishing, combining and 
enlarging of all the known techniques of primitive accumulation 
previously practised in Nigeria. 
This monetisation of democratic processes, which commenced in 1979, has since been carried over 
to the Fourth Republic, making public office, a “do-or-die” affair for those interested in seeking 
public life through politics. Shagari’s failure to address this problem caused the administration to 
be perceived as notoriously corrupt (Ahuche, 2013:26).  
Okonkwo (2007) and Ahuche (2013) argued that it was because Shagari was ineffective in 
stopping the looting of public funds by the democratically elected officials that General 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     112 | P a g e  
 
 
Mohammadu Buhari, on 31st December, 1983, led a military coup to halt corruption in the country. 
Buhari arrested the state governors and commissioners and brought them before tribunals of 
inquiry. All of the bank accounts of politicians were frozen. Scores of federal government 
buildings mysteriously caught fire after investigators started to probe the finances of the officials 
working in the buildings. The NITEL building in Lagos, for instance, was set ablaze by yet-to-be 
identified arsonists in 1982 (Adebanwi, 2010: 113). 
Buhari latched on to unchecked corrupt practices in the Shagari government and overthrew the 
civilian government. Justifying the military coup, Buhari, in his first broadcast to the nation, said, 
“It is necessary to reiterate that this administration will not tolerate fraud, corruption, squander-
mania, abuse of office or graft, or other such vices that have characterised that administration for 
the past four years” (Buhari, 1983: 2).  
The Buhari government also launched the War Against Indiscipline (WAI). While this regime 
lasted, many former party stalwarts, ministers, state governors and commissioners of the previous 
administration, were arrested and prosecuted by Special Military Tribunals on the Recovery of 
Public Property. Some were imprisoned for life, for crimes ranging from ‘unlawful enrichment’ to 
‘contributing to the economic adversity of the country (Osoba 1996:381). It was yet another 
opportunity to instil integrity and accountability into public life in Nigeria, but the experiment was 
cut short by another palace coup, staged by General Ibrahim Babangida, the number-three-man in 
the government. Joseph (1987) asserted that corruption was responsible for the collapse of the 
Second Republic in Nigeria. The question to be asked is “why were the two previous 
administrations that attempted to rid Nigeria of corruption truncated mid-way into their 
programmes?” Further studies may be needed in this area. 
4.3.6 The Military Era: 1983–1993 
In the process of trying to instil discipline and probity into the way things were done in the country, 
the Buhari regime introduced several draconian decrees and launched policies which the masses 
considered very harsh (Osoba, 1996: 381). It was under this regime that Decree No 22 of 1984, 
which allowed for the imprisonment of journalists without trial for daring to publish a report or 
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story that might embarrass the government, was enacted. This regime was perceived to have 
violated the human rights of the citizenry by its style of governance. 
It was this perceived human rights violation that Babangida used as leverage and seized power in 
August, 1985. President Babangida promised to operate an open door policy and to respect human 
rights. After consolidating himself in power, Babangida’s regime was credited with 
authoritarianism, brazen corruption and waste. Though a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
was introduced, the activities of government were not reflective of austerity, frugality and 
modesty. Babangida released the politicians convicted by the Buhari tribunals, and he returned 
most of the seized assets (Ayoola, 2007:15). It was during the Babangida regime that Nigeria spent 
$12billion that brought more poverty, foreign debt, failed banks and wretchedness to the citizenry 
(Dibie, 2007: 7). 
In-spite of his popular Mass Mobilisation for Social Justice, Self-Reliance and Economic Recovery 
(MAMSER) programme, the eight and half years of Babangida’s administration became notorious 
for profligacy, “settlement”, kickbacks, looting of the treasury, etc. Corruption became official 
state policy during this regime (Adebanwi 2011). Throughout his time in power, Babangida never 
took a public stand against corruption (Osoba, 1996: 381). He was later forced to step aside in 
August, 1993, for an Interim Government, after annulling the June 12th, 1993, presidential 
elections which had been adjudged to be free and fair (Akinola, 2002:5). As Ahuche (2013: 26) 
noted: 
Babangida transformed Nigeria into a family company in which 
every member was a shareholder, with even the Governor of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria accountable to the family, and had to make 
available whatever sums of money were demanded by any of its 
members. 
While the regime of Babangida lasted, merit and hard work occupied the back seat in the affairs 
of the country. Lamenting the scenario, Osoba (1996: 381) asserted:  
The main distinguishing feature of corruption in the Babangida 
regime was the pervasive culture of impunity: any of his acolytes, 
however high or low in status, could loot the treasury to their heart's 
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content with impunity, provided they remained absolutely loyal and 
committed to the leader. 
Gboyega (1996: 7) asserted that corruption under Babangida’s rule reached “unprecedented levels 
in incidence and magnitude” and Dowden (2009: 282) noted that “corruption is a way of life in 
Nigeria”. 
4.3.7  The Military Era/Aborted Third Republic: 1993-1999 
Following the series of street protests that followed the annulment of the June 12th presidential 
elections, which are believed to have been won by the late M. K. O. Abiola, Babangida was forced 
to step aside. An Interim National Government (ING), headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, was 
appointed to rule the country and, owing to the fact that the Interim Government lacked the 
capacity to curtail the annulled election crisis, it did not last. The Interim National Government 
was overthrown in a palace coup on 17th November, 1993, by a group led by General Sani Abacha, 
the number-two-man in the administration. Like previous military regimes, the Abacha regime 
described itself as a “corrective” one. However, events later revealed that the administration was 
seriously implicated in gargantuan corruption on a scale that was unheard of in the history of the 
country (Olaniyan, 2005: 19).  
Igbikiowubo (2004) opined that it was a government that was known more for its silence. Millions 
of dollars were siphoned out of the country to Swiss Banks through dubious contracts and, in most 
cases, were taken directly from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) through security accounts 
maintained for criminal purposes. Adebanwi (2010) described corruption under Abacha as 
unparalleled in the history of Nigeria. An estimated $3.4billion were said to have been stolen by 
Abacha during his five years of most brutal and kleptocratic rule. Abacha’s loot was traced to 130 
banks across the world (Adebanwi, 2010). Although, this government introduced War Against 
Indiscipline and Corruption (WAIC), and set up the Failed Banks Tribunals to recover fraudulent 
loans, all of these were not reflected in the actions of the leadership (Igbikiowubo, Vanguard, 
Nigeria, December 6th, 2004). Dibie (2007) asserted that Babangida and Abacha were pioneers in 
hypocrisy, adept in corruption, greedy in material acquisition, in a fashion that had never been 
witnessed in the history of the nation (Dibie, 2007:7). Osaghae (1998) and Gboyega (1996) noted 
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that Nigeria witnessed its worst phase of military corruption under the Babangida and Abacha 
governments.  
General Abdusalami Abubakar took over power upon the death of Abacha in June, 1998. 
Successive Nigerian governments have been discussing with the Swiss government how to recover 
several billions of Nigeria’s money stashed away in Swiss Banks by Abacha and his family. The 
Nigerian government has only recovered $825 million from Abacha’s family members, leaving a 
total of $1.3 billion frozen in several banks in Switzerland, Luxembourg and Liechtenstein (TI, 
2004: 102). The government also seized assets believed to have been corruptly acquired by the 
Abacha family and their aides, and some were even auctioned. Although Abubakar’s government 
was in office for nine months, it was characterised by much corruption. Indeed, the regime 
allegedly depleted the country’s foreign exchange reserve from $6.7billion in 1998 to $4billion at 
the end of March, 1999 (Kolade, 1999; Olaniyan, 2005). 
The money recovered from the Abacha family also disappeared mysteriously, and no meaningful 
explanation was offered for this. Abubakar was never questioned or charged for his alleged 
corruption, simply because he handed power to the civilians as promised. However, all contracts 
awarded, and appointments made, during this period were suspended by the Olusegun Obasanjo 
civilian administration that came to power on 27th August, 1999 (Ahuche, 2013:31). 
Obasanjo set up the Christopher Kolade Commission to look into all contracts awarded by the 
Abubakar regime. Kolade, in his report, recommended the cancellation of 1,684 contracts, valued 
at $1.08billion, from a total of 4,072 reviewed. In addition, 770 contracts, valued at $4.6million, 
were recommended for renegotiation (Ayoola, 2007: 12). It appeared, then, that the civilian 
government was poised to rid the country of corrupt vices and restore her to the path of 
accountability and probity (Olaniyan, 2005: 21). However, events later revealed deep corruption 
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4.3.8  The Fourth Republic: 1999 - 2015 
Determined to confront the problems of corruption head-on, the first Bill forwarded to the National 
Assembly by the Obasanjo administration, was the Anti- Corruption Bill in June, 1999, which was 
intended to deal with the scourge of corruption (Adebanwi, 2010 and Enweremadu, 2013). That 
Bill was passed and signed into law on 13th June, 2000. This law, the Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Act, set up the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC). The Commission commenced operation on the 13th September, 2000, with 
the swearing-in of Justice Mustapha Akanbi as its pioneer Chairman (ICPC Annual Reports, 2005). 
In his inauguration speech on 27th August, 1999, Obasanjo admitted that corruption was a hydra-
headed problem confronting the country, and he pledged to tackle the menace: 
Corruption, the greatest single bane of our society today, will be 
tackled head-on at all levels... No society can achieve anything near 
its full potential if it allows corruption to become the full-blown 
cancer it has become in Nigeria. One of the greatest tragedies of 
military rule in recent times is that corruption was allowed to grow 
unchallenged, and unchecked, even when it was glaring for 
everybody to see (Obasanjo’s inauguration speech 27th August, 
1999).  
President Obasanjo also created the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) when 
Nigeria was included in the Financial Action Task Forces blacklist of Non-Cooperating Countries 
or Territories (NCCTs). The FATF’s list of NCCTs includes countries or territories which are 
perceived to be non-cooperative in the global fight against money laundering and terrorist 
financing. At that time, Nigeria, and eight other countries, were on the list. Obasanjo set up EFCC 
to remove Nigeria from the NCCT’s list (Adebanwi, 2010: 31). The Due Process Office was also 
created in 2002 to further tackle corruption. 
4.4  Overview of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Nigeria  
The abortive coup led by Kaduna Nzeogwu on 15th January, 1966, was staged to end corruption 
and indiscipline in the country. The agenda of Nzeogwu and his colleagues always formed the 
basis of all subsequent military coups until the Abacha regime of 1996 (Osoba, 1996). In other 
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words, reducing the menace of corruption has always been on the agenda of successive 
governments in Nigeria. 
Between the 1970s and the early 1990s, various programmes were initiated by the government to 
exterminate corruption. The Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo administration waged war against 
corruption through its Jaji Declaration. The civilian administration of Shagari also waged war 
against vices, while the Buhari regime launched “War Against Indiscipline” to confront the 
scourge. The Babangida administration, in 1989, inaugurated a committee on corruption and other 
economic crimes, while the late Abacha set up a number of probing panels to fight corruption 
(Bello-Imam, 2004). In spite of various initiatives by successive governments to fight corruption 
in the country, no single top official in government was indicted and punished for corruption for a 
decade, from 1990 to 2000 (Ayittey, 2006: 13). This was despite the fact that, between 1966 and 
1999, successive administrations justified their seizure of power on the grounds of their purported 
desire to curb corruption (Adebanwi, 2010).  
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Table 4.1: The table below provides a summary of the past and current initiatives. 
S/N Government/Regime President Anti-Corruption 
Programme(s) 
Year(s) 










Shehu Shagari Ethical Revolution 1979-
1983 
3. Military Regime Muhammadu 
Buhari 




4. Military Regime Ibrahim Babangida Mass Mobilization for Self 











Olusegun Obasanjo Independent Corrupt Practices 
and Other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC), 
Economic and Financial 





Musa Yar’Adua and 
Goodluck Jonathan 
Continued with the anti-




Researcher’s field work 2015 
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No single Politically Exposed Person (PEP) is presently serving a jail term for corruption related 
offences, despite the existence of EFCC and ICPC (Aluko, 2006: 202; Akanbi, 2014). I argue that 
this is due to the lack of a strong political will on the part of those in authority to ensure the full 
implementation of the various anti-corruption laws in the country. 
4.4.1  The Obasanjo Government: 1999-2007 
To some extent, the Obasanjo Government is the only Nigerian government during the study 
period that appeared more determined from the start to act against corruption. I argue that the 
pressure from its foreign democratic allies was also a reason for which it had to appear to do so. 
Soon after taking power on 29th May, 1999, the government introduced the Anti- Corruption Bill 
to the National Assembly, which was passed as the “Anti-corruption law of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 2000”. 
The government also set up the ICPC, which became bogged down with court injunctions, brought 
upon it by accused persons. The constitutional nature of the enabling law was also challenged in 
the Court by Ondo State and 19 others. The matter was eventually thrown out by the Supreme 
Court three years after it was instituted (Interview with Akanbi, 2012). The government also set 
up the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which caused what Nwolise (2007) 
described as an “earthquake in the world of the corrupt in Nigeria”. This anti-graft agency was led 
by a Lawyer, Nuhu Ribadu. 
4.4.2 Anti-Corruption Agencies in Nigeria 
Many legal instruments exist in the country today to fight corruption. They include the Criminal 
Code under which the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) can prosecute persons alleged to have engaged 
in corrupt acts: The Penal Code, applicable in the North; the Code of Conduct Bureau; and the 
Recovery of Public Property Act of 1984, the Independent Corrupt Act 2000, as well as the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2002/2004. However, this study will attempt to 
highlight the provisions of the Code of Conduct Bureau, ICPC and EFCC, and to reveal the extent 
to which they can be effective. 
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4.4.2.1 Overview of the Code of Conduct Bureau 
The Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) is the first major legal anti-corruption agency set up by the 
Federal Government of Nigeria. It has the primary responsibility of checking corrupt practices in 
the Nigerian public service. It was established in 1979 during Obasanjo’s military regime. The 
1979 Constitution provided a list of Codes of Conduct for public officers. The military 
administration of Murtala /Obasanjo inaugurated a board before handing over power to the civilian 
government in July. This failed to make any impact because the National Assembly of the Second 
Republic did not pass the enabling law. Ten years later (1989), the Bureau got its legal mandate 
under the Babangida regime. 
The Code of Conduct provision has since maintained a permanence of sorts in the Fifth Schedule 
of all the constitutions that followed thereafter; 1989, 1993, 1995, and the current 1999 
constitution. A brief review of this code reveals:  
In the Code of Conduct for Public Officers, as contained in Paragraph 12(1) of Part 1 of the Fifth 
Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, as amended, the constitutional right of citizens is specifically 
spelled out. Paragraph 3(a) of Part 1 to the Third Schedule to the 1999 Constitution, as amended, 
provides that the Code of Conduct Bureau shall have powers to receive declarations by public 
officers made under Paragraph 12 of Part 1 of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, while 
Paragraph 3(c) of the same Schedule empowers the Bureau to “retain custody of such declarations 
and make them available for inspection by any citizen of Nigeria on such terms and conditions as 
the National Assembly may prescribe.” 
Since 1999, the Code of Conduct Bureau has declined all requests for access to asset declarations 
by public officers on the ground that the National Assembly had not issued any instrument 
prescribing the terms and conditions upon which citizens could have access to the information 
(Media Rights Agenda 2012). 
4.4.2.2 Overview of the ICPC Act 2000 
It has been argued that it was the inability of the Code of Conduct Bureau and other ad-hoc 
legislation enacted prior to 1999, to reduce the menace of corruption that prompted President 
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Obasanjo to establish the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC) in 2000. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was similarly set up in 
2002. The establishment of the two anti-graft bodies marked a new phase in the war against 
corruption and the abuse of power in Nigeria.  
The ICPC Act deals comprehensively with corruption in both the public and private sectors of the 
economy. The Act stipulated that the ICPC shall consist of a Chairman and 12 other members, to 
be selected from each of the six geo-political zones of Nigeria. Section 6 of the Act provides for 
the duties of the ICPC, including:  
[a] Where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that any person has conspired to commit or 
has attempted to commit or has committed an offence under this Act or any other law 
prohibiting corruption, to receive and investigate any report of conspiracy to commit, attempt 
to commit or the commission of such offence and, in appropriate cases, to prosecute the 
offenders; 
[b] To examine the practices, systems and procedures of public bodies and where, in the 
opinion of the commission such practices, systems or procedures aid or facilitate fraud or 
corruption, to direct and supervise a review of them; 
[c] To instruct, advise and assist any officer, agency or parastatal on ways by which fraud or 
corruption may be eliminated or minimised by such officer, agency or parastatal; 
[d] To advise heads of public bodies of any changes in practices, systems or procedures 
compatible with the effective discharge of the duties of the public bodies as the Commission 
thinks fit to reduce the likelihood or incidences of bribery, corruption, and related offences; 
[e] To educate the public on and against bribery, corruption and related offences; and 
[f] To enlist and foster public support in combating corruption. 
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The ICPC thus has a three-pronged mandate of enforcement, which includes receiving complaints 
and prosecuting offenders under the Act; a prevention mandate, that is, the review of practices, 
systems and procedures of public bodies which aid or facilitate corruption and instruct, advise or 
assist any officer, agency, or department on ways to minimise fraud or corruption; The last, but 
not the least, mandate is educating and mobilising the public against bribery and corruption.  
The Act also defines 19 offences relating to corrupt practices and the abuse of office, among which 
are: accepting gratification (Section 8); fraudulent acquisition of property (Section 12); fraudulent 
receipt of property (Section 13); making a false statement or return (Section 16); bribing a public 
officer (Section 18); the use of office or position for gratification (Section 19); bribery in relation 
to auctions (Section 21); bribery in relation to contracts (Section 22); and failure to report bribery 
in transactions (Section 23). Moreover, the Act forbids the Commission from engaging the press 
in its investigative activities (Section 27, Subsection 4). It introduced a presumption of corrupt 
enrichment against any public officer who fails to explain the source of excessive interests in 
property having regard to his/her past and current emoluments. 
Under the Act, the President and other high-ranking officers of the executive arm of government, 
who are covered by the immunity clause of Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution, can also be 
probed. By virtue of Section 52, the Chief Justice of Nigeria is empowered to authorise an 
independent counsel (a legal practitioner of not less than 15 years’ standing) to investigate an 
allegation of corruption made against the President or Vice-President, or against any State 
Governor or Deputy Governor.  
The Independent Counsel is required to make a report of his findings under this Section to the 
Federal Legislative House or to the relevant state legislative house, as the case may be. Section 64 
of the Act makes provision for the protection of informers and information. Many journalists 
believe that the Section, which states that information shall not be disclosed to the public, should 
be removed to make the education mandate of the Commission more proactive (ICPC, Act 2000). 
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Following the Presidential assent to the ICPC Act in 2001, the President and Commander-in-Chief 
approved the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Monitoring Unit (ACTU) in federal ministries, 
extra-ministerial department/agencies and parastatals. Each ACTU will serve as the eye of the anti-
corruption body in their agency, with powers to carry out the duties of ICPC except for the 
prosecution of cases. The Human Rights Watch (2011) reports on the war against corruption in 
Nigeria, scored the anti-graft agency low mark. 
4.4.2.3 Overview of the EFCC Act (2004) 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was created in December, 2002, 
through an Act of the National Assembly. The Commission began operations in April, 2003, when 
its Board was inaugurated. It is charged with the following responsibilities: 
 Investigation of all financial crimes e.g., Advanced Fee Fraud (otherwise known as 419) 
Money Fraud, Counterfeiting, Illegal Cash Transfer, Futures Market Fraud, Fraudulent 
Encashment or Fraudulent Diversion of Funds, Contract Scam, Forgery of Financial 
Insurance or Dud Cheques, etc. 
 Coordination and enforcement of all economic and financial crimes law, enforcement 
functions conferred on any other person or authority. 
 Adoption of measures to identify, freeze, confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist 
activities, economic and financial crime-related offences or properties, the value of which 
corresponds to such proceeds. 
 Adoption of measures to eradicate and prevent the commission of economic and financial 
crimes, with a view to identifying individuals, corporate bodies or groups that are involved. 
 Facilitation and rapid exchange of scientific and technical information, and the conduct of 
operations geared towards the eradication of economic and financial crimes. 
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 Determination of the extent of financial loss, and such other losses, by government, private 
individuals or organisations. 
 Collaboration with government economic bodies within and outside Nigeria in carrying 
out its functions, wholly or in part, analogous with those of the Commission. 
The EFCC is also empowered to enforce the following laws: 
1. Money Laundering Act 1995; 
2. The Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act 1995; 
3. The Failed Bank (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994, 
as amended; 
4. The Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act, as amended; 
5. Miscellaneous Offence Act (Cap 410LFN); and 
6. Any other law or regulation related to economic and financial crimes. 
A critical analysis of the enabling acts revealed some basic differences between the ICPC and the 
EFCC, with regard to the functions of each organisation. It is instructive to note that while ICPC 
investigates corruption offences, as enshrined in the ICPC Act 2000, such as gratification, corrupt 
offers/demands, fraudulent acquisition of property, making false statements or returns in respect 
of money or property received, bribery, conferring undue advantage using one’s office, price 
inflation and awards without budgetary provision, and others, EFCC investigates financial crimes, 
including advanced fee fraud (419), money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal money transfers, 
fraudulent encashment of negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam, 
terrorism cybercrime and others. Second, ICPC implements only the provisions of the ICPC Act 
2000, while, on the other hand, EFCC is the coordinating agency for the enforcement of the 
provisions of the Money Laundering Act 2004, Advanced Fee Fraud and other Related Offences 
Act, 1995, the Failed Banks Act 1994 (as amended), the Banks and Other Financial Institutions 
Act, 1991, the Miscellaneous Offences Act. In-spite of the enormous support received by the 
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EFCC from International Development Partners its impact is yet to be seen (Human Rights Watch 
Reports, 2011). 
Furthermore, ICPC is not only a law enforcement agency, but also executes a preventive mandate 
through the mechanism of systems review in public organisations, identifying corruption prone 
areas and effecting changes. The EFCC does not have that responsibility (ICPC Position Paper, 
2013: 16-17). 
4.5 Anti-Corruption Drive under Obasanjo, Yar’adua and Jonathan: A Comparative 
Analysis 
Every successive administration in Nigeria has always articulated and adopted the war on 
corruption as its national policy and, as such, this is the cardinal objective of such administrations 
(Adebanwi, 2010). This discourse seeks, therefore, to deconstruct these wars by analysing the 
administrations of ex-presidents Olusegun Obasanjo, Umar Musa Yar’dua and Goodluck 
Jonathan, in order to assess the success(es) or otherwise of such attempts at corruption, Nigeria’s 
bane in development. 
In pursuit of the principle of Section 15(5) of the 1999 Nigeria Constitution, the Obasanjo 
administration, initiated the Bill to establish the ICPC as an instrument for executing its war on 
corruption and, in 2000, the Bill eventually became an Act of the Nigerian Parliament. In 2002, 
due to observed contradictions in the ICPC Act of 2000, and the challenges against an effective 
execution of the war on corruption, the Economic and Financial Bill was initiated, and this 
culminated in 2002 with its enactment as the EFCC Act by the National Assembly. The ICPC Act 
2000, as an anti-corruption warhead of the Obasanjo administration, started on a sure footing by 
the appointment of Justice Mustapha Akanbi (retired), the erudite activist judge, as its pioneer 
Chairman.  
However, the effectiveness of the Commission was constrained by the same government through 
under-funding and subtle intervention in its operations. This led to frustration for the Commission 
and the eventual disinterest of the retired judge in remaining as the Chairman of the Commission 
beyond his first term of appointment. Lamenting his frustration, Akanbi noted: 
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It is the government that frustrates the anti-corruption fight. The 
same people that should ordinarily assist you in making progress are 
the ones who, at your back, work against you to ensure you don’t 
succeed. It was a very bad experience that even those in your team 
would do all manner of things to stop you from making progress. I 
never knew that even some members of the team were not willing 
to work, but saw the appointment as their way into political offices 
and benefits (Akanbi, Daily Sun, Tuesday, November, 27 2012). 
What the retired jurist was saying, in effect, is that the nomination of politically exposed persons 
as members of the anti-corruption agencies in Nigeria is a serious challenge to the anti-corruption 
war in the country. Social critics believe that Obasanjo’s government did not screen those 
nominated onto the Board of the ICPC, while others believed that appointment to political offices 
in Nigeria was generally seen as an avenue to either “compensate” or “rehabilitate” a supporter.  
While it may appear that the ICPC was being frustrated and decimated by the same people who 
ought to nurture it, paradoxically, the EFCC, which came into existence as an institution of 
compulsion, due to the insistence of the international community, was somehow intentionally 
allowed to flourish momentarily. This unintended benevolence of the administration to the EFCC 
ultimately led to some major achievements from this anti-graft agency. In 2007, the late President, 
Umar Musa Yar’Adua also maintained the position of his predecessor on the war on corruption, 
although he demonstrated transparency by declaring his assets openly, unlike Obasanjo and later 
Jonathan (Adeniyi, 2011).  
Under the Yar’adua government, the legal and administrative instruments of executing the war on 
corruption were rendered totally ineffective as the Attorney-General attempted to take over the 
prosecutional duties of the two anti-graft agencies, but was forced to drop the idea due to massive 
public opinion against doing so. He, however, succeeded in removing the pioneering Chairman of 
EFCC from office, and he installed his own person, Farida Waziri (Zero Tolerance, 2013:64). 
The same could be said of the Jonathan administration, which appeared to be confounded on 
corruption in the polity. One of the staff of ICPC in this study interviewed asserted: 
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Obasanjo, notwithstanding his weakness as ordinary mortal, is 
deeply committed to the anti-corruption war. His commitment to the 
campaign to reduce corruption cannot be compared to that of 
Yar’Adua or Jonathan. Obasanjo has a principle which guides his 
anti-corruption stand, once you are caught, you will face the music. 
Baba will never support you again. This is the simple reason why 
you see that most people charged with corruption in the last 14 years 
were Obasanjo’s friends or aides. The reverse is the case under 
Yar’Adua and Jonathan, even when you are caught, they will still 
use the system to protect you if you are close to them. So, to me, the 
zeal with which the war against corruption was fought under 
Obasanjo is different now (Interview 2013).  
In fact, Obasanjo (2013) expressed worry over the high incidence of corruption under President 
Jonathan’s watch. He noted that ‘when the guard becomes the thief, nothing is safe, secure nor 
protected in the house’ (p:10). The zeal to bring corrupt people to justice has reduced drastically. 
In 2005, for example, Nigeria moved from No.2 on the Corruption Perception Index table to No. 
45, but the country had come down to No. 36 on the table, as at 2015 (TI 2015 reports). It is simply 
a fact that Nigeria is losing the battle against corruption. Indeed, during the Yar’ Adua era, there 
was general perception that anti-corruption campaign was pursued with less vigour, with 
suspicious exoneration of high ranking suspects previously charged under the Obasanjo 
administration. Adeniyi (2011:10) noted that the implementation of the war against corruption 
during this period became ‘dysfunctional and diabolical’.   
Worried that the incidences of corruption were on the increase, scores of Nigerians, for the first 
time in the history of the country, staged a peaceful protest in Lagos in January, 2012, saying “No 
to Corruption” and yet scandals involving government officials continued to make the headlines 
of all the dailies. 
  
  






ICPC Annual Reports 2000-2015 
The chart, above, shows that petitions have continually been forwarded to the ICPC since its 
inception on 13th September, 2000. This clearly indicates that Nigerians put a reasonable level of 
confidence in the anti-graft agency, but the agency is constrained from carrying out its three-fold 
mandate of Enforcement, Prevention and Public Enlightenment/Education. Despite this wide 























2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
PETITIONS RECEIVED SINCE INCEPTION
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     129 | P a g e  
 
 
4.2.5.1 Comparison of Cases Filed in Courts and Convictions Secured Since Inception 
Figure 4.3: 
 
ICPC Annual Reports (2000-2015). 
The chart, above, reveals the number of cases filed, and the convictions secured by the Commission 
since 2000. The generally low ratio of the number of convictions secured to the number of cases 
filed may be attributed to the slow judicial process, which is obviously not within the purview of 
the ICPC. From the chart, between 2006 and 2015, the number of cases being won by ICPC appears 
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Comparison of Cases Handled Under Different ICPC Leadership 
From the chart, above, (2006-2010), when Ayoola was the chairman of ICPC, more cases were 
prosecuted if compared with those prosecuted under the first Chairman of the Commission, 
Mustapha Akanbi (2000 – 2005), while under Ekpo Nta (2010- 2015) the number appeared to be 
more, but the calibre of personalities convicted by the Commission is a concern to many Nigerians. 
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Table 4.5: Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) Charged by the EFCC 
EFCC Zero Tolerance (2014). 
From the chart, above, 2005-2008, more politically exposed personalities (PEP) were charged and 
brought to court under Nuhu Ribadu’s tenure. The number of PEPs, however, dropped when 
Ribadu was removed as Chairman of EFCC, and then picked up slightly when Waziri was 
appointed. EFCC, on the other hand, advertised in the Punch Newspaper of 10th February, 2014, 
to the effect that the Commission secured 117 convictions in 2013, but no single VIP was on the 
list published.  
In-spite of the consensus among Nigerians that corruption is one of the major challenges facing 
the country, President Goodluck Jonathan has been postulating a corruption theory that says 
“Corruption is not Nigeria’s problem”. In fact, during his visit to South Africa in May, 2013, he 
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when asked by reporters about the major challenge facing the nation. In March, 2014, in Namibia, 
he noted that corruption was over-exaggerated in Nigeria. Williams, in an opinion piece, “Nigeria 
is Corrupt: True or False” published in the Guardian on Sunday of 30th March, 2014, p. 21 noted:  
The President is of the mind-set that the global rating of Nigeria as 
one of the most corrupt countries is exaggerated…. the President 
has entangled himself with a difficult assignment; he does not agree 
with the perception that Nigeria is down there on the ladder of 
world’s most corrupt countries. He said, pointedly, that the 
perception is louder than the true situation on the ground. 
The newspaper reports on President Jonathan’s position on the problem of corruption expose the 
insincerity of the political elite in relation to the problem. Though the legal instruments to curb 
corruption in Nigeria appeared to be comprehensive, Nigeria occupied No. 142 out of 168 on the 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for (2015), because heavy emphasis is 
placed on the role of law enforcement agencies, quasi-judicial bodies, prosecutors and judges, 
while neglecting the non-state actors, notably the mass media (Adeniran, 2008: 66). Opara (2007) 
offered two other reasons for the failure of the government’s efforts to curb corruption: 
Past and existing statutory provisions have been ineffective because 
they target the symptoms rather than the cause of corruption in the 
country. Furthermore, they failed because of the time they were 
introduced by the regimes as a mere smokescreen and they therefore 
lacked the political will to enforce applicable law and rules (Opara, 
2007:7). 
Here, Opara’s viewpoint that the political will to fight corruption is lacking, and thus, no matter 
how the anti-graft officials strive, such efforts will be futile. Similarly, the 2011 report by Human 
Rights Watch revealed:  
Many of the corruption cases against the political elite have made 
little progress in the Courts: there have been only four convictions 
to date and those convicted have faced relatively little or no prison 
time. Other senior political figures who have been widely 
implicated in corruption have not been prosecuted. At the time of 
this writing, not a single politician was serving prison time for any 
of these alleged crimes. Despite its promise, the EFCC has fallen 
far short of its potential and eight years after its inception is left 
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with a battered reputation and an uncertain record of 
accomplishment (Human Rights Watch, 2011:1). 
The Code of Conduct Bureau was deliberately excluded from this analysis because the Bureau had 
only existed on the books, rather than in action. Chapter Five will examine the various forms of 
corruption affecting the advocacy role of the media. 
4.6 Summary 
While it may be conceded that Nigeria had a bad colonial experience, as corruption, exploitation 
and other vices were introduced to the Nigerian socio-cultural and political environment by the 
colonial masters, this study reveals that it is rather too late to keep blaming colonialism for 
corruption in Nigeria 56 years after independence. Similarly, several efforts and initiatives by 
successive governments to reduce the menace of corruption in the country have not yielded the 
desired results, owing to a lack of the political will on the part of those in authority to fully 
implement the various provisions of the laws enacted to fight corruption in the country. Third, the 
legal instruments that have so far been enacted in Nigeria appeared to be comprehensive in order 
to reduce the incidences of corruption, but they have failed because the horizontal and vertical 
instruments of accountability have not been fully mobilised by the State. Since 1966, corruption 
has remained a dominant political narrative among the military and civilian leaders as a legitimate 
means of gaining and sustaining power in the country.  
  
  





THE PRINT MEDIA IN THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter assesses the watchdog role of the media, both historically and through changing inter-
disciplinary debates about democracy. It attempts to highlight the role of the media in the anti-
corruption drive in a democratic setting, while interrogating the inability of the media to have a 
positive impact on transparency and accountability in Nigeria, despite the exposure of corruption 
in the media. In essence, this chapter sets out to outline the various forms of corruption within the 
media sector, from the global perspective, then to Africa and, finally, to Nigeria, the focus of this 
study. 
5.2  The Role of the Media in Anti-Corruption  
In Nigeria, just as in other societies, the mass media transmit ideas and new information to a target 
audience. Essentially, the media drive most of the adjustments in the behavioral pattern of people 
in society. The influence of the mass media extends to almost every segment of society. In other 
words, the media serve as an agent of change and, as the watchdog of society, it is expected to play 
a part in ensuring transparency and accountability in government, as well as to contribute to the 
efforts of crime –fighting institutions to curb corruption in the country (Nwuneli, 1990; Nwosu, 
1990). However, a corrupt press cannot fight corrupt individuals.  
The literature that is available indicates that, in the developed world, the media have not merely 
been agents that operate the checks and balances against the excesses of government; they have 
been at the forefront of socio-political change. The media expose the misdeeds of government and 
quickly investigate issues of corruption. The media are often regarded as “the Fourth Pillar in 
democracy” (Mendes et al, 2013: 1).  
It must be noted, however, that while the media, both in developed and developing countries, have 
been relatively proactive, they are still faced with some shortcomings. Dahlstrom (2002: 4 
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) pointed out that a free press may not necessarily reduce corruption. He identified the “cash for 
news coverage” terminology to explain a situation in which “journalists agree to publish positive 
news against payment”. 
Citing a study conducted by the IPRA (2002), Dahlstrom showed that “40 percent of the 
respondents, chiefly senior practitioners, in Southern Europe, Africa and the Middle East, 
answered that they thought that “bribes commonly influence the editorial content”. He also showed 
that “in Latin America 41 percent believed it was common to accept bribes to stop the publication 
of an article”. The study even stated that another issue is the discounts given to political parties 
and candidates. Indeed, Anderson (2004) and Jhally (2004) argued that adverstising was a threats 
to democracy globally. Dahlstrom, equally, observed a similar trend with politicians through 
donations to their campaigns. A case in point was in the US, between 1993 and 2000, the media 
provided US$75 million to politicians. Other practices in the media industry, which some scholars 
have tagged corrupt practices, include checkbook journalism (Peters, 2003: 49-50). Peters (2003) 
provided a description of how media men in developed countries engage in corruption: 
In the developed world, the practice of freebies is well established. 
Journalists enjoy free air travel from airlines and hospitality at 
hotels and then write glowing travel articles. In Europe, members 
of media organisations often expect hotels and meals to be 
complimentary when they attend press conferences; they may even 
count on sponsors to provide gifts (Peters, 2003: 55). 
Corruption in the media is thus not restricted to African media alone but it is a common 
phenomenon the world over. However, Tassseni, (2010: 5) noted that the media can only report 
the news, but their effectiveness in reducing corruption is dependent on other realities in the 
political system of the state. It may not be out of place to ask, at this juncture, whether the press 
can contain corruption in any given society? 
Based on the 2013 press index reports by the Reporters Without Borders, what is notable is that 
countries which the EU report shows to be the least corrupt, such as Denmark, Finland, 
Luxembourg and Sweden, are also the highest ranked in the press freedom index. In contrast, 
countries such as Greece, Bulgaria and Croatia, which rank relatively low in press freedom, also 
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rank among the most corrupt (Reporters Without Borders 2013). The question is, does this mean 
that there is a perfect inverse correlation between press freedom and corruption? The answer is 
“NO”. The Czech Republic, for instance, is an exception. Though ranked very high in press 
freedom, it is reported to be one of the most corrupt EU countries. 
Nigeria also is an exception, though it is not as strong on the corruption index as the Czech 
Republic. It performs better on the press freedom index (111 out of 180 countries) than it does on 
Transparency International’s corruption index (136 out of 168 countries). It is the contention of 
this study that the media are not free, as has been widely reported in some literatures. The integrity 
of the Nigerian media seems to be in doubt. Corruption in the Media sector in Nigeria is said to be 
prevalent, to the extent that the media are generally perceived to be corrupt.  
5.3  Factors That Influence Media Integrity 
While explaining the role of the media in anti-corruption, Mendes (2013: 2-4), in a collaborative 
work with Transparency International, identified a number of factors that are likely to influence 
the integrity of the media in a democratic setting. These factors include: 
5.3.1  The Constitutional and Legal Framework  
The legal framework of a country has a huge impact on the integrity of the media that exist therein. 
It is the legal framework that determines the extent of freedom of expression, the right of access 
to information, media licensing and registration. While the legal framework has been relatively 
expanded in developed countries, the possibility of their expansion in developing countries is 
ubiquitously obvious. UNESCO disclosed that as at 2016, only 11 out of 54 African countries have 
passed national freedom of Information (FOI) laws while draft FOI laws in other African states 
are at different stages in the process towards their adoption. Such is the nature of the legal 
framework in which the media operates in many African countries.  
Access to information is necessary if the media are to maintain their status as impartial information 
disseminators. However, practically, many African nations are yet to ratify the framework in order 
to efficiently allow for free information access. The constitutions of most African states make 
provisions for press freedom but, in reality, the media still struggle to carry out their duties in 
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society. The Freedom of Information Act has been passed and signed into law in Nigeria, but is 
yet to be fully implemented, due to litigation on its passage by some of the states.  
Eribo (1997: 52) defined press freedom as the availability of a free market place of ideas and 
information for all the citizens without fear, favour, intimidation or obstacles. Similarly, McQuail 
(2000) argued that press freedom ‘is a certain independence, sufficient to protect free and open 
public expression of ideas and information’ and at the same time, prevent concentration of 
ownership and monopoly of control, whether on the part of the state or private media owners 
(McQuail, 2000: 144-145). The Committee to Protect journalists (2004) defined press freedom as 
the ‘rights of journalists to report news without fear of reprisal’. This right to broadcast and print 
without intimidation and persecution is backed both constitutionally and by universal conventions. 
Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), for instance, 
states: 
Every person has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers (UN document). 
Following the footsteps of the United Nations, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979, Section 36(1), stipulated: 
Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and 
information without interference. 
Besides the freedom of expression accorded to individuals in the 1979 and 1999 constitutions, the 
latter also gave a formal role to the Nigerian press to act as a watchdog, without interference. 
Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution stipulated: 
The press, radio, television and other agencies of the mass media 
shall, at all times, be free to uphold the fundamental directives 
contained in this chapter and uphold the responsibility and 
accountability of the government to the people. 
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This study believes that Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria ought to be amended so 
that a definite stand on the roles and protection of the media can be spelt out in clear terms. 
However, legal practitioners and media scholars have argued that there is nowhere in the world 
where the media enjoy absolute press freedom, including advanced democracies, as represented 
by the United States of America and Britain (Smith, 2004: 76). 
It has been argued that the Nigerian press enjoys partial /qualified press freedom. It is imperative 
to look at the constitutional provisions on the media in America and Ghana, Nigeria’s West African 
neighbour, for a brief comparison. 
A preview of the American constitution, which provided a framework for the Nigerian 
constitution, would suffice. The first amendment to the American Constitution provided: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
prohibiting the free exercise of religion, infringing the freedom of 
speech, infringing the freedom of the press, limiting the right to 
peaceably assemble, or limiting the right to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances (First Amendment to US Constitution).  
In Ghana, Sections 162 and 163 of the 1992 Constitution guarantee the freedom and independence 
of the media: Section 162 
(1) Freedom and independence of the media are hereby guaranteed. 
(2) Subject to this Constitution and any other law not inconsistent 
with this Constitution, there shall be no censorship in Ghana. 
(3) There shall be no impediments to the establishment of private 
press or media; and, in particular, there shall be no law requiring 
any person to obtain a licence as a prerequisite to the establishment 
or operation of a newspaper, journal or other media for mass 
communication or information. 
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(4) Editors and publishers of newspapers and other institutions of 
the mass media shall not be subject to control or interference by 
Government, nor shall they be penalized or harassed for their 
editorial opinions and views, or the content of their publications. 
(5) All agencies of the mass media shall, at all times, be free to 
uphold the principles, provisions and objectives of this Constitution, 
and shall uphold the responsibility and accountability of the 
Government to the people of Ghana. 
(6) Any medium for the dissemination of information to the public 
which publishes a statement about or against any person shall be 
obliged to publish a rejoinder, if any, from the person in respect of 
whom the publication was made. 
                               Section 163:  
All state-owned media shall afford fair opportunities and facilities 
for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting ones. 
A dispassionate look at Section 39 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution gives a clearer picture of the 
kind of press freedom that the framers of the document envisaged for the media: 
39(1) every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, 
including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas 
and information without interference. 
  (2) without prejudice to the generality of sub-section (1) every 
person shall be entitled to own, establish and operate any medium 
for the dissemination of information, ideas and opinions, provided 
that no person, other than the government of the federation or of the 
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state or any other person or body authorized by the president on the 
fulfilment of conditions laid down by an act of the National 
Assembly, shall own, establish or operate a television or wireless 
broadcasting station for any purpose whatever. 
  (3) nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. For the purpose of 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
maintaining the authority and independence of the courts or the 
regulation of telephony, wireless broadcasting, television or the 
exhibition of cinematography films; or (b) imposing upon persons 
holding office under the government of the federation or of a state, 
members of the Armed Forces of the federation or members of the 
Nigeria Police Force or other government security service or 
agencies established by law. 
However, a critical review of these sections revealed that press freedom is also curtailed by (Sub-
Section two of Section 39 (2), which states that only the governments of the Federation or State; 
or their representatives and agencies can own, establish and operate or authorise a television or 
wireless broadcasting station. This instrument gives the government, through the Minister of 
Information and its agency- the Nigerian Broadcasting Commission (NBC), the power to issue and 
withdraw broadcasting licences. The cost of securing this licence runs as high as N20 million 
(US$105,263) and N15 million (US$78,947) depending on the state in which the station is to be 
located (African Media Barometer, 2011: 34).  
As argued earlier, there is no society where there is absolute press freedom. Sawant, et al (2003) 
identified two categories of media control that are acceptable in all democratic societies. These are 
legal restraints, such as the Official Secrets Act, and journalism ethics designed and approved by 
the journalists, otherwise known as a Code of Ethics. Added to these controls are those imposed 
by advertisers (Babasola, 2009: 4-7). The Advertising market in Nigeria is believed to be worth 
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N20 billion (US$105,263,158) at the exchange rate of N190 to a dollar. This revenue, “is widely 
considered to be insufficient to support Nigeria’s media industry” (African Media Barometer, 
2011:30). 
A critical study of the anti-press laws and legislation in Nigeria revealed that all have their origins 
in the colonial period (Elias, 1969: 1; Momoh, 2002; 10). Most of the existing laws were used by 
the British authorities between 1916 and the 1950s against Nigerians. Between 1917 and 1960, 
when Nigeria gained her independence from the colonial authorities, nine rules were made to 
restrict freedom of expression and media freedom. Between 1960 and the coup d’état of 1966, 
seven were enacted. Between 1966 and 1979 (the military era), 11 restrictive laws were 
promulgated to hinder media freedom, and between 1979 and 1999, a period of both military and 
civil rule, 14 regulations were enacted to cage the media (Momoh, 2002: 6-9). 
A critical appraisal of the 1999 Constitution reveals that there is freedom of speech, but there is no 
freedom of the press in Nigeria. The Minister of Information at the federal level and the 
Commissioner of Information at the State level remain powerful officials who are in charge of 
broadcast sector, since they appoint the chief executives of the state-run broadcasting stations. 
“There is no true public service broadcaster in the country since public radio and television stations 
are managed much like parastatals” (African Media Barometer, 2011: 34).  
5.3.2  Free, but Everywhere Chained 
Although, the constitution and laws provide for freedom of speech and the press, the federal and 
state governments in Africa frequently restrict these rights; and cases were reported in which the 
government curtailed the right to speech and other expression. In Egypt, for instance, the court 
found Peter Greste (Correspondent), Mohamed Fahmy (Producer), and Baher Mohamed 
(Producer), guilty of reporting false news and of associating with the now outlawed Muslim 
Brotherhood. Baher Mohamed was sentenced to an additional three years for being in possession 
of a spent cartridge. Greste was released after 400 days in prison, while his two other colleagues 
were later released on bail by the Egyptian court while their cases continue. 
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In Nigeria, Freedom House, in its May (2013) annual survey of media independence, (Freedom of 
the Press 2013), described the Nigerian press as “partly free.” Nigeria is reputed to have one of 
the most vibrant private domestic media in Africa (Ronning, 2009). It is also one of the countries 
on the continent where the cost of daily newspapers is high, while accessing television is relatively 
expensive and the literacy level is low. Nigerians pay to access television stations, with the 
exception of a few state-owned stations. An average Nigerian lives on $1.29 a day (Burleigh, 
London Daily Mail, August 9th, 2013), while the cover price of most daily papers is N150 and 
weekend papers sell for N200 (the cover prices were less than one US dollar as at March, 2016). 
Radio, to a large extent remains the most important medium of mass communication and 
information.  
The Secretary-General of Reporters Without Borders, Jean-François Julliard, in a letter to 
President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua of the 1st July, 2009, expressed deep concern about the various 
attacks on journalists in Nigeria. The organisation claimed that it registered 42 press freedom 
violations in Nigeria in the first half of 2009 and found that, for the most part, police officers or 
local officials, such as provincial governors, were responsible. 
The United States of America, in her 2013 Country Reports, also documented various challenges 
that are being faced by the Nigerian media. In Section 2 of the Reports, the US State Department 
revealed that security forces detain and harass journalists sometimes for reporting on sensitive 
problems, such as political corruption and security. The report further explains that, on certain 
occasions, the security forces and police arrested and detained journalists who criticized the 
government. Reporting on matters of political corruption and security problems is particularly 
sensitive. 
Curiously, the National Secretary of the NUJ, Mr Shuaibu Leman, in a statement noted: 
After about 15 years of uninterrupted democracy, we are yet to 
move away from anti-democratic practices that characterized 
military regimes… we say NO! To government who make a 
mockery of the freedom of expression and democracy when they 
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encourage a culture of impunity and lawlessness against the media 
(Leman, 2014, 1-3). 
Besides the attacks on media practitioners, newspaper vendors and distributors have also suffered 
government clampdowns. For one week, 6th-11th June, 2014, several copies of various 
newspapers were seized and circulation drivers were arrested by the Nigerian Military. The 
Nigerian Army, in a statement by its Director, Defence Information, Major-General Chris 
Olukolade, justified this onslaught on the newspaper houses. Olukolade noted that the military 
action was informed by the information at its disposal that the circulation vehicles of the media 
organisations were being used to carry arms and ammunition for the insurgents in the North 
Eastern part of Nigeria (Soriwei, The Punch Newspapers, June 11th, 2014, p 8). The President of 
the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) described the action of the military as being unacceptable 
under a democratic rule. 
The Nigerian Press Organisation, including the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria 
(NPAN); the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), and the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE) have 
expressed worry over the clampdown on the media (Obaigbena, et al, The Nation Newspapers, 
13th June, 2014, 13). 
The kind of language used to address media men in the country is almost absurd. Journalists 
covering the National Conference for instance, decried the way they were “being treated like 
dogs”, especially by the Conference Chairman, Justice Idris Kutigi (Okeke, Daily Trust 26th June, 
2014: 66). Kutigi was widely reported in the media to have used uncivilised language about the 
media men while asking them to vacate the plenary of the conference: 
Pressmen, clear yourselves. The pressmen should disappear! 
Pressmen disappear…shut your cameras, shut everything and get 
out from the gallery, clear and get out from here. Disappear from 
here now. Security, get them out of here immediately. Get out of 
here. Disappear; get out, all of you.  
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What can be inferred from this report is that the Nigerian media are still confronting challenges 
with the advent of the civilian regime, despite the view that democracy always guarantees an 
atmosphere in which the press can thrive.  
Despite the FOI Act, censorship or content restrictions are still a common practice in Nigeria. The 
US reports noted that journalists practise self-censorship while local media and NGOs have 
claimed that security forces have intimidated newspaper editors and owners in order to censor 
some reports of killings and other human rights abuses (US Country Reports, 2013). The 
government controls much of the electronic media through the National Broadcasting Commission 
(NBC), which is responsible for monitoring and regulating the broadcast media. The law prohibits 
local television stations from transmitting programmes from other countries, except for special 
religious programmes, sports programmes, or events of national interest. Cable and satellite 
broadcasting is less restricted (Zikirullahi, 2005). The NBC, for example, permits live broadcasts 
of foreign news and programmes on these networks. Cable and satellite services are, however, 
required to dedicate 20 percent of broadcast time to local programming.  
Licences for electronic media are also restricted by the government. The President is the sole 
authority for the approval of a licence to television and radio stations. Several applications for TV/ 
radio licences have been refused in the past because the government believes that the applicants 
are in the opposition parties (Mr X in NBC 15th December, 2013, Abuja, in an interview) 
Libel laws/Official Secrets Act have been deployed by the present civilian government in order to 
harass and intimidate media practitioners in the country. On 3rd September, 2013, the Minister of 
the Federal Capital Territory, Senator Bala Mohammed, ordered the arrest of Tukur Mamu, the 
publisher of the Kaduna-based newspaper, Desert Herald, on charges of defamation and extortion. 
The Minister claimed that Mamu published defamatory stories in the Desert Herald and demanded 
payment to stop further publication. Mamu was allegedly arrested to halt the publication of the 
book FCT Administration: The Rot Within, which allegedly accused the Minister of corruption. 
After the arraignment, there has been no further development in relation to the case since 
September, 2013. 
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Attacks on journalists are not restricted to the government and its officials alone, as a few non-
state bodies have also threatened media practitioners in Nigeria since the advent of democratic 
rule. In 2013, Boko Haram threatened to kill journalists and attack media outlets for what the group 
described as inaccurate reports about them. The Abuja Office of ThisDay Newspaper Abuja office 
was petrol-bombed by people who were suspected of being terrorists in 2011, while threats were 
issued to the Punch and other media outfits in Abuja by the same terrorist body. 
5.3.3  Media Ownership 
In many developing countries, the government owns and finances media houses and thus the media 
houses and journalists tend to do their bidding. As Djankov, McLiesh, Nevona and Shlefer (2001) 
observed in a World Bank survey of media ownership in 97 countries around: 
We found that countries with more prevalent state ownership of the 
media have less free press, fewer political rights for citizens, inferior 
governance, less developed markets and strikingly inferior 
outcomes in the areas of education and health (p:31). 
In Nigeria, the rate at which “politicians of questionable character” own media outfits, be it print 
or electronic ones, is a source of worry to most media observers (Olatunji, interview 2014). 
5.3.4  Resources and Capacity 
This may include the norms and values that should guide journalism. A combination of appropriate 
training, a remuneration package, quality control, the employee turnover, all have impacted on the 
media in Africa. The challenges posed by these factors have contributed to the low credibility of 
the media. Indeed, Nyamnjoh (2001) blame the poor remuneration of journalists for the menace of 
the brown envelope. However, Nwabueze (2010: 402) noted that the brown envelope syndrome 
cannot be divorced from the nature of the society within which a journalist operates. Nyamnjoh 
(2005, 73-74) noted that poor salaries and working conditions in African newsrooms have pushed 
journalists into “prostitution”, or what he termed “a hand-to-mouth journalism”.  
Similarly, Lodamo & Skjerdal (2009) believe that poor journalistic training is another factor 
promoting the culture of impunity among media men. One of the conclusions that can be drawn 
from this summation is that the original foundation of the media profession in Africa was faulty, 
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especially on the issue of remuneration. Second, and more important, is that the African journalist 
lacks the requisite education and proper training. Bolawole (author’s interview 2009) argued that 
in the early days of journalism in Africa, most of the leading lights were non-university graduates, 
this is unlike the situation in Britain, where the majority of journalists at the BBC and in the print 
media were Oxbridge arts graduates (Webster, 2006: 172).  
Akinfeleye (2000) argued that the problem of the Nigerian press is foundational. Journalists are 
not properly trained because there is no co-ordination among institutions in Nigeria for the proper 
training of journalists; apart from the fact that these institutions suffer from inadequate staffing. 
Dare (1996) and Shobanjo (2002) argued that the major disability of an average Nigerian journalist 
is inadequate skills resulting from poor training. Regular training is important, because the role of 
the editor, as a media manager, has changed dramatically in the last two decades, with new and 
difficult demands being made on the practitioners (Dantiye, 2008:6). 
This study contends that the faulty foundation of the journalism profession, as well as the 
educational inadequacy of the early journalists in Africa, may not be the justification for the higher 
incidence of brown envelope in Africa than in any other parts of the world. This is because many 
journalists in Nigeria have acquired university degrees, ranging from first degrees through Masters 
and doctoral degrees. Babasola (2009, author’s interview) asserted that the media profession is no 
longer a profession for drop-outs. Nigerian journalists can hold their own academically; and they 
are not inferior to any profession (Babasola, 2009: 18).  
It is the contention of this researcher that poor remuneration and the lack of proper training and 
education may not be valid reasons for media practitioners to engage in corruption. Some of the 
editors that engage in moonlighting (as consultants to individuals and corporate bodies), as the 
Ayorinde vs. Azubuike Ishiekwene case revealed, were not poorly paid, nor did they lack adequate 
education. It is just a matter of the poor understanding of the ethical roles of a journalist. Scores 
of media practitioners in the country were not aware of the enormous social responsibility that 
society places on the media. The orientation of most of the media practitioners is for an extreme 
desire for wealth at the expense of the public good, which the media ought to defend.       
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5.4  Forms of Corruption in the Media 
For the purpose of this study, the five forms of corruption in the media are: Bribery; Gift and 
Advertisement; Nepotism; Media Capture; and Moonlighting. These five forms appear to capture 
the different types of corruption that have been prevalent in the media in Africa in the past few 
decades. These five forms were identified by Mara Mendes of Transparency International, in a 
collaborative study with the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, released in February, 2013. 
5.4.1  Bribery 
The most popular corrupt practice in the Nigerian media is the acceptance of monetary inducement 
popularly referred to as the brown envelope. Generally, the brown envelope is a monetary 
inducement handed out to a person to pressurise them to do what the bribe giver wants. It is any 
form of gratification which a journalist receives to cover an event or to influence the judgment of 
a journalist. The event may be a press conference, an interview of any sort, a workshop, an 
impromptu or organized briefing. Basically, the coining of the phrase brown envelope evokes the 
idea of criminality in the mind of right thinking persons. This nomenclature is so regarded because 
it is derived from the underworld business of the wrapping of wares in business envelopes. It is 
perhaps, the most usual source of corruption in the media.  
Nwabueze (2010) defines the brown envelope as all practices exhibited by journalists in the pursuit 
of gratification. Bolawole quoted in Babasola, (2009) defined the brown envelope as the practice 
of offering or accepting gifts, drinks, food or money in order to influence the judgment of a 
journalist in their course of their duties. The practice is not alien to other parts of the world, 
although practice differs from place to place. According to Obianigwe (2009), the term brown 
envelope is also used in some other African and Asian countries. The broad term that perfectly 
covers the practice is “envelope journalism”. which refers to red envelope journalism, white 
envelope journalism, etc. More recently, however, the term “ATM journalism” is becoming 
popular in the society, and this indicates the change to the electronic transfer of bribes into 
journalists’ bank accounts (http: //www.enwikipededia. org/). 
Corruption in the media is multi-faceted. It may come through some of the ways mentioned above, 
or perhaps through what is called the “Media Executive Dinner”, through generous offers of 
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expensive gift items, or through various forms of either political or economic gratification. At 
times, in a bid to get exclusive stories or a scoop, journalists may be tempted to give bribes, most 
especially if such stories are regarded as offering very highly sought-after information.  
5.4.2  Ethics and the Journalistic Profession  
The word, “ethics” is connected to the question of correct conduct within society. Etymologically, 
“ethics” comes from the Greek “ethos” meaning “character”, which indicates a concern for 
virtuous people, reliable character and proper conduct (Ward, 2010). In short, “ethics has more to 
do with principles concerning the rights and wrongs of human conduct, principles which have 
some reasoned theoretical basis and which therefore apply objectively and impartially” (Besley 
and Chadwick, 1992: 7).  
In order to guide the conduct of media practitioners in Nigeria, a Code of Ethics was developed by 
the Nigerian Press Organisation (NPO) and the Nigerian Press Council (NPC). There are 15 items 
in the Code of Ethics agreed by the two bodies, but only Item 7 remains relevant to this study. Item 
7 specifically frowns at brown envelope. Rewards and Gratification  
i. A Journalist should neither solicit nor accept bribe, gratification or patronage to suppress 
or publish information.  
ii. To determine payment for publication of news is inimical to the notion of news as the 
fair, accurate, unbiased and factual report of an event. 
Corruption in the media is, no doubt, an ethical issue, and damages journalists as well as media 
outfits’ integrity and affects professionalism. In-spite of the code of ethics, corruption perpetrated 
through brown envelope is a serious problem within the industry (Ekerikevwe 2012: 516). 
However, most journalism organisations are somewhat reluctant to tackle the problem head on by 
implementing some of the codes of conduct of the profession, like their counterparts in other 
professions. Risley (2001) noted that when a journalist is confronted with ethical problems, he or 
she should consider the following principles: 
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 When there are two extreme positions in a situation, he or she should seek the middle 
ground, which Aristotle called the “Golden Mean”. 
 Act only as you would wish others would act. 
 Consider the utilitarianism of our actions, that is, our action should produce the greatest 
balance of good over evil. 
 Apply the veil of ignorance, that is, make ethical decisions as if you are equal to all members 
of society and, lastly, treat people in the same way you would expect to be treated. 
These ethics are not totally obeyed by media practitioners in Nigeria. Extant literature on 
corruption in the media is replete with examples and cases of bribery involving journalists and 
their patrons. As Aiyetan (2007) observed that there are many examples of journalists, editors and 
media houses accepting bribes and paid material disguised as news stories, or extorting money 
either for publishing favourable stories or for not publishing damaging ones. It is equally 
noteworthy to state that bribes may take different forms; soli (in Ghana), gombo (in Cameroon), 
or mshiko (in Kenya), keske, kola, goro kwa/qua, chope, awuf, egunje, communiqué (in Nigeria) 
and “perks” (in Tanzania).  
Apart from the local term ascribed to the “brown envelope”, it also has English terms like, “family 
support”, “better life”, “the-journalists-are-going”, “energiser” and “handshake” (Skjerdal, 2010: 
375). However, for the purpose of this study, the terminology brown envelope will be adopted as 
the major source of corruption within the media sector.  
Moreover, in 2007, the Public Communication Secretary and Kenyan Government spokesperson, 
Dr. Alfred Mutua, stated that the country’s media “had become synonymous with corruption and, 
therefore, lacked the moral authority to accuse others” (Mutua reported in Mudhai 2007: 31). He 
accused some journalists in the print media of taking bribes from senior opposition politicians in 
order to influence content and he provided evidence of his claims. 
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So bad is the incidence of bribery in the media that a quote from the Ugandan Media Review reads: 
“Yes, there is corruption in the media. And oh, we take bribes to write or suppress stories, we are 
biased, we favour certain politicians over others….” (Wasswa and Kakooza, 2011: 7). Mare and 
Brand (2010: 426) noted that in Zimbabwe and Kenya - it seemed that “brown envelope” 
journalism is an accepted practice. They contend that in South Africa related practices, such as 
freebies and sponsored travel, are ubiquitous. Hasty (2005) posited that although the exposure of 
corruption is the primary genre of political news writing in Ghana, informal exchange of money, 
favours, and food between journalists and their sources are essential for news gathering and 
personal survival in the context of material and informational scarcity.  
Skjerdal (2010: 372), in his work on brown envelope journalism in the African media, identified 
three ways in which corruption is practised in the media sector globally. He mentioned the brown 
envelope, publication in exchange for paid advertising, and journalists’ employment when it shared 
with PR agencies. 
Dirbaba (2010: 482), in a study conducted in Ethiopia, noted that bribery in journalism was no 
longer restricted to food and small gifts, but also to acquisition of property, such as land. He argued 
that apart from monetary incentives, land-grabbing corruption has emerged in Ethiopia. However, 
Mpagaze and White (2010) noted that the perception of corruption in the African media which 
tends “to lump together” as bribery, the refreshments and accommodation to attract reporters to 
cover public events, the “brown envelope” tip to cover expenses such as transport to draw 
journalists in to report on press conferences, and major payments to suppress information or falsify 
news accounts,” is untenable.  
They argue that statements that journalists are corrupt are rooted in the subjective “perception” of 
the journalists themselves who are part of the culture of journalism in many African contexts 
(Mpagaze and White 2010: 549-550). Onyisi (1996), exploring the arguments both for and against 
the practice of bribery, identifies four classes of people who view the practice from different 
perspectives: 
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Idealists (who see brown envelope as a form of bribery and 
unethical practice in journalism and should not be accepted for any 
reason); Altruists/Culturists (who opine that it is offered to be nice 
to journalists and in line with the hospitality nature of African 
culture); Realists (who believe that though the practice is morally 
wrong, the Nigerian society is such that you need to do something 
to get your story published); and Opportunists (who have no firm 
conviction but simply believe that to accept or reject brown 
envelope depends on the situation (Onyisi,1996:81). 
It is the contention of this work that denying the existence of corruption within the media sector 
may amount to being economical with the truth. Still, the link between brown envelope and 
journalists, whether for good or ill, remains crucially important to the social responsibility role of 
the media.  
Dan Agbese, Editor-in-Chief of the defunct Newswatch Magazine, painted a sorry picture of the 
state of the Nigerian media on the issue of the brown envelope: 
The brown envelope is, perhaps, the most eloquent evidence that 
journalists accept gratification in the course of their duties. This has 
tarnished the image of the Nigerian press considerably. Most of us 
have, at one time or another, decried this practice with a rather high-
minded feeling of hurt. My understanding is that the gratification is 
now offered in more acceptable colours of the envelope, such as 
white or blue. A more serious variant of this is the practice by some 
news editors to ask their reporters to make daily returns to them. 
Reporters who cover the political beat, said to be the most lucrative, 
make such returns. Those who don't, are yanked off the beat by their 
news editors or editors (Agbese, 2001, February 28th). 
Unfortunately, journalists who dare to report incidences within the industry are treated with 
suspicion and even threatened by their colleagues:  
When, a few years ago, one of our quality magazines had the 
isolated and rare audacity to report on growing corruption in the 
media, the editor of the magazine confessed to me that he was 
assaulted with a barrage of intimidating complaints, short of curses 
from several professional colleagues who wondered what had 
suddenly come over him? From the point of view of these irate 
journalists, it was all right for the media to expose corruption in the 
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three other Estates of the Realm but the media’s own linens; 
however foul-smelling, should be beyond inspection! (Olukotun, 
2009: 17). 
It may appear that these kinds of reactions to reports of corruption in the media are encouraging 
the culture of silence around the problem, thus encouraging the perpetuation of brown envelope 
culture among media practitioners. Out of 56 registered daily and weekly newspapers and 
magazines in Nigeria, only two: The Punch and Daily Trust; seem to publicly denounce the brown 
envelope syndrome. 
The Punch Newspapers have an ethics statement placed at its right bottom column:  
Ethical Complaints: 
We, Punch Nigeria Limited, do not demand or accept gifts or 
gratification to publish articles or photographs, neither do our 
journalists. Therefore, we implore you not to offer any to our 
journalists. 
In the event that a PUNCH journalist demands such, please send 
your complaint(s) to ethics@punchng.com or 08168214977. 
It is, however, surprising that when allegations of corrupt practices and abuse of office were 
levelled against the Director of Publications of Punch Newspapers by one of its former Editors, 
the management of the Newspapers did not sanction the Executive Director in question. He was 
given a safe passage to resign his appointment. Steve Ayorinde had, in a 12-page petition dated 1st 
March, 2010, catalogued a lot of infractions and corrupt practices perpetrated by his boss, 
Azubuike Ishiekwene, the Executive Director, Publications of the Newspapers 
(Pointblanketnews.com, accessed on the 21st January 2014).  
Ayorinde noted in the petition, sent to the Chairman of the Punch Newspapers, Jibola Ogunshola, 
that Azubuike’s corrupt acts, as well as his abuse of office and ethical misconduct should be 
probed. However, nothing was heard about the matter, except that Azubuike later headed the 
Leadership Newspapers as its Managing Director. If Punch Newspapers, supposedly noted for its 
transparency and anti-corruption stance, could condone such a high level of infraction against one 
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of its top managers, and nothing concrete was reported in the media to have been done in this 
regard, then it shows the media’s penchant for protecting its own in the country. Bolawole argued, 
“this is a criminal act, but so far in the history of the media in Nigeria, nobody has been caught or 
jailed for collecting or demanding brown envelope”, (Author interview with Bolawole, 2009). 
Daily Trust, an Abuja based Newspaper, placed a similar warning on page 3 of its publication: 
NO, THANK YOU! 
Media Trust Limited journalists have pledged to uphold the 
company's policy of not asking or taking a gift by whatever name, 
from those they encounter in the course of their work. 
Please assist us by not seeking to influence our reporters and editors 
with your favours. Where they can, our journalists are expected to 
graciously decline a gift. When it is pressed on them, they are 
expected to declare it. The company will write a letter thanking the 
giver and donating the amount to charity. Report anyone who claims 
to be our staff, but engages in unethical conduct. To blow the 
whistle, send an SMS to 08035896941, 08185691881 or email to 
whistleblower@dailytrust.com. 
Help us produce newspapers you can trust. 
Akinkuotu, of Tell Magazine, noted that journalists have descended from the high pedestal into 
the modern jungle:  
This descent into anarchy can best be illustrated by the various 
scenarios as played by the Reporter on the beat, his almighty Editor 
and the Proprietor. There was a time when beat associations almost 
strangled the profession by their nefarious activities…..So if you 
read one account of an event in a daily, do not bother to read them 
elsewhere; it will be the same source. It will be the same in all the 
papers because it has been given the stamp of the beat association. 
If the price is right, many journalists are ready to deliberately distort 
stories and serve half-truths to the public (Akinkuotu, 2008:20-21) 
He continued: 
The decay is further worsened when such stories get to the 
newsrooms and the final gate-keepers pass them, because 
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reporters have “settled” them. There used to be a saying in many 
newsrooms that this story “smells”. To remove the “odour,” the 
reporter will need to settle such editor. And the story goes. And 
journalism is the poorer for it. (Akinkuotu, 2008:21) 
Akinkuotu (2008), however, admitted that there were many practitioners who, despite the token 
pay, still see journalism as a calling and are using their abundant talents in the cause of uplifting 
society.  
In another context, Nwabueze (2010) noted that the failure of media institutions to identify and 
punish journalists who accept brown envelopes shows that there is a limit to the self-regulation of 
the media. On whichever side of the argument one belongs, Nwabueze’s verdict will suffice, “the 
practice of acceptance of gratifications has continued to pose a credibility problem to the 
journalism profession, invariably affecting the role of the press as a watchdog of the society” 
(Nwabueze 2010: 504).  
While trying to understand the syndrome of the brown envelope, it will not be out of place to 
identify those who help to perpetuate the culture. Kasoma (2010) identified three top sources of 
brown envelopes and freebies in Africa. These are: Public Relations practitioners, politicians and 
business people (Kasoma 2010: 467). These three sets of people influence the editorial content of 
the media across the globe, especially in this era of globalisation.  
It is not only field journalists who engage in unethical behaviour in the course of their duties; 
media owners and managers also engage in unethical practices in order to keep their businesses 
from collapsing. Some managers receive contracts from government officials in exchange for 
spiking stories that are not complimentary to them. This researcher believes that this has 
contributed significantly to corruption in the media. 
Owing to the brown envelope culture among media practitioners in Nigeria, “truth is often 
suppressed and the highest bidder usually gets away with injustice and unfair treatment” (Okoro 
and Ugwuanyi, 2010: 142). The culture of the brown envelope is ubiquitous in Nigeria because 
“the media are fighting for survival amid economic pressures or political turmoil; it would be easy 
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to put journalism ethics on the back burner” (Ward, 2012). Ekeanyanwu and Obianigwe (2012: 
516) asserted that the brown envelope “is a new form of news commercialization in Nigeria”. 
Aderogba (2013) noted that, as a result of this phenomenon, the media are largely corrupt.  
5.4.3 Gifts and Advertisements 
Gifts and advertisement are commonplace among journalists and their so-called patrons in many 
parts of Africa. Gifts are mostly rewards given to journalists for doing the bidding of their “clients”. 
They may come in different forms and are very useful in cajoling those in developing countries, 
where salaries are very low (Mendes, 2013). 
 Mendes et al (2013), noted that corruption via advertisements “results from the widespread 
collusion between journalists and public relations and advertising organisations”. They explained 
that placing advertisements in the media is one of the ways by which private individuals and 
companies can influence the editorial content of media organisations. Mare and Brand (2010), in 
Business Journalism Ethics in South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe, argued that pressure from, or 
on behalf of advertisers, is a major impediment to ethical news production in the three countries 
being studied. 
Besides business men using advertisements to influence the media, governments, mostly in Africa, 
still use a similar method to control the media. Edward Dickson (2009) noted that the government 
uses advertising as a weapon with which to control the media. Newspapers get a large percentage 
of their advertisements from government ministries and departments, and if government considers 
a newspaper is too critical, it instructs its officials to stop giving advertisements to such a 
newspaper. This leads to the use of nepotism to influence the work of the media. 
Peters (2003: 44) has argued that the roles of advertising and corrupt journalistic practices 
undermine the media’s ability to adhere to internationally accepted standards. For him, the 
independence of the media is also compromised by advertising. Although he admitted that 
advertising is vital to media companies’ financial performance, he noted that advertising has had 
an increasingly pernicious impact on editorial departments. Journalists are increasingly expected 
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to produce material to suit sponsors and advertisers, blurring the line between advertising and 
editorial content.  
He insisted that among many private newspapers in Africa the relationship between journalism 
and advertising is more straightforward. Since advertising departments are often understaffed, 
reporters are expected to solicit advertising while on assignment, thus earning a share of the fee, 
if they are successful (Ibid: 44-47). 
5.4.4  Nepotism 
Nepotism in the media occurs during the hiring and firing processes. In many African countries, 
the government has the power to appoint and remove journalists in government-owned media 
organisations. In many cases, top government functionaries are known to exert a great deal of 
influence on appointments to key positions in media houses. These appointees, in turn, ensure that 
the media content produced is in favour of their patrons. Such is the extent of the influence of 
nepotism on the media that Olatunji (2014 interview) rightly observed: 
An average Nigerian editor will tell you, ‘my Publisher may wake 
up tomorrow and remove me and I will not want my standard of 
living to go down’. They will tell you that the average tenure of a 
Nigerian editor is three years. So the strategy is that within those 
three years, let me accumulate what I can accumulate with my 
position and go into public relations or start a business if my 
Publisher fires me. 
It is when nepotism appears to have failed that the elite will resort to what some scholars call media 
capturing. For example, three editors (names withheld) were sacked at the Nigerian Tribune, 
Ibadan, Oyo State, for allegedly failing to toe the line put in place by some members of the Board 
of the newspapers. 
5.4.5  Media Capture 
The place of the media as the vital channel of information dissemination to the public puts the 
media in a position of being capable of influencing public opinion, public mood, and the 
perceptions of people, organisations or governments. In this vein, it is not out of place to agree 
with Mendes (p: 6) that “media capture is a present or latent risk in most developing countries, 
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with attempt by either private or governmental interests to capture the media for their own benefit”. 
A top editor of a newspaper argued that the trend was becoming worrisome in Nigeria. His 
observation: 
Media capturing is taking different forms in the country now. Some 
editors, especially, news editors and political editors are on the 
monthly payroll of some bigshots in political and economic sectors, 
with the sole aim of capturing and protecting their interests in the 
media (Interview with an Abuja-based editor, December, 2013). 
Moreover, Bolawole (interview 2009 by the author) noted that most politicians now see the 
ownership of a media house as a weapon to be deployed at the appropriate time. He argued that, 
to an average politician in Nigeria, a media house is an instrument of influence. “We are reaching 
a situation in the country that the culture of silence is taking over. People are afraid to criticise 
those in government because the government will deploy media outfits to attack them” (ibid: 
2009). Dare (1996) toeing this line, noted that media owners set up newspapers to enhance their 
access to power in order to boost their businesses, not to carry out the business of journalism 
professionally. This is one of the major challenges to the Nigerian media industry, as owners’ 
interests take precedence over the public good. 
One journalist interviewed in Ibadan explained a different method of media capturing in Nigeria. 
He noted: 
What can be more capturing than the way federal and state 
governments are spending heavily on the media? In most states of 
the federation, including the nation’s seat of power, Abuja, 
journalists are paid monthly. Some collect N10, 000; some N20, 000 
from the offices of Chief Press Secretaries. It is part of a grand 
design by these image makers to control what those assigned to 
cover their offices are writing; this monthly stipend is called several 
names. Any journalist who writes something the CPS considers bad 
will be denied the money and most journalists are playing along, 
basically due to the economic pressure, now that most media houses 
owe their staff salaries running into one year in some cases 
(interview, August, 2013). 
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Felix Adenaike, (author’s interview, 2014) retired Editor-in-Chief of the Nigerian Tribune 
Newspapers, Ibadan, argued that most beat associations formed by media men in Nigeria “are a 
platform for the collection of bribes”. Strikingly, too, media practitioners who are not toeing this 
line of business are taking solace in moonlighting.   
5.4.6  Moonlighting 
Another form of corrupt practice in the media is what Hayes Mabweazara called moonlighting. In 
“Moonlighting in Zimbabwe”, Mabweazara described the concept as additional journalistic work 
taken up by reporters to augment their income. He noted that when a reporter is involved in 
multiple interests, the primary motivation of the mother employer may be corrupted. Moonlighting 
has close links with other commonly known corrupt practices in journalism (Mabweazara, 2010: 
444). He asserted that Moonlighting has taken on a “new” meaning that poses critical professional 
and ethical questions (Mabweazara, 2010: 446). Dele Oguntayo, who shared his experience with 
the researcher, asserted that the problem posed by the phenomenon is yet to be fully appreciated 
in Nigeria because some publishers and media owners are failing to provide a conducive 
environment in which their staff can work professionally.  
Banda (2010) noted that moonlighting “is an ethical dilemma which falls under the conflict of 
interest in the journalism profession”. Besides the issue of the brown envelope that has been 
extensively treated in this research, further study needs to be carried out on the issue of 
moonlighting, as it can create a conflict of interests that may further erode the credibility and 
performance of the media in the anti-corruption campaigns across Africa. It can then be concluded 
that the media, though, expected to perform certain roles in the society based on some 
constitutional provisions, are failing, not necessarily of their own volition, but due to certain 
societal and economic constraints. This study views those scenarios under which the media operate 
as RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT AUTHORITY. The economic, legal and professional 
conditions needed by the media to discharge their duties are lacking in most African countries, and 
even in some parts of the developed nations. 
Despite the picture painted in this chapter, the online media have succeeded where the mainstream 
media fail, by exposing the high incidence of corruption in most states in Nigeria. The online media 
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are leading the pack in exposing the wrongdoings of those in the corridors of power, as reflected 
in their coverage of the anti-corruption stories.  
5.5  Summary  
So far, attempts have been made to situate the ways in which the media in Africa and, by extension, 
in Nigeria, are faring in term of their advocacy role in society. In short, the study concludes that 
the media have been implicated in the corrupt practices of the brown envelope, moonlighting, 
nepotism, gifts and advertising. The media are therefore receding to become a lapdog, rather than 
the watchdog of society. Second, although the Freedom of Information Act was passed in Nigeria 
(2011), it has yet to reflect on the ways in which government affairs are run, because some states 
of the federation are challenging the constitutionality of the Act in the Courts. It is also the 
contention of this study that there is little the media can do to fight corruption without the active 
support of non-state actors, notably civil society, professional bodies, 
traditional/religious/academia and others. Additionally, the reporting of corruption- related stories 
remains a source of threat to media practitioners, despite the fact that the country is under a 
democratic dispensation. Where there is no adequate legal protection for journalists, it is difficult 
for the media to engage in advocacy journalism. Essentially, therefore, the media can only expose 
wrongdoings, while the punishment of the culprits remain the prerogative of the State. The media 
can therefore only be helpful in the anti-graft war with the active support of both the state actors 
and the non-state actors in the society.  
  
  




COVERAGE OF CORRUPTION STORIES IN NIGERIA UNDER DEMOCRATIC 
RULE: A DISCUSSION OF TWO CASES, POST-1999. 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the coverage of corruption cases by the four selected newspapers in the 
country, using variables such as ownership structure; the geographic location of the newspapers; 
the political interests of owners; and the ethnic bias of each newspaper. An attempt is further made 
to see whether the media coverage of corruption cases has caused the electoral defeat of a politician 
or an entire government. Has the publication of corrupt-related stories in the media provided 
disincentives for political or public office holders to be corrupt, or to condone corrupt acts in the 
country after 15 years of uninterrupted civilian rule? This chapter attempts to answer these 
questions using the findings of the fieldwork. 
6.2  Analysis of Print Media in Nigeria 
The media are not strangers to advocacy or the reform of moral ethics in Nigeria. They have 
advocated reforms and promoted accountability, just as public officials have tried to mobilise 
ethnicity and religious sentiments against their reportage. Although, allegations of corruption have 
been made against public officials in the past in such a way as to suggest that the media were 
partisan, this did not appear to be the dominant trend. 
There are various tendencies in the Nigerian press coming from their differing interests, 
motivations and agendas. Whether considered from an ethno-religious perspective or from the 
socio-economic and political contexts, this has often defined the parameters of the discourse, 
constructing and deconstructing words, issues and personalities in ways that are fundamental to 
the Nigerian state. To this extent, the discourse on accountability and probity and its articulation 
in the media are dependent on their antecedents, proprietorship, ownership ties, location, work 
environment and the professional ethics subscribed to by the individual editors and their managers. 
The Nigerian media operate in an ethnically divided society where they are predominantly located, 
in the South-West of Nigeria. Four privately owned newspapers are selected for the purpose of 
this study. 
  




The table below depicts the structure, locations and editorship of the four newspapers chosen 
for the study: 





Ibadan Abdulai Debo Private The Obafemi 
Awolowo Family  
The Punch Lagos Martins Ayankola Private The Olu Aboderin 
Family 
ThisDay Lagos Ijeoma 
Nwogwugwu 
Private Nduka Obaigbena 
Daily Trust Abuja Is’haq Modibbo 
Kawu 
Private Kabiru A Yusuff 
*Source: Author’s Research (2014) 
Most of the print media in Nigeria today are privately owned, with The Punch being the most 
widely read. Historically, the print media are reputed to have been in the vanguard of struggle in 
the pre-colonial and post-colonial era. This implies that the press has been at the vortex of power. 
The aggressive media campaign against the mismanagement of public funds, which was the 
hallmark of press activities at the advent of civilian rule in 1999, appears to be fizzling out. 
Although, the press played a key role in the installation of civilian rule in 1999, it appears that it 
has failed to live up to its potential of improving the quality of democracy (Gunther and Mughan, 
2000: 444). 
Furthermore, the privately-owned newspapers remain loyal to personalities and the causes of their 
proprietors. Essentially, their vision and mission cannot be divorced from the political aspirations 
of their owner(s). The predominance of the print media in Lagos and the South-West cannot be 
separated from the presence of the advertising and commercial infrastructure (which are conducive 
to the growth of the mass media), which are found in Lagos and in its geo-political area. In 
addition, the reading public to which the print media appeals, are predominantly Yoruba, and they 
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are the products of a liberal education and egalitarian culture and are well-grounded in the history 
of political activism. 
6.3  The Search for Accountability: Case Studies 
6.3.1  Obasanjo/Atiku Crisis 
This was borne out by the crisis of confidence generated by the second term aspirations of Chief 
Olusegun Obasanjo. Whilst the crisis lasted, a high level of corruption that had been perpetuated 
by top public office holders in Nigeria was exposed, particularly the alleged running of dedicated 
bank accounts by close associates of both the President and the Vice-President for selfish motives. 
The genesis of the Obasanjo/Atiku crisis could be traced to the 2003 PDP presidential primaries, 
when the Vice-President, Atiku Abubakar, indicated his interest in vying for his party’s (PDP) 
ticket as its flag bearer in the 2003 presidential election, despite the sudden decision of his boss to 
seek re-election.  
Following intense persuasion by party stalwarts and elder-statesmen, Atiku later supported 
Obasanjo’s re-election bid and agreed to enter the contest as his running mate. Immediately after 
the 2003 elections, the President moved against his Vice-President by whittling the latter’s powers 
in government and removing certain portfolios that were under his supervision. In addition, some 
of the Vice-President’s political appointees were removed; the President also, reportedly, led a 
campaign for the VP’s impeachment, alleging abuse of office, when a case was raised against the 
VP for allegedly using his office to further his private business interests.  
The probing of the Petroleum Trust Development Fund’s (PTDF) funds with the Trans 
International Bank (TIB) necessitated that the EFCC followed up a letter of complaint from 
William Jefferson to President Olusegun Obasanjo over an alleged $6.5 million 
telecommunications deal between NDTU, owned by Otunba Reuben Fasewe, and his company, 
iGate. The issue came to the fore as a result of a $1 million bribe demanded from him before iGate 
could secure a contract.  
The outcome of the investigation alleged that Atiku Abubakar used his office and position to divert 
funds, (approved for the PTDF operations), to the Equatorial Trust Bank (ETB) and the Trans 
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International Bank (TIB), Abuja, instead of implementing the projects for which the money was 
meant. These actions were said to have benefitted his private business interests and those of his 
friends and associates, rather than the public interest. This, it was alleged, amounted to 
mismanagement, misappropriation and abuse of office. Particular mention was made of the 
business interests of the Vice-President’s associates in Netlink Digital Television (NTD), a satellite 
television project and the Mofas Shipping Company, where the Chairman was a long-standing 
friend of the Vice-President.  
In the report, Atiku was alleged to have approved the sum of $125 trillion and a $20 million PTDF 
funds’ placement in ETB and TIB, since it negated the purpose for which the funds were requested. 
It was reported that Otunba Fasewe received over N700 million in loans from the TIB shortly after 
the PTDF money was deposited there. 
On the other hand, Atiku alleged that the Mofas Shipping Company account with TIB, which was 
allegedly being used for his personal interest and those of his associates, was actually used by the 
President and his political party PDP to divert public funds for personal, business and political 
activities between 1999 and 2004. It was alleged that the President’s campaign funds were drawn 
from the said account, which was run by Otunba Fasewe.  
The pattern of coverage of the scam by the four selected newspapers revealed the pursuit of 
different agendas by the media houses. An overview of these cases, as reported in these four 
Nigerian print media between the 7th and 29th September, 2006, are discussed later in this section. 
2006 was marked by political corruption that rocked the seat of power in Nigeria. The four print 
media covered the corruption cases involving the two powerful personalities. 
6.3.2  Analysis of Newspaper Reports  
The Punch and Nigerian Tribune newspapers were picked for the first case study, tagged the 
Obasanjo/ Atiku Scam. This section of the thesis analyses the coverage of corruption related stories 
involving some key officials of the Third Republic, namely, the former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo and his deputy, Atiku Abubakar, as well as the scandal that rattled the House of 
Representatives in Abuja, the city which is the seat of power in Nigeria. The two newspapers 
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picked for the first case study, tagged the Obasanjo/Atiku scandal, framed the stories of the scandal 
in different ways. The headlines and the introductory paragraphs of each story in the two 
newspapers revealed the inherent agendas of those papers in terms of their sympathy or apathy. A 
critical discourse analysis of the Obasanjo/Atiku scandal revealed that the ownership structure and 
political affiliation of a paper plays a dominant role in the way news stories are framed by that 
newspaper. 
An analysis of the news reports, starting with the Nigerian Tribune, clearly showed the bias and 
tone in defence of the coverage. A critical analysis of the headlines, in Table 6.1, reveals the subject 
and the object of the story. It is imperative to consider these two headlines from The Punch 
newspapers: 
 How Atiku looted PTDF – Presidency 
 Controversial Account belongs to Obasanjo and Atiku – Atiku aide 
The Tribune, for instance reported: 
 The EFCC report on Atiku. 
 Atiku lists Obasanjo’s 127 impeachable offences. 
The Punch newspaper reported that the Presidency had given graphic details of how Vice-President 
Atiku, who supervised the Petroleum Trust Development Fund (PTDF), had deployed the 
resources of the Fund for political activities. The second headline by The Nigerian Tribune, 
justified the actions of the Vice-President, claiming that the account was being jointly run by 
Obasanjo and Atiku. A crucial examination of all the headlines in The Punch shows that the paper 
was trying to be liberal. 
The tone of the newspaper coverage neither condemned nor shamed the actions of the two leaders 
involved in the scandal. It was easy to discern that the newspaper was sitting on the fence and 
refraining from incurring the wrath of the Presidency, which might deny it the patronage of 
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advertising from government Ministries, Department and Agencies. However, The Nigerian 
Tribune’s position was defensive and provided media space for Atiku. 
The coverage of the incident by the two papers did not reflect any deep ethno- regional division in 
the Nigerian media, as the two papers were based in Lagos and Ibadan respectively (both cities are 
in the South Western zone of the country, sometimes referred to as the Lagos - Ibadan axis). To a 
large extent, the political affiliation of the owners of the two newspapers determined the frame, 
tone and the structure of the stories and headlines.  
These two stories, which emanated from the same scandal but with different tones and headlines, 
showed that the agendas of the papers were determined by their political affiliations. The Punch 
appeared to be reporting the investigative findings of a government agency, EFCC, which was 
controlled by Obasanjo, while The Nigerian Tribune carried a report from Atiku’s camp listing 
127 impeachable offences that were said to have been committed by Obasanjo. It was a case of 
different strokes for different issues. The newspapers fed their readers with the biased corruption 
related issues that filled the pages of many newspapers in Nigeria. This kind of reportage did not 
send the correct message to readers, and this is how newspaper editors frame stories that, directly 
or indirectly, shape the perception of readers. 
The scenario, above, is a further confirmation that the way a language is deployed determines the 
direction of a discourse. For advocates of critical discussions, language can be used to represent 
speakers’ beliefs, position and ideas in terms of spoken, written or oral message (Mogashoa,20014: 
112). While the headlines in The Punch gave subtle indications that Atiku was guilty of the 
corruption allegation levelled against him, The Tribune concentrated on defending the Vice-
President, giving him generous media space, bold headlines and catchy phrases in order to hit back 
at his boss in relation to the scandal. The newspaper reported the dirty deals of Obasanjo and did 
not provide an alibi for the financial misconduct levelled against Atiku. The following headlines 
will suffice: 
 How Obasanjo operated MOFAS Account – Atiku. 
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 Atiku revealed more dirty deals. 
A critical analysis of the news items reported has indicated that there was no single instance in 
these two newspapers that their news reports were efforts at investigative journalism; meaning that 
there was a dearth of investigative media practice in the country, but what we do have is more than 
one newspaper reporting on the same issue, and possibly casting similar headlines on the scandal. 
These headlines appeared in both The Punch and The Nigerian Tribune on the same day: 
 PDP Suspends Atiku 
 Atiku to Be Tried-Conduct Bureau 
Curiously, none of the newspapers asked what had become of the President, who was alleged to 
have been involved in the scandal, based on the series of revelations about the scam. The lack of 
follow-ups by the media, and possibly also the lack of in-depth analysis of the event, portends a 
serious erosion of the responsibility for the Nigerian media’s accountability. 
When these headlines from The Nigerian Tribune are compared to those of The Punch, it can be 
easily inferred that the economic and political affiliations of the paper have played a central role 
in reporting on corruption related stories in Nigeria. One of the negative outcomes is that the reader 
who limited him/herself to The Punch or The Nigerian Tribune due to purchasing powers was 
likely to get a partisan account of the entire scandal. From this analysis, therefore, it is clear that 
corruption related stories were framed based on the economic and political affiliation of the papers, 
with little or no consideration for the behaviour of the gladiators in the state of affairs of the nation. 
The likely social effect on the readers of this kind of framing is that public space is filled with 
biased reports and the possibility of a public discourse that is based on facts and figures is nil. 
The possibility that the readers of an average newspaper stick to their own myopic world view was 
therefore perpetuated. An ardent reader of The Nigerian Tribune is likely to view the scandal as 
an attempt by the Obasanjo led federal government to run a witch-hunt against his deputy, and 
possibly to prevent him from succeeding as president in office, while an average reader of Punch 
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newspapers may view the scandal as part of Obasanjo’s anti-corruption crusade, which was meant 
to cleanse and sanitize the Nigerian political landscape.  
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Table 6.1: Obasanjo/Atiku Corruption Scandal as Reported by The Punch and The Nigerian 
Tribune, based on Subject-Verb-Object (SVO) 
Nominalisation SVO Newspaper Date 
 The EFCC report on Atiku The Punch 8th Sept, 2006 
 How Atiku, Adenuga, Mohammed, 
Babangida diverted public funds 
 Text of the report President 
Obasanjo’s administration 
panel of inquiry. 
The Punch 9th Sept, 2006 
Epic Battle Obasanjo VS Atiku The Punch 10thSept, 2006 
 Obasanjo, Atiku in war of letters 
Vice-President raises legal team, 
Gani says - it’s over for him.  
The Punch 11th Sept, 2006 
 2003 poll: Obasanjo collected 50 
million Naira from Dariye – Atiku.  
 It’s not true – Presidency 
Vice-President suspended 
vacation. 
The Punch 12th Sept, 2006 
 How Atiku looted PTDF - 
Presidency  
The Punch 13th Sept, 2006 
 Atiku hits Obasanjo with Check 
Bomb… says President collected 36 
million Naira through Fasawe’s 
account. 
 14th Sept, 2006 
 PDP summons Atiku  
 Vice-President chasing 
shadows says presidency. 
 Obasanjo is misleading 
Nigeria – Atiku 
The Punch  15th Sept, 2006 
 Atiku should be impeached – Gani 
Fawehinmi 
The Punch  10th Sept, 2006 
 You can’t have my wife’s letters to 
Jefferson, Atiku tells Ribadu. 
The Punch 9th Sept, 2006 
 Atiku’s loyalists chide Obasanjo Sunday Punch 10th Sept, 2006 
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 Atiku drops fresh bombshell 
 Obasanjo’s aide made over 
100 withdrawals from 
controversial account – 
Vice-President 
 Beg Nigerians for 
forgiveness – Presidency 
tells Atiku 
The Punch 16th Sept, 2006 
 Resign now, Presidency tells Atiku, 
No it’s Obasanjo who should go – 
Atiku 
The Punch  17th Sept, 2006 
 DDP suspends Atiku 
 
The Punch 29th Sept, 2006  




6th Sept, 2006 
 Obasanjo orders Atiku impeached 
 Send request to Senate 
 I remain Innocent – Atiku 
Nigerian 
Tribune 
7th Sept, 2006 
 Atiku lists Obasanjo’s 127 
impeachable offences 
 As Senate receives EFCC 
reports on Vice-President 
Nigerian 
Tribune 
8th Sept, 2006 
 EFCC Reports: PDP mauls Atiku. 
 Nobody can stop me – Atiku 
 Obasanjo is playing Bole 
Kaja politics – Senior 
Advocate of Nigeria 
Nigerian 
Tribune 
9th Sept, 2006 




11th Sept, 2006 
 Controversial account belongs to 
Obasanjo, Atiku – Atiku’s aides 
Nigerian 
Tribune 
12th Sept, 2006 
 Obasanjo VS Atiku  14th Sept, 2006 
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 Obasanjo sends Jefferson’s 
letter to National Assembly 
 Shun Atiku’s handshake 
 How Obasanjo operated MOFAS 
account – Atiku 
Nigerian 
Tribune 
16th Sept, 2006 
 Obasanjo VS Atiku 
 Atiku reveals more dirty 
deals 
 PDP will decide Atiku’s fate 
soon – Ali 
 Gani asks Obasanjo to quit 
Nigerian 
Tribune 
18th Sept, 2006 
 Atiku shuns PDP’s invitation Nigerian 
Tribune 
19th Sept, 2006 
 Atiku’s Aide Arrested  20th Sept, 2006 
 Atiku to be tried – Conduct Bureau  27th Sept, 2006 
 PDP suspends Atiku. My suspension 
is illegal – Atiku 
 29th Sept, 2006 
Researcher’s field work 2015 
The Punch newspaper coverage appeared not to have been tilted in favour of either of the two 
gladiators, but the common theme that emanated from the coverage indicated that the news items, 
as published, was simply the reports provided by the two camps. None of the report was an effort 
relating to investigative journalism carried out by the newspapers. Second, there was no adequate 
follow up report on the scam. Invariably, the issue fizzled out. The Nigerian Tribune coverage of 
this particular story appeared to have favoured Atiku. This is because some of Atiku’s media aides 
were former staff of The Nigerian Tribune, and perhaps the owners of the newspaper were not 
favourably disposed to the Obasanjo presidency. Just as in the reportage of The Punch, Tribune’s 
report was devoid of any investigative journalism and there was no deliberate effort to do the 
necessary follow-up, even after the two had left office. 
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What differed in all the surveyed newspapers were the headlines and the introductory parts of their 
stories, the body and sometimes the wording were the same, so that once you read a report by 
Newspaper A, you need not have read Newspaper B. It is pertinent to note that some of the 
headlines were front page lead stories, while a substantial part of the news items was used as 
“promos” for news stories that were in the inner pages.  
6 3.3  The Second Case Study 
A synopsis of the Farouk Lawan Fuel Subsidy Scam 
The Second study is on the subsidy probe scandal involving a federal lawmaker from the North, 
Lawan Farouk, and a Lagos based businessman from South-West, Femi Otedola. 
 
The House of Representatives had set up a Public Inquiry Committee, headed by the Hon. Farouk 
Lawan, to look into the allegations of corruption being perpetrated by oil marketers. The 
Committee held a series of closed door sessions and held a public hearing between January and 
February, 2012, which culminated in the submission of a Report on April 18th, 2012. It uncovered 
monumental fraud in fuel subsidy management. 
 
The House considered the Report and passed the resolutions. However, it was later alleged that 
some monies had exchanged hands. Some sections of the media reported that the Oil Baron Femi 
Otedola had given the Hon. Farouk Lawan, and his associates, a $620,000 bribe to exonerate Zenon 
Oil from indictment. 
The Chairman of the Committee, the Hon. Lawan, issued a statement denying ever collecting any 
bribe from anybody. However, less than 24 hours after that denial, Otedola admitted to offering 
the bribe in what he referred to as a “sting operation” involving security operatives. In a report on 
Premium Times, an online news agency, on the three occasions that Lawan visited Otedola in a C- 
class Mercedes Benz, during which five video recordings were made, each of them for a period of 
between eight and 10 minutes. It alleged that Lawan negotiated the terms of the bribe with Mr. 
Otedola over lunch during the first visit. On the second visit, it was reported that he received the 
first part of $250,000 at about 11 p.m. On the third visit, the recording indicated that he received 
the balance at about 5.05am. He was said to have put the money in his pockets and under the cap. 
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The coverage of the scandal by the two newspapers, which involved some key officials of the 
House of Representatives, revealed the ethno-regional divide of the Nigerian newspaper industry.  
A critical analysis of the fuel subsidy scam and its coverage by both The Daily Trust and ThisDay 
newspapers revealed that the former was more sympathetic to the cause of the Federal Lawmaker 
than the latter. The partisanship showed in the headlines of Daily Trust is also vividly shown in 
some of the first few paragraphs of their news items. Though the issue was same, the newspapers 
reported select portions of the scandal that fitted into their narrative. Here are a few examples of 
the headlines published by the Daily Trust on the fuel scandal. The Daily Trust is based in Abuja 
and is owned by a Northerner. 
 Farouk’s Fall into a Big Trap 
 $620,000 bribery Saga: Farouk Released, Vows to Sue FG 
 How He Fell into a Big Trap 
 Fresh multi-million bribery Trials House 
 Emergency Session after Spending 48 hours in Police 
Custody. 
 Farouk in Condemned Criminal’s Cell buys own bucket, cup, soap 
In the above headlines, the Daily Trust newspaper did not hide its sympathy for Lawan, a suspect 
being tried for corruption-related acts. The introductory part of the first headline showed that the 
paper was trying to portray the accused as innocent to some members of the public, especially the 
readers from the Northern part of the country. The first paragraph read thus: 
Now, we’ve got him at last! This may be the Victory refrain of 
powerful elements in the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), the 
Presidency and among oil barons. They clink their glasses in a toast 
of exotic wines as they celebrate the fall of this middle-aged but 
young-looking man. 
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The above is the first paragraph of a front page lead story published in the 17th June, 2012, edition 
by The Daily Trust, on “Faroukgate”. It is clear that Daily Trust chose to write from a partisan 
position in the process, and jettisoned the tenets of its profession. Facts and figures were 
suppressed and falsehood promoted as being the truth. Basically, this reflected the prejudice of the 
editors of the Newspaper. This bias ought to be reserved for opinion pieces and editorial pages, 
and not used as the introduction to a major news story. Regionalism and ethnicity played a 
definitive role in the publication of this story. Another feature article on Fraouk from the same 
newspaper reflected the way Nigerian media paints “a suspect as a saint” to members of the public. 
Here is the concluding part of a feature celebrating the Hon. Farouk Lawan at 47, in the same 
period as he was being probed by both the Police and the EFCC in relation to the bribery case: 
Lawan loves to do things to perfection. But is he a perfect man? The 
answer is definitely no. Reason: He is human. He has his shortfalls. 
He has worked to come thus far so he does not accept mediocrity or 
laziness. 
The paper also published another headline and story: 
Police quiz, detain Farouk Lawan 
The introduction of the story published on 16th June, 2012, read thus:  
Contrary to the directive of the Inspector General of Police, 
Mohammed Abubakar that no suspect should be detained beyond 
24 hours, the police Special Task Force in Abuja has held Rep. 
Farouk Lawan for more than one day.  
This write up, therefore attempted to polish and launder the image of the lawmaker.  
Readers may need to be educated on what the position of the paper was the last time a 
suspect was remanded in Police custody without due diligence. 
However, This Day newspaper, owned by a Southerner and based in Lagos, demonstrated another 
viewpoint by running the story as if trying to convict the suspect, when the actual trial by a 
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competent court of law was yet to sit and rule on the case. These few headlines, among others, 
dotted the front and inside pages of the This Day newspapers: 
 Lawan Promises to Tender Bribe Money to Police 
 Lawan: I Received money, Not bribe 
 Police Detain Farouk Lawan 
 House Removes Farouk Lawan as Committee’s Chairman 
 Why Lawan was not Arrested after Collecting Bribe 
 
One thing that is clear from the reports of the two newspapers is that they remained consistent in 
using Subject-Verb-Object in their headlines, (Yusha’u, 2015:137-156) and hardly deployed the 
elements of nomination in headlines, writing about the subject and the object of the story. 
  
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     175 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 6.2: Headlines used by The Daily Trust and This Day on the Fuel Subsidy Scandal in the 
Federal House of Representatives 
Nominalisation   SVO Newspaper Date 
   Investigators quiz, detain 
Farouk. 
Daily Trust 11thJune, 2012 
   Lawan turns self to police.  19th June, 2012 
   Police quiz Farouk again.  29th June, 2012 
   $620,000 bribe House quiz 
Farouk. 
Daily Trust 29th June, 2012 
   $620,000 bribery saga: Farouk 
released. Vow to sue FG. 
 How he fell into a big 
trap. Fresh multi-
million bribery trails 
house. 
Daily Trust 17th June, 2012 
   Farouk’s fall into a big trap. Daily Trust 17th June, 2012 
   Farouk report without Farouk. Daily Trust 17th June, 2012 
   Farouk’s agonists. Daily Trust 17th June, 2012 
   Farouk, Otedola faces house 
panel. 
Daily Trust 18th June, 2012 
   Criticism against our 
committee’s work are 
baseless, says Farouk Lawan. 
 18th July, 2012 
   Again, Lawan turns self to 
police. 
Daily Trust 19th June, 2012 
   Farouk Lawan clocks 47.  19th July, 2012 
   Police quiz, detain Farouk 
Lawan. 
Daily Trust 16th June, 2012 
   Subsidy Bribe: I will be 
vindicated. 
Daily Trust 22nd June, 2012 
   Farouk in condemned criminal 
cell, buys own bucket, cup and 
soap. 
Sunday Trust 3rd Feb, 2013 
   Police quiz Farouk again. Daily Trust 26th June, 2012 
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   Farouk Lawan kept in 
condemned criminal cell, Kuje 
prison. 
Daily Trust 2nd Feb, 2013 
   Subsidy probe scandal. 
 Jonathan: I’m 
committed to 
Committee Report. 
 Investigators quiz, 
detain Farouk. 
 House begins probe on 
Otedola. 
Daily Trust 15th June, 2012 
   House to hold emergency 
section on Bribery scandal. 
This Day 14th June, 2012 
   Fuel subsidy probe: Otedola 
confirms bribe to lawmakers. 
This Day 15th June, 2012 
   Lawan: I collected $500,000 
bribe offer. 
This Day 12th June, 2012 
   Police detain Farouk Lawan. This Day 15th June, 2012 
   House removes Farouk Lawan 
as Committee Chairman. 
This Day 16th June, 2012 
   Lawan promises to tender 
bribe money to police 
This Day 19th June, 2012 
   ICPC on standby to prosecute 
Lawan. 
This Day 21st June, 2012 
   Lawan: I received money, not 
bribe. 
This Day 29th June, 2012 
 
This brief review of the coverage of the Obasanjo/Atiku and Faroukgate scandals confirms deep 
divisions exist in Nigeria’s print media, in terms of political/economic affiliations, ethnicity and 
regionalism. This implies that globalization, with its attendant social media and digital 
communication, has not been able to erode ethnic colouration in news production. From the 
perspective of a critical discourse analysis, it demonstrates that newspapers can promote a 
particular ideological position linguistically. It is therefore very clear that all the four newspapers 
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used for the two case studies did not employ their headlines to condemn or to shame the activities 
of the subjects mentioned in the stories. 
The Newspapers were very careful in their choice of vocabulary, and this is what Fairclough (1995) 
described as the process of categorization. In reporting the Obasanjo/Atiku scandal, The Punch 
and Nigerian Tribune consistently used the phrases: report, war of words, collected, impeachment, 
accounts, bombshell, and it refrained from employing vulgar language or phrases that were capable 
of costing the media millions of Naira in libel suits. The word “looting” was sparingly used, while 
words such as “stealing, cheating and pocketing of public funds”, were hardly used in describing 
the behaviour of those connected with the scandal.  
Similar restraint was also exercised in the second case studies, involving the Federal legislator, as 
soft language, such as “quiz”, “detain” and “bribery”, were used. Words such as “venality, 
corruption, fraud, arrest, jail,” etc., did not feature in the vocabulary of the Daily Trust and ThisDay 
newspapers. Previous studies have been carried out on how newspapers framed their headlines. 
Chiluwa (2007), and the work of Mohammed Yusha’u (2015), have analysed the ethno-regional 
divisions in Nigerian media in covering major crises, such as Boko Haram and the Niger Delta. 
This section of the thesis has clearly demonstrated how the ethno-regional divide is also affecting 
the reportage of accountability and transparency issues in Nigeria. 
The indisputable fact that one can draw from these scenarios is that the news consumed by readers 
is a manipulated product, devoid of any sound empirical doctrines, packaged by chains of unethical 
gatekeepers and spin doctors, dished out to achieve an intended goal without the readers knowing 
it. 
6.4  Editorials 
All the selected newspapers wrote series of editorials on the level of corruption and the 
government’s handling of it. The Punch newspaper presents a good example of such editorials. In 
one editorial entitled, Oduah and the Triumph of Corruption, published on Monday, October, 21st, 
2013, the newspaper analysed how President Goodluck Jonathan and the National Assembly 
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handled the corruption charge against the then Minister of Aviation, noting that the task was 
daunting.  
Jonathan has in three years in office failed to demonstrate 
purposeful leadership and only pays lip service to fighting 
corruption and ensuring prudent financial management. It is 
dismaying enough that Oduah apparently sees nothing inappropriate 
in her actions and public anger over the $1.6 million (about N250 
million) purchase, but it is even more troubling that the President 
has not deemed it fit to fire her. The National Assembly that should 
protect the public interest and exercise oversight on the Executive 
is equally greedy and uncaring. A passive electorate and weak civil 
institutions have also fostered a culture of impunity and lack of 
accountability in those occupying public office. It added that mind-
boggling cases like this are bound to catch the attention of those 
who have been dehumanised and debased by an insensitive 
government. At an exchange rate of N155 to $1, Oduah’s vanity 
would establish eight cottage clinics of N30 million each, or fund 
the sinking of 50 boreholes in a country where only 17 per cent of 
its 160 million people have access to pipe-borne water, according to 
a UNDP report. 
In its conclusion, the Punch editorial, asserted that:  
the Jonathan government’s chronic lack of transparency makes the 
odious cars’ purchase possible. In a decent world, Oduah would not 
be defending the scurrilous affair but answering questions from 
anti-fraud agencies. The President should fire this minister 
immediately. Failing to do so suggests a lack of modicum of 
integrity in government. The President should search for an honest, 
passionate professional that understands aviation to succeed Oduah, 
the latest in a long line of ministers who lack knowledge of the 
industry. Jonathan should take the war against corruption more 
seriously, while the National Assembly should adopt a more 
vigorous and effective stance on its oversight responsibility. 
Nigerians should not be complacent but continue to demand 
accountability from public officials. 
The Punch, in another editorial on Tuesday, December 23rd, 2014, under the headline, Jonathan’s 
N21 billion Donation: Impunity Taken Too Far, and noted:  
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… we are also faced with a total collapse in political morality, with 
corruption worn now as a badge of honour. It is sad to note that 
there is an instinctive conclusion among the Nigerian public that 
the Jonathan government is the most financially corrupt, fiscally 
irresponsible, politically insensitive and socially disconnected in 
Nigerian history. What a shame!”  
The editorial, which ran from the front page and ended at page 26, also noted that a string of ugly 
scandals had dotted the course of the Jonathan administration in the previous six years. Other 
newspapers surveyed for this study have also written editorials on corruption and other forms of 
the abuse of power in the country. Whether the editorials were effective is yet to be seen.  
6.5  Cartoons 
At this juncture, a peep into the usage of cartoons as a vehicle for passing anti-corruption messages 
is imperative. As Enemaku (2005: 131) argued, “Cartoons are both entertaining and educative, and 
they project social messages in a vivid, satiric and visual form, combining sketches or graphic 
illustrations with apposite, witty expression” (Enemaku, 2005, 131). Cartoons have also been 
deployed by the Nigerian media in responding to the government’s lip service anti-corruption 
crusade. A cartoon in the Daily Trust of Wednesday, 9th September, 2006, is a good example. In 
the cartoon under the pen name, Ghana Must Go, which is placed at the bottom right corner of the 
back page of the paper, was written; Two fighting, President Obasanjo and his Vice, Atiku, with a 
sketch depicting the two men at loggerheads, with the message, “We are partners in corruption”. 
This was apparently referring to the scam between President Obasanjo and his Vice-President in 
2006. In 2007, another cartoon in the paper depicted how the $5million recovered by the EFCC 
was re-looted. Similarly, Ghana Must Go also had a cartoon on corruption in the Federal House 
of Representatives, under the heading, ‘2 govs under probe in Britain, for looting…Says High 
Commissioner’. A fellow was addressing his friend, “Yes, but in plain English, how did you come 
about this loot?” There are several other cartoons in the other two newspapers that are used as 
examples in this study.  
6.6  Summary 
The basis of the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria has come under the spotlight in recent times. 
In spite of the perceived priority attention accorded the fight against corruption by the government, 
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it appears that corruption had reached a phenomenal stage in Nigeria and is spiralling under a 
democratic rule, if the report on global ratings on anti-corruption efforts of governments is 
anything to go by. Ostensibly, it appears that the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria boils down to 
lip-service, if the newspaper reports, editorials and cartoons surveyed in this study were used as a 
yardstick.  
One major theme that emerges from the analysis of the media coverage of corruption cases is that 
a culture of lethargy and torpidity, where the mass media have an interest in corruption cases, 
fizzles out after the arraignment of the suspects in Court. This is certainly an unhealthy scenario 
for proper accountability. In essence, the lack of a follow-up culture for stories is non-existent, and 
this is contributing to the higher level of impunity in society. One conclusion that can be reached 
from the media coverage of corruption cases is that ethnicity, ownership structure and the locations 
of media houses, still play a significant role in the framing of news reports. In Nigeria, as 
elsewhere, the media pursue different agendas, depending on their political, and sometimes on 
their socio-economic affiliations. Finally, the publication of corruption-related stories in the media 
is not a disincentive to unethical conduct in public, since the gladiators seemed to have muzzled 
the capacity of the media. 
  
  




ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN THE ANTI-
CORRUPTION INITIATIVES IN NIGERIA 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on themes from interviews with stakeholders in the anti-corruption sub-sector 
of the Nigerian state. They include: practising journalists, editors, officials of professional bodies, 
such as the Nigerian Bar Association, (NBA); the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ); the 
Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE); past Heads of the anti-corruption agencies; a labour leader; a 
legal practitioner; retired University administrators; civil society activists; religious leaders- 
(Muslim, Christian and traditional faith worshippers), and the staff of anti-graft agencies. Twenty-
five (25) respondents were interviewed. The analyses addressed five important questions; how 
have the anti-corruption agencies notably, ICPC, EFCC and the Code of Conduct, used the media 
in their campaigns? What role do the mass media and other non-state actors play in the anti-
corruption drive? How do journalists perceive their role in the anti-corruption drive and, by 
extension, what are the impediments to their work? What are the impacts of the growing linkage 
between the media class and the political class in Nigeria’s anti-corruption drive? Has Nigeria’s 
democratic experiment impacted on the level of transparency and accountability in the country?  
7.2  The Partnership Between the Mass Media and the Anti-Corruption Agencies 
The mass media play a significant role in anti-corruption campaigns everywhere in the world. To 
a large extent, the success of any anti-corruption project depends on its deployment of the mass 
media. The role of the media in the publicity around, and investigation of, anti-corruption, is 
crucial to the success of such campaigns. The society needs information on corruption allegations, 
investigations and the conviction of corrupt government officials or persons. The agenda setting 
role of the media enables it to put certain issues in the forefront for public debate. Engaging the 
various media outlets in the anti-corruption campaign thus enables the anti-corruption agencies in 
Nigeria to inform the public of developments in the fight against corruption, and also to leverage 
the information from the mass media in its investigations. 
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However, divergent views were expressed by all the 25 stakeholders who were interviewed by the 
researcher on the usage of the media by the three anti-corruption agencies in the period under 
study. While those who had worked in the anti-agencies were unanimous that they used the media 
as stipulated by the enabling laws of their agencies, others, from the civil society groups, and the 
media practitioners, were not convinced that the anti-graft bodies deployed the media very well in 
the discharge of their mandates. Presented below are comments from the stakeholders on the usage 
of the media by the anti-corruption bodies. 
Mustapha Akanbi, the pioneering Chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offence Commission (ICPC) noted: 
Actually, no anti-corruption project can succeed without the full 
support of the press. Therefore, within the limit of available 
resources, I tried, as much as possible, to make contact with the 
press. Sometimes I addressed the members of the press and they 
contributed by writing stories and articles which got published in 
the press. We make full use of the press as we ought to have done. 
We should have had special allocations targeted at the press to get 
them encouraged (12th May, 2013, Ilorin). 
According to him, inadequate funds militated against the efforts of the ICPC to fully engage the 
mass media in the anti-corruption crusade. Akanbi stated: 
I have made friends among the media, if I have an engagement, I 
invite them, and when I invite them, what type of encouragement 
will I bring them for? What I am trying to say is that there must 
always be an avenue for media and anti-corruption bodies to have a 
discourse where there will be cross fertilization of views, an 
exchange of ideas of what will be done and what will not be done. 
For them to be identified, we must encourage them to show 
commitment to fighting corruption. Now you are doing such a thing, 
you spend plenty of money, either to call them to do a conference 
or a symposium.  
Giving vent to the central importance of the media in the anti-corruption campaign, Uyim Akpabio, 
pioneering Director of Investigation and Educational Advisory Services of the Code of Conduct 
Bureau, (CCB), noted:  
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The media had been very useful to us in the Bureau. When I became 
the Director of Investigation and Education Advisory Services of 
the Bureau, I initiated some media related activities. We started a 
series of programmes -- Magazine programmes on Television titled 
“Reflection”, with a focus on topical issues. It has an interview 
segment, mini- documentary, vox pop, and the feedback segment. 
While we were running that on television, we also had a programme 
on radio, which we called “Town Crier”.  
She, however, lamented the funding for the Bureau’s media related activities as Akanbi of ICPC 
said:  
And due to some financial constraints however, we had a break at a 
stage and when we became buoyant, we continued. The problems 
in sustaining these programmes were actually fund-related. Most of 
the media related activities can be very expensive, especially; the 
electronic media. It can mainly be done through an effective public-
private sector arrangement. Many programmes have been designed 
and implemented. I’m sure you know EFCC and ICPC also have 
some programmes. 
Going by the submission of the two, therefore, inadequate funding posed a serious challenge to 
the anti-corruption agencies in extensively engaging the mass media in its anti-corruption projects. 
Given the cost of engaging the mass media, adequate funding is needed by the anti-corruption 
agencies, as this has a direct impact on the level of engagement. Though funding seems not to be 
the problem of all of the anti-corruption agencies, some agencies enjoy better funding than others, 
be it from the government or from international donors. This edge reflects the disparity in the 
capacity of these various anti-corruption agencies to engage the mass media in their campaigns. 
As Chido Onumah, the pioneering Coordinator of the Crime Prevention Unit (Fix Nigeria 
Initiative) of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) noted: 
We worked with the media, we supported their organizations, and 
we actually had programmes, because we were getting a lot of 
funding from the development partners: UNDP, the UN and the 
UNODC, for the training of journalists. For us, then, our 
relationship with the media was important and we used it 
effectively. The media were willing to work with our organization; 
they provided insight in some cases. Where we could not go directly 
because politically exposed people were involved, we got the media 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     184 | P a g e  
 
 
involved, gave them the facts and aided them to investigate and 
report and bring it to the public, and that became a basis for the 
EFCC to move in. 
This approach seems to have been the reason why the EFCC appeared to enjoy better publicity 
than the other two anti-corruption agencies in the period under study. However, the argument for 
more funding in order to engage the mass media in the anti-corruption campaign raises the question 
about how proactive and responsive the mass media are towards fighting corruption. The mass 
media are expected (on its own) to be disposed to fighting corruption, without being galvanized or 
reminded by the anti-corruption agencies. If the mass media sees themselves as a partner in fighting 
corruption, the cost of engagement will be reduced. There are other prevailing arguments on why 
the mass media are lacking in their fight against corruption. This will be extensively discussed 
later in this chapter. 
Hassan Salihu, a staff member of the ICPC, gave a seemingly positive deployment of the media 
by the anti-graft agencies. He notes that the Commission used the media in the area of publicity 
and the reportage of its activities. Electronic and print media organizations report ICPC activities, 
such as anti-corruption campaigns, courtesy visits, anti-corruption news reporting, 
conferences/seminars, educational activities etc.  
Emmanuel Ayoola, who succeeded Akanbi as the Chairman of ICPC, concurred with his 
predecessor on the role of the media, but he expressed regrets over the lack of pro-activeness by 
the media in the fight against corruption in the country: 
Well, one of the institutions from which we drew tremendous 
support when I was with the ICPC was the media. They were very 
cooperative and they supported the campaign whenever we invited 
them. We tried to encourage their partnership with us. Where 
necessary, we supplied them information. They participated in 
covering our activities, we used to hold interactive sessions and 
round table discussions, but beyond that, one would have wanted to 
see them as a corruption fighting machine on their own, instead of 
being a rear guard mechanism in the fight against corruption. I 
expect the media to be at the forefront in the fight against corruption 
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and all of the ills in society. I do not think the media are doing 
anything like that at the moment. 
The role of the mass media should not only be seen against the background of reporting corruption 
activities. This makes the mass media seem to merely be responding to events as they happen. A 
more proactive reportage is expected from the media, for they can be the external accountability 
instrument that they are supposed to be, especially in a democratic setting for a successful fight 
against corruption. The media play the role of the “unofficial custodian of public information”. 
This information constitutes an important part of the investigations on corruption, and thus the 
media are an integral part of the investigation process. Consistent with this assertion are the 
comments of Ayoola:  
The media in Nigeria are not sufficiently proactive in the fight 
against corruption; I do not know the reason for their lack of 
proactive enthusiasm in the fight against corruption, but one notices 
that, apart from two instances, they are usually indifferent. The 
media are very alert in publishing news of corruption, but seldom 
would they generate such news themselves through investigative 
journalism. So, if I were to rate the media, I would say, the media 
are a little less than average. 
The duo of Olu Falae and Bishop Bolanle Gbonigi, the former Secretary to the Government of the 
Federation, and the retired Anglican Bishop of Akure Diocese, respectively, blame the lack of 
media pro-activity on the relationship of the media with the political class. Femi Soyinka, a former 
University Administrator, also narrated his experience while trying to use the media in the course 
of his advocacy work: “the problem is that some media people, before they write any report, 
demand for money, and you know that very well, they are paid to report one way or the other”.  
The issue of corruption within the media is thus a challenge which must be addressed if the media 
are to perform their advocacy role credibly. The problem of corruption is one of the challenges 
identified in Section Five of this study. On how they were able to cope with this challenge, Ayoola 
and Femi-Soyinka provided different answers: Ayoola noted: 
Well, we held weekly conferences with the media. We also ensured 
that those of them covering the activities of the Commission were 
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accredited. Our main intention was to have an occasional roundtable 
meeting with them, which we held, and we were able to give them 
an opportunity of assessing our fight against corruption. We also 
rubbed minds with senior members in the profession and we 
benefitted from their frank opinions. Of course, whenever we called 
them they responded quickly.  
However, for Soyinka, the media men were treated with suspicion: 
I treat them with suspicion, of course, because I know that many of 
them will report correctly if given money, and if you do not give 
money, your stories will not be published.  
Soyinka argued that the media practitioners of the 1960s and 1970s were braver than the present 
crop of journalists in Nigeria. According to him, the journalists of old were able to confront the 
social ills in the society, not because of their education, but because they had style and language 
and, more importantly, they were courageous.  
Akanbi noted that, without the media, the anti-corruption battle will not create the needed impact 
in the society: “No anti-corruption project can succeed without the full support of the Press”: He 
insisted that the anti-corruption fight cannot be fought by one man, neither by the Chairman of the 
ICPC, nor by the EFCC alone, neither by the President, nor by the political leadership, but by 
everyone in the country. His view affirms the assertions of the need for a holistic approach in the 
fight against corruption. Nwariaku also agreed with Akanbi on this. He stated: 
Everybody suffers from the negative impact of corruption since 
national wealth is being stolen by some people. Every individual 
has a responsibility to fight, and in fighting corruption, I always 
advise that you start with yourself. You as an individual; must live 
up to a high moral ideal; that is why I have a slogan “Corruption 
Must Stop, Starting with me”. You must begin to restrain yourself; 
be more responsible with people’s resources at your disposal; 
because every individual in Nigeria, even the beggar, has his money 
in the national purse.  
Ehirim, the Chairman of the Abuja chapter, NUJ, notes his contentment with the roles being played 
by the media and the civil society groups, so far. He noted that the mass media have been doing 
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more than enough, because of whistle blowers in some of the leakages in the fight against 
corruption:  
I am satisfied with the role the media have played. Look at all the 
things that the media have unearthed; all the scandals involving 
ministers, governors, political office holders and the ones 
championed by some other non-state actors, like the civil society 
groups, academia, lawyers. But the thing is that, have the anti-
corruption agencies taken seriously the things that these whistle 
blowers came up with? 
The comment above suggests a functional and performing media sector, but a lack of synergy 
between stakeholders. The media are necessary for combatting corruption, but such potential can 
be undermined when there is no strategic linkage and no functional relationship between the mass 
media and the anti-corruption agencies. Through the process of information dissemination, the 
mass media ensure public support for the anti-corruption agenda; it strengthens the partnership 
between all stakeholders and sustains the anti-corruption momentum. This reinforces the anti-
corruption values in the society and serves as a deterrent to corruption. 
While the EFCC uses the media as part of its investigative activities, one of the ICPC Board 
members has cited legal provisions against deploying the media for its investigative duties. 
Onumah highlighted more ways in which the EFCC works with the mass media. Dame Julie 
Nwariku, one of the oldest Board members of the ICPC, disagrees with EFCC’s usage of the media 
as an extension of their Investigation Department:  
We fight shy of the media, to a large extent, we have not been using 
the media so much, because we believe, as an organisation with 
integrity, you do not publicise somebody’s offence until you have 
concrete evidence, until it has been proven there is a prima facie 
case. The proof is that the person had been charged in court, found 
guilty, and convicted of the offence.  
She concluded that the ICPC exercises more restraint when it comes to the issue of using the mass 
media: 
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You know some of the sister organisations do not have that kind of 
restraint. As far as they are concerned, if there is any allegation, as 
an anti-corruption agency, they must publish it, the people must get 
to know that there is an allegation against somebody. While others 
will just rush to the Press, ICPC is more restrained, because we 
believe in being thorough in such matters, because somebody’s 
image is involved. We do not want to assassinate somebody’s 
character for nothing, so we are thorough and it takes us time. We 
believe in investigating the allegations very thoroughly before 
making them public. 
Yusuff Alli, Chairman of the Nigeria Bar Association’s (NBA) Anti-Corruption Commission, 
noted that the media can perform more than they do in the anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. “I 
think they are trying, but, they can do better”. 
Evelyn Eyo Ugbogu, The National Coordinator of the Child Education and Crime Eradication 
Foundation, (CECF), one of the NGOs working on anti-corruption issues, rates the anti-corruption 
agencies low in their usage of the media in the fight against anti-corruption in Nigeria: 
The level of the coordination, and the amount of the synergy 
between the media and the anti-corruption agencies is very low, and 
if I am permitted to qualify it, I will say it is poor. In some cases, 
the media are not relating properly with the anti-corruption 
agencies. The media are supposed to be the link between the anti-
corruption agency and the society. The media are supposed to 
educate the society about corruption and other related offences, but 
they are not there, the materials are not there, the empowerment is 
not there. 
Ugbogu, of CECF, also provides an insight into the kind of working arrangements used by the 
media in a country where nothing happens without money changing hands: 
If we actually wish to win this war, we should work together; there 
is supposed to be an avenue, an access of enlightenment, 
programmes from the corruption agencies to the media, so that they 
can disseminate the same to the society. And once you go to the 
media, they demand money from you, so it boils down to a lack of 
empowerment, because there is no material, no equipment and no 
training, that is the issue. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     189 | P a g e  
 
 
Apart from the views of the officials of the Anti-Corruption Agencies, the opinions of journalists 
on the role of the mass media show a different perception altogether. While there is agreement on 
the importance of involving the mass media in the fight against corruption, there seems to be some 
disagreement on the role that the mass media should play, and also on the level of synergy achieved 
so far. 
Femi Adesina, former President of the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE) and currently the Senior 
Special Adviser to President Buhari on Media and Publicity retorts: 
The anti-corruption agencies need the media in their campaign, as 
their effectiveness is measured by the quantum of information 
available to the public. If they do so much, and those things are not 
made available to the public through the media, it is then like 
winking in the dark. They know what they are doing, but nobody 
else knows. I think the ICPC, EFCC use the media better than the 
Code of Conduct Bureau. 
Lekan Otufodunrin, Managing Editor of the Nation Newspapers simply concurs that:  
The media have been used to publicise the activities of the 
agencies through editorial publications and advertisements. 
Regularly, the activities of the agencies are published and 
broadcast by the print and broadcast organisations. They issue 
press statements and other information for the media to use. 
Chuks Ehirim, the Chairman of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) Abuja chapter, however, 
disagrees with his fellow media practitioners on how the anti-corruption bodies have been using 
the mass media in propagating their activities:  
Every successive government has always seen the media as an 
enemy and thus they should be avoided, so there has always been 
this “cat and mouse” relationship between the mass media and the 
government. These agencies appear to have taken a cue from this 
behaviour from the government, whether federal or state: and that 
is one of the problems that the media face; the problem throws up 
issues of arrest, the issue of trust; if the government is doing 
anything it wouldn’t want the media to be part of it. 
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It can therefore be suggested that the media do not share the same optimism in the anti-corruption 
partnership as that held by the Anti-Corruption Agencies. This, of course, as opined by Chuks 
Ehirim, has resulted from the lack of trust between the media and the government. This distrust 
also extends to government agencies, regardless of the fact that they are anti-corruption agencies. 
The draconian laws against the media and government’s high handedness has characterized the 
relationship between the mass media and the government, even after sixteen years of democratic 
rule. Professionals in the mass media still feel government’s attitude towards the media has not 
changed much.  
The constitutional framework for transparency in government and freedom of expression is also 
still lacking. A critical case is the “Information Bill”, which suffered several setbacks in the 
National Assembly before it was passed into law in 2011. It is thus with some trepidation that 
many journalists view the government and its agencies. This distrust is mutual in the anti-
corruption campaigns, because while the media sometimes see anti-corruption agencies as an 
extension of the government with a conflict of interest, since most of the people at the centre of 
corruption scandals are government officials, anti-corruption agencies also question the reliability 
of information from the media institutions, due to their questionable relationship with politicians. 
This latter assertion has two further aspects: firstly, that some media institutions are controlled or 
owned by politicians, and, secondly, that media institutions speaking against the government are 
tools of the rhetoric of the opposition. 
Olalere Fagboola, a veteran journalist in Nigeria gives flesh to these assertions. He submitted: 
It is unfortunate that the government anti-corruption agencies 
themselves are perverted from the outset and, more unfortunate, is 
the fact that the media which themselves are crusaders of 
convenience, are not providing a level-playing ground on which 
corruption could be fought impartially, or even to a standstill. The 
media are also anti-corruption crusaders of convenience because 
they are also selective when it comes to whom to expose or attack 
on issues of corruption. The combination of virile anti-corruption 
agencies and incorruptible media could have been the best thing to 
happen, and the greatest weapon against corruption in Nigeria, but 
we have got it wrong.  
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To him, the pursuit of economic survival by both the media and the journalists makes it difficult 
for the media to perform effectively their role as a watchdog in society. He further argues that the 
media have mortgaged their sense of social responsibility and consequently are facing credibility 
problems, while the hazards of the profession have made journalism ignoble and journalists 
disposable, leading to the gross miseducation of the people. 
He also posited: 
No doubt the press is the proverbial, unacknowledged social 
crusader and legislature of good governance, but the Nigerian press 
has got the half-hearted backing of the constitution, which gives it 
only the power to bark, but not the power to bite. The most 
unfortunate aspect of it is the fact that whereas the constitution does 
not give the press the legal teeth to bite, the people that constitute 
the greatest weapon, on which the press could have relied in its 
crusades against corruption, are not willing to support the media.  
He posited that the anti-corruption bodies are not carrying the media along in their activities. He 
argued that a lack of transparency in the government leads to a lack of trust in government 
institutions. Citing examples from the concluded 2015 National Conference, where most of the 
committees wanted to ban the media from reporting on its proceedings, Fagboola pointed out that, 
recently, the lack of transparency has been emulated by the government, and this has extended to 
other government institutions. He further argued that there has not been effective synergy between 
media practitioners and the anti-corruption agencies. 
Consistent with Fagboola’s observation is that of Sunday Adewusi, Vice-President of the Nigeria 
Labour Congress (NLC). He agrees with Fagboola that the agencies have not been using the media 
as effectively as they should be. Felix Adenaike, retired Editor-in-Chief of the Nigerian Tribune 
Newspapers also agrees with Sunday Adewusi. Adenaike rated the anti-corruption bodies low in 
their usage of the media: 
You see, they use the media to propagate the findings of their 
investigations into alleged corrupt practices by public officers and 
others. So, to that extent, they use the media, and the media have 
been collaborative in that regard, since the establishment of the anti-
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     192 | P a g e  
 
 
corruption agencies, notably, ICPC, EFCC, of course, the Police, 
but they didn’t do it well, because if they did it well, the ICPC and 
EFCC would have gone far. 
Kunle Oderemi, a practising journalist, has a different view. He asserts that the EFCC and ICPC 
were doing a lot in the fight against corruption, but due to the negative perception of government 
agencies and a lack of knowledge of the internal workings and legal restrictions of the agencies, 
the public criticizes their activities. However, he conceded that the media have not been 
sufficiently mobilized for the anti-corruption war in Nigeria. 
Similarly, Moshood Erubami, President of Nigerian Voters’ Assembly, and the immediate past 
Chairman of the Transition Monitoring Group, former Chairman of the Campaign for Democracy 
(CD) in Nigeria, also subscribed to the position of Kunle Oderemi on why public perception of the 
workings of Anti-Corruption agencies seems to tend towards the negative: 
I think that, to a large extent, the EFCC has been very pro-active in 
the usage of the media and this is why, if you rate the three 
organisations, ICPC, EFCC, and the Code of Conduct Bureau, you 
will find out that EFCC is always in the limelight. Not necessarily 
because of the achievements that they have recorded, but because 
ICPC is not visible in the public domain in terms of activities. It is 
not that ICPC is not working, but that what ICPC is doing is not 
reflected in the media. 
Segun Olatunji, former Managing Director and Editor-in-Chief of Nigerian Tribune Newspapers, 
rated EFCC and ICPC low on their usage of the media. He noted that the former was more visible 
than the latter in the media. According to him, the ICPC is a conduit for wasting government 
resources. This, he says, is as a result of its inactivity over long periods of time. He described the 
compromised judicial system as another challenge in the anti-corruption war, noting that in 
situations where judges were bribed, the truth was not enough protection for the media. He states: 
So why should you risk your newspaper for a fight that you know 
you can’t win? In any case, the owner of the newspaper will soon 
call you to order, because, sometimes, these corrupt people are the 
most powerful people in this society. They go over the head of the 
media manager to the owner. 
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Giving further insight into one of the challenges faced by the media in the course of supporting 
the anti-graft battle in Nigeria, O. B. C Nwolise, former Head of Department, Political Sciences, 
University of Ibadan, noted that the media are handicapped in the anti-corruption war in the 
country. He argues that even when the media write editorials and blow the whistle on corruption 
allegations, the anti-corruption agencies, more often than not, fail to respond. Rather, the 
government witch-hunts the media institutions, saying they are inciting the public. The media are 
thus denied its watchdog and revolutionary vanguard functions. Consistent with the observations 
of Segun Olatunji, Nwolise also pointed out the corruption in the judiciary as an impediment to 
the success of any anti-corruption project. These views reveal that the judiciary is compromised 
and without an incorruptible judiciary, the anti-corruption campaign is on a wild goose case.  
Data provided in answering Research Question One so far reveals that the three anti-corruption 
agencies have not deployed the media effectively in the anti-corruption battle in Nigeria. The 
reasons for this failure include: the inadequate funding of the anti-graft agencies; the lack of pro-
activeness from the media on the anti-corruption issues; and constitutional provisions which 
prohibit ICPC from engaging the media in its investigation exercise. Findings reveal that there is 
a need for better funding of the anti-graft agencies, especially for publicity and education. The 
EFCC under Ribadu appeared to have enjoyed better media attention than the ICPC and the Code 
of Conduct Bureau, because the EFCC was able to access funds for mobilisation and publicity 
from development partners, such as the UNODC, the World Bank, and other development 
agencies. 
7.3. The Role of Non-State Actors in the Anti-Corruption Drive 
The fight against corruption is not restricted to government agencies. A holistic approach is 
required. The capacity of the anti-corruption institutions in carrying out their mandates is 
insufficient, and so an anti-corruption strategy requires all stakeholders to be involved and their 
commitment to the strategy. Non-state actors have important roles to play in the anti-corruption 
campaign. These include raising public awareness of corruption cases, monitoring public servants 
and public procurement, lobbying for legislation that gives access to public information, taking a 
stand against corruption and contributing to advancing the anti-corruption agenda (UNCAC, 
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2012). In some countries, the government engages non-governmental organizations in monitoring 
government activities. Some governments adopt this strategy with caution, because governments 
need to consider the possibility of non-state actors being involved in corrupt activities. It is against 
this background that an in-depth analysis into the role of non-state actors in the fight against 
corruption in Nigeria becomes imperative. 
All the 25 stakeholders (100 percent) interviewed by this researcher conceded that the non-state 
actors were crucial to the anti-corruption campaign, not only in Nigeria, but also globally. They 
provided different views on the role of non-state actors in the fight against corruption. This section 
focuses on the following non-state actors: civil society organizations, religious institutions, 
traditional institutions and professional bodies. 
 
7.3.1  The Role of Civil Society Organizations and Professional Bodies 
The consequences of corruption cut deep into the fabric of any society. It is pervasive and it affects 
the development and growth of every society. Over the years, corruption has become a norm, and 
it is deeply embedded in the Nigerian society; some scholars have argued that corruption has been 
institutionalized in Nigeria and almost passes for state policy (Adebanwi, 2011). Public awareness 
of the problem of corruption has created the need for concerted effort from civil society 
organizations (CSOs). The concept of civil society has several meanings, but it generally refers to 
those human rights organizations, interest groups, professional bodies, non-profit organizations 
that operate outside the realms of state control. The CSOs play a strong role in the fight against 
corruption; they serve as a watchdog on the activities of both government and private institutions, 
they are involved in constitutional review, and they lobby for better laws that ensure government 
transparency. The CSOs are the trustees of the community, and thus they ensure social 
accountability and respect for fundamental human rights. 
Responses from the stakeholders interviewed offered an insight on these assertions and deepens 
the understanding of the workings of CSOs in Nigeria. Adesina, the NGE President, conceded that 
there was a need for proper synergy between the media and the civil society, if the campaign 
against corruption and other vices is to be meaningful: 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     195 | P a g e  
 
 
The mass media and the civil society have a crucial role to play in 
anti-corruption. Nigeria is a country in which anything not placed 
on the front burners also gets forgotten. If the media do not continue 
to harp on the issue of corruption, then it will fester, and the country 
will be the worse for it. It is crucial that there is an interflow of 
information between the anti-graft agencies and the media. I believe 
this is where the civil society can come to help by providing the 
platform for interaction between the media and the anti-corruption 
agencies. 
Erubami opined that the civil society had been doing enough, but there was a need for the civil 
society groups to engage in massive civil re-engineering to force the needed political will to 
confront corruption in Nigeria. He observed that advocacy has been continuing for several years, 
but the advocacy message is falling on deaf ears in government.  
He also noted that the political will to fight corruption was crucial to the anti-corruption battle, but 
this is lacking among the political class of the country. “This is a problem because the involvement 
of politicians in corrupt activities predisposes them to insincere commitment towards the anti-
corruption campaign”. He lamented that the political class was so implicated in corrupt activities 
that the civil societies are helpless in fighting the scourge of graft. He noted that “there is a terrible 
lack of political will to fight corruption. It is a sad commentary”. 
According to Nwolise, there is nothing the civil society and the media can do to help the cause of 
anti-corruption fight based on the situation on the ground in Nigeria. He argued that the 
government and its officials do not feel they are accountable to the people, and this has led to 
widespread impunity in the system. He also indicted the judiciary for this problem. It is difficult 
for a corrupt system to change a corrupt process. The judicial system has not lived up to its 
responsibilities for ensuring social justice. Such gaps in the judicial system breed a culture lacking 
in public accountability. When the political class feels that it is above the law, there is no restriction 
on the corrupt activities that will occur in the society.  
Anti-corruption advocacy and campaigns are capital intensive. This poses a challenge to CSOs 
with limited sources of funding. Olatunji provides economic reasons for the incapability of the 
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non-state actors to advance the anti-corruption war. He said that the corrupt people would continue 
to enjoy positive media coverage as long as the press pursues profit in order to remain in business:  
Unfortunately, the media and civil society cannot do much, and the 
reason is very simple. We are in a shrinking economy where the 
government control virtually everything. Even the so called private 
sector businesses are not really private, because most of the people 
who are shareholders in these big companies are politicians based 
in Abuja. So, if you think that when the government begins to fight 
against you, that the private sector will rescue you, that is just a 
utopia or false hope. When I joined the Tribune 26 years ago, the 
tonne of newsprint was N4, 700, then, because newsprint was very 
inexpensive, we did not need adverts. So we could fight corruption, 
we could write anything we wanted. But the same tonnes of 
newsprint today are about N200, 000. It means that the newspaper 
is sold at a loss. So how do you make profits? It is through 
advertisements. Unfortunately, those who steal are the ones that can 
afford to pay for these advertisements. So the media can’t do much, 
because these corrupt people will just withdraw all their patronage 
and that will be the end of the so called newspaper. 
Femi-Soyinka further gives clarification on this: 
I wouldn’t say the civil society alone; I will say the community, the 
people. How many civil societies do we have? Where do they get 
their money from? How strong are they? How committed are they? 
I would say that the answer to what you are talking about lies with 
the community, though the civil society organizations can be a 
catalyst. If they are well trained and coordinated to do their 
assignment themselves, they can bring the people together, and 
provide a platform for the citizens to ask questions. 
Ugbogu’s views are also consistent with the foregoing. She said that poverty, the “fear factor” and 
the lack of coordination from the anti-corruption agencies, impede the work of Nigerian civil 
society groups: 
Poverty and corruption have made the Nigerian civil society close 
its eyes to what they are supposed to focus on; to what they are 
supposed to tame down; to what they are supposed to expose.  
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Interestingly, one of the major challenges facing CSOs is corruption within their rank and file. As 
observed by Ugbogu, most CSOs do not have a sincerity of purpose, because some were set up as 
money making ventures and, ironically, they indulge in the same acts they are fighting. Her 
comments were quite revealing: 
Let’s assess the civil society that I belong to, for instance, I 
discovered much corruption within the system. People running the 
civil society organizations are also from within the community, and 
that means they are part of the system. But they are supposed to 
know better; in fact, they are supposed to take steps to correct the 
corruption that is within the society, but they are just doing exactly 
the same thing. 
The civil society has to be credible in order to be considered a stakeholder in the fight against 
corruption. More importantly, Nigeria is still under the yoke of militarism. The situation is such 
that we have weak civil society organisations. There is no way our civil society (as presently 
constituted) can drive and reposition the nation in democracy. There is therefore a need to develop 
the civil society properly in order to mobilise citizens against corrupt public officials.   
The fight against corruption requires a responsible professional elite that is diligent, courageous, 
vibrant, and holds the ethics of professionalism in high esteem. Professional bodies, like the 
National Association of Nigerian Students’ Union (NANS), the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC), 
the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA), and the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASSU), were 
highly instrumental in the fight against military rule. However, the relevance of these organizations 
in recent times evokes divergent responses from the respondents who were interviewed for this 
dissertation. 
Ayoola explained that professional bodies have been the engine room of the development of CSOs 
in Nigeria, but he lamented the apathy of the non-state actors in relation to recent anti-corruption 
issues in Nigeria. He also asserted that critical sectors of the nation, such as the Nigerian Labour 
Congress (NLC), the University Teachers and the Students’ Union bodies, which used to be the 
nation’s think-tank groups in the past, are now indifferent to the anti-corruption war in the country. 
He proposes: 
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I can’t see anything that they do. We tried to fashion a National 
Integrity Outreach to make the fight against corruption stronger and 
more effective than mere rhetoric, and make everybody an active 
participant; active participant, not in the sense of merely criticizing 
the other man, but each segment of the civil society fashioning out 
its peculiar mechanism for combating anti-corruption. What we 
have in Nigeria is that we talk too much but, when it comes to every 
hand being on deck, you don’t find any hand on deck. We are a 
nation of talkers, not a nation of doers. 
Fagboola opined that the Nigeria Labour Congress, a pressure group expected to champion the 
cause of workers intelligently, has not lived up to expectations because the labour activists now 
pursue their selfish interests, and even when they come close to championing the interests of 
workers, they are very crude and unintelligent about it. Ayoola agreed that the Nigeria Labour 
Union has failed to be the arrowhead of the anti-corruption drive in the country: 
Take the Nigeria Labour Union (NLC), for instance, I did not see or 
know the reasons why the NLC should not fund a radio and 
television station and establish a newspaper, because one would 
expect that the Labour Union should really be in the front line 
playing the watchdog against corruption.  
However, Adewusi, Vice-President of the NLC, disagrees with the arguments of Fagboola and 
Ayoola. He said that the Congress is doing well in the fight: 
The NLC has spearheaded the fight against corruption by using 
every opportunity and platform to sensitise the Nigerian public to 
the destructive effects of corruption on national development. The 
Congress has embarked on several protests and road shows over 
corruption, and these have helped to slow down corrupt tendencies 
of public officials. Yes, I am satisfied with the role of the Congress 
in the anti-graft campaign, because without such orchestrated 
interventions, the impunity would probably have been worse. 
According to him, the NLC will continue to insist that accountability and transparency be imbibed 
by all public officials, or be forced on them through the application of the rule of law, and all that 
are implicated in corruption cases must be made to face the law. Besides, Ali, the Chairman of the 
NBA Commission on anti-corruption, urges his colleagues in the legal profession (as key players 
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in the justice sector), to do more to ensure the return of probity and accountability in Nigerian 
public life: 
I think we can do much better. I think all of us should put on moral 
armour and know that it is when we have a society that we can have 
a profession. I am not satisfied with the way some of our colleagues 
go about the supposed defence of these cases. Let us go back to the 
path of rectitude, let us go back to the old ways, where things were 
orderly, people were honest, people were their brother’s keepers, 
neighbours were safe with themselves. We must reinvent, re-
introduce and reinforce our value systems so that people don’t 
worship money as we are doing now.  
Another important aspect of democracy is political participation. Democracy requires involving 
people in the running of public affairs. CSOs are to demand public accountability from government 
officials and political office holders in the handling of public funds. It is important that the 
government knows that it is answerable to the people. The principle of political participation 
ensures that the civil society is not obstructed from questioning the affairs of the state. For 
government officials to feel the responsibility of being accountable, the principle of the rule of law 
must be strictly adhered to.  
In addition, transparency and the freedom of information strengthen the formal processes and 
institutions that ensure public accountability. With the Freedom of Information Act, the non-state 
actors can use the budget of the Government as an instrument of accountability. When the budget 
of the government, and that of its various ministries, agencies and parastatals, are in the public 
domain, the civil society can use this to monitor the government and hold it accountable in its 
dealings. All these are democratic principles that the media and other non-state actors’ need in the 
polity. The rule of law stipulates strict adherence to the law, decisions taken by the government 
must be in accordance with the law, thus disallowing any form of arbitrariness in the decision 
making process. Fundamentally, Nigerian citizens seem to have the capacity to tolerate aberrant 
behaviour on the part of their elected leaders and public servants alike. 
7.3.2  The Role of Religious and Traditional Institutions 
Nigeria is a country that has strong religious and traditional institutions. These institutions form 
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the very basis of the values and ethics of “good and “bad” in the society. Culture and religion 
inculcate norms and values that are expected to promote social justice and acceptable standards, 
thereby reducing vices, such as corruption in the society. Most Nigerians are very religious, as seen 
in the proliferation of various worship centres around the country. However, the prevalence of 
corruption in Nigeria today tells a different story, because it is ironic that a country with over 90% 
of its population ardent followers of some form of religious and traditional belief, is a melting pot 
of corrupt ideas and practices. This irony can even be extended further when one looks at 
developed countries that are supposedly experiencing a decline in religious belief, yet they rank 
low in the global corruption indices. This puts into question the relationship between the 
prevalence of religion in a society and the corrupt activities therein. However, religious and 
traditional institutions are still important stakeholders in the anti-corruption campaign, given their 
strategic roles in the society. Their role and the extent to which these roles have helped in fighting 
corruption is the focus of this section. 
On the role of the religious and traditional institutions in the campaign, Akpabio opined that many 
people use religions and traditional bodies as a cover with which to commit crimes in the country 
and, unfortunately, when these issues are raised, some “sympathisers” politicize them.  
Yusuf Ali, (SAN) deployed rhetoric on who will challenge corruption in the nation’s religious 
circle: 
There is total destruction of self-moral value; everybody worships 
money. People don’t ask where a person gets the money he spends 
carelessly any more. I have said it severally that the churches and 
the mosques are promoting corruption on a large scale. Otherwise, 
how can a President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) 
say somebody bought a plane for him. Who is the person? Are we 
not entitled to know? 
Oderemi also submitted that the religious bodies, traditional institutions and professional bodies 
have failed woefully to help the cause of anti-corruption: 
One, the church, in particular, to me, is not playing a noble role. I 
will give you reasons: In those days, if a policeman arrested a 
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member of a particular family, that family is likely to go about with 
the stigma forever, but that trend has changed. These days, 
somebody who has been compromised while holding public office, 
somebody who the anti-graft agencies have to some extent 
arraigned, is still celebrated. The same person will go to church and 
be honoured; he would even occupy the first row seat in the church. 
Two, traditional rulers’ honorary titles are now based on heavy 
prices, so to say; they are given to the highest bidders. So, if you 
have enough money, nobody wants to know how you came about 
your wealth. As long as you are ready to throw part of it around, the 
traditional leaders will honour you, they will give you what is called 
the ‘’Otunba’’ of this place, the ‘’Balogun’’ of that place. It is quite 
unfortunate that, even in some communities in Nigeria today, those 
who are top monarchs are said to be people of questionable 
characters. 
These views, above, suggest a compromise between both religious and traditional institutions. 
Religious and traditional rulers have become the appendages of politicians, and they are failing in 
their primary roles. The monetization and politicization of these institutions have far reaching 
consequences for the anti-corruption campaigns.  
Gbonigi’s illustration of the imprisonment and later release of a corrupt public official offers more 
insight into how the anti-corruption campaign is politicized. He states: 
When we just say the Church aids and abets corruption, what do we 
mean? Bode George, for instance, behaved badly before he was 
jailed. After he had served his jail term, they arranged a 
thanksgiving service in Christ Church Cathedral in Lagos. What 
was being celebrated, that this man has become an ex-convict, what 
was he being thankful for? 
Gbonigi acknowledged that there were still exceptions to this norm. He was particularly happy 
that Bode George was not treated with kid gloves during the so-called thanksgiving service, when 
the clergyman who preached on that day was courageous enough to condemn the corrupt activities 
of public office holders. He also agreed that Christian organisations, like the Bible Society of 
Nigeria, (BSN), the Scripture Union (SU), the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), and many 
others, have been advising their members to steer clear of sin. 
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In his criticism of professional bodies, Ayoola lamented the lack of commitment on the part of 
religious institutions in fighting corruption: 
I will rate it as next to nothing. We interacted with religious bodies 
across the country, but after the interactive sessions, you don’t see 
any sign of initiative on their part. I don’t think the religious 
organizations, as a body, play any significant role in the fight 
against corruption. 
Nwariaku suggested that this was also the same with traditional institutions in the country, 
especially when bordering on transparency: 
The general impression is that many people are getting titles that 
they do not deserve because of their shady behaviour. Some are 
even made traditional rulers through monetary inducement to the 
community leaders. As you enthrone people of questionable 
characters to traditional positions, young people watch, and it sends 
a very wrong signal to them.  
Nwariaku, however, disagreed with the view on the culpability of the Church in the fight against 
corruption. She argued that no religious body deliberately sets out to mislead followers, except 
ISIS and other terrorist groups. The ICPC Board member noted that the responsibility of religious 
institutions is to give the message; to teach, to educate, and to draw the faithful onto the path of 
integrity. The retired Anglican Bishop Gbonigi asserted that the role of the church is “advisory 
and cannot go beyond praying and advising the faithful, but our prayers have helped in reducing 
the cases of corruption in the country”: 
Whether the faithful live up to the teachings or not, the church 
cannot be held accountable, although I have a responsibility. 
Whether it is a church or a mosque, the leaders preach to the people, 
point out the right path to follow; the right path of truth. I do not 
think there is any religious organisation that misleads the people in 
telling them that ‘this is right’, when it is not right, except, of course, 
when you are thinking of the extremists.  
Olatunji, also a Senior Pastor in the Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG), notes that most 
of these corrupt officials are not faithful members of religious institutions and, by extension, do 
not adhere to the tenets of the religion. The church is handicapped in enforcing code of conduct. 
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Olatunji further thinks that governments’ meddlesomeness in the appointment of traditional heads 
has weakened the capacity of the traditional institutions in the society. He observes: 
Since government has to approve the appointment of any traditional 
ruler, so somebody who will be a traditional ruler has to also be 
either a politician or must have extreme political connections to 
even get there. That is not good, and has really whittled down the 
influence of the traditional leaders. 
Research Question Two highlights some of the factors militating against the media and other non-
state actors in the battle for a more transparent society; economic reasons, which force media 
practitioners to abandon their social responsibility to the society; the debasement of the cultural 
values of the state, making citizens worship money; the lack of synergy between the media and 
the anti-graft bodies and the limit to which religious and professional bodies can invade the privacy 
of their members. Two critical issues seem to have emerged from this section: First, Nigerian 
society is increasingly becoming dominated by pastors, evangelists, spiritual teachers, olushos and 
woliis, to the extent that some of the interviewers argued that religion has contributed to the high 
level of prebendalism in the country. Second, another critical issue that emerged is that the culture 
and tolerance of corruption has crept into the consciousness of an average Nigerian, including the 
media practitioners. 
7.4 Journalists’ Perception of their Role in the Anti-Corruption Drive, and the 
Challenges They Face in Carrying Out This Role. 
Most of the journalists interviewed for this study agree that they have a role to play in the anti-
corruption drive, but they lamented the series of challenges impeding their advocacy work. They 
agreed that a combination of political, economic and legal constraints have undermined the 
media’s advocacy capacity to serve as the mirror of the society and to play their accountability 
role credibly.  
Simon Kolawole, former Daily Editor of ThisDay Newspaper, and currently the publishers of The 
Cable, an online media site, stated: 
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As a journalist, I consider my role as that of an investigator and as 
exposing corruption where possible; and giving cases of corruption 
the necessary prominence to encourage official action.  
Otufodunrin, one of the editors of the Nation newspapers, also noted that journalists know that 
they have a duty to help the cause of anti-corruption:  
Journalists know that, as much as possible, they have a duty to make 
the society corruption-free, considering its implication for 
everybody. The major impediment has to do with lack of necessary 
information, sometimes, on corrupt practices across board. There is 
also the problem of a lack of co-operation of the agencies saddled 
with the prosecution of corrupt persons.  
Oguntayo agreed that the media men have a role to play in the anti-corruption drive. He argued 
that journalists are to sanitise the society with their reports and promote a culture of integrity and 
probity in the conduct of government business.  
However, a veteran journalist, Felix Adenaike, doubted the commitment of the media to the anti-
corruption drive. He noted that the present crop of journalists wants to behave and live like other 
professionals, forgetting that their role in the society is quite different and peculiar. According to 
him, many of the present crop of media practitioners believe that they don’t have any role in the 
anti-corruption drive of the state, so they can't make up their minds whether or not to join the 
campaign. They know they want to do it, but they can’t bring themselves to do it, because they are 
prone to corruption. Adenaike noted: 
You cannot perform the role of a watchdog if you demand and take 
bribes. Journalists are hampered to that extent in the effective 
performance of that role. A journalist is a missionary; you are out 
there to rid the society of filth, to be a watchdog, to hold society, 
and those who operate in it, including government, corporate bodies 
and individuals, to the laws of the land. To hold people up to such 
laws, you also have to obey the same laws. If you are a corrupt 
person, you can’t excuse yourself that your pay is low, but you must 
live within your means. Many people don’t want to live within their 
means. 
The assertion that journalists do not know their role in the fight against corruption seems 
contestable. However, with the fall of educational standards and the influx of people to 
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journalism, this assertion is not farfetched. Otufodunrin’s views seem more plausible, for he 
argues that the problem is not a lack of knowledge of its role, rather, journalists are constrained 
in their duties as a result of the prevailing circumstances in the society.  
Certainly, the Nigerian media are faced with certain challenges that undermine its capacity, some 
of them include the lack of an effective legal framework that supports media practice, corruption 
in the media (where a journalist expects gratification for covering, or reporting on, events) and 
also, the problem of the ownership of media institutions by politicians or their stooges. This lack 
of professionalism has, to a large extent, compromised the media. Akpabio, (CCB) opined that the 
media are caught in the intrinsic web of these sentiments for three basic reasons: 
First, a lack of professionalism in the media, because the rank and 
file of the industry has been infiltrated and polluted by quacks. 
Therefore, there is an urgent need for capacity training in order to 
streamline their activities. Second, financial capacity is non-existent 
for members of the profession. Welfare and professional schemes 
are two crucial things for most professions, and it is a big challenge 
in the media industry. Third, there is the need for a clear career path, 
a clear progression in the sector. At present, this is lacking. 
On the issue of corruption within the media, Bolanle Gbonigi, a retired Anglican Bishop, argued 
that corruption within the sector “is a reflection of what is happening in the society”. However, he 
noted that corruption within the media was affecting the anti-corruption battle in the country: 
There are people within the media who are corrupt, and because 
those at the top are corrupt, they look at the situation in the whole 
country and say ‘let me have my own share of the national cake’’, 
and so they do all they can do to have their own share of the national 
cake. And now they talk about brown envelope, they receive it, not 
in thousands, but in millions, in order to sway the mind of the people 
in favour of a particular person.  
Oderemi, Head of the Political Desk, Nigerian Tribune newspapers, also posited that corruption 
within the media sector was affecting their work. A lack of professionalism in the sector, according 
to him, “is due to people going into the media industries for the wrong reasons. Some go into the 
media with the notion that the profession is an avenue to make money. They do not care about the 
issue of ethics or their integrity; they do not matter to them”. 
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This argument was further echoed by Adesina, the former President of NGE, who said that the 
media do not operate in a vacuum: 
It operates within a milieu, and if that milieu is overtaken by 
corruption, it is only natural that the media will be affected. Media 
men are not from another planet, and if they operate in an 
environment suffused by corruption, it is only natural that they will 
be affected. Clean up the society, and clean up the media too, 
because they are part of society. Brown envelope, if there are no 
givers, there will be no takers. When the consciousness on doing 
things right is very high, even the media falls into line. But when 
society is very permissive, expect the brown envelope syndrome to 
be pervasive. 
Adenaike agreed with Gbonigi and Adesina that corruption in the larger society reflects on the 
media industry:  
They are members of the larger society and many people migrate 
into journalism to make money, but they get their focus wrong from 
the beginning; they think it is a glamorous job, so they can as well 
make money. The larger society is corrupt, and journalists, as part 
of that society which they are expected to police and clean up, 
sometimes, unfortunately, fall prey to the filthy lucre and take blood 
money, and this makes them vulnerable and corrupt. By extension, 
they can’t do a thorough job. To be able to live above board and be 
a thorough professional, journalists must respect the ethics of the 
profession. 
Ehirim observed that the practitioners who are ready to help the cause of the anti-corruption fight 
are not encouraged in carrying out their duty by the relevant agencies, and blamed it on the non-
implementation of the Freedom of Information Act by some federal agencies and states’ 
governments in the country. The lack of accurate information impairs the ability of the mass media 
in reporting credible information to the people, as required.  
Oderemi paints a graphic picture of media practitioners’ inability to perceive any definite role in 
the anti-corruption drive. His response is consistent with the earlier assertions. He stated: 
Most of us don’t have the orientation, and this is unfortunate. Some 
of us don’t even have the belief that we ought to be part of the team 
waging war against corruption, yet, we have the weapons, the 
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platform to use and pursue that cause through our write-ups, 
analyses, features, interviews, and so on. But some people don’t see 
it that way, people would prefer to compromise. Placing the story 
as it is, they want to play ball and, possibly, to cover up a few things. 
Another factor is that of ownership. Many of those who own media 
houses are not professional journalists; they are more businessmen, 
so to speak; the social responsibility theory of the Press does not 
matter to them, in fact, they don’t even understand what that means.  
Oderemi also concurred with the argument of societal influence as a challenge to journalists in 
defining their role in the anti-corruption campaign. The Nigerian society measures success, most 
frequently, in monetary terms. This culture of getting rich at all costs erodes the ethics of 
professionalism and predisposes journalists to cutting corners.  
Erubami, of CD, noted that media practitioners believe that they have both moral and legal 
obligations to expose the vices of those in positions of authority, but they are greatly constrained 
by the political leadership of the country and the corruption within the sector: 
The Fourth Estate of the Realm believes it has both moral and legal 
obligations to expose corruption and corrupt people, even at the risk 
of their lives. They publish and expose corrupt tendencies in the 
society. Their main impediments are the overbearing attitude of 
government operatives and the impunity with which they intimidate 
journalists and prevent them from publishing the truth; while the 
very poor remuneration is demoralizing. 
Ehirim, Chairman of the NUJ, Abuja Chapter, argued that it was wrong to say media practitioners 
are involved in corruption. To him: 
When you put it that way, you are giving blanket condemnation to 
the entire profession. I can speak for myself, I can speak for several 
other journalists who are not involved in such a practice; that is not 
to say that one or two are not involved. There is a Committee that 
fights against quacks in the profession. There are people who are 
not representing any media organisation, but they go about with 
their recorders to 'interview' unsuspecting members of the public, 
and, at the end of day, they say “oga wetin dey for us now?" which 
is a language that no trained journalist would use. They are fake 
journalists, and in the event of being ripped off, they throw blanket 
blame on the generality of journalists, which is not fair. 
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In order to drive home his message, Ehirim insisted: 
What is brown envelope? It is a phenomenon in the media 
profession. Unfortunately, it has been given a very derogatory tag. 
I was on radio the other day, and this issue came up, and I was 
asking, when you go to a lawyer don’t you pay a consultancy fee 
before anything? Most times when you go to the Hospital, you pay 
some money before you see the doctor. Why should the society see 
it as evil when a journalist does something for somebody and the 
person says ‘thank you'? I am not saying it is a precondition before 
you can do your duty. In African culture, whenever somebody does 
any favour for you, you thank him. If a journalist interviews you 
and gets it published, and one day you meet him and say ‘my friend, 
thank you very much for what you did for me, please can you have 
this? Is there any crime in that?  
As earlier discussed, the ownership of media institutions by politicians is a prevailing impediment 
to a free press. Olatunji argued that the ownership structure of most media “is a serious issue 
affecting the advocacy role” of journalists: 
The role of the media, ordinarily, should be to expose corruption in 
all ramifications, because the media are supposed to stand between 
the governed and the governor; that is the ideal role of the media. 
But we are now in a society where journalists are assassinated for 
speaking the truth; we are now in a society whereby journalists are 
attacked for writing true stories.  
Onumah concurred with Olatunji’s submission, but provides an interesting dimension on why 
media practitioners appeared to be incapable of using their power to fight corruption: 
Many media houses are owned by politicians and even those that 
are owned by private businessmen do not pay salaries, and nobody 
holds them accountable. Imagine having a family, you have to work 
for 3-6 months without getting paid. ThisDay Newspapers are 
usually cited where this is common practice, and when reporters 
asked the Publisher about their salaries, he would be quoted as 
saying: 'young men, why are you asking me about salaries when I 
have given you an ID card?” So, there was an unwritten rule that 
you have to use what you have, to get what you want. 
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It is imperative to say that, in the course of this study, it was discovered that it was not only ThisDay 
Newspapers and the AIT television station that owed workers’ salaries running into several months 
or even a year. Other media houses said to be owing staff salaries include: Daily Independent, 
People’s Daily, National Trust, Leadership, The Newswatch Times, Newswatch Magazine; 
National Mirror, PM/TheNews Magazine, The Union, New Nigerian and News Direct. Apart from 
the non-regular payment of salaries and other allowances, journalists are among the least paid 
workers in the country, with some collecting salaries as low as N50, 000 per month, equivalent to 
$102 at the exchange rate of N490 to a US dollar.  
Adenaike, however, faulted this line of reasoning, insisting that the poor salary should not be an 
excuse for media practitioners to engage in unethical behaviour: 
I don’t think so; it could be a factor, but not a major problem. One, 
assess yourself as an individual, how do you value yourself? Do you 
value the ethics of the profession? Don’t you appreciate a situation 
where somebody sees a banker salute him and commend him for 
what he represents, and then another person sees you as a reporter 
and calls you a press boy? The major issue is you as an individual, 
how much is your value, your name, your family name, and what is 
your goal in life? Do you just want to come into this profession and 
leave the place without making any impact? 
Olatunji argued that most newspapers also engage in various unethical practices which militate 
against the watchdog role of the media, like organising extra-curricular activities. Olatunji 
identified three forms of these unethical practices as: 
 Political Awards: Nigerian newspapers are now fond of organising political awards for 
State Governors or Local Government Chairmen. A governor or council chairman would 
be chosen as the Governor of the Year, or the Man of the Year, for a price. In the past, 
when such awards were based on the genuine contributions of the person to society, the 
Governor, or whoever is picked for the award, must pay millions of Naira to cover 
'logistics'. At the same time, the recipient must get his friends and aides to place 
congratulatory messages in the newspaper. These advertisements will also rake millions of 
Naira into the coffers of the papers. 
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 Corporate Awards: This is a variant of awards organised by the media that are targeted 
at the captains of industry. Pictures of captains of industry will litter the pages of such 
newspapers. It also attracts a price tag. Millions of Naira are raked into the accounts of the 
media house. 
 Commercial News: The broadcast outfits are guilty of this trend. Educative and 
informative documentaries that can help citizens grow, suffer as most of them are yanked 
off the air to provide adequate time for the friendly press releases. Millions of Naira are 
raked into the accounts of the organising broadcasting station. 
Although all the journalists interviewed for this study acknowledged that they have a definitive 
role to play in the anti-corruption drive, it was only Simon Kolawole that personalised his answer. 
Kolawole noted “as a journalist, I consider my role as that of an investigator and as exposing 
corruption where possible, and giving cases of corruption the necessary prominence to encourage 
official action”. What is in short supply in Nigeria is an equivalent of the Ghanaian investigative 
journalist, Anas Aremeyam Anas, who exposed high level corruption and wrongdoing in the 
Ghana judiciary, resulting in the removal of over 40 judges. 
Research Question Three indicates that media practitioners perceive that they have a role to play 
in the anti-corruption drive, but they are unable to carry out this sacred duty because their rank and 
file have been infested with the virus of corruption. Although the brown envelope syndrome has 
compromised the watchdog role of the media, most of the media practitioners and union leaders 
interviewed were a little defensive on the issue. The change in the media landscape of the country, 
where only the rich class (populated by politicians and business men), can own and operate the 
media, has affected the way their employees-journalists operate. Advertising appears to have a 
damning impact on the media accountability role. It was discovered in the course of this study that 
some newspapers in Nigeria have turned their reporters into advertising canvassers. Payment of 
salaries is now being tied to the amount /volume of advertising generated by a reporter. For 
instance, some reporters in one of the Ibadan based newspapers were issued with queries for their 
failure to bring advertisements into the company from their respective beats. 
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The consequence of this is that reporters are expected to “play along” with the Chief Executive 
Officers of the organisations that they are assigned to cover, in order to be considered for 
advertising from the ministries and government agencies. The end result of this co-option of the 
media is that investigative journalism suffers a huge set back. A reporter with the Ibadan based 
newspaper (name withheld) retorted, “investigative journalism is becoming a dangerous terrain. 
We have seen cases where Editors have betrayed their reporters by contacting the affected 
personalities mentioned in a story in exchange for money”.  
The situation on the ground is that journalists, who are struggling to survive, cannot be forceful, 
as an external mechanism with which to engender accountability in the country. The result of this 
situation is that the media have been turned into a lapdog of the politically powerful and the 
wealthy few who run the government, so the media cannot be seen as the watchdog of society. 
7.5 The Impact of the Growing Linkage Between the Media and the Political Class on 
Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Drive  
In the course of this research, many of the stakeholders who were interviewed agreed that the 
growing linkage between the media and the political class is having a negative effect on the anti-
corruption drive in the country. Onumah argues that, over the years, the media landscape of the 
country has changed from that of the pre-independence media era, (when the newspapers were 
mostly used as a platform to end colonial rule; to the post-Independence media era, when 
newspapers were published to fight the military dictatorship, and then democratic rule, when 
businessmen, following in the footsteps of those like the  Ibrus and the Aboderins of this country, 
ventured into the newspaper business to protect and to defend their own personal and business 
interests. Onumah specifically retorted: 
We are in a period where the majority of the newspapers/magazines 
in the country today are owned by businessmen/politicians, they 
were set up to protect the business/political interests of their owners. 
For example, The Nation titles are owned by Bola Tinubu, a 
politician/businessman; Champion is owned by Iwuanyawu; the 
Sun and the Telegraph are owned by Orji Uzor Kalu, a former 
Governor of Abia-State, while the famous Guardian titles are 
owned by the Ibru family. Many politicians also own FM radio and 
television stations. What we now have is that the agenda of the 
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media has shifted from championing the national or anti-military 
struggle to purely defending the interests of politicians. Politicians 
who are accused of corruption own their media houses, and they 
fight their own wars through the same. 
Olatunji lamented that the growing number of politicians setting up newspapers is casting serious 
doubt on the capacity of the media practitioners to report on, and defend, the truth in Nigeria:  
It is not good for the media; the truth is that when a politician 
establishes a newspaper that will protect his political interests, he is 
neither interested in a newspaper that will publish the truth, nor one 
that will protect public interests. Anytime the interests of a 
politician are at variance with the interests of the public, of course, 
the interest of the politicians takes precedence, and, of course, no 
society makes progress that way. So, it is obvious that, in Nigeria, 
we don’t have a vibrant media.  
Ayoola asserted that the payer of the piper dictates the tune. For him, the ownership of media 
outlets by politicians or businessmen with a vested interest in politics, creates a conflict of interest 
when the media cannot independently report on events without external influence and control. 
However, he suggested that the government should allow media houses to be quoted on the Stock 
Exchange, as this will throw the doors of the media outfits open in order to shift its corporate 
governance from individual to collective ownership. 
This view was also echoed by Nwariaku, and she argued that this trend was prevalent; politicians 
were going the extra mile to manipulate the process in their favour, using all of the means possible, 
including the media. Adewusi also agrees with Nwariaku on this. Adewusi believes that the 
politicians have been using the media to cover their corrupt deals: 
The truth is that most media outfit owners are either big time 
politicians or friends of politicians. Unfortunately, when corruption 
issues relate to these publishers or their political friends, the 
publishers use their ownership influence to block the exposure of 
such corruption in their media. At some other times, they use the 
media to attack others who blow the whistle on them or their friends. 
For me, this is an unfortunate linkage. 
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Oderemi gives an insight into how some politicians, who are media owners, have been deploying 
their outfits to project the political interests of their friends/associates in government:  
The man who owns AIT, for instance, is a politician, and he knows 
how to play games and that, of course, is reflected in the political 
reportage, especially when the elections are around the corner. At 
the moment, the owner of the Silverbird Media Group had just been 
appointed to a Federal Government Board and, in the last few days, 
the man has started campaigning for the President, just as he did 
before the election. That alone is a problem for anti-graft agencies. 
Thisday and The Nation, are completely owned by politicians. The 
journalists working there must do the bidding of their owners, 
except if they want to lose their jobs. 
Adenaike explained that media practitioners may maintain close contact with the political class, 
with a caveat that the media ought to be able to hold the politicians accountable. He, however, 
opined that if you ask and take gratification from a politician, then you have joined the class. “You 
now can no longer hold the politicians accountable to the electorates. I am not suggesting, by any 
means, that journalists should antagonize the political class, because if you don’t have political 
contacts, you cannot have the relevant information to publish and analyse; you can’t have tips to 
investigate”. The veteran journalist, however, observed that:  
We now have a situation in which media people sign on to work for 
politicians while they are running their media. They work for them; 
they take money from them; they are on their payroll. How can you 
watch them? And if you watch them, how can you hold them 
accountable to the electorate? 
To resolve this problem, Akpabio argues that the media houses and journalists should be insulated 
from the political interests of their owners/employers and from other external forces that are 
capable of undermining their professional duties: 
There should be an instrument that divorces the interests of the 
owner from the administrative policy of the media houses. I don't 
know how successfully that has been done, because that becomes a 
challenge, and, I can tell you, whenever you are approaching a 
political event, you see a number of papers emerging on the street. 
A particular newspaper can, from its front page through to the last 
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page, focus on attacking a particular issue or individual in the 
opposition.  
Fagboola was particularly irked by the growing influence and negative impact of the political class 
on the media industry in the country, noting that this has constituted one of the unwritten hazards 
of journalism in Nigeria. He explained that the ownership of media institutions in Nigeria as 
follows: 
In Nigeria, the pattern of ownership is built around 3 phases: 
government, private and government/private. The biggest 
ownership of the media is dominated by the government, especially, 
in the broadcasting world. But the private control 2/3 of the 
newspaper and magazine publications. This pattern of ownership 
definitely has a negative impact on the role of the media. 
Ehirim, however, sees no reasons for concern on this issue. He stated that there was no need to 
worry about the growing number of politicians who own media houses. According to him: 
… even, within the political class there are factions. Some of them 
are in the PDP, some of them are in the APC, some in the Labour 
Party, while others belong to a few mushroom parties; so would it 
be possible for a man who owns a particular media organization 
with one party to tell his workers to cover up the atrocities of his 
opponent in another party, it is not possible? Rather, he would want 
to use the media outfit he controls to expose the corrupt practices in 
the other party”.  
He, however, conceded:  
I agree with you that, probably, it is difficult, if not impossible, for 
you to write against your employer or his political/business 
associates. So, I don’t think it is proper to conclude that there is 
connivance between the media and the political class. 
Adesina, the former NGE President, complained that the way the political class was manipulating 
the media with the journalists’ helplessness was a big dilemma:  
The media class and political class are not necessarily adversaries. 
But we know there should be a sort of peer review between them. 
That is why some sort of critical discourse is needed for the review 
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to be effective. When the political class and the media are too 
chummy, critical review may be compromised. But the snag is that 
most of the media outfits of today are owned by the political class, 
since they are the ones that have the requisite funds. How, then, do 
you begin to censure your owners? A big dilemma. 
The capital intensive nature of running media houses makes the ownership of these institutions 
challenging. Nwolise argued that it is the politicians that have the resources to get newspaper 
licenses and they own the media houses in the country. 
Otufodunrin admitted that the growing number of politicians owning media institutions constitutes 
a major impediment to the constitutional role of the media in society:  
Journalists should be very professional in the discharge of their 
duties and avoid pandering to political interests. Ownership of 
media houses by politicians should be discouraged, since he who 
pays the piper, usually dictates the direction of the coverage. 
Monitoring organizations should ensure strict compliance with 
codes on broadcasting, in the case of broadcast stations.  
To Olatunji, the only way for the media to reduce the controlling influence of politicians and 
businessmen in the industry is for journalists to pool their resources together, and to jointly fund 
and operate a media outfit that will be professionally run. Second, he advocated that foreigners 
should be encouraged to operate media houses in Nigeria. According to him, such a foreign owned 
newspaper will not have any attachment to the state and the political class.  
However, Onumah does not believe that foreigners should be allowed into the newspaper sector 
in Nigeria, and he also faulted the joint ownership of a medium by journalists: 
I'm totally opposed to the idea of any foreign ownership of media 
outfits in Nigeria, because, at the end of the day, it remains a 
business and whoever owns it would have to survive to make a 
profit, so it will be the interest of the foreign owners first and 
foremost, to the detriment of the interests of Nigerians. On the issue 
of a jointly established media outfit by media professionals, we've 
seen it happen in the past. Take, for instance: The News magazine, 
Tell, The Post, and, of course, Comet, and so on. These were 
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papers/magazines owned by journalists, but few of them have 
managed to survive. 
He also cited the case of The Next, a newspaper house that suffered systematic government 
persecution because of its vibrant reportage of corruption in government ministries. 
In answering Research Question Four, it can be inferred that the growing linkage between the 
media and the political class constitutes such a serious threat to the independence and the capacity 
of the media to serve as a watchdog. Due to the poor salary, the irregular payment of salaries, and 
the fear of job loss, journalists use their media as a meal ticket for survival. At the same time, the 
owners deploy their employees to protect their political and economic interests, whether noble or 
ignoble. Overall, the vertical accountability roles of the media have been sacrificed, making the 
battle against corruption, a lost battle. 
7.6 The Impact of Democracy on the Level of Transparency and Accountability: The 
Nigerian Experience 
Democracy is a system of government that is rooted in certain principles. A consensus in the 
definition of democracy suggests that democracy is a government with the consent of the majority; 
it is a system of government based on the acquisition of power from the legitimacy that is offered 
by the people. If legitimacy resides with the people, then it is justifiable when the people demand 
good governance which is based on the principles of transparency and accountability. 
Flaws in the Nigerian democratic system underscore that there is a problem with the application 
of democracy in Nigeria. The enthronement of democratic principles, which is a necessary 
requirement for good governance, is lacking. After fifteen years of democratic governance in 
Nigeria, given the chronic levels of corruption and the lack of accountability, there is a growing 
recognition of a missing link in the application, or practice, of democracy in Nigeria. Allegations 
of corruption threaten to erode any gains from democracy. There is widespread scepticism on the 
role of democracy in ensuring a transparent and accountable government and uncertainty about the 
instrumental values of democracy on good governance abounds.  
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Transparency and accountability determine a nation’s growth and development. This view has 
been questioned by oppressive or undemocratic governments, such as those in Russia and China. 
These countries have experienced tremendous development in the absence of a democratic 
government. This suggests that a responsive and accountable government is not predicated on the 
premise of a democratic government. Although some of the interviewees such as Nwolise and 
Akpabio (personal interviews, 2104) argue that Nigeria is a nascent democracy and is in a learning 
process, expectations should thus not be too ambitious. The basic inherent principle in democracy 
justifies the demand for the benefits it claims to offer. 
Consensus remains elusive on how democracy has brought about a transparent and accountable 
government in Nigeria. The twenty-five (100%) stakeholders interviewed had varying views 
regarding the impact of democracy on the culture of transparency and accountability in the country. 
However, there is an agreement that the structures of financial responsibility and accountability 
need to be strengthened to address the corruption menace that has plagued the country.  
Onumah noted: 
The poverty rate is shooting off the roof, corruption, abuse of the 
rule of law, everything has worsened. The only thing that perhaps 
may not be as visible is the brutal killing of people, journalists, and 
attacks on everything, so, in the true sense of it, nothing has really 
changed in the last 15years.  
Otufodunrin insisted that democratic rule has not really helped the cause of citizens, adding, 
“Much still has to be done through good governance at all levels. Politicians should fulfil their 
electoral promises and improve on the standard of living in the country”. Erubami strongly believes 
that Nigeria still has a long way to go in order to attain democratic rule in the country:  
There is no way the kind of democracy we are practising now, can 
help the anti-corruption struggle. There is no democracy in Nigeria 
and the way to know whether there is democracy in any country is 
to know whether the law is allowed to rule, whether there is 
guarantee of human rights; whether everybody is equal before the 
law. Where those three fundamental conditions are not available in 
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any country, there is no democracy; this is because corruption itself 
is not synonymous with democratic status. 
Ehirim asserted:  
I must tell you, as a Nigerian and as one of those who really fought 
for democracy, that l’m disappointed, in the sense that what we have 
been doing in the last 15years has not been democratic; we only 
have elections that are massively rigged. People who have no 
mandate from their people are the ones calling the shots and are 
grandstanding as leaders all over the country, and it doesn’t bother 
them. Just look at how bad things are now, they don’t care. It is only 
in Nigeria that failures are rewarded with a second chance.  
Oderemi concurred with the argument of Ehirim that Nigeria is yet to have democracy. He insisted: 
We don’t have democracy; they have turned democracy upside 
down. They don’t even understand what democracy stands for. 
What is important to them is to build empires for themselves and 
their so called friends, or what have you. There is no democracy in 
Nigeria, and what we have is civil rule, being managed by the rich. 
Over the years, Nigerians have been at the receiving end, no gains 
from democracy as far as I am concerned.  
Adesina described the last fifteen years of democratic rule in Nigeria as work in progress:  
It is not entirely a gloomy report, but the state of the country does 
not give much to cheer about. Looking at the level of insecurity, 
national suspicion, and the ill will of the ethnic nationalities towards 
one another, there is almost no country again. The onus is on Nigeria 
to use democracy to build a more cohesive country with happier, 
more prosperous people. That is not happening for now. 
Findings suggest that the Nigerian government under democratic rule appears to be more corrupt 
and unaccountable in comparison to the military era. Given the inclusive nature of democracy, the 
number of public officials engaged in corrupt practices is huge, if compared to a military system 
that was run by a few loyalists. It is thus plausible to assert that the incidences of corruption under 
democratic rule in Nigeria are greater than they were during the military era. Onumah, formerly 
of the EFCC, submitted:  
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We haven't landed on democracy in Nigeria; democracy landed on 
us, which, in a way, is quite true. The expectation has not been met, 
we were hoping that, with the benefit of hindsight and with what we 
had been through: colonialism, various crises and military rule, our 
politicians would have put in their very best. In fact, there is a lack 
of contentment on the part of our politicians. Our leaders are like 
modern day buccaneers; they grab with both hands, shoot and kill 
anything that is around them as a threat, they appropriate 
everything, and their ilk. What democracy has done in Nigeria is 
that it has legitimized barefaced banditry. So, people are stealing, 
but they do it under the cover of the law, they are legalizing their 
stealing, that is what democracy has done to the average person.  
Olatunji also noted:  
A lot of these “elected” officials got their positions through rigging, 
so they know that they didn’t get there through the masses. Would 
a democratically elected leader be demolishing structures all over 
the place while ignoring the cries of the people? You are destroying 
a market without providing an alternative, is that how democracy 
works? You are relieving people of their daily jobs, you have not 
provided alternative jobs, is that what democracy is all about? But 
these people know that, at the end of the day, once they have the 
money to bribe the relevant organs of government, they would be 
re-elected. So, why should they bother about the masses?  
It appears as if the government deliberately attempted not to be transparent because it is afraid that 
the citizens will link transparency mechanisms to accountability. The citizens are sceptical of the 
government’s sincerity in relation to fighting corruption. The lack of transparency benefits the 
clandestine and corrupt activities that exist in the government. To this end, investigations into 
corruption allegations tend to be frustrated by the government and its institutions. An example is 
given by Akanbi; he notes: 
Look at the case of Farouk Lawan. He was taken to court, and he 
said that the money he received was not a bribe but the giver said it 
was a bribe demanded by the lawmaker. Let him go to court and 
defend himself. If the judge believes his story, he would be 
discharged and acquitted. But look at the period the case has taken, 
the House was investigating on several occasions.  
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Democracy entails the institutionalization of the rule of law and the entrenchment of the principles 
of transparency and accountability in the political process. These principles are essential for a 
democratic political system. The absence of this in any democratic setting is a mockery of what 
democracy is, and a wishful expectation of the dividend it should bring. Growing public 
resentment and civil society activism are reflections of a disenchanted citizenry who feel they have 
been short-changed by the so called “democratic dispensation”. Others are even of the opinion that 
Nigeria is not practising democracy. As Olatunji noted: 
What we have in Nigeria, as far as I am concerned, is a ‘’civilian 
rule’’ not democracy, because in a democracy, corruption is fought 
to a standstill, in a democracy people are free to speak. For instance, 
in 1979, when democracy took off, media houses mushroomed, 
because normally a democracy should encourage transparency, 
should encourage people to be interested in their government. But 
this current democracy is not like that.  
Akpabio also supported the forgoing argument, but she noted that the progress recorded by Nigeria 
in her quest for a democratic journey has been eroded by insecurity challenges: 
We are not matured at the level expected by some, especially, when 
one considers the space of time of democratic rule. It is ironic that 
after we had upheld democracy thus far, certain security issues are 
playing up, which means that there is a disconnect. The progress we 
have made has been wiped away by the insecurity issues.  
Government officials appear to be opposed to the incorporation and consolidation of true 
democratic principles. It seems as if the adoption of democracy is a game of rhetoric, because there 
is no political will or commitment to translate democratic principles into good governance. Ayoola 
agreed with this view. He offered insight into why democratic rule appeared to be failing to 
promote the culture of accountability in our public system: 
Our democracy is not founded on values, selflessness, good 
ideology, and a self-generating character. We have a democracy that 
is not fashioned to do anything that is enabling; I think we have 
democracy in name only, not, in actual fact, in reality. 
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Democratic principles create the conditions for good governance, and the quality of governance is 
fundamental to the assessment of transparency and accountability in a political system. 
Accountability has to be built on the qualities of democratic principles, and when this is lacking, 
economic development in the economy is stalled. Proponents of democracy strongly argue that the 
growth and development of a country, and also the equity of its citizenry, are dependent on how 
well these principles are incorporated into the political system. An alternative assertion to the 
above was that given by Fagboola. Though he believes that Nigeria is yet to swim in the real river 
of democracy, he nevertheless believes that the lack of democratic principles in Nigeria results 
from a lack of development: 
It is not democracy that gives birth to development, but it is 
development that gives birth to true democracy, which is why it is 
only when we witness true development [which is that of the mind] 
that we would have a real democracy, including its dividends. Many 
politicians, in the name of building big roads, bridges and 
skyscrapers, have equated all of these infrastructures to mean the 
dividends of democracy.  
Ugbogu, the National Coordinator of CEFE, sounds optimistic about the prospects of a better 
democratic rule in Nigeria. To her, Nigeria’s democratic rule is still growing, and she pleads with 
Nigerians to keep hope alive in the system. She contended that “if we do the right things we need 
to do, if we work together, if the religious, traditional, community leaders and civil service 
personnel would work together as they are supposed to, it will work out”. 
Bishop Gbonigi opined that democracy has not helped at all, because of the groups mentioned 
above by Ugbogu. In his words:  
Unfortunately, the majority of our civil servants, our politicians, 
our business men and women, are very greedy. They look for 
positions in order to get possession. Look at the case of the Hon. 
Farouk Lawan, and Femi Otedola. It appears that corruption is 
on the increase under our civilian government”.  
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Falae argued that one of the benefits gained under this democratic rule is that it has opened the 
eyes of the people to see the kind of monumental corruption going on around them, unlike during 
the military regime, when corruption was very secretive. He averred: 
But we are a democratic regime; there is more participation in 
political/corruption process. So we now know that stealing is going 
on, on a very large scale, but that has not deterred people from 
stealing. We know from the local level that Chairmen and 
Councillors who had nothing before have suddenly becomes 
millionaires overnight. So you don’t need any rumours, you can see. 
Democracy has opened our eyes to see corruption everywhere, and 
it has not reduced. On the contrary, it has made it more widespread, 
for there are more participants, and democratic corruption as well. 
Soleye, on his part, believes that democracy has been helpful in Nigeria, but insisted that some 
sectors of the economy have had more benefits than others in terms of the dividends of democracy. 
He singles out the media as one of the sectors that had always enjoyed the dividends of democracy. 
Soleye asserted: 
In fact, the beneficiaries of democracy are the mass media in 
Nigeria. If you say you don’t see the dividend of democracy, you 
can say that, but the mass media cannot say that. Before 1999, the 
pagination of an average newspaper, such as The Guardian, 
Nigerian Tribune, and The Punch used to be about 20 to 30 pages, 
but it has expanded to an average of 68 pages. In fact, some of them 
are giving us bulletins free of charge. Are they not making profit 
from the volumes of adverts?  
He asked rhetorically. “The media are the first beneficiaries of democracy. And the 
evidence, if you want to see it, go and look at the pagination and the number of 
adverts of an average newspaper.” 
This position appears to be in sharp contrast to the argument of Olatunji that the media sector is 
facing a serious challenge under the current democratic dispensation, with many newspapers dying 
because of the harsh economic environment in the country. Indeed, Hassan and Adewusi appeared 
to be on the same wave length, as they noted that democratic rule has not yet helped the cause of 
good governance and accountability in Nigeria. Hassan says “the only thing is that there is little 
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fear to perpetrate corrupt practices due to the existence of anti-graft agencies. Impunity is waxing 
stronger”. 
Data presented in answering Research Question Five suggest that democratic rule has not yet 
impacted positively on the level of accountability and development in Nigeria. Corruption is an 
element that frustrates any form of gains made in the past fifteen years of democratic rule in 
Nigeria, and political leadership in Nigeria is plagued with a history of a lack of accountability to 
the people. To some Nigerians, democracy may thus not necessarily be an antidote to corruption. 
Cases of corruption seem to be on the increase, and the living conditions of Nigerians are getting 
worse. Shallow practices of democratic principles are what are at play in Nigeria. A growing 
demand for the government to inculcate the culture of transparency and accountability is a 
reflection of the absence of financial policies, and of a framework that ensures accountability and 
hinders all the processes of financial misappropriation. The agitation for the full implementation 
of the Freedom of Information Act, by all the three tiers of government, thus suggests a simple but 
basic premise; accountability cannot be achieved without transparency. 
7. 7 Theoretical Implications for the Study 
The primary goal of literature reviews, as structured in Chapter Two of this thesis, is to identify 
the preceding, relevant knowledge and ideas that prevail in regard to the subject under 
investigation. In doing this, the strengths and weaknesses of the literature under review are 
examined in order to establish their significance, or otherwise, to the research. The primary 
responsibility for reviewing theoretical and empirical literature is to identify the existing gaps in 
the literature under review and to close the gaps, as part of bringing-up-to-date and contributing to 
knowledge.  
In research like this, the role of the theoretical framework is to identify the theory or theories that 
are competent enough to explain the practical realities and to make representative predictions. In 
Chapter Seven of this research, the qualitative presentation and the analysis of interviews 
conducted with significant stakeholders in the anti-corruption subsector are presented. The 
identified stakeholders and the issues for interrogation were clearly spelt out in Chapter Two of 
this study.  
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Following from the above, it is significant to draw attention to the theoretical facts and the value 
that the analyses of the primary interviews conducted with significant stakeholders, as far as anti-
corruption is concerned, were meant to validate the argument that was canvassed in the literature 
review in relation to the strengths and weaknesses alluded to above. The analyses of the field 
interviews with key stakeholders also helped to close the existing gaps that were identified in the 
course of the literature review. Moreover, from the various analyses, it is evident that the adoption 
of the political economy approach as the lead approach to explain the subject matter was quite in 
sync with the responses from the fieldwork. 
This work bears a very close connection to the theories that are itemised for usage, starting with 
the Political Economy Theory. The Political Economy Theory is premised on the assumption that 
economics cannot be separated from politics. Proponents of this theory believe that political factor 
determines, to a large extent, the economic issues. Furthermore, the media, under this theory, lays 
more emphasis on profit making, while serving the public interest takes a secondary place in most 
societies, and, as a result, the communication industries have moved to the centre of global 
capitalism. Consequently, journalists must not only understand their discipline, but they must also 
know how politics and other social variables impact upon their subject, either positively or 
negatively. 
This theory is very suitable for the analysis of the role of the mass media and other non-state actors 
in Nigeria between 1999 and 2015, because it appears that the major reason why the media are 
receding towards a lapdog status, instead of its watchdog role there is the economic consideration 
which, in turn, is determined by the political system. Owing to the prevailing economic situation, 
many newspapers can no longer survive without depending on government patronage, especially, 
advertising. This therefore means that the media only serve the interests of their sponsors at the 
expense of the public. A lot of independent media houses that try to write objectively about 
government officials and their cronies, have died prematurely, because they were simply starved 
of the needed advertising and patronage. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     225 | P a g e  
 
 
The Nigerian media industry is a perfect example of where this theory is utilised. The media 
content in Nigeria is influenced by a combination of media ownership, advertisements and the 
state/size of the economy. The media, which used to be known for agitation in the past, has 
suddenly become an instrument of power and control in the country. Accountability and 
transparency, regarded as critical pillars in a democratic setting, are generally lacking because 
newspaper owners now use their newspapers to cover scandals. Newspaper editors hobnob with 
members of the political class, not for the purpose of getting news items that will serve public 
interests, but to enhance their personal interests. 
Moreover, the harsh economic situation, coupled with the lack of infrastructural facilities, such as 
electricity, potable water, a good transport system, and other social amenities in the country, make 
it difficult for the media to make a profit as they are forced to provide all these aforementioned 
facilities themselves. As a result of the economic situation in the country, most media organisations 
operate at a loss, with the staff bearing the brunt of the harsh conditions; the salaries and allowances 
of media practitioners are not paid for a period of three months to one year. Invariably, 
investigative journalism and the following-up of stories suffer greatly. To compound the situation, 
only a handful of investors and financial bodies are willing to invest in the media business because 
of slow, and sometimes low, returns on investment. 
Due to a difficult operating environment, media growth and expansion have remained stagnant 
since the commencement of democratic rule in 1999. During the period under study, The Next, 
News Nigerian, Compass, Westerner, New Age, Daily Times, Monitor, The Comet, Daily Sketch, 
Concord, The Moment, Triumph, Third Eye, Hallmark, Herald, Tempo Magazine, and scores of 
regional newspapers appeared and have died as a result of harsh economic situation and 
government policies. In fact, the government of Olusegun Obasanjo stopped the printing of annual 
calendars for government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) by the media houses. 
This printing of calendars used to be a major source of revenue to most of the media houses in the 
country before 1999. In the field work carried out, and as analysed in Chapter Seven, it is evident 
that the economic goal of the media, most especially those owned by politicians, as they evidently 
are in Nigeria, and as demonstrated by the significant stakeholders, is to protect the political 
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interests of their owners. Consequently, the political and economic interests of media ownership 
which influence each other bring out in bold relief the value of the political economy theory in 
providing a lucid explanation and interpretation of the reality of the role of the media in fighting 
corruption, or not. 
The availability of mobile internet is encouraging more and more people to key into information, 
entertainment, and even education, not from the traditional news sources, but increasingly from 
social networking websites. This is affecting the revenue profile of the average newspaper, as there 
is a steady decline in the sales of newspapers and advertisements. In response to this challenge, 
most newspapers are reducing their staff strength, introducing new marketing strategies, and 
reducing the cost of their operations. All these measures have, in one way or another, affected the 
capacity of the media to carry out their watchdog role in the society. 
Some have introduced an online version of their papers. Media practitioners are also taking to the 
online media to get their messages across to Nigerians. Online media sites that have emerged in 
the last few years include: Sahara Reporters, The Cable, Premium Times, Pointblank, Elendu, 
Newspot, Newsreel, International Centre for Investigative Reporting, and Witness Nigeria. The 
coverage and number of hits on these sites remains an issue, because the population of Nigerians 
that have access to internet facilities is still very low. Understandably, too, these online media 
bodies have joined the struggle for the limited advertising, competing with the traditional media 
for the advertising from the government and their agencies. In fact, one of the anti-corruption 
agencies was reported to have signed an MOU with the scores of online media houses in Nigeria 
not to publish any “critical stories” on the leadership of the agency in question, with the promise 
of a supplement and advertorials. This is where the literature review on globalisation comes into 
play. The globalisation of the media and of technology has impacted upon the sector both 
positively and negatively. 
The pursuit of economic interests has made many journalists throw ethics to the winds, as 
incidences of brown envelopes (bribe taking by journalists) are very rampant. This has affected the 
credibility of the media houses. The situation is so bad that most editors and their correspondents 
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are on the monthly pay roll of government officials and politicians, and so scandals of various 
dimensions are not reported in the media. Journalists write one-sided stories. Some journalists do 
not attend assignments due to the many beats assigned to them and thus syndicated stories litter 
the pages of most newspapers. Sometimes, when one reads a news item in one newspaper, there is 
no need to read the other papers, since they contain virtually the same story line, except for the 
introductory part and the headlines. This is because most newspapers hardly make any funds 
available for thorough investigation, as well as for follow-ups of the stories already reported in the 
media.  
The situation is further compounded by the fact that most of the programmes on the electronic 
stations are usually devoted to commercial news, sponsored religious programmes and music 
programmes. Programmes that educate citizens on their rights, and that encourage active 
participation in the day-to-day affairs of the state, are hardly given enough air time. The way 
forward for the Nigerian media is to pay close attention to how media organisations in the 
developed countries respond to these challenges, while, at the same time, ensuring that they make 
their newspapers more attractive by introducing interesting features/items, and cheaper products.  
The data collected from the stakeholders demonstrated that the perspective of some of the literature 
reviewed in Chapter Two that demonstrates that the media plays a fundamental role in anti-
corruption, without interrogating issues like the political and economic interests of the owners, has 
created a huge gap in the literature, which, of course, the data collected takes care off. For instance, 
the perceptible reality in the increasing relationship between the political and media elites is 
becoming threatening, not only to the anti-corruption drive, but to democracy and democratization. 
It is very true that media owners are part of the ruling political and economic elites in Nigeria, it 
is also true that such media organizations are deployed to serve a political party and other patronage 
interests that are, in most cases, against good governance. The advocacy role of the media has thus 
been greatly undermined by the ownership structure, which is dominated by the political class.  
Against this backdrop, the argument, as reviewed in Chapter Two, that the media are known to be 
an agent of democratization, may not be wholly valid within the context and experience of Nigeria 
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and as provided by the significant stakeholder interviews. This again points to the perceptible fact 
that isolating the media from political interest is very difficult, if not impossible. This is because, 
the establishment of the media, irrespective of the demonstrated economic interests, in the act of 
creating them, is first of all a political act; hence, the theoretical argument put forward in Chapter 
Two, that the media can be insulated from political interests, is an illusion, an argument that was 
captured in the stakeholders’ interviews.  
The point is that the media are not just there to serve the political interests of their owners, but the 
economic interests of the media organization, by serving the political interests of others--for a fee. 
This is so because political and economic interests are ostensibly inseparable, and that is why the 
media are easily available for manipulation to serve a pecuniary goal. The consequence of this is 
the subordination of public to private interest, whether the media are owned by the public or are 
privately owned, depending on the nature of ruling elites and the configuration of power and what 
it is used to serve.  
The further consequence is that democracy and democratization take a back seat, with negative 
consequences for transparency and accountability. The submissions from the various stakeholders 
interviewed for the study indicated that democracy has not helped the cause of accountability and 
transparency in Nigeria, and this is a further confirmation of the existing literature, which suggests 
that democracy may not after all provide a solution to the political and economic challenges being 
experienced by the citizens. It is true that democracy, in a practical sense, could promote 
democratic accountability, but this is in so far as the media are not seen to be manufacturing voices 
of dissent against the war on corruption. This position confirms the argument of scholars such as 
Pastor (1999), Sen (2009) and Schmitter and Karl (1991) on what democracy can and cannot 
achieve as highlighted in the literature review. 
Again, the kind of social and economic conditions of democracy argued by Claude Ake, mentioned 
in Chapter Two, cannot even be said to exist without anti-corruption. If the media are said to be 
the watchdog of society while sitting as the fourth estate of the realm after the executive, the 
judiciary, and the legislature, it cannot negate the fundamental values of anti-corruption. This 
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position has been made clear by the significant numbers of stakeholders interviewed. On this note, 
the literature needs to take seriously the argument that it is a media that is professional, ethical, 
and known for its integrity that can promote the social and economic values of democracy through 
anti-corruption.  
Following from this is the point that when the media are not pursuing investigative journalism, it 
is impossible to have a professional and problem-solving mission and vision in the media sector. 
The essence of being a watchdog is to impartially discharge the responsibility of investigating the 
wrong doings of those in authority who are capable of undermining democratic governance and 
accountability. What the stakeholder interviews have added to the existing literature is that when 
media organizations are not pursuing investigative journalism, they cannot be proactive and, 
consequently, the needed social sense of responsibility will not be there to serve the public good. 
This again brings us to the social responsibility theory of the media, reviewed in Chapter Two. 
Although it was acknowledged in the literature reviewed that the media should carry out corporate 
social responsibility, but in actual fact this corporate social responsibility is experienced in rare 
cases because of the challenges highlighted above. 
In essence, the business model already introduced to the media sector is antithetical to the 
democratic and advocacy mandates of the media, as the market now dictates the operations of the 
media, which are influenced by the political economy theory. In addition, the media ownership 
structure, advertising, the poor state of the Nigerian economy, and mobile internet, have all 
combined effectively to destroy the traditional role of the established Nigerian media, thus turning 
them into a lapdog. 
The Principal-Agent, Cultural, and Patron-Client models of corruption have also been useful in 
this study in providing an insight into why media practitioners indulge in corrupt and unethical 
conduct. Journalists engage in collecting bribes, which are tagged as the brown envelope, because 
chances of being punished remain very low. In fact, despite the public condemnation of the brown 
envelope by media managers, no single journalist has been punished for engaging in this unethical 
act in the entire history of Nigeria. The Punch and Daily Trust newspapers have inscriptions, which 
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are boldly written on each of their editions, advising members of the public not to give brown 
envelopes to their staff, yet those accused of engaging in the act have never been punished.  
The Cultural Model contends that corruption can be explained by the culture of gifts. As such, 
members of the society, in their interactions with the media, are expected to provide some form of 
refreshment and parting gifts (usually cash) at public functions. Corruption is therefore fuelled by 
informal obligations and demands. These obligations are often fulfilled through corrupt 
enrichment. Moreover, the institution of accountability in the media sector is very weak, as 
members of the three professional bodies in the sector are said to be involved in corrupt acts.  
Principal officials of the Nigerian Guide of Editors (NGE), the Nigerian Union of Journalists 
(NUJ) and the Newspapers Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) have not sanctioned any 
erring member for allegedly violating their ethics. The culture of corruption within the media 
industry can be described as being a decentralised form, as well as a norm, as every cadre of the 
sector seemed to be involved- (editors, news editors, heads of desks and beat correspondents, etc.) 
This confirms the assumption of the proponents of the Principal-Agent Model, as argued in the 
literature review section, discussed in Chapter Two of this study. 
This study also deployed the Patron-Client Model because a typical Nigerian journalist is faced 
with a lot of financial pressure from family, clan, hometown and ethnic constituencies. Cases 
abound where journalists are not paid their salaries and allowances for a relatively long time of as 
much as 12 months, yet they have to provide for their immediate family needs and meet other 
social obligations, hence, they resort to unethical behaviour to survive. This alliance between the 
political class and the media practitioners validates the Patron-Client Model, which says two 
unequal parties perform obligations to each other that are mutually beneficial.  
The corrupt and unethical acts in the media industry are further compounded by the absence of 
state welfare programmes. Journalists, as citizens, are thus forced to rely on politicians and 
bureaucrats to provide some basic social facilities, which then engenders informal obligations and 
thus this practice is now at the heart of politics in Nigeria. As Femi-Soyinka also notes, because 
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“corruption is well tolerated in Nigeria, you cannot expect the media men, as members of the 
society to be different” (Personal interview, 2014). What Femi-Soyinka said, in essence, is that the 
level of corruption within the media is a reflection of what is happening in the greater society. 
Due to failure on the part of the owners of media houses to pay a living wage, and to pay the 
salaries of their staff promptly, there are the solidarity networks which seem to justify collecting 
the brown envelope, instead of attracting advertising to the media houses. The unethical conducts 
of scores of journalists, then, contributes in no small measure to the decline in the revenue profile 
of their organisations. Findings have thus justified the Political Economy Theory, along with the 
Principal-Agent, Cultural and Patron-Client Models that were deployed in this study. 
7. 8 Salient Findings of the Study 
This study has investigated the role of the media in the anti-corruption efforts under the 
democratically elected government in Nigeria between 1999 and 2015. Five research questions 
were used for this purpose.  
The First Research Question, directed at 25 stakeholders in the anti-corruption sector, sought to 
know how the agencies, notably, ICPC, EFCC and the CCB, use the media in their campaigns. It 
was discovered that the agencies have not effectively deployed the power of the media in carrying 
out their statutory mandates of fighting corruption and other social vices in Nigeria since 1999. It 
was obvious that, during the period under review, gross under-funding of the agencies did not help 
in encouraging their proper usage of the media. Two of the agencies, the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and the Code of Conduct Bureau, 
suffered inadequate funding which affected their media engagement. However, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) did not complain about inadequate funding, because the 
agency secured a lot of funds from development partners, such as UNODC and the World Bank. 
Furthermore, constitutional provisions appear to have prevented the ICPC from involving the 
media in its investigative activities. Section 27 of the ICPC Act 2000, forbids the agency from 
engaging in media activities, in any matter before it, until a prima facie case has been established. 
In specific terms, Section 27 Sub-Section 4 stipulates: 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     232 | P a g e  
 
 
A report made under sub-section (1) of this section shall not be 
disclosed by any person to any person other than officers of the 
Commission or the Attorney-General until the accused person has 
been arrested or charged to court for an offence under this Act or 
any other written law arising from such report 
This Section, invariably, prevents the ICPC from engaging the media in its investigatory activities. 
As Nwariaku notes, “ICPC does not use the media, because the agency will not want to assassinate 
anybody’s character for nothing. ICPC investigates allegations thoroughly before making them 
public”. On the other hand, EFCC treats the media “as an extension of its investigation 
department”. This simply confirms the widely held view that the media are crucial to the anti-
corruption campaign. 
It was further discovered, in the course of the study, that there was no proper synergy between 
anti-corruption and the media in the anti-corruption campaigns; this is due to an ages-long 
suspicion which has continued between the media and the government agencies. As Ehirim (2014) 
rightly observes, “the government, right from the colonial era, has never seen the media as a partner 
in progress and, as such, the anti-corruption agencies, as appendages of government, seemed to 
have imbibed the practice, thus, the media are avoided as much as possible”. This is affecting the 
advocacy role of the media as an agent of anti-corruption. In addition, the Nigerian Press is not 
fully backed by the Constitution. It only has the power to bark, and not the power to bite. Section 
22 of the 1999 Constitution ought to be amended in such a manner as “to effectively mandate the 
media to hold public officials accountable”. This lack of constitutional backing, this researcher 
believe, is preventing the media being proactive in the anti-corruption war. This situation is 
compounded by the failure of the Legislature to amend the enabling law setting up the three anti-
corruption agencies. Several constitutional amendments have been proposed to the ICPC and 
EFCC laws, yet the National Assembly have declined to approve such amendments.  
From the above, it is clear that a partially free press may not be a viable external control mechanism 
against corruption in society. It further validates the fact that the political will on the part of the 
State to provide adequate funds for the anti-graft war is crucial to any anti-corruption project.  
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The Second Research Question sought to discover the role of the mass media and other non-state 
actors in the anti-corruption drive. It was revealed that no anti-corruption project can succeed 
without the full support of the mass media. Findings from the interviews indicate that, due to the 
shrinking economy, the media and non-state actors cannot do much. For the mass media, the 
pursuit of profit has eroded their capacity to act as the watchdog of society. 
The harsh economic reality in Nigeria, where millions of university graduates remain unemployed 
and many citizens live on less than $1.50 per day, is seriously affecting the media. The situation 
is so bad that many cannot afford to buy newspapers, thus giving impetus to the “free readers’ 
association.” At most newspaper stands, scores gather in the morning to read newspapers free, 
rather than buying them. Those gainfully employed can hardly feed their families, not to speak of 
buying newspapers, as their salaries cannot “take them home”. A corollary to this is the fact that 
the reading culture among Nigerian youths appeared to be dying. They seem to prefer “pinging or 
chatting” on their mobile devices to newspaper reading. This has partly reduced the sales of 
newspapers. At the same time, advertising is declining because many companies are collapsing. 
All these conditions make the mass media less committed to democratic accountability, thus 
weakening the fulfilment of their watchdog function, and stopping them from acting as the true 
Fourth Estate of the Realm in society. The end result is that the media that are supposed to be the 
main barrier to the abuses of power by those who exercise power, as postulated by Keane 
(1994:175), are also implicated in corruption and other abuses of power. This is reflected in the 
way politicians and civil servants who are accused of corrupt acts, still enjoy positive media 
coverage, both in the print and the electronic media.  
The exigencies of the market and the pursuit of profit have forced the media to abandon their social 
responsibility to the society. The social responsibility of the media in helping the anti-graft drive 
is zero in Nigeria. In Hong-Kong, for instance, anti-corruption advertorials, press releases, 
announcements and jingles, are not paid for. The media organisations carry such messages without 
cost, because they consider them to be their contribution to the national anti-corruption drive.  
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The non-existence of active and viable civil society groups has failed to checkmate the drift of the 
media towards being a lapdog, for economic reasons. This study therefore believes that the lack of 
viable and active non-state actors remains a major challenge to the anti-corruption war in Nigeria.  
Research Question Three examined the role that journalists perceive for themselves in the anti-
corruption drive and, by extension, what has been the major impediment to their work. It was 
revealed that during the course of this study their role was critical to the anti-graft war. All of the 
journalists interviewed agreed that they have a definitive role to expose the corruption of those in 
positions of authority and, in the process, to help in promoting transparency in society, but due to 
the level of corruption among journalists, it has been difficult to perform their roles as expected. 
Incidences of brown envelopes are a daily occurrence among media personnel. Adesina (2014) 
argues that when the “society is very permissive, expect the brown envelope syndrome to be 
pervasive”.  
Allied to this is the fact that many of the journalists lack proper training. Many editors and 
journalists are not aware of their sacred duty as enshrined in the Constitution. Most of them are 
not properly trained to know that their own calling is different from other professions in society. 
Newspaper owners and managers hardly ever organise induction and re-orientation courses for 
their staff to educate them about their expectations in relation to their duties. They make up for 
this by learning from their colleagues on the beat. 
Most media personnel are poorly paid, and they are sometimes owed salaries for periods of time 
ranging from three months to one year. The advent of capitalism and globalisation has so changed 
the media landscape of the country that only the rich, dominated by the political and business class, 
can own and operate the media in Nigeria. These rich media owners prefer flamboyant lives 
without paying the salaries and allowances of their staff, and so, staff members may resort to other 
sources of income to cater for their family needs.  
Some publishers deliberately encourage corruption among their workers by simply telling them 
that their Identity Cards serve as their meal tickets to getting whatever they want. Furthermore, 
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most of the publishers use their newspapers to cover up scandals, so publishing corruption-related 
stories remains a no-go-area for the journalists working in such media houses. Most politicians/ 
businessmen set up newspaper outfits to solicit for contracts and other favours from the 
government, so any reporter who refuses to follow the dictates of his employer, risks losing his/her 
job. This situation is compounded by the various unethical practices in almost all the media houses, 
as editors and managers usually organise political awards, corporate awards and commercial 
views, for people of “questionable characters”.  
Some newspaper editors serve as media consultants to politicians and political parties. Three 
editors of Lagos based newspapers, for instance, were reported to be members of the strategic 
committee of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Censorship, Street (2001: 104-105) argued, is 
the most obvious form of state control. He noted, however, that self-censorship has proved to be a 
much more common, pervasive and insidious form of control. Self-censorship is very rampant 
among newspaper editors in the country, as they pander to the interests of owners and advertisers-
an action that has eroded the vertical accountability of media practitioners. 
In Nigeria, most of the media are privately–owned, the exigencies of the market and profit 
considerations usually override professional decisions. There is thus ample evidence from the 
interviews that the media have been dismally ineffective in holding political office holders 
accountable. The four newspapers analysed for the study pursued different agendas in their 
coverage of the two case studies. 
Also in Nigeria, the practice of newspaper reports is to inform readers without setting an agenda 
for them. Most of the stories follow a sensationalist tone. The former Minister of Aviation, Stella 
Oudh, for instance, who was forced out of government for allegedly using N225 million to 
purchase two cars, was also given the Imo South senatorial ticket on the platform of the PDP, and 
the media did not highlight this issue because she gave them adverts and commercial news.  
The Nigerian media appear to be like the developed/under-developed approach to modernisation, 
as postulated by Bill Siffin. Utomi (2014)) noted that under-developed media are characterised by 
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low social values, the limited education of journalists, the poor economic structure of the media 
(which are not profitable enough to pay journalists well), and the failure of the media owners to 
provide the right tools for the work. This, he describes as bazaar media. The developed media, on 
the other hand, are more sophisticated, more responsive to stakeholders, and more focused on the 
common good. These are the canteen media. As Utomi (2014) asserts, the Nigerian Press is closer 
to a bazaar than to the canteen end of the spectrum. Invariably, this study infers that the more the 
country experiences “civilian rule”, the more the corruption increases on all tiers of government 
in Nigeria, including the media. Furthermore, the joint pursuit of economic and political reforms 
has provided a fertile ground for corruption in Nigeria. 
Research Question Four examined the impact of the growing linkage between the media class and 
the political class in Nigeria’s anti-corruption drive. Following the change in the socio-political 
and economic landscape of Nigeria, more and more businessmen and politicians have gone into 
the newspaper business, not for the public good, but to protect their political and economic 
interests. The situation is such that politicians, accused of corruption, have pocketed the media and 
they use them to launder their image. These newspapers are not only biased in their reportage of 
corruption involving their sponsors, they are used in defence of the accused persons. Ayoola 
justifies this line of reasoning, and said “who pays the piper dictates the tune. If I own a media 
house and I belong to a particular political party, I am likely to sack the Editor–in-Chief who sees 
himself differently, even if he is telling the truth”. 
The absence of an active newspaper regulatory body that lists and separates out the interests of the 
owner from the running policy of the media houses, remains a challenge. The growing interest of 
politicians to own newspapers is casting serious doubt on the capacity of the media to report and 
defend the truth in Nigeria. Olatunji (2012) notes that “any time the interest of the politicians is at 
variance with the interest of the public, the interest of the politicians will override”. 
Indeed, the truth is sacrificed for political exigencies and the free market, as media owners lobby 
for appointment into key government bodies. The owner of the Silverbird Television Station 
served on the Board of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) while, at the same time, the 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     237 | P a g e  
 
 
Chairman of Punch Newspapers also served on two federal Boards. Their appointments onto the 
Boards was later reflected in the way these media houses reported government activities, while 
their tenure lasted. 
The acceptance of political appointment by newspaper publishers has led to the large turnover of 
editors and the increased job insecurity of other editorial staff within the industry. Consequently, 
media practitioners spend quality time trying to secure a better future, instead of focusing on their 
jobs. So, some move from one politician to another, soliciting various forms of patronage from 
state officials. This encourages corruption, as they confer a positive status on those they should be 
exposing. Otufodunrin (2014) opines that monitoring organisations should therefore ensure strict 
compliance with codes of ethics for both broadcast and print media houses. 
The linkage between the media and the political class constitutes a serious threat to the 
independence of the media. This study thus concludes that a free press that exists in a nation is not 
an indication that the media’s capacity to function as a watchdog of society cannot be eroded by 
the socio-political and economic climates of the State. Based on the 2015 annual ranking of 
Freedom House, Nigeria’s media were regarded as being partially free; yet, the media failed to 
perform their vertical accountability role in the country. 
The media cannot perform its democratic accountability role without the active support of all of 
the elements of the horizontal accountability subsumed as the Executive, Judiciary, Legislature 
and the political/business class. The Nigerian media continue to reflect the political coloration of 
the State, (Siebert et al, 1963). Contrary to the views expressed by Soyinka and Nwolise (personal 
interviews 2013), democratic government in Nigeria did not guarantee transparency and media 
freedom within the period covered by this study.  
Research Question Five explored the impact of democracy on transparency in Nigeria since 1999. 
There is a consensus of opinion among the 25 stakeholders interviewed that the democratic 
administrations in Nigeria in the last 15 years, have not impacted positively on the level of 
transparency and accountability in the country. 
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Although, Nigeria held elections in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015, the situation in the country cannot 
be described as democratic, as the liberal theorists would want us to believe. The Nigerian 
democratic situation could be likened to what Nyamnjoh (2005: 24) calls “face-powder 
democracy”, or what Dahl (1991) describes as a polyarchy. It has been observed that periodic 
elections in Nigeria have only seen the reward of failed politicians with re-elections across the 
board. It was also revealed that Nigeria is only experiencing civilian rule and not a democratic 
government. As Olatunji (203) noted, “in a democracy, corruption is fought, in a democracy, 
people are free to speak, but the reverse is the case now.”  
Onumah posited that what democracy has done in Nigeria in the last 15 years, is that “it has 
legitimised barefaced banditry”. He describes Nigerian leaders as modern day buccaneers, “who 
grab with their hands, shoot and kill anything around them, and appropriate to themselves.” It was 
further revealed that 15 years of the democratic experiment has only worsened the economic well-
being of an average Nigerian.  
The poverty rate, Onumah asserts “is shooting off the roof.” Invariably, this confirms the argument 
of Sen (2009), Schmitter and Karl (2009), and Pinkey (2003), that democracy may not necessarily 
lead to economic growth and development. Fagbola (2013) argues that “it is not democracy that 
gives birth to development, rather, development gives birth to true and genuine democracy”. 
Indeed, Nwariaku notes that “the gap between the rich and the poor in Nigeria is still very wide.” 
The living conditions of millions of Nigerians remain bad, as they live on $1.50 dollar per day 
(Burleigh, 2013). The Global Prosperity Index, released on Monday, 2nd November, 2015, ranked 
Nigeria’s prosperity as 125th of the 142 countries surveyed, and 26th of 54 states in Africa. The 
UK-based Legatum Institute describes prosperity as more than just the accumulation of material 
wealth. “It is also the joy of everyday life and the prospect of an even better life in the future”. The 
Prosperity Index is the only global measurement of prosperity that is based on both income and 
well-being. “It is the most comprehensive tool of its kind and is the definitive measure of global 
progress” (The Legatum Prosperity Index 2015). 
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After 15 years of democratic government, Nigeria’s performance in the 2014 Prosperity Index is 
poor in all the eight sub-indices used in the survey. It came 97th in Economy; 114th in 
Entrepreneurship and Opportunity; 120th in Governance; 123rd in Education; 132nd in Health; 137th 
in Safety and Security; 106th in Personal Freedom; and 108th in Social Capital. This ranking further 
confirms the findings of this study (www.li.com, accessed on Tuesday, 3rd November, 2015).  
It was discovered that what has changed in the last 15 years is that “we no longer have people in 
khaki calling the shots at the three tiers of government (federal, state and local councils); we now 
have those people wearing Agbada, and other traditional dresses, directing the affairs of the nation” 
(Olatunji 2012, interview). One major feature of the democratic regime is that elections are 
massively and brazenly rigged. The use of money and “freebees” by politicians to buy their 
mandate, is on the increase. This is a serious challenge to the consolidation of the democratic ethos, 
and it undermines the vertical accountability of the citizens. There is no internal democracy in all 
the registered political parties because candidates are imposed on them by godfathers.  
During elections, the electorate sell their votes to politicians and refrain from questioning their 
representatives on the utilisation of resources. The concept of stomach infrastructure, where voters 
are induced with rice and other food items, is now part of the political lexicon in Nigeria. As 
extreme poverty pervades the land, citizens negate their inalienable right under a democratic 
regime, the media and other non-state actors are expected to act as their guardian, but fail in their 
duties. Erubami (2012) argued that the kind of democracy being practised in Nigeria cannot help 
the cause of the anti-corruption campaign as the rule of law, which is one of the pillars of 
democratic government, is non-existent. Nwolise said that Nigeria has yet to practice true 
democracy, saying that most Nigerian political leaders behave as the master of the people, whereas, 
under a truly democratic regime, a leader is the servant of his people. 
Furthermore, the security challenges posed by the menace of Boko Haram further validate the 
argument of Sen that democracy may not provide solutions to the social and political problems of 
a state. The challenges of the Boko Haram insurgency suggest a disconnection between democracy 
and the citizens of the affected states in Northern Nigeria.  
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The concept of liberal democracy, as practised in the West, cannot be wholly embraced in Sub-
Saharan states, because globalisation has yet to eradicate the communal nature of the African 
states. The egalitarian and communal nature of Africans is in sharp contrast to the individualism 
that is inherent in most Western societies. There is the need to revisit the concept of electoral 
democracy as a panacea for the socio-political and economic challenges confronting Africa.  
 
7. 9 Summary 
The findings arising from the above discourse indicate that the contributions of the media 
(especially the print media) to the anti-corruption crusade have been mixed. The findings 
addressed the five research questions of this thesis. This analysis also explained that issues of 
media accountability, media ownership, and the economic/political interests of media 
practitioners, remain a challenge in a civilian administration, such as that in Nigeria. The end result 
is that democratic accountability has been abused by the media. The biased and one sided news 
reporting on corruption and other social vices that has filled the pages of the four newspapers 
analysed for this study has indicated that the media are not passing the correct messages, ones 
based on integrity and transparency, to the citizens, in gross violation of the sacred duty of the 
mass media as watchdog of democracy. 
This chapter also provides a summary of the findings based on the research questions raised in this 
study. The thrust of the argument is that the media is receding to take on a lapdog position, rather 
than being a watchdog, which could be described as the Fourth Estate of the Realm in Nigeria. It 
is clear from the summary of the interviews and the analyses of the newspapers that the media are 
grossly implicated in the culture of corruption in Nigeria. The ownership structure of the media, 
the poor economic state of Nigeria, the unethical behaviour of media practitioners, and the 
declining revenue of media houses, resonate across the analyses and interviews in this study. The 
influence of the media in promoting the culture of accountability under a democratic government 
in Nigeria, therefore appears to be waning. 
The diverse views expressed by the 25 stakeholders interviewed for this research reflect the general 
socio-economic discourse of the people. The triangulation method deployed has been useful in 
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fulfilling the objective of the study, as the data generated have been useful in analysing the vertical 
accountability role of both the media and other non-state actors in a democratic setting. Moreover, 
the findings of the study affirm the need to revisit some theoretical postulations in view of the 
emerging social, cultural, political and economic challenges of the globalised world. A partially 
free press and democracy may not necessarily help the cause of an anti-corruption struggle, nor 
engender the culture of transparency that is required for the consolidation of democracy. There is 
adequate evidence to show, in this study, that the Political Economy Theory is crucial to the 
analysis of the mass media in Nigeria. In addition, the Cultural Theory, Principal Agent and Patron-
Client models remain very useful in investigating the anti-corruption drive in Nigeria. This study 
further justifies the usefulness of the Political Economy Theory in analysing the media. It also 
offers useful insights into how the universal generalisation of concepts must be revisited by 
scholars. The socio-political, economic and cultural factors of individual nations must be taken 
into consideration before a concept can be used to analyse events.  
  
  




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8. 1  Areas of Future Research 
This study should be replicated in other African countries to see how the media are helping the 
cause of anti-corruption campaigns and to assess the media’s democratic accountability function 
in such societies. This will broaden the scope of media knowledge in Africa, and will provide a 
basis for comparison. A study should also be carried out on the mode of economic system that is 
suitable for the African media sector. This could provide useful information on how the media can 
operate, untainted, in a collapsed culture, where corruption and the abuse of power are systemic. 
This study has established that the free market media theory is antithetical to the consolidation of 
the media’s democratic ethos in Nigeria.  
In addition, a study should be carried out to explore the existing media systems and the policies 
which allow the media to make money from the internet and the mobile telephone, as in other 
climes. This will help to solve the impoverishment of the media and their propensity to corruption. 
Since this study focused mainly on the print media, it will add to the body of knowledge if a similar 
study is carried out on the electronics sector, most especially in view of the fact that the ownership 
structure in the electronic media industry, is evenly shared between the government and private 
individuals.  
Furthermore, the research design deployed in this study is largely qualitative. A quantitative 
method might be used for the same study. Alternatively, a combination of the two approaches 
might be deployed for such a study. This may expand the existing scope of knowledge on the 
Nigerian media and other non-state actors.  
8.2  Weaknesses 
The option of deploying other theoretical approaches to address the central questions of this study, 
such as using the Agenda-Setting Theory and its status conferral function, might have added more 
impetus to the work. However, a careful analysis of the theory revealed that it falls short in 
addressing the challenges of the free market media world, where ownership structure, government 
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policies and economic climates are critical factors in analysing the media. The Agenda -Setting 
Theory has suffered heavy criticism, thus, its usefulness in analysing social issues is in doubt. The 
Political Economy Theory, and its variant models of Critical Political Economy Theory, were 
found to be more useful and relevant to the research work. The study also could not explore the 
“Four theories” of Siebert et al (1963) in detail, because of the criticisms that are highlighted in 
the literature review, and I believe that the Four Theories might probably have added more strength 
to the study. This is not to say that the study’s failure to deploy these approaches has negatively 
impacted on the findings.  
Additionally, the newspaper sample size used for the study could have been larger if the 15 years’ 
period covered by the study is to be taken into consideration. This inadequacy has been 
compensated for by the triangulation methods of archival research, the content narrative of some 
newspapers and the critical discourse analysis adopted for the study. The outcomes and findings 
of the study have not in any way been undermined by this. Though the study is largely qualitative, 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches would have added value. 
8.3  Original Contribution to Knowledge 
There is evidence in this study to show that the media play a crucial role in transitional 
democracies, such as Nigeria. In the democratic accountability of the media, this thesis has 
established that a free market media system is antithetical to the consolidation of the democratic 
ethos and the promotion of the culture of transparency in Nigeria. What has emerged from the 
study is that the media cannot carry out their vertical accountability role in society in a collapsed 
culture where corruption is both systemic and endemic. A partially free press may not be able to 
function as an external control mechanism on corruption and other social abuses.  
The key finding that this thesis has put forward is that the universal generalization of the concepts 
of democracy and press freedom as a panacea to solving the socio-economic and political problems 
of modern states, needs to be revisited in view of the challenges and contradictions following the 
inception of democratic rule in Africa. Specifically, this study has provided empirical findings to 
show that if a concept is universal, this does not in any way suggest that its consequences would 
be consistent or predictable. Local conditions can challenge universal assumptions. It is clear that 
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a distinction needs to be made between the types of press that can help the cause of an anti-
corruption drive. A press may be free, but still compromised and implicated in corruption, as 
revealed in this study. The outcome of the study, has added to the knowledge about how to 
investigate the relevant social phenomenon, since it relates to the capacity of the media as the 
watchdog of a society.  
This research has also filled the gap in the literature on why Nigeria (both in reality and in 
perception) still remains a corruption-ridden nation, in-spite of the exposure of corruption by the 
Press. It is clear that the Nigerian media has receded to become a lapdog. The findings of the study 
have contributed to knowledge and scholarship, not only about how the media can be deployed for 
the anti-corruption campaigns in Nigeria, but it has also offered useful hints about African 
democratic culture. The qualitative analysis and oral tradition approach that are adopted in this 
study may be useful to other, future researchers who are interested in studying the media and civil 
society organizations in Nigeria, Africa, and beyond.  
8.4  Concluding Reflections and Conclusion 
For the media, striking a balance between serving the public good and pursuing profit is an on-
going debate, and will continue to attract the attention of media scholars for years to come. It is 
clear from this thesis that privately-owned media may not hold the key to the consolidation of 
democracy nor guarantee the watchdog function of the media in society. The present Nigerian 
media have become a tool in the hands of the powerful and the rich.  
This study thus proposes that some measures ought to be put in place to address the challenges 
facing the media in the course of their constitutional duties in the society. First, an instrument must 
be put in place to ensure the large spread of the media ownership structure is in the hands of core 
media professionals, rather than the present situation, where almost 100 percent of the print media 
are in the control of politicians and businessmen. There is an urgent need for the media 
professionals to unite and establish a joint newspaper that will promote ethics and professionalism 
and that will carry out the democratic accountability function and engender the culture of 
transparency, which is an essential pillar of democratic government.  
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It is only professionally managed media that can demand accountability from those in positions of 
authority. A publicly quoted media outfit, as in the case of the old Daily Times newspapers 
(Nigeria), where members of the public can subscribe as shareholders, should be set up by the 
media practitioners, particularly, the veteran ones in the country. Moreover, government at all 
levels in the country should consider the payment of a subsidy to the media within their domains. 
This is in line with the position for which Hallin and Mancini (2004) canvassed, as well as the 
practices in some of the advanced democracies, for instance, in the United Kingdom, United States 
of America, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and others. Indeed, Schweizer and his colleagues, in their 
2014 Media Policy Brief, supported public funding for private and independent media as part of 
measures to strengthen media operations in society. Furthermore, it will not be out of place if state 
and private organisations in Nigeria, and in other African states, can set up an endowment fund to 
cater for the growing financial needs of the media. Similar bodies exist in Europe, with the 
establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy Centre for International Media 
Assistance.    
 
Second, Nigerians must show the willingness and capacity to vote out corrupt politicians from 
office, because it is only when the state is well run that the economy can grow and can create the 
enabling environment for the media to function credibly. The present harsh economic situation is 
hampering the media from vertical accountability and from being the “Fourth estate of the realm”. 
The poor economic situation is depleting the revenue base of most newspapers, as advertisements 
and sales decline. It is when the economic base of the media organization is virile that the modern 
tools for investigative stories and, in the process, the culture of follow-up of stories, will be 
resuscitated in the industry. The salaries and allowances of media practitioners will be both regular 
and paid. The era of journalists being owed three months to one-year of salary will stop. All these 
will reduce the menace of corruption among the media practitioners. It is only a well-paid journalist 
who can act as an agent of change and overcome the temptation of the brown envelope in society. 
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Third, there is a need for the regulatory agencies and professional bodies within the media industry 
to ensure that the code of conduct for both the electronic and print media are fully observed by the 
media owners. Adequate sanctions should be meted to those found contravening the ethics of the 
profession. Those found collecting and demanding the brown envelope should not be treated with 
kid gloves, as this contributes to the high incidence of corruption among the media professionals. 
The Nigerian Guide of Editors, (NGE), the Nigerian Union of Journalists, (NUJ), and the 
Newspaper Proprietors’ Association of Nigeria (NPAN) should take a more pro-active interest in 
cleansing the media industry  
 
Moreover, civil society groups and professional bodies, such as the Nigerian Labour Congress and 
the Nigerian Bar Association, should establish their own media to serve the public, thereby 
enthroning the culture of accountability in society. The training and re-training of media 
practitioners should be given adequate priority, so that the editors and managers can manage their 
media outfits both efficiently and effectively.  
Finally, there is the need for a proper synergy between the media and the anti-corruption agencies 
in the country. To consolidate this synergy, the National Assembly should effect the relevant 
amendments that are forwarded to it by the anti-corruption agencies. I believe Section 22 of the 
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria should be amended, while Section 27, Sub-
Section 4 of the ICPC Act 2000, should be repealed and replaced with a specific provision which 
allows the anti-corruption agency to further engage the media in its investigative activities. 
It is pertinent to state that, in-spite of the challenges mentioned above, the media remain a viable 
instrument of information about events in society. The media provide adequate information in 
sports, entertainment, economic issues and politics/governance. This is reflected in the space 
allocated to these areas in the newspapers that are surveyed in this study. The importance of the 
print media in Nigeria is further reflected in newspaper reviews, which usually feature on the 
morning belts of most of the electronic media.  
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These newspaper reviews by the radio and television stations can be likened to the concept of the 
public sphere postulated by Jurgen Habermas (1989), because the Stations provide an environment 
in which citizens can interact and possibly air their views on the affairs of their society. For 
instance, Nigerian Inform FM radio station, on frequency 95.1, based in Abuja, allows listeners to 
comment on newspaper reviews on a daily basis from 6.30 a.m. to 7a.m.        
  
  




 Achebe, C., (1986): A Man of the People. Ibadan Heinemann Limited 
Achebe, C., (1983): An Image of Africa and the Trouble with Nigeria. London. Penguin Books 
Ltd. 
Achebe, C., (2001): Things Fall Apart. London. Penguin Books Ltd.  
Achebe, C., (2001): The Anthills of the Savannah. London. Penguin Books Ltd. 
Achebe, C., (2010): No Longer at Ease. London. Penguin Books Ltd. 
Achebe, C., (2012): There was A Country: A Personal History of Biafra. London, Allen Lane, 
Pengiun Group.  
Adadu, O. (2006): Curbing Corruption in Nigeria: The Untold Facts, Ibadan. Ogunleye Publishing 
Printing Press. 
Ade-Ajayi, J, F., and Ekoko, A. E., (1988): ‘Transfer of Power in Nigeria: Its Origins and 
Consequence’, in Gifford, P., and Roger Louis W. M., (eds.) (1988): Decolonisation and 
African Independence: The Transfer of Power 1960-1980.  New Haven. CT.  Yale 
University Press Ltd. 
Adebanwi, W, and Obadare O., (2011) ‘When Corruption fights back: Democracy and Elite 
Interest in Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption War’. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 49, 
No.2 pp. 185–213. Cambridge University Press. 
Adebanwi, W., (2010): A Paradise for Maggot: The Story of a Nigerian Anti-Graft Czar. Abuja. 
YMCI. 
Adebanwi, W., (2012): Authority Stealing: Anti-Corruption War and Democratic Politics in Post 
Military Nigeria, Durham North Carolina, USA, Carolina Academic Press. 
Adeniran, A., (2008): ‘Anti-Corruption Measures in Nigeria: A case for selective intervention by 
non-state actors’. King's Law Journal, Vol. 19 pp 57-79. Accessed 30/06/2009. 
Adejumobi, S., (2000): ‘Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy’. International 
Political Science Review.Vol.21, No 1, pp59-73, London, Sage.  
Ades. A., and Di Tella, R., (1997): ‘The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and Some New 
Results. Political Studies, Volume 45, pp. 496-515.  
Adegboyega, A., (1984): Why We Struck: The Story of the First Nigeria Coup. Ibadan, Evans 
Brothers (Nigeria Publishers) Ltd  
Adeniyi, O., (2011): Power, Politics and Death: A front-row account of Nigeria under the late 
President Yar’Adua, Lagos, Nigeria. Prestige Imprint. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     249 | P a g e  
 
 
Aderogba, A., (2013): ‘Nigerian Media and Corruption Practices: The Need for Paradigm Shift’, 
European Scientific Journal, Vol.9. No1  
Adeyemi, A., and Okorie, N., (2009). ‘The Perception of Nigerian Journalists on Brown Envelope 
Syndrome: South West Media Practitioners in Perspective’. National Conference, African 
Council for Communication Education (ACCE) Nigeria Chapter. Nov. 30th-Dec. 3rd, 
University of Maiduguri. 
Agbaje E. B. A. (2007). ‘Corruption, Power, and Insecurity in the Contemporary Nigerian State: 
A Historiography of Paradoxes’. A paper delivered during an International Conference on 
Nigeria in the 21st Century: Issues and Challenges, organized by the Faculty of 
Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife/Conference Centre of the Obafemi 
Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.   
Agbaje, A., (1992): The Nigerian Press, Hegemony and Social Construction of Legitimacy 1960-
1983. New York: Edwin Mellen Press. 
African Media Barometer (2011): The First Home Grown Analysis of the Media Landscape in 
Africa (Nigeria, 2011). Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, (FES) Fesmedia Africa, Windhoek, 
Namibia. 
Ahrend, R., (2002): Press Freedom, Human Capital and Corruption. Delta Working Paper. 
Accesed on the 19th July 2012 
http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en8q=press+freedom%2Chuman+capital+anddf.corr
uption8meta 
Ahuche Z. P., (2013): Curbing Corruption in Nigeria. A Necessity and A Reality. Ilorin, Kwara 
State, Nigeria, Gosh Impressions. 
Aiyetan, D., (2007): Bound by Greed. The Tell Magazine, March 5th edition. pp:16-19. 
Ajibewa, A., (2008): ‘Democracy and Corruption in Nigeria’ in Ojo, E.O. (Ed) Challenges of 
Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria. Ibadan: John Archers (Publishers) Limited, pp.261 – 
273. 
Ake, C., (2003): Democracy and Development in Africa: Ibadan, Nigeria. Spectrum Books Ltd. 
Akindele, S. T., Gidado T. O., and Olaopo O. R., (2002): Globalisation, its Implications and 
Consequences for Africa, Ife: Department of Political Sciences, Obafemi Awolowo 
University, Ile-Ife 
Akinfeleye, R. A., (2000): ‘Proliferation of Journalism/Mass Communication Training 
Institutions in Nigeria and Its Impact on Professional Standards’. A paper presented at a 
workshop of the Nigerian Press Council on The Media and Democracy on May 22. 
Akinfeleye, R.A., (2012): Untitled presentation at annual African Media Centre. University of 
Westminster, London. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     250 | P a g e  
 
 
Akinjide, R. O., (2001): ‘Democracy and the Challenges of Succession in Nigeria’, At BCOS 25th 
Anniversary Lecture, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Akinkuotu, A., (2008): The Media: Victim or Collaborator in Corruption, Reporting Anti-
Corruption Issues. ICPC Capacity Building Series, Lagos, Macpact Venture. pp: 18-23. 
Akinola, A.A., (2002): ‘History of Corruption’. West Africa Magazine, p.2  
Akpabio, E., (2003): African Communication System; Lagos, Nigeria. An Introductory Text Lagos, 
B Print Publications. 
Aluko, J. O., (2007): ‘Corruption: A Legacy of Colonialism’, in Aina D. Ayandija (ed.), 
Corruption and the Challenge of Human Development, Ilishan-Remo, Babcock University 
Press, pp: 201-214.  
Aluko, J.O., (2006): Corruption in the Local Government System in Nigeria. Ibadan, Nigeria, Book 
Builders. 
Ampuja, M., (2004): ‘Critical Media Research, Globalisation Theory and Commercialisation’. 




Accessed 6th August, 2009. 
Anderson, R., (2004): Introduction. In Critical Studies in Media Commercialisation edited by 
Anderson, Robin and Starte Lance.   Oxford. Oxford University Press. pp: 1-20.  
Andreski, S., (1968): The African Predicament: A Study of the Pathology of Modernisation, 
London, Michael Joseph Ltd. 
Andrews, M., and Shah, A., (2005): Citizens-Centered Governance: A New Approach to Public 
Sector Reform (Chapter 6). In the Public Expenditure Analysis, edited by Anwar Shah. 
Washington DC. World Bank. 
Andvig, J. F., O. Amundsen, I. Sissener, and Soreide T. (2001). Corruption: A Review of 
Contemporary Research. Bergen; Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human 
Rights. 
Anikulapo-Kuti, F., (1980): Authority Stealing. LP Album, Lagos.  Kalakuta Records 
Anikulapo-Kuti, F., (1984): Teachers don’t teach me Nonsense. LP Album, Lagos Kalakuta 
Records 
Ansah, P., (1988): ‘In search of A Role for the African Media in the Democratic Process’. African 
Media Review. Vol.2, No2 
Ayedun – Aluma, V., (2011): ‘Theorizing popular community media for democracy and 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     251 | P a g e  
 
 
development’ in Wasserman, Herman (Ed) Popular Media, Democracy and Development 
in Africa. New York, USA, Routledge. 
Ayittey, G.B., (2006): ‘Nigeria’s Struggle with Corruption’. Testimony before the Committee on 
International Relations’ Sub-Committee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International 
Operations.  U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Accessed 22/05/09.  
Ayodele, A, S., (2006): Introduction: Fighting Corruption in Nigeria: The Challenges for the 
Future. (pp. 1-4). Report of a two-day National Workshop held at Ibadan the Development 
Policy Centre. January 16-17. 
Ayoola, E., (2007): ‘Corruption: The Past, the Present and the Future: Any Hope for Sanity’. 
Paper delivered at the Law Week of the Faculty of Law, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. 
Ayoola, E. O., (2007): Promoting Good Governance with Emphasis on Anti-Corruption and 
Ethics. Abuja, ICPC Monograph Series No.7. 
Babasola, O. A., (2009): ‘Press Regulation and the Challenges of the Anti–Corruption War in 
Nigeria: A Conjunctural Analysis of Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Commission (ICPC) Nigeria’— Unpublished MA thesis at Middlesex University, 
UK 
Balogun, M. J., (2000): ‘Promoting Integrity in an Ethically Cloudy Setting. Critical Battles in the 
Anti-Corruption War’. Paper presented at the National Seminar on the Nigerian Public 
Service in the @1st Century. 15-22 December. Ijebu-Ode 
Batley, R., (1997): The Role of Government in Adjusting Economies. An Overview of Findings. 
International Development Department. Birmingham, Alabama. University of 
Birmingham. 
Barker, C., (2008): Cultural Studies: Theory and Practices.3rd edition, London, Sage. 
Baran, S.J., and Davis, D. K., (2003). Mass Communication Theory: Foundations, Ferment and 
Future.  Boston, MA USA, Wadsworth Cengage Learning. 
Baran, P., (1957): The Political Economy of Growth. New York, Monthly Review Press. 
Branda, F., (2010): Media Reforms in Africa- A Theoretical Commentary – in Dumisani Moyo and 
Wallace Chuma (ed) Media Policy in a changing South Africa: critical reflections on media 
reforms in the global age, South Africa, UNISA Press Pretoria, South Africa.  
Becker, G., (1994): ‘To Root Out Corruption, Boot Out Bad Government’, Business Week January 
30.  
Bello-Imam. I. B (2004): Corruption and National Development, In I.B. Bello-Imam, & I. M 
Obadan, (eds.) Democratic Governance and Development Management in Nigeria’s 
Fourth Republic: 1999-2003 (pp. 266-281), Ibadan, Nigeria: JOPAD Publishers 
Berger, Arthur A. S. A (1998): Media Research Techniques. 2nd Edition London, Sage Publications. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     252 | P a g e  
 
 
Berger, G., (2002): ‘Theorizing the Media – Democracy Relationship in Southern Africa’. The 
International Journal for Communication Studies, Volume 64, Number 1, pp25-37. 
Besley, A and Chadwick, R. (Eds.) (1992): Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media. London, 
Routledge. 
Bicchieri, C., and Duffy, J., (1997): ‘Corruption Cycles’. Political Studies. XLV pp. 477-495.  
Binns, T., (1994): Tropical Africa. London, Routledge. 
Black Law Dictionary. 4th edition edited by Henry Campbell. MA, USA: West Publishing Co. 
Available [online]. https://thelawdictionary.org. 
Bonner, M. (2009): ‘Media as Social Accountability: The Case of Police Violence in Argentina’. 
The International Journal of Press/Politics.htpp.//www.sage publication.com Accessed 
14th August, 2014. 
Bratton, M., (2009): ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: Region of Democracy’, in Haerpfer et al (eds.) (2009): 
Democratisation. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Brown, E., and Cloke, J., (2004): ‘Neoliberal Reforms, Governance and Corruption in the South. 
Assessing the International Anti-Corruption Crusade’. Antipode Vol.36. No 2. pp.Pp. 272-
294 
Bryman, A., (1988): Quantity and Quality in Social Research. London. Unwin Hyman. 
Brunetti, A., and Weder, B., (2003): ‘A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption’. Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 87, pp 1801-1824. Accessed on the 21/07/2011. 
Bryman, A., (2001). Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bryman, A., and Bell, E., (2011): Ethics in Business Research. In Bryman and Bell Business 
(eds.) Research Methods. 2nd Edition. New York. Oxford University Press. 
British Foreign Office Record marked FO 84/1527. 
Buhari, M (1983): Speech as Military Head of State in December. Lagos. Federal Ministry of 
Information 
Burns C, (1974): World Civilisations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Burnham, P., Lutz, K., Grant, W., and Layton-Henry, A., (2008): Research Methods in Politics, 
2nd edition. New York. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Camaj, L., (2013): ‘The Media’s role in Fighting Corruption: Media Effects on Governmental 
Accountability’. The International Journal of Press/Politics: LHP// www.sage publication 
pp. 21-42, com. Accessed 8th August, 2014. 
Campbell, J., (2011): Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink. London. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     253 | P a g e  
 
 
Chabal, P., and Daloz, J. P., (1999): Africa Works: Disorder. As Political Instrument, Oxford, 
Indiana University Press.  
Chiluwa, I., (2007): News Headlines as Pragmatic Strategy in Nigerian Press Discourse. 
International Journal of Language Society and Culture, Vol 27. Pp: 63-71 
Castells, M., (2009): Communication Power. Oxford; Oxford University Press. 
Chazan, et al., (1999): Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. 3rd edition. Boulder, Colorado 
Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc. 
Chomsky, N., (1989): Necessary Illustrations: Through Control in Democratic Societies. Pluto 
Press London. 
Chowdhury, S., (2004): Do Democracy and Press Freedom Reduce Corruption? Evidence from a 
Cross Country Study, Bonn, ZEF Papers on Development Policy.  
Code of Ethics for Nigerian Journalists (1998) Abuja. Nigerian Press Council. 
Code of Conduct Act (1979). Federal Ministry of Information. Lagos. 
Cohen, R., (1971): ‘From Empire to Colony: Borno in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, 
in Turner, V., (ed.) (1971): Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960. Vol. Three. Profile of 
Change: African Society and Colonial Rule Series. London. Cambridge University Press. 
Committee to Protect Journalists (2004). CPJ at a Glance. Available [online] 
http://www.cpj.org/development?about-cpj-html. Accessed on June 6. 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1979). Lagos, Daily Times Publications. 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). Abuja, Government Printers. 
Cronkite, W., (1997): A Reporter’s Life. New York. Ballantine Books 
Curran, J., (2010): Mass Media and Society - 5th edition; London. Bloomsbury Academic. 
Curran, J., and Seaton, J., (2009): Power Without Responsibility. The Press, Broadcasting and 
News Media in Britain, 7th edition, London, Routledge. 
Dahlström, T (n.d.) (Work in progress): The Role of the Media in Combating Corruption. 
Jönköping International Business School, Sweden. 
Dare, O.,(1996): The Press. In Diamond, A. Kirk-Greene and O. Oyediran. (Eds). Transition 
Without End: Nigerian Politics and civil society under Babangida) Ibadan: Vantage 
Publishers. pp.535-551. 
Dawodu, T., (2014): Nigeria is Not Yet a Country. Saharareporter.com, online. Accessed 7th July, 
2014. 
Davidson, B., (1992): The Black’s Man Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State. London, 
  




Dahl, R, A., (1991): Modern Political Analysis. New Delhi. Prentice Hall. 
Dahl, R, A., (1989): Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 
Dantiye, H., (2008): My Stewardship and Secretariat Report. The Editor. Official Journal of the 
Nigerian Guild of Editors. (July, ed.). 
Djankov, T., McLiesh, C, Nevona, T, and Shlelfer, A., (2001): Who Owns the Media. World 
Bank.org/INTWRS/Resources/477365-/1257315064764/2423-djankov.pdf. 
 
De Maria, W., (2008): ‘The Failure of the African Anti-Corruption Efforts: Lessons for Managers’, 
International Journal of Management, Vol 27 No 3 pp. 
http://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-2043368071/the-failure-of-the-african-anti-
corruption-effort. Accessed 29th March, 2014. 
Defleur, M.L and Dennis, E.E. (1981): Understanding Mass Communication, Boston Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Denscombe, M. (2003): The Good Research Guide for Small Scale Social Research Projects, 
Maidenhead, Open University Press.  
Denzin, N.K., and Lincoln, Y.S., (2000): Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2nd en. Thousand 
Oaks, C.A. Sage Publications. 
Diamond, L., (1999): Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation. London, John Hopkins 
University Press 
Diamond, L, Plattner, M., and Schedler A., (1999): Introduction. The International Community in 
National Election. In Schelder Edition. The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder London, Lynne Reiner Publisher. 
Diamond, L., Linz, J., and Lipset, S M., (1993): Vol. 2: Democracy in Developing Countries; 
London. Lynne Rienner. 
Diamond, L., (1988): ‘Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism and The Struggle for Democracy’, in Diamond, 
Linz and Lipset (Eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa. London. Lynne 
Rienner. 
Diamond, L., J (1988): Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria: The Failure of the First 
Republic. Macmillian. London, UK, USA. 
Dike, V., (2003): Managing the Challenges of Corruption in Nigeria: Centre for Social Justice and 
Human Development, Sacramento, CA., USA.  
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     255 | P a g e  
 
 
Dibie, R., (2007): ‘Ethical Leadership, Social Responsibility and Corruption in Nigeria’, in Aina, 
D. Ayandiji (Ed.) Corruption and Challenges of Human Development, pp.1-27, Ogun 
State, Babcock University Press Ltd. 
Dirbaba, B. O., (2010): The Growing Influence of Bribery in Ethiopian Journalism, in African 
Communication Research, Vol. 3 No 3, Mwanza, Tanzania, Faculty of Social Sciences and 
Communications at St. Augustine University of Tanzania. 
Doig, A., (2000): ‘In the State We Trust? Democratisation, Corruption and Development’, in A. 
Doig and R. Theobald (Eds.) Corruption and Democratisation, pp.13-36.  
Doig, A., and Theobald R., (2000): Corruption and Democratisation. Routledge London, UK.  
Doig, A., and Riley, S., (1998): ‘Corruption and Anti-Corruption Strategies: Issues and Case 
Studies from Developing Countries’, in UN (ed.) Corruption and Integrity Improvement 
Initiatives in Developing Countries. New York, United Nations. 
Donnelly, E., (2008): ‘Corruption in Nigeria’. Transparency Watch News, March Edition London.  
Dowden, R., (2005): ‘Wrong with Africa?’ London, Open Democracy Document 
Dowden, R., (2009): Africa: Altered States, Ordinary Miracles. New York Public Affairs. 
Doyle, G., (2006): Understanding Media Economics. London Sage Publications Limited. 
Duyile, D., (1987): Makers of Nigerian Press. Lagos Concord Press Limited 
Duyile, D., (1980): Media and Mass Communication in Nigeria. Ibadan, Sketch Press Publishing 
Company. 
Dwayne, W and Yong D, J., (2011): The Political Economies of Media: The Transformation of 
the Global Media Industries. London, Bloomsbury Academic Press. 
EFCC Act (2004): Abuja, Heritage Press Limited. 
Ekeh, P., (1975): ‘Colonialism and Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement’. Comparative 
Studies of Society and History, Vol. 17, No.1 pp. 91-112. 
Ekeanyanwu, N. T., and Obianigwe, N.O., (2012): ‘The Nigerian Press, Brown Envelope 
Syndrome (BES) and Media Professionalism: The Missing Link’. Journalism and Mass 
Communication, Vol.2 No.4 pp. 514-529  
Ekerihevwe, S.A., (2009): ‘Manifestation of Corruption Among Journalists in Nigeria’. Makurdi 
Journal of Communication Research Vol. 1, No 1 pp. 14-23. 
Ekundayo, A., (2012): ‘New Media and the Renewal of Local Democracy’, in Africa Media & 
Democracy Journal (AMDMC), Vol. 1, Issue: 1 p. 30. 
Elias, T. O., (1969): Nigerian Press Law. London, Evans Brothers Limited. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     256 | P a g e  
 
 
Ellis, S., (2006): ‘The Root of African Corruption’. Current History, May, Edn 105, pp.  200-208. 
Enemaku, O. S., (2005): ‘Reporting Corruption in a Democracy:  A case Study of Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic’, in Olurode and Akinboye, Democracy, Good Governance and Corruption in 
Nigeria (1999-2005), Lagos, Nigeria: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung- Frankad Publishers.   
Entman, R.M., (1989): Democracy without Citizens. New York, Oxford University. 
Enweremadu, D.U., (2013); ‘The Impact of Corruption on Economic Development: Comparing 
the Experience of Nigeria and Indonesia (1967-1998)’. In Bernedsen, B. Dietz, T. 
Nordholt, H. S and Van Der Veen R, (eds.). Asian Tiger, African Lions, Comparing the 
Development Performance of Southern Asia and Africa, Leiden Brill, pp. 197-226. Journal 
of International Studies and Development. 
Eribo, F., and Jong-Ebot, W., (1997): Press Freedom and Communication in Africa. Trenton, NJ: 
Africa World Press, Inc, Esan, O., (2009): Nigerian Television: Fifty Years of Television 
in Africa. Princeton, NJ., USA, AMV Publishing. 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., and Jackson, P., (2012): Management Research 4th edn. London, 
Sage Publications Ltd 
Esipisu, M., and Khaguli, I., (2009): Eyes of Democracy: The Media and Elections, London, 
Commonwealth London, Commonwealth Secretariat. 
Ezeanya, C., (2012): ‘Origin of Corruption in Africa and the Way Forward’. A Paper presented at 
the Rwanda 50th Independence Anniversary, July. 
Ezeani, E., (2013) In Biafra, Africa Died: The Diplomatic Plot, 2nd Edition. London Veritas Lumen 
Publishers. 
Falola, T and Heaton, M., (2008): A History of Nigeria. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Falola, T., (1999): The History of Nigeria. Westport, CT., Greenwood Press. 
Fashola, B.R., (2007): ICPC and the Crusade Against Corruption in Nigeria: Evolution A National 
Strategic Plan of Action, ICPC Monograph Series. No 10 
Fairclough, N., (1995): Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. London and 
New York. Longman 
Ferree, M.M., Gamson, W., Gerhards, J., & Rucht, D. (Eds.). (2002): Shaping Abortion Discourse: 
Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States. Cambridge. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Flanary, R., and Watt, D., (1999): ‘The State of Corruption: A Case Study of Uganda’. Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 20 No.3. The New Politics of Corruption. Taylor and Francis Limited. 
Accessed 08th April, 2009). 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     257 | P a g e  
 
 
Fox, E., (1998): Conclusion, In Elizabeth Fox (ed.). Media and Politics in Latin America: The 
Struggle for democracy. London. SAGE Publications. pp: 171-98. 
Francke, W., (1995): ‘The Evolving Watchdog: The Media Role in Government Ethics’. Annals 
of American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 31-48, 
Cambridge University Press Plc. Accessed 8th April, 2009. 
Freedom House: Press Freedom Survey 2009. 
http.//www.freedomhouse.org/pfs/2009/pfs/2013,2013. Accessed 11th August, 2013.  
Freedom of Information Act 2011. Media Rights Agenda, Lagos 
Freud, B., (1984): The Making of Contemporary Africa. The Development of the Africa Society 
since 1800. Bloomington. Indiana University Press. 
Gans, H., (2003): Democracy and the News. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Gboyega, A., (1996): ‘Political Corruption in Nigeria’, in (eds.) Corruption and Democratisation 
in Nigeria. Ibadan: Fredrick Ebert Foundation. 
Girling. J., (1997): Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy. New York: Routledge.  
Global Corruption Report. Pp. 44-56. 
Goenendijk N, (1997); ‘A Principal Agent Model of Corruption. Crime’, Law and Social Change: 
vol 27,pp.207-229, Meherland, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Golding, P. and Murdock G., (1997): The Political Economy of the Media. Volume 11, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Limited, London, UK. 
Golding, P and Elliott, P., (1979): Making the News:  New York: Longman 
Goje, M D., (2009): ‘The Media, Democracy and Governance’. A paper presented at the second 
Convocation Lecture of the Nigerian Institute of Journalism, Lagos. 25th May. 
Gunther, R., and Mughan, A., (2000): Democracy and The Media. Cambridge University Press, 
UK. 
Guriev, S., (1999): A Theory of Information:  Red tape with an application to top-level Corruption. 
New Economic School, RECEP and CEPR, Mosco, Russia. 
Gregen, K., (1999): Social Construction and Relational Action. Vol. 9 Issue 1. Sage Journals. 
Habermas, J., (1989): An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Oxford, UK Polity Press 
in association with Blackwell publishers Ltd.  
Haerpfer, C. W., et al., (2009): Democratization. New York. Oxford University Press. 
Hallin, D, & Mancini, P., (2004): Comparing Media System: Three Models of Media and Politics. 
London, Cambridge University Press. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     258 | P a g e  
 
 
Harber, A., (2014): ‘Accountability and the Media’. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science. LHP// www.sage publication.com. Accessed 8th August, 
2014. 
Hardy, J., (2010): The Contribution of Critical Political Economy. In James Curran 5th (ed.) Media 
and Society. London. Bloomsbury Academy. Chapter 10. pp:186-207.  
Hargreaves, J., (1996): Decolonization in Africa. 2nd (ed.). London Longman. 
Harsch, E., (1993): ‘Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa’. The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp 31-48, Cambridge University Press 
Plc. Accessed 8th August, /2009. 
Hasty, J., (2005): ‘The Pleasures of Corruption: Desire and Discipline in Ghanaian Political 
Culture’. Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 20, issue 2, pp 271-301. Accessed 8th April, 2009. 
Haynes, J., (2002): In Politics in the Developing World: A Concise Introduction, Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Heidenheimer, A. J., (1989): Perspective on the Perception of Corruption. In Heidenheimer, 
Arnold J., Johnson, Michael and Levine, Victor (eds.): Political Corruption: A Handbook. 
New Brunswick. Transition Publishers. 
Held, D., (2006): Models and Democracy; London. Polity Press. 
Hendrickson, M., (1997): Culture and Democracy; Kaduna, Nigeria. ABU Press Ltd. 
Hesmondhalgh, D., (2000): ‘The Cultural Industries’ in Curran, J and Park M-J De – Westernising, 
Media Studies Communication and Society. London, Routledge. 
Heywood, P., (1997): Political Corruption: Problems and Perspective. Journal of Political studies 
XLV. pp: 417-435. 
Hiebert Ray E., et al (1974): Mass Media: An Introduction to Modern Communication New York: 
David Mikay 
Higgins, M., (2008): Media and their Publics. New York, Open University Press. 
Hornblower, S., (1992): ‘Creation and Development of Democratic Institutions in Ancient 
Greece’, in Dunn A., (eds.) (1992). Democracy: The Unfinished Journey 508 BC to AD 
1993. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Human Rights Watch (2011): Nigeria: Corruption on Trial? The Record of Nigeria’s Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission. New York, Human Rights Watch. 
Human Development Report (2015): Work for Human Development, United Nations Development 
Programme, Washington DC. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     259 | P a g e  
 
 
Huntington, S., (1993): The Third Wave: Democratisation in the 21st Century; Norman, US, 
University of Oklahoma Press.  
Human Development Index 2015. 
Hyden, G., and Okigbo, C., (2007): ‘The Media and the Two Waves of Democracy’ in Hyden, G., 
Leslie. M., and Ogundimu, F., (eds.) (2007). Media and Democracy in Africa. London. 
Transaction Publishers. 
Ibrahim, M O Foundation (2015): Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Executive 
Summary.Retrieved:static.moibrahimfoundation.org/u/2015/10/02193252/2015-IIAG-
Executive Summary.pdf? _ga=1.65526702.146659138. 22nd October, 2015.  
ICPC Act, (2000) Ibadan, University Press Ltd. 
ICPC Law Reports 2013. 
ICPC (2014). Newspaper Review, February. 
ICPC Position Paper on the Merger of ICPC/EFCC (2015). 
Igwenyi, B.O., (2010): The Crime of Corruption in Nigeria, Laws, Issues and Solutions, Lagos, 
SNAAP Press Ltd.  
Iheukwumere, E. O and Iheukwumere C.A., (2003): ‘Colonial Rapacity and Political Corruption: 
Root of African Underdevelopment and Misery’. Chicago-Kent/Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, USA, Illinois Institute of Technology. 
Jaffrelot, C., (2000): ‘Democracy in India’, in Frankel, F, R., Rajeev Z, H., and Arora, B., (eds.) 
(2000). Transforming India: Social and Physical Dynamics of Democracy. New York. 
Oxford University Press.  
Jain A. K., (2001): ‘Corruption: A Review’, Journal of Economic Surveys Vol. 15, No. 1 Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd, Oxford UK. 
Jain A. K., (2001): The Political Economy of Corruption; London, Routledge.  James, C., and 
Seaton, J., (2003): Power Without Responsibility: The Press, Broadcasting, and New 
Media in Britain. Routledge, London 
Jayeoba, O., (2011): Anti-Corruption Crusade in Nigeria: An Assessment of the Economic and 
Financial Crime Commission EFCC, USA, Lambert Academic Publishing. 
 Jefferson, T., (1787): Letter to Edward Carrington. Jefferson on Politics and Government: 
Freedom of the Press. Available [online], 
http://www.famguardian,org/subjects/politics/ThomasJefferson/jeff1060.htm. Accessed 
on 27/10/2011 
Johnston, M and Doig A., (1999: Different Views on Good Government and Sustainable Anti-
corruption Strategies’ in Stapenhurst, R, and Kpundeh, S. J., Curbing corruption: toward 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     260 | P a g e  
 
 
a model for building national integrity. World Bank Institute (WBI), EDI Development 
Studies. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Johnston, M., (2005): Syndromes of Corruption Wealth, Power, and Democracy. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge UK 
Johnson, R, A and Sharma, S., (2004): ‘About Corruption’ in Roberta and Johnson (ed.) The 
Struggle Against Corruption: A Comparative Study. New York Palgrave Macmillan 
Joseph, R., (1987): Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the 
Second Republic. London. Cambridge University Press 
Jhally, S., (2004): Advertising at the Edge of the Apocalyps-Advertising destroying the World. In 
Critical Studies in Media Commercialisation edited by Anderson, Robin and Starte Lance.   
Oxford. Oxford University Press. pp: 27-39. 
Jibril, M., (2010): Corruption Has Long History in Nigeria. Vanguard Newspapers, October,7. 
Kasoma, T., (2010): ‘Zambian PR Practitioners’ Perspectives on Brown Envelopes and Freebies: 
Working Through the Confusion’ in African Communication Research, Vol 3 No 3, Mwanza, 
Tanzania, Faculty of Social Sciences and Communications at St. Augustine University of 
Tanzania. 
Keane, J., (1994): The Media and Democracy. Cambridge, UK. Polity Press. 
Kolade, C., (1999): Main Report of the Commission of Inquiry for the Review of Contracts, 
Licenses and Appointments 
Klitgaard, R., (1998): Controlling Corruption.  Berkeley, University of California Press. 
Khan, M.H (1996): ‘A Typology of Corruption in Transactions in Development Countries’. IDS 
Bulletin 27 (2) pp. 12-21 
Kpundeh, S. J., (1995):  Politics and Corruption in Africa: A Case Study of Sierra Leone. 
Maryland. University Press of America, Inc 
Kpundeh, S., (1999): ‘The Fight against Corruption in Sierra Leone’, in Stapenhurst, R, and 
Kpundeh, S. J. (1996): Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National 
Integrity. World Bank Institute (WBI), EDI Development Studies. Washington, DC: World 
Bank  
Kuper, A., (2004): Democracy Beyond Borders: Justice and Representation in Global Institutions. 
Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Kvale, S., (1983): The Qualitative Research Interview: A Phenomenological and a Hermeneutical 
Mode of Understanding. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology. Vol.14. No. 2: pp:171-
196.  
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     261 | P a g e  
 
 
Kvale, S., (1996): Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing. London, Sage 
Publication Inc. 
Kvale, S., (2006): Dominance Through Interviews and Dialogues. Qualitative Inquiry. Http: // qix. 
Sagepub.com/cgi pp 480-500 
Lawal, A., (2006): ‘Corruption in Nigeria: A Colonial Legacy’. Inaugural Lecture, Lagos: 
University of Lagos Press. 
Leff, N.H., (1964): ‘Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption’. American 
Behaviour Scientist. Vol.8, No 3. Pp 8-14. 
Kelly, D., and Donway, R., (1990):’ Liberalism and Free Speech’, in Lichtenbery (ed.), 
Democracy and the Mass Media. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. 
Lewis, P., (1996): ‘From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in 
Nigeria’. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 34, No 1, pp 79-103, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lewis, P., (1998): Africa; Dilemmas of Development and Change. Boulder, Colorado; Oxford. 
Westview Press. 
Lodamo, B and Skjerdal, T. S., (2009): ‘Freebies and Brown Envelopes in Ethiopian Journalism’. . 
African Journalism Studies Ecquid Novi: No 30 (2) pp. 134-154 
Lucke, A., (1996): Text and Discourse Analysis. New York. American Educational Research 
Association. Vol.2, pp:3-17 
Maathai, W., (2009): The Challenge for Africa: A New Vision; London. William-Heinemann. 
Mabweazara, H. M., (2010): ‘When your “take –home” can hardly take you home: Moonlighting 
and the Quest for Economic Survival in the Zimbabwean Press’, in African Communication 
Research, Vol 3 No 3, Mwanza, Tanzania, Faculty of Social Sciences and Communications 
at St. Augustine University of Tanzania. 
Malmstroem, C., (2014): Corruption Survey in 28 EU Countries BBC News Report, February 3rd 
Mamdani, M., (1996):  Citizens and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Mare, A., and Brand, R., (2010): ‘Business Journalism Ethics in Africa: A comparative study of 
Newsrooms in South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe’. in African Communication Research, 
Vol. 3, No 3, Mwanza, Tanzania, Faculty of Social Sciences and Communications at St. 
Augustine University of Tanzania. 
Maxwell, M., and Shaw D. L., (1977): The Emergence of American Political Issues.  New York: 
West Publishing. Co 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     262 | P a g e  
 
 
McChesney R, and Nichols J., (2010): The Death and Life of American Journalism:  The Media 
Revolution that will Begin the World Again. USA:  The Nations Books. 
McChesney, R., (2008): The Political Economy of Media: Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas. 
New York. Monthly Review Press. Google Scholar. 
McChesney, R., (1998): ‘Making Media Democratic’. American: Boston Review. A bi-monthly 
American political and literary Magazine, Cambridge Massachusetts, USA. Boston Critic 
Inc.   
McManus, J., (1994): Market-Driven Journalism: Let the Citizens Beware. London, Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
McQuail, D., (2000): McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory. 4th (ed.). London. Sage 
Publication. 
McQuail, D., (2010): McQuail’s Reader in Mass Communication. (6th edition). London, Sage 
Publications Ltd.  
Media Right Agenda, (2011): A Citizen Guide to the Freedom of Information Act 20011. 
Mendes, M., (2013): Transparency International Overview of corruption in the media in 
developing countries, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 27 February, Number: 368 
Meredith, M., (2006): The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. New York, 
London. Free Press. 
Merlo, A., (2012):  Political Economic Theory. Retrieved on June 6th, 2012, from 
www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa/wpapers/ESWC_merlo.pdf. 
Mikula, M., (2008): Key Concepts in Cultural Studies. New York. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mogashoa, T., (2014): Understanding Critical Discourse Analysis in Qualitative Research. 
International Journal of Humanities Social Sciences and Education (IJHSSE). Vol. 1 Issue 7. Pp: 
104-113. 
Momoh, T., (2002): Nigerian Media Laws. Lagos, EFUA Media Associates Limited. 
Momoh, B., (2012): Untitled paper presented at University of Westminster, African Media Centre 
Conference. London. UK. 
Moore, C., (2010): FELA: This Bitch of A Life; Abuja, Nigeria. Cassava Republic, Edo House. 
Mosco, V., (1996): Political Economy of Communication, London. Sage Publications Ltd. 
Mosco, V., (2008): ‘Current Trends in the Political Economy of Communication’, Canadian 
Edition, Vol1, Issue 1, pp 45-63. Global Media Journal 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     263 | P a g e  
 
 
Mpagze, D, and White, R.A. (2010): Tanzanian Journalists’ AmbivalentPerception of their Ethics: 
“A Jekyll and Hyde” Occupation’ in African Communication Research, Vol. 3, No 
Mudhai, F., (2007): ‘Time to harvest? Media, Corruption and Elections in Kenya’, Ethical Space: 
The International Journal of Communication Ethics. Vol 4, No. 4, pp:30-35. 
Murdock, R and Golding, P., (2005): For a Political Economy of Mass Communication. The Social 
Register, Vol.3 pp. 205-234.  
Murdock, G., and Golding, P., (2010): ‘Culture, Communications and Political Economy’, in 
Curran J. and Gurevitch M, Mass Media and Society, 4th edn., London. Oxford University 
Press Inc. 
Mulinge, M, M., and Lesetedi G, N., (1998): Interrogating Our Past: Colonialism and Corruption 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. African Journal of Political Science Vol. 3 No. 2, pp.15-28 
National Population Commission (NPC), Nigeria and ICF International (2014). Nigeria 
Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS), 2013. Abuja, Nigeria. Accessed on the 19th 
August, 2014. http://dhs program.com/pubs/dpf/FR293/FR293.dpf. 
Neild, R., (2002): Public Corruption: The Dark Side of Social Evolution. London: Anthem Press. 
Nordenstreng, K., (2006): ‘Four Theories of the Press Reconsidered, in Researching Media, 
Democracy and Participation’. The Intellectual Work of the 2006 European Media and 
Communication Doctoral Summer School. Tartu University Press, pp.35-46. 
Norris, P., (2006): ‘The Role of the Free Press in Promoting Democratization, Good Governance 
and Human Development’. Papers delivered for World Press Freedom Day, Cambridge, 
Harvard University. 
Norris, P., (2000): A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post Industrial Societies. 
Cambridge. Cambridge University press.  
Nwabueze, C., (2010): ‘Brown Envelopes and the need for ethical re-orientation: perceptions of 
Nigerian Journalists’ in African Communication Research. Vol. 3, No 2. pp.43-51. 
Nwabueze, B.O., (1992): Democratisation. Ibadan. Spectrum Law Publishing. 
Nwankwo, A., (2001): ‘Political Economy of Corruption in Nigeria’. in Akanni A., (ed.). 
Corruption in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Experience. Enugu Fourth Dimension Publishing 
Ltd.  
Nwauwa, A. O., (2003): ‘Concepts of Democracy and Democratisation in Africa: Revisited’. Paper 
presented at the fourth Annual Kent State University Symposium on Democracy. 
Nwoko, M. I., (1988): ‘Basic World Political Theories’: Owerri, Claretian Institute of Philosophy, 
pp.240-242. 
Nwolise, O.B.C., (2006): ‘Corporate Governance and Corruption: Public and Private 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     264 | P a g e  
 
 
Approaches. In B. Aboyade and S. Ayodele (ed.), Fighting Corruption in Nigeria: 
Challenges for the Future. (pp. 98-118), Report of a two-day National Workshop held at 
the Development Policy Centre, 16-17 January.  
Nwosu, I. E., (1990): ‘Mass Communication and National Development: Perspectives on 
Communication Environments of Development in Nigeria.  Aba, Nigeria. Frontiers 
Publishers.   
Nwuneli, O., (Ed): (1990). Mass Communication and National Development. Enugu: Fourth 
Dimension Publishers.  
Nyamujoh, F., (2001): ‘Media Ethics and Professionalism in Cameroun’, in C. Ukpabi (ed.). 
Handbook on Journalism Ethics: African Case Studies. pp 65-86. Windhoeck. The Media 
Institute of Southern Africa. 
Nyamujoh, F., (2005): African's Media: Democracy and The Politics of Belonging London, Zeb 
Books Ltd. 
Nye, J S., (1967): ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost –Benefit Analysis’. America 
Political Science Review, Vol. LXI (61) No 2. pp: 417-427. 
O’Donnell, G., (1999): ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’. in Schelder (Ed). The 
Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder, London, Lynne 
Rienner Publisher.  
O’Neil, P., (1998): Communicating Democracy: The Media and Political Transition, London, 
Boulder London, UK. Lynne Rienner 
Obasanjo, O., (1999): ‘Presidential Inauguration Speech’. Abuja, Federal Ministry of Information.  
Obasanjo. O., (2014): Untitled paper, At the public presentation and launching of an Auto-
biography of Hon. Justice M.M A Akanbi, The Story of My Two Worlds: Challenges, 
Experiences and Achievements, Abuja, November 26th. 
Obasanjo, O., (2013): Before It Is Too Late. Open Letter to President Jonathan on the State of the 
Nation on 2 December. pp:1-18. 
Obianigwe. N. O., (2009) Perception of Lagos – Based Journalists On Brown Envelope Syndrome 
in The Coverage of News Events in Nigeria. Unpublished B.Sc. Project. Covenant 
University. Ota. Nigeria.  
Ochapa, A., (2006): Curbing Corruption in Nigeria: The Untold Facts. Abuja Ogunleye 
Publishing & Printing Press. 
Ogundimu, F., (2007): ‘Media and Democracy in Twenty-First-Century Africa’, in Hyden, G., 
Leslie. M., and Ogundimu, F., (eds.) (2007). Media and Democracy in Africa. London. 
Transaction Publishers. 
Ogundiya, I, S., (2009): ‘Political Corruption in Nigeria: Some Theoretical Perspective and Some 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     265 | P a g e  
 
 
Explanations’. Anthropologist Vol.11 No 4. P. 281-292 
Ojo, E. O., (2006): ‘Imperatives of Sustaining Democratic Values’, in Ojo E (ed.) Challenges of 
Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria. Ibadan. John Archers (Publishers) Limited. 
Ojo, E. O., (2003): The Mass Media and the Challenges of Sustainable Democratic Values in 
Nigeria: The Possibilities and Limitations. Media, Culture and Society. Accessed 8th April, 
2009. 
Ojo, O., (2007): ‘A Political Economy Approach to Understanding Corruption’, in Aina, D. 
Ayandiji (ed.). Corruption and the Challenge of Human Development, pp. 105-112, Ogun 
State, Nigeria. Babcock University Press Ltd. 
Okeke, S.E., (1980): How to Tackle Corruption Effectively in Nigeria. Accessed March 20, 2013 
Okoro, N. M and Ugwuanyi, J.C., (2006): ‘Brown Envelope Syndrome and Mass Media 
Objectivity in Nigeria’. Africa Journal of Communication and Development, Vol 1. No1. 
pp.123-148. 
Okonkwo, R., (2007): ‘Corruption in Nigeria: A Historical Perspective (1947-2002). In Africa 
Unchained’. Retrieved from 
http://africaunchained.blogspot.com/2007/09/corruption.in.nigeria.historical.html 
Onadeko, T., (2008): ‘Yoruba Traditional Adjudicatory System’. African Study of Monograph. 
Vol. 29. Issue 1: pp 15-28  
Olagoke, D, O (1972): The Incorruptible Judge. London. Evans Brothers. 
Olaniyan, A., (2005): Corruption and Economic Development: How Nigeria was Underdeveloped 
by its Elite Lagos, Woodhaven Nigeria Ltd. 
Olaniyan, R., (1985): Nigerian History and Culture. London. Longman Group Limited. 
Olanipekun, O., (2013): ‘Proposal for the Reform of the ICPC Act 2000’. Given at the Nigeria 
Law Reform Commission Workshop on the Reform of the ICPC Act 2000, Abuja. 
Olatunji, I. S., (2012): (Unpublished PhD thesis): Explaining the Mortality of Nigerian 
Newspapers (1960-2004), Ibadan, University of Ibadan.  
Oloyede, B., (1996): Press Freedom in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of the Salient Issues, 
Abeokuta, Kunle Alayande. 
Olukotun A., (2004): ‘Media Accountability and Democracy in Nigeria, (1999-2003)’. African 
Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, ProQuest Central, pp. 69-90  
Olukotun, A., (2009): ‘Watchdog or Partisan Hounds (1)’, The Punch Newspaper, Thursday, 19th 
March.  
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     266 | P a g e  
 
 
Olunloyo, O., (2008): ‘Life and Time of the Honourable Adegoke Adelabu-2008 Memorial 
Lecture’. An Ibadan Foundation Project, Nigeria. 
Olurode, L., (2009): Pockets of Ethical Islands in a Sea of Scoundrels, Issue in Good Governance 
and Human Development, Lagos, Nigeria, Rebonik Publications Ltd. 
Olivier de Sardan, J. P., (1999): ‘A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa’. Journal of Modern 
African Studies Vol 37. Issue 1; pp 25-52.  
Omotoso, F. (2006): ‘Corruption, Private Accumulation and Problem of Development in Nigeria’. 
Soc. Sci, 1(4), 335-343. 
Omu, Fred, I. A., (1978): Press and Politics in Nigeria, 1880-1937. London, Longman Group 
Limited. 
Onanuga, B., (2008): ‘Media Corruption Reporting and Governance’, in the report of a workshop 
on Reporting Anti-Corruption Issues, Abuja, ICPC. pp: 32-42. 
Oni, M. A., (2007): ‘Institutional Approach as a Strategy for Anti-Corruption Practices in 
Developing Nations: A Review of ICPC and EFCC in Nigeria’, in Aina D, Ayandiji (ed.) 
Corruption and the Challenge of Human Development, (257-274), Ilishan, Ogun State, 
Nigeria. Babcock University Press Ltd. 
Onyisi, T., E (1996): Mass Media, Ethics Analysing: The Brown Envelope or ‘AWUFU’ 
Syndrome in Nigeria, in Nwosu and Ecwo (eds). Mass Media and Marketing Communication. 
Enugu. Thought Communications Publishers. pp:78-91. 
Opara, I P., (2007): Dividends of the Anti-Corruption Crusade in Nigeria and its Sustainability. 
Jos, Nigeria, Lizborn Printer and Publishers. 
Osaghae, E. E., (1998): Crippled Giant: Nigeria Since Independence. London, Hurst and Co. 
Osoba, S.O., (1996):’Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspectives’: Review of African Political 
Economy. Vol. 23, No. 69 Pp. 371-386. Taylor & Francis Ltd. Accessed 22nd January, 2009. 
Oso, L, and Ibraheem, I., (2014): ‘The Intellectual as Custodian of Public Conscience’. in 
Adebanwi Wale (ed), Public Intellectuals, the Public Sphere and the Public Spirit: Essays 
in Honour Olatunji Dare, (pp. 31-47) Ibadan University Press, Ibadan, Nigeria. 
Otite, O., (1986): Sociology Study of Corruption in Odekunle, F (ed). Nigeria: Corruption in 
Development. Ibadan, University of Ibadan.  
Oyovbaire, S., (2001): The Media and Democratic Process in Nigeria. In the Guardian Nigeria. 
Available [online]. http://www.ngrguardiannews.com 
Pakenham, T., (2003): The Scramble for Africa. New York. Harper Perennial. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     267 | P a g e  
 
 
Pastor, R.A., (1999): ‘The Third Dimension of Accountability: The International Community in a 
National Election’. In Schelder A., (ed). The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publisher. 
Peters, B., (2003): The Media’s Role: Covering or Covering up of Corruption? Global Corruption 
report, pp 44-56. Accessed from 
unpan1.un.org/intradocument/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN008437.pdf. 
2nd Feb. 2011. 
Peters, S.J., (2004): African Politics and Society: A Mosaic Transformation. Belmont, CA: 
Thomson/ Wadsworth. 
Pinkney, R., (2003): Democracy in Third World, 2nd edn. Boulder. London: Lynne Rienner. 
Pintak, L., (2011): The New Arab Journalist: Mission and Identity in a Time of Turmoil. London. 
I. B Tauris &Co. Ltd.  
Press Freedom Index (2011-2015). 
Reader, J., (1998): Africa: A Bibliography of the Continent. England: Penguin Books. 
Prosperity Index (2015). Retrieved from www.li.com/activities/publications/2015-legatum-
prosperity- 22nd July 2015. 
Reid, R., (2012): A History of Modern Africa: 1800 to the Present, 2nd edn. Oxford, Wiley – 
Blackwell. 
Reporters Without Borders Annual Report 2013. Retrieved on https://rsf.org/en/news/2013-world-
press-freedom-index-dashed-hopes-after-spring. 12th march,2014.  
Report of Coker Commission of Inquiry into the Affairs of Certain Statutory Corporations in 
Western Nigeria (1962), Lagos. Federal Ministry of Information. 
Report of the Foster-Sutton of Inquiry (1956), Lagos. Federal Ministry of Information. 
Regional Anti-Corruption Programme for Africa (2015): United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa/ African Union Advisory Board on Corruption Working Document.  
Ribadu, N., (2009): Capital Loss and Corruption: The Example of Nigeria. Testimony Before the 
House Financial Services Committee, May 19. Centre for Global Development.  
Ribadu, N. (2006a): Corruption: The Trouble with Nigeria.  3rd Annual National Trust Dialogue. 
19th January, p.26. 
Ribadu, N., (2006b): (Untitled paper). At the Archbishop Vining Memorial cathedral, Lagos. 
November 24th.  
Ribadu, N., (2007): ‘Nigeria’s Struggle with Corruption’. Unpublished Paper, EFC C Library.  
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     268 | P a g e  
 
 
Ritchie, J., (2003): ‘The Applications of Qualitative Methods in Social Research’, in Ritchie, J and 
Lewis, J., (eds.) (2003): Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science 
Students and Researchers.  London. Sage Publications. 
Richstad, J., (2000): ‘Asian Journalism in the Twentieth Century’. Journalism Studies Vol.1. Issue 
2: pp 275-278  
Rodney, C., (2012): ‘Mass Media and the Anti-Corruption Crusade: The Challenges Ahead’, in 
ICPC Monitor Quarterly Magazine, Vol 5, issue 1, pp. 15-16 October- December edition. 
Rodney, W., (1981): How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Washington: Howard. 
Ronning, H., (2009): ‘The Politics of Corruption and the Media in Africa: Journal of African 
Media Studies, Vol.1 No 9.  
Rose-Ackerman, S., (1999): Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Rose-Ackerman, S., (2010): ‘Corruption, Greed, Culture and the State’. The Yale Law Journal. 
Vol. 120, pp 125-140. Yale law and Economics Research Paper No. 409.  
Sadeeq, W (2006): ‘Mass Media and Democracy’. In Ojo E., (ed) Challenges of Sustainable 
Democracy in Nigeria. Ibadan, John Archers (Publishers) Ltd. pp: 247-260. 
Sarantakos, S (2013): Social Research. (4th ed.). Palgrave Macmillan, London. 
Scharpf, F.W., (1997): Games: Real Actors Play-Actors Centered Institiutionalism in Policy 
Research. Bouldier, C. O. Westview Print 
Schelder, A, (1999): ‘Conceptualizing Accountability’: In Schelder A. (ed) The Self-Restraining 
State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder London, Lynne Rienner 
Publisher. 
Shleifer, A and Vishny, R.W., (1993): “Corruption”. Quarterly Journal of Economies. Vol 108. 
pp:599-617.  
Schmidt, D., (2007): ‘Anti - Corruption: What Do We Know? Research on Preventing Corruption 
in the Post-Communist World’. Political Studies Review Volume 5, Issue 2, pp.202-232. 
Schmitter, P. C (1999): ‘The Limits of Horizontal Accountability’, in Schelder, A. (Ed.); The Self-
Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder, London, 
Lynne Rienner Publisher. 
Schmitter, P.C., and Karl, T. L., (1991) What Democracy is—and is Not, in Diamond, L., and 
Plattner, M., (eds.) (1993). Journal of Democracy, Vol 2, No. 3, pp 75-88. Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Schudson, M., (1989): The Sociology of News Production. Media, Culture and Society. London 
Sage Publication online. Pp.263-282. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     269 | P a g e  
 
 
Searle, G. R., (1987): Corruption in British Politics, 1895 – 1930; New York, USA. Clarendon 
Press – Oxford University Press. 
Sedigh, S, and Muganda, A., (1999): ‘The Fight against Corruption in Tanzania’ in Stapenhurst, 
R, and Kpundeh, S. J. (ed): Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National 
Integrity. World Bank Institute (WBI), EDI Development Studoes. Washington, DC: 
World Bank 
Sen, A., (1999): Development as Freedom.  Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Sen, A., (1999b): ‘The Universal Value of Democracy’. Journal of Democracy Volume 10, pp. 3-
17. 
Shah, A., (2006): The International Encyclopedia of Performance Accountability and Combating 
Corruption, London. The World Bank Press. 
Shaw, S, E., and Bailey, J., (2009): Discourse Analysis: What is it and why it is relevant to Family 
Practice. Oxford Journal. Vol 26, No.5, pp: 413-419. 
Shah, A., (2006): “Tailoring the fight Against Corruption to Country Circumstances. In Shah (ed) 
2006, The International Encyclopedia of Performance Accountability and Combating 
Corruption. London. The world Bank press. Chapter 7, pp:233-254. 
Shobanjo, B.,(2002): ‘The Strengths and Opportunities of Print Media Advertising’, Paper 
presented at the AGM of the Newspapers Proprietors’ Association of Nigeria (NPAN), in Abuja, 
on March 1, 2002.  
Simon, J., (1998): Hot on the money trail. Colorado Journalism Review. 
Skolnick, J.H and McCoy, C., (1984): ‘Police Accountability and The Media’, Law and Social 
Inquiry. Vol. 9, Issue 3: pp 521-557 
Smith, D., (2001): ‘Kinship and Corruption in Contemporary Nigeria’, Ethno. Vol. 66, No. 3. 
pp: 344-364. Sparks, C., (2007): Globalisation, Development and the Mass Media. London. 
Sage. 
Smith, A., (2004): ‘Global Ethics in the Age of Behemoths’, in Anderson R and Strate L, (eds.): 
Critical Studies in Media Commercialism, United States, Oxford University Press. 
Smith, D. J., (2008): A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in 
Nigeria, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press. 
Snipe, D., and Spencer, L., (2003): ‘The Foundations of Qualitative Research’, in Ritchie, J and 
Lewis, J., (eds.) (2003): Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science 
Students and Researchers.  London. Sage Publications. 
Sklar, R. L (2003): The Premise of Mixed Government in African Political Studies, in Olufemi 
Vangham (ed), Indigenous Political Structures and Governance in Nigeria, Ibadan Sefer 
Books. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     270 | P a g e  
 
 
Soola, E., (2009): ‘Media, Democracy and Mis-Management in Africa’, International Journal of 
African Studies, Vol. 1 No 1, pp25-35. 
Sparks, C. (2007): Globalisation, Development and the Mass Media. London, UK, Sage 
Publications. 
Stapenhurst, R., and Sedigh, S., (1999): ‘Introduction: An Overview of the Costs of Corruption 
and Strategies to Deal with It’. in Stapenhurst, R, and Kpundeh, S. J.(eds.): Curbing 
Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National Integrity. World Bank Institute (WBI), 
EDI Development Studies. Washington, DC: World Bank 
Spence, E. H., (2008): Corruption in the Media. International Journal of Applied Philosophy. 
Vol.22, No.1 pp: 231-241. 
Stack, G., (2009): ‘Twitter Revolution’ Activist goes into hiding. Guardian, 15 April. London. 
Available [online]. http//www.guardian.co.uk/word/2009/apr/15/moldova-activist-hiding-
protest.Accessed 16 April. 
Street, J., (2001): Mass Media, Politics and Democracy. New York: Palgrave  
Stokes, J., (2008): How to do Media and Cultural Studies. London, Sage Publication Ltd. 
Steward, C., (1986): Islam: In Roberts, A (eds.) Cambridge History of Africa: From 1905 to 
1940. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. pp: 199-222. 
Suphachalasi, S., (2005): ‘Bureaucratic Corruption and Mass Media. Environment Economy and 
Policy’. A Research working paper, University of 
Cambridge.http.//www.dur.ac.uk/john.ashworth/EPCS/papers.suphachalasi.pdf. 21st April, 2006. 
Szeftel, M., (1998): ‘Misunderstanding African Politics, Corruption and the Governance Agenda’. 
Review of African Political Economy: Vol. 76: (pp 221-245). 
Takaya, B., (1997): ‘Democracy in Northern Nigeria’, in Hendrickson M, M (eds.) (1997). Culture 
and Democracy. Kaduna. ABU Press Ltd. 
Tanzi, V., (1998): ‘Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope and Cures’.  
Vol.45, No 4. (pp.559-594). www.jstor.org/stable/3867585. Accessed 8th April, 2009. 
Tasseni. M., (2010): Media Power and Political Power in ‘War against Corruption in Tanzania. 
Scribes. Journal for the advancement of journalism. Jan-June edition. No.3 pp:4-18.    
Tettey, W., (2001): ‘The Media and Democratization in Africa: Contributions, Constraints and 
Concerns for the Private Press’. Media, Culture and Society. London, Sage, Publication. 
The World Fact Book (2014). 
The Code of Ethics of Journalism in Nigeria. Accessed online 7th September ,2014. 
Thomas, C., (1999): ‘Does the “Good Governance Policy” of the International Financial 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     271 | P a g e  
 
 
Institutions Privilege Markets at the Expense of Democracy?’ Connecticut Journal of 
International Law, Volume 14. pp: 551-562. 
Thomson, A., (2000): An Introduction to African Politics; London. Routledge.  
Thussu, D., (2012): ‘Approaches to Theorising Communication (online) Available from 
http://courses.essex.ac.uk/gv/gv905/W05%Readings/Thussu--
Approaches_to_Theorising_internal.pdf (Accessed August 19,2012). 
Tignor, L. R. (1993). ‘Political Corruption in Nigeria Before Independence’. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol.13, No.2, Pp. 175-202. 
Transparency International (2015): Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Berlin: Transparency 
International. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/result.   Accessed 
August 30, 2015. 
Transparency International (2014): Corruption perceptions Index 2014. Berlin: Transparency 
International. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/result. Accessed May 
28, 2014. 
Transparency International (2013): Corruption perceptions Index 2013. Berlin: Transparency 
International. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi/2013/result. Accessed 
December 16, 2013. 
Transparency International (2012): Corruption perceptions Index 2012. Berlin: Transparency 
International. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/result. Accessed on 
August 19, 2012. 
Transparency International (2011): Corruption perceptions Index 2011. Berlin: Transparency 
International. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/result. Accessed 
April 22, 2011. 
Transparency International (2010): Corruption perceptions Index 2010. Berlin: Transparency 
International. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2010/result. Accessed June 
8, 2010. 
Treisman, D., (2000): ‘The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study’. Journal of Public 
Economics, Vol. 67, pp. 399-457. 
TUGAR: (2011): Technical Unit on Governance and Anti-Corruption Initiatives in Nigeria, 
Reports of Scoping Survey of Anti-Corruption Reforms. Abuja, Nigeria. 
Udo, R. K., (1984): ‘Environments and Peoples of Nigeria. A Geographical Introduction to the 
History of Nigeria’ in Obaro Ikime (Ed/): Groundwork of Nigerian History. Ibadan, 
Heinemann Educational Books Nigeria, Ltd. pp: 7-24. 
Ugboajah, F.O (1980): ‘Oramedia or Traditional Media as Effective Communication Options for 
Rural Development’.  Africa Communication Year Book. Vol.3, No.5. pp: 165-176. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     272 | P a g e  
 
 
Umechukwu, P., (2000): Mass Media and Nigeria Society, Development Issues and Problems. 
Enugu: Thompson Printing and Publ. Co 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Retrieved 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf.  Accessed March 
21st, 2103. 
UNESCO (2016): Freedom of Information in Africa. Available [online]. 
Unesco.org/new/en/communication-and information/freedom-of-information/for-in-Africa. 
Accessed on 2/22/2017. 
Utomi, P., (2014): ‘The Media in a Collapsed Culture’, The Punch, Thursday, December 18th, pp. 
26. 
Vanhannen, F., (1997): Prospectus of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries. New York 
Routledge. 
Van Dijk, T.A., (2006): Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. Amsterdam. University of 
Amsterdam. 
Voltmer, K., and Rawnsley, G., (2009): ‘The Media’, in Haerpfer et al (Eds.) (2009). 
Democratisation. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
Von Maravic, P., and Reichard, C., (2003): New Public Management and Corruption: IPMN 
Dialogue and Analysis. International Public Management Review. Electronic Journal. Available 
[online] http://www.ipmr.net. Vol.4, Issue 1. pp:84-130   
Wamba-dia-Wamba, E., (1996): Pan Africanism, Democracy, Social Movements and Mass 
Struggle. African Journal of Political Science New Series. Vol.1, No.1. pp: 10-20. 
Waller, C.J., Verdier, T. A., and Gardner, R., (2002): “Corruption: Top-Down or Bottom-Up”. 
Economic Inquiry. Vol. 40. No.4. pp: 688-703. 
Ward, S. J. A., (2010) Ethics @Journalism, Wisc.edu, Centre for Journalism Ethics, School of 
Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsm –Madison. Accessed 30th 
April ,2015. http:// journalismethics.info/research ethics/index. / 
Ward, S.J.A., (2012): Untitled Paper for International Journalists’ Network. 
http://ijnet.org/en/stories/why-journalism-ethics-r. Accessed 30th April, 2014. 
Warren, M., (2004): What Does Corruption Mean in Democracy? American Journal of Political 
Science, Vol.48, No 2, pp.328-343., Accessed 21st January, 09. 
Wasserman, H., (2011): Popular Media, Democracy and Development in Africa. London, 
Routledge. 
Wasswa, J. B and Kakooza M., (2011): ‘Media and Corruption’, Uganda Media Review, Issue II, 
November. Uganda Media Development Foundation. 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     273 | P a g e  
 
 
Watt, D; Flannary R, and Theobald R., (2000): ‘Democratisation or the Democratisation of 
Corruption? The Case of Uganda’ in Doig and Theobald (Eds.) Corruption and 
Democratisation, London, Frank Cass and Company Limited. 
Watson, J., and Hill. A., (2003): A Dictionary of Communication and Media Studies, 6th ed. 
London, Edward Arnold 
Webster, F., (2006): Theories of Information Society. London, Routledge. 
Wengraf, T., (2001). Qualitative Research Interviewing. London: Sage. 
Williams, K., (2003): Understanding Media Theory. London, Arnold. 
Williams, R., (1991): Political Corruption in Africa; England. Gower Publishing Company Ltd. 
Wilson, D., (1980): ‘Traditional Mass Communication: Towards A Redefinition of Concepts’. A 
paper presented at the inaugural conference of the Nigerian Mass Communication 
Association, Lagos, University of Lagos, Nigeria. 
Wimmer, R.D., and Dominick, J.R. (2000): Mass Media Research: An Introduction. 6th ed. 
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
Winseck, D., and Jin, D, Y., (2011): The Political Economies of Media: The Transformation of the 
Global Media Industries. London, Bloomsbury Academic. 
Wiredu, K. (2010): ‘Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: A Plea for a Non-
Party Polity’. The Centennial Review Vol. 39 No 1. 
Wiseman, J.A., (1990): Democracy in Black Africa: Survival and Revival. New York, Paragon 
House Publishers. 
Wood, A, T., (2004): Asian Democracy in World History. New York. Routledge 
Wodak, R and Meyer, M., (2009): Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis. London and New 
York. Longman. 
World Bank (1997): World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. New York, 
Oxford University Press. 
Wraith, R., and Simpkins E., (1963): Corruption in Developing Countries, Great Britain, Allen 
and Unwin 
Zikirullahi, I. M., (2005): Nigerian Media’: KAF Democracy Report. pp.215-232. Accessed May 
2009. 
Zowam, G., (2007): Strategy for a Final Assault on Corruption. Abuja, Nigeria. Organisation and 
Productivity Consultant Limited.  
 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     274 | P a g e  
 
 
Newspapers and News Magazines References  
 Associated Press News Bulletin, July 16th, 2007. 
Daily Independent (Nigeria) May 1st, 2009  
Daily Trust (Nigeria) June 11th, 2012  
Daily Trust (Nigeria) June 15th, 2012   
Daily Trust (Nigeria) June 17th, 2012  
Daily Trust (Nigeria) June 18th, 2012  
Daily Trust (Nigeria) June 19th, 2012  
Daily Trust (Nigeria) June 22nd, 2012 
Daily Trust (Nigeria) June 25th, 2012  
Daily Trust (Nigeria) June 26th, 2012  
Daily Trust (Nigeria) June 29th, 2012  
Daily Trust (Nigeria) February 2nd, 2013  
Daily Trust (Nigeria) February 3rd, 2013   
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 8th 2006  
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 9th, 2006  
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 9th, 2006  
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 10th, 2006   
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 11th, 2006  
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 12th, 2006  
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 13th, 2006  
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 14th, 2006  
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 15th, 2006   
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 16th, 2006 
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 17th, 2006  
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) September 29th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 6th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 7th, 2006  
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     275 | P a g e  
 
 
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 8th, 2006   
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 9th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 11th, 2006   
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 12th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 13th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 14th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 16th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 18th, 2006   
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 19th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 20th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 23rd, 2006 
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 26th, 2006   
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 27th, 2006  
Tribune Newspaper (Nigeria) September 29th, 2006 
The Sun (Nigeria), March 8 2005   
This Day (Nigeria) June 12th, 2012  
This Day (Nigeria) June 14th 2012   
This Day (Nigeria) June 15th 2012   
This Day (Nigeria) June 15th 2012  
This Day (Nigeria) June 16th 2012   
This Day (Nigeria) June 19th 2012  
This Day (Nigeria) June 22nd 2012  
This Day (Nigeria) June 29th 2012  
The News (Nigeria) June 6th, 2011, pp.16 
Punch Newspaper (Nigeria) December, 18, 2014. 
Ayorinde, Steve: Open letter on How Executive Director of the Punch Newspapers is engaging in 
Corruption. 1 March, 2010.  
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     276 | P a g e  
 
 
Igbikiowubo, H., (2004): ‘TSKJ Saga: Swiss Govt. Freezes $100milion Account’, in Vanguard 
Newspapers, December 6th. 
Okeke, A (2014), in the Daily Trust Newspapers (Nigeria) June 26th. 
Obaigbena et al (2013): ‘Nigeria Press Council Statement Condemning Media Attack in Nigeria’ 
published by Nation Newspapers, June 13th. 
Soriwei, C., (2014) in the Punch Newspapers (Nigeria) June 11th. 
Burleigh, M., (2013). Daily Mail Newspapers, (London) August 9th. 
Lema, S., (2014), ‘Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) Statement condemning attack on Media 
Houses by Nigeria Military’, June 14th.    
Tell Magazine July 2000 
Code of Conduct Act 1998 
Daily Sun Newspapers, November 27th, 2012. 
Zero Tolerance (EFCC) Magazine, Jan-March edition 2013. 
Zero Tolerance (EFCC) Magazine, July-Sept edition 2014 
The Guardian Newspapers (Nigeria) March 30th, 2014 
Freedom House: Press Freedom Index Reports 2013 
USA Country Report on Nigeria 2013 
The Punch Newspapers (Nigeria), October 21st, 2013 
The Punch Newspapers (Nigeria), December 23rd, 2014 














A breakdown of the list of prospective interviewees follows: 
(1) Anti-corruption Crusaders: These are principal staff or heads of foremost anti-corruption 
agencies in the country. Their role as implementers of the various anti-corruption laws is critical. 
Therefore, their views are crucial to this study. Six stakeholders were interviewed in this category 
of anti-corruption stakeholders in Nigeria:  
1. Justice Mustapha A. Akanbi-Pioneer Chairman of ICPC 
2. Justice Emmanuel Ayoola- Immediate past Chairman of ICPC;  
3. Dame (Mrs.) Julie Nwariaku- Member of ICPC Board and also, African Union- AU 
Commission on Anti-Corruption; 
4. Dr (Mrs) Uyim Akapbio, Consultant of Ethics and Anti-corruption and Former, Director, 
Education Advisory Services-Code of Conduct Bureau; 
5. Mr. Chido Onumah, Former, Head, Fix Nigeria Initiative of the EFCC; and  
6. Hassan Salihu, Assistant Superintendent with the ICPC.  
(2) Members of the Non-State Actors: This category includes members of the other non-state 
actors. They are not members of the state, that is, they are neither in the Executive, Judiciary nor 
Legislature. They belong to the third sector of the economy and their individual opinion on how 
state is governed is crucial. They possess enormous powers on the activities of their community.  
1. Mallam Yusuf Ali- (SAN) Chairman, Anti-Corruption Commission of the Nigerian 
Bar Association NBA; 
2. Prof. Femi Soyinka-Retired Academia and President of NELA, Ibadan, Nigeria; 
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3. Comrade Moshood Erubami- Former Chairman, Campaign for Democracy (CD); 
4. Comrade Promise Adewusi, Deputy President, Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC); 
5. Bishop Bolanle Gbonigi-retired Bishop of Anglican Communion Nigeria; 
6. Mrs. Evelyn Ugbogu National Coordinator, Child Education and Crime Eradication 
Foundation; and  
7. Prof Wande Abimbola- Retired University Don and Traditional Practitioner. 
(3) Political Class: These are people who had served in public offices. Their experience and inputs 
into how state affairs are conducted is very important. They include: 
1. Chief Olu Falae, Former Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF) 
2. Dr Onaolapo Soleye, Former, Finance Minister, under Gen. Mohammed 
Buhari’s Administration 
3. Prof. A. B. C Nwolise, Political Scientist and Head of Department, Political 
Sciences, University of Ibadan 
(4) The Media Sector: These are those who ply their trade in the media industry. Their day to day 
experience is crucial to this study and by extension, in the anti-corruption campaigns in the 
country.  
1 Dr Segun Olatunji- Former MD/ Editor-in-Chief of Nigerian Tribune and now Director 
of the Newspapers; 
2 Mr Femi Adesina- Now, Senior Special Assistant to President Mohammed Buhari; and 
Presidents, Nigerian Guide of Editors (NGE) 
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3 Mr Chuks Ehirim-Chairman, Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) Abuja Council; 
4 Mr Kunle Oderemi-Head, Political Desk, Nigerian Tribune Newspaper; 
5 One senior staff member of NBC (name withheld); 
6 Mr Felix Adenaike, Veteran Journalist, former Editor-in-Chief of Nigerian Tribune; 
7 Mr Simon Kolawole, The Publisher of Cable Online Newspaper; 
8 Mr Olalere Fagboola, Former Bureau Chief of Punch Newspapers, South-West Region; 
9 Mr Lekan Otufundorin, National Coordinator, Journalists for Christ and Online Editor, 
the Nation Newspapers. 
10. Dele Oguntayo- Former, News Editor, The Nation Newspaper 
Appendix II 
INTERVIEW WITH NWARIAKU ICPC 
Q. Good afternoon, can i meet you Madam? 
A. I think you know me already, but my name is Julie Nne Onum Nwariaku. I am a second term 
board member; no we don’t say board member, second term executive member of the ICPC. 
Q. So apart from that position in ICPC have you ever served in any capacity within Nigeria 
or outside Nigeria? 
A. Well, I was in the civil service and I ended my career as a Permanent Secretary, many years 
ago over twenty years ago or more and when Abia state was created, I was both Commissioner 
and the Permanent Secretary, for Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. I set up the 
Ministry of Economic Development and I had held very strategic positions as Permanent Secretary 
in strategic ministries; Ministries of Education, Land, Commerce and Industry and Finance. Then, 
when I finished with civil service I was the Executive Director of a bank though the bank has 
ceased to exist, Progress bank of Nigeria. I was Chairman and member of many corporations. I 
was the Chairman of the Abia state Broadcasting Corporation. I was a member of the Abia Glass 
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Industries ltd and quite a number of others. Then my work with the anti-corruption organisation, I 
was elected by African Head of States as a member of the African Union advisory board on 
corruption representing Nigeria and in fact, at some stage I was the Chairperson of that board. I 
am no longer the Chairperson but I am still on the board, my term will end next year because it is 
a two-year term subject to a maximum of two terms, I should be ending my term in the advisory 
board next year. 
Q. As one of the oldest member of the ICPC, how would you assess the usage of media by the 
anti-corruption agencies; the ICPC, EFCC, and CCB? 
A. Let me start with the ICPC. We fight shy of the media to a large extent we have not been using 
the media so much because we believe as an integrity organisation the Commission is chaired or 
headed by legal professional. The first two Chairmen, Akanbi was President of the Court of 
Appeal, Ayoola was a Supreme Court Justice. You know what is in the law, you do not want to 
publicise somebody’s offence until you are sure , until you have evidence, concrete evidence, until 
it has been proven what is that proof. The proof is that the person has been charge to court and 
actually found guilty and convicted of the offence. So when I was discussing with justice Ayoola, 
at a stage I was worried about this very modest use of press and he said Dame supposing there is 
an allegation about somebody and you begin to investigate you have not concluded investigation 
the person has not been found guilty and you go and publicise it and eventually the person is not 
found guilty, you have destroyed that person’s name because it won’t be easy for you now to bring 
back that propagation you have made that the person was charge with so and so. So it is better to 
wait till you have convicted the person, then you can say what you then like. But you could of 
course use the press when somebody has been charged to court, you can just say this person has 
been charged to court for so offence, but it will be unfair on the bases of an allegation or a petition, 
you begin to go to town, go to press and say, so and so because even when he is discharged and 
acquitted and you go to press, people are not going to believe, they will say ah, one of those things, 
the man did this. So he said it is better to be patient, but you know some of the sister organisations, 
they do not have that kind of restrain because they are not lawyers, they are not judges. As far as 
they are concerned, if there is any allegation and as anti-corruption agency they must publish it, 
the people must get to know that there is an allegation against so and so. That is the difference 
between us. While others will just rush to the press, ICPC is more restrained because we believe 
in been thorough in these matters because somebody is image is involved, we do not want to 
assassinate somebody’s character for nothing, so we are thorough and it takes us time. We believe 
in investigating the allegations very thoroughly before making it public. 
Q. So, from your experience do you envisage any specific role for the media and other non-
state actor in the anti-corruption crusade idea, what I mean by non state actors are may be 
the civil society groups, the traditional institutions, the religious bodies! So what do you 
envisage, how can they assist in the fight against graft in Nigeria? 
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A. The fight against corruption is every body’s fight. The citizenry must be fully involved; 
everybody has a responsibility to fight corruption because in the final analysis the impacts of 
corruption on the economy rub off on everybody. Because when we say corruption, when are the 
people using their offices to access national wealth and making away with them, you are a head of 
hospital, you use the funds for running hospitals; you pocket it, or whatever. Everybody suffers 
from the impact of corruption since national wealth is been made away with by the individuals. 
The infrastructure or what we call the social amenities, the roads, electricity, public health and so 
on are not performing as optimally as suppose to perform because the funds meant for them are 
not fully applied to these things so if we all join hands in fighting corruption, of course we untie 
the resources, we bring back the resources, that are meant for facilities and then apply them to 
what they are meant for. So every individual has a responsibility to fight, and to fight corruption I 
always say start with the self. You the individual must live up to high moral ideals. I have the 
slogan corruption must stop starting with me. Begin to restrain yourself, begin to be more 
responsible with the people’s resources that are at your disposal because every individual in 
Nigeria, even the beggar, his money is in the national revenue or national fund. Every individual, 
the taxes we pay go to that and nobody is happy that you are paying tax and it is been made away 
with by individual now. The non-governmental organisations or the civil society organisation also 
have a responsibility, to educate their members on integrity and values. The organisations 
themselves have values and I am sure they would not like to see their members been apprehended 
and imprisoned for corruption. That in itself will attack organisation. So every organisation has a 
responsibility if they are interested in seeing that their members live to the ideals of the profession. 
Civil society organisations yes if you have singled yourself a member of the civil society, if you 
have come together as a civil society organisation what you are saying is that you have come 
together, bind yourself together to defend the values, to defend the resources, to defend the 
integrity of the organisation. So that is why you see that members of the civil society organisation 
are the custodians of the people’s values. So they are the eyes and the ears of the people.  that is 
why you see them getting involved with organisation; finding out what organisations are doing, 
finding out how organisations are using their budget and finding out how the level of integrity is 
in organisations. You remember when we had the protest about fuel, some two or three years ago, 
it was the civil society organisations that championed the cause. They championed to say the fuel 
subsidy should not be removed, then they championed to say having removed it, how has it been 
utilized, they are very much interested in seeing how the revenue belonging to the people have 
been utilized. So all over the world, you have civil society organisations being champion of the 
cause of the people. They talk about standard of living of members of the society, of the grass-
root. They talk about everything. So they also championed anti-corruption initiative. The United 
Nations recognised them.  They have linkages all over the world. They do have their meeting and 
even the Africa Union (AU) recognises them too. Then when it comes to religious organisations, 
they are supposed to uphold the morals of society. And I remember when Arch-bishop John 
Onaiyekan came here to feature in the Chairman’s Forum and I raised the issue and ask the 
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question, sir the churches are conferring knighthood on members but are the churches asking 
questions about how all these people they are conferring knighthood make their money or when 
they make huge donations to the churches then they are made knight. He said well if an individual 
think that they donating to the church or by being knighted that he is going to heaven that it not 
true this is just an organisation and it’s a people. We cannot pretend that we know everything about 
the individual, yes of course we do ask questions, make inquires but the extent of our knowledge 
about the individual is limited but it is God that knows everything. We can ask a man question, 
drill him and he answers, we do not know whether it is true. He may decide to tell lies so the church 
cannot be held accountable for the action of the individual. The responsibility of the church is to 
give the message; to teach, to educate and to draw them on the path of integrity whether now they 
live up to it or not the church cannot be held accountable but they have a responsibility. Whether 
it is a church or a mosque, they preach to the people, point out the path; the right path to follow 
the right of truth, I do not think there is any religious organisation that mislead the people in telling 
them that this is right when it is not right except of course when you are thinking of these extremists 
like we are hearing about Al Qaeda, ISIS you know, saying killing people is right and all that. That 
is not what religious organisation stands for.  They teach people how to be morally upright. 
Q. What of the traditional institution? 
A. Aha that is another place where you have problems.  People are being made chief here and there 
all over the place, they say people go and steal, I do not known but the general impression is that 
many people are getting is that those being titles do not merit it because of their behaviour, even 
some are being made traditional rulers by giving money to the community. That is unfortunate if 
it is really true that it is happening because the traditional stool is the traditional value of a 
community or society so when you make robber, thieves, traditional rulers, what are you saying, 
you have completely eroded the cultural integrity of the communities and that is not good for 
society and mark you, as you do all this, as you enthrone these people of questionable characters 
to position whether you knight them or whether you make them,  I do not know what they make 
them, whether in the Muslim religion or whether you make them Chief of traditional rulers, the 
young people are seeing these things and it gives a very wrong signal to the young people because 
you even hear of cases where some children were asked what do you want to be when you grow 
up. They say I want to be a 419 as far as they are concerned 419 is the fasted way of making money 
they do not really understand what it is that is a wrong thing but they see those people that say they 
are 419 build mansion, have so many cars and are made chiefs, traditional rulers and they are say 
they want to be like them, thereby destroying the fundamental of our society. whether it is the 
church, whether it be civil society organisation we must all come together to fight corruption, 
because corruption had belittled and humiliated this county among comity of nations. But i think 
the situation is improving, a few years ago, it was so terrible all eyes were, you know people did 
not just hold Nigeria with any respect, it was not a good thing. You travel out and they say he’s a 
Nigerian and you are searched so terribly. You know other nationals are allowed to pass but you 
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as a Nigerian you are almost stripped. People want to strip you and search you. So we must rebuild 
Nigeria, we must demonstrate that Nigeria is a country of integrity, of values and positive values. 
Q. I want to specifically ask you what of the political class have they associated in the fight 
against corruption? 
A. Well that is an area we have a problem all over the world, all over Africa, you will hear of 
governors even America been charged to court for corruption and actually been convicted and 
imprisoned.  it happened in France, it happened in Italy and back home in Nigeria I am not saying 
the political class have done very well either, I will not say so. There is a terrible lack of political 
will to fight corruption it is a sad commentary but that is the situation and that because the political 
class try to comport themselves as if they are above the law, they do things as if they are above the 
law, even when they are charge to court or there are investigation going on against them they 
manipulate the process. The courts are not very forth coming fast enough; these matters are delayed 
and delayed well.  You do not want to insinuate that there is political interference but it does not 
give the right signal. When people talk about political class, politically visible politicians, some of 
them behave as though they are above the law. 
Q. Ma, I want to know whether in your own estimation, our democratic experiment or 
government in the last 15years has impacted positively on the living standard of citizens. 
A. Yes I am glad you corrected it. It is no longer experiment, we are in it, we are trying very hard 
to fellow the principles of democracy and what are the principles.  Openness, transparency, 
accountability. You must be accountable to people because if you are in government, if you have 
been elected a president or governor or member of the National Assembly or House of Assembly, 
it is the people and your loyalty must be to the people and therefore everything you do must be to 
the people and therefore everything you do must be focused on the interest of the people. It is 
debatable, standard of living, I think personally that standard of living has generally improved and 
that is firm believe, you see that many people, when everybody is carrying GSM (mobile phone). 
So many people owe cars of their own. I think that generally the standards have improved across 
board but may be when you are mindful of the fact the gap of the haves and the have not has not 
been bridged enough because as the masses, the standard of living is improving, the standard of 
living of those at the top is even improving, going higher and higher so we have not succeeded in 
narrowing the gap, the gap is still very wide between the rich and the poor but if you go to my 
village. For instance I do not see that abject poverty I used to see before, people looking almost 
not like human being people who cannot feed once, twice a day or three times, I cannot see it 
anymore.  It is not there even the building, the houses they are building, they are now having many 
zinc roofed houses we are having many buildings. There are evidences people are dressing better. 
I see it but whether it has improved as it ought to have improved with the extent of our wealth as 
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a nation without oil money, I say no, it has not improved as it ought to improve but it has improved, 
the standard of living has improved, that is my conviction. 
Q. Finally ma, do you believe we can win the war against corruption do you think we can 
win it and what can we do win the battle? 
A. What do you mean by winning the war? What would you regard as having won the war? 
Q. From the available literature ma the incidences of corruption are on the increase? 
A. you see, I wanted you to explain what you mean because I think you have made the point 
reducing the level of corruption. Because if you say winning the war, is not eradicating corruption. 
It is not possible, there is nowhere in the world where there is no corruption. Everywhere, not even 
just in visible government, even in private businesses, even in homes, there is corruption. It is not 
possible, it is a part of human nature, some trait in humanity, people trying to cut corners, people 
try to take advantage of fellow human beings so that trait is always there.  But can we reduce the 
level of corruption? Oh yes I believe very strongly that we can reduce the level and I believe we 
are moving towards there and I believe that corruption even at this stage in Nigeria is reducing. 
The brazenness is reducing, people now mindful that ICPC and other organisations and people are 
looking. We would say that ICPC is looking. It really means that people are mindful of that people 
are very careful of that, it is no longer so much business as usual; people know that we are looking, 
but there are number of factors that will help to reduce the level of corruption.  Take for instance 
this thing we are doing, system study; we have been having interactive sessions with some MDAs 
where we have carried out system study. Part of the problem why there is corruption or part of the 
reason for corruption in government establishment is that the process themselves sometimes are 
so loose it gives people the opportunity to engage in corrupt practices.  So in the system study we 
conduct, we look at the system, process to identify the ones that lend themselves to corruption 
exploitation, vulnerable system that encourage corruption loopholes that people exploit for corrupt 
practices. That is the essence of this system study, to strengthen the system and the processes, to 
reduce the loopholes, to block those system and process that can be exploited for corruption. So 
as you reduce those processes, you make it more difficult for public servant to engage in corrupt 
practices. Secondly as the laws generally, not only looking at the system itself but laws that are in 
place like the Financial Regulations, the Procurement Act, the Federal Character Commission, you 
see there are laws already in place, there is the ICPC law that puts in place that has identified what 
are corrupt practices and given penalties for them. As we try to enforce these laws because it is 
one thing to have these laws, it is another thing to enforce them but when people contravene these 
laws and nothing is done to them, you turn your eyes to it. It encourages impunity so you must 
enforce these laws and make sure that people who contravene these laws are penalised. In the law 
court, you hear the judges tell you there are so many loopholes they keep adjourning cases. The 
present Chief Justice has promised that she is going to block all these opportunities avenues for 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     285 | P a g e  
 
 
which case are adjourned and I think she came up with policy, they are going to insist that 
corruption cases must be concluded within I think she said six months. These are the cases that 
can help curtail corruption. Then also you know what we are doing how we are building integrity 
studies into education. The Education Department will tell you more about it anyway. What we 
are doing about it including integrity studies into curriculum both at the primary, secondary and 
tertiary level that is we want what they say ‘catch them young’ we want to teach the young people 
about integrity, values we want to inculcate in them. The right values so that they themselves will 
know even if they are seeing their father, their parents doing these things, they will know that they 
are wrong. You know, it took us a long time to be where we are as far as corruption is concerned. 
It is not something we can fight to stop immediately. It will take some time, it took us quite some 
time to get to where we are so we will continue to fight corruption everybody all hands on deck 
we will continue to fight corruption applying all these processes, strategies I call them strategies. 
So as you know our own mandate, the ICPC has this mandate of preventing. Preventive is the key, 
if you can even prevent people engaging in corrupt practices you will have more than won half of 
the war. When you put that preventive measure and some people find a way of circumventing the 
preventive measure, then you catch them and then you deal with them. And then the education, it 
is an on-going thing; you must continue to go on at every opportunity, formally in schools, 
informally in home, religious organisations, society, professional bodies. So both informal and 
formal education, we must engage the people generally, the children especially in fighting 
corruption. So these are the strategies and I think and if we really are steadfast you will be surprised 
as I know we are already succeeding. 
 
 2. Mr Chido Onumah: Former Head, Fix Nigeria Initiative of the EFCC 
Q. Please can we meet you? 
A. My name is Chido Onumah. I’m a Journalist and an author, also currently a doctoral 
candidate at the autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain where I’m researching on digital 
newspapers in Africa. 
Q. I understand you worked briefly with EFCC sometime ago? 
A. Yes I worked with the EFCC. I joined the EFCC in September, 2006 and I left little over a 
year, to be specific at the end of December, 2007 of effective February, 2008 so I was there for 
about a year and six months. I was the head of the civil Society unit which was called Fix Nigeria 
Initiative. I learnt that since then it has gone through a lot of transformation in terms of 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     286 | P a g e  
 
 
nomenclature at one time it was call Strategy and Re-Orientation Unit. Anyway I set up the unit 
prior to my joining in September 2006. They had a media and publicity unit but there wasn’t really 
any interface with Civil Society not just to buy into the activities or programs of the commission 
but to become driving force. So in a sense even though there was tension and conflict between my 
unit and the media unit so to say but the idea was to actually look at the civil Society in a broad 
way including the media. We also believe that there was need to get the media engagement as one 
drivers of the anti-corruption process so the media engagement was part of which the people in 
media saw as an attempt to encroach their own field. Their responsibilities as people in media unit 
was that they were spokesperson for the commission and they were responsible for helping the 
society or the public through the media, understand what the commission was doing but also to 
paint the commission in a very positive light in public which was different from engaging the 
media properly terms of helping the media become active tools in the corruption process, so 
investigative journalism was a critical part of this public engagement. So the media was one part 
of the civil society engagement but the other part then was the public which we divided into 
different groups, so we had students including students in secondary schools, we had students in 
tertiary institutions, then we had the civil service which we realized and is still the same situation 
now as one of the major areas where corruption was really engraved so the civil service, public 
institutions an also the private sector, banks, the manufacturing concern and professionals 
generally. 
These were the areas where we divided our work to just see how we can engage the critical sector 
of the society and see how we can partner with them to build the whole same anti-corruption 
process. 
Q. Was the civil society willing to be part of your campaigns? 
A. They were quite enthusiastic and I don’t know why because by the time I joined in 2006, I 
think the commission had been in place for about three or four years and surprisingly there had not 
been any attempt to really reflect on the role of civil society which is quite important because at 
the end of the day, people who are corrupt have to deal with, they are from families, they are from 
communities, they are from states, etc. so it is the citizens in the states or communities and so on, 
who would be able to provide information about people who are corrupt or become whistle blowers 
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it is very important to get citizens along in the drive, it could be in churches, it could be in mosques 
and other religious setting. So when we introduced this process in 2006, people were more than 
willing and I remember vividly the launch in 2006. The labour was involved, every stratum of 
society, I think Adams Oshiomole who is now the Governor of Edo State was the president of the 
NLC, he was the special chairman of the occasion. Traditional rulers were involved. It was really 
a big event. People were concerned that corruption had taken its toll on the country and they were 
more than willing to contribute to the process and they felt elated that the commission considering 
the great job it was doing was actually reaching out to them. They saw themselves as part and 
parcel of the anti-corruption drive and we didn’t have problem at all. It is quite unfortunate with 
the change of the government. Much of that has been eroded and really we’ve lost that steam. 
People are no longer keen and a lot of it has to do with how you assess or how you think about the 
commission. The kind of image the public has about the Commission will determine their 
enthusiasm and the level of engagement. So, to answer your question directly, yes! People were 
really interested. They were keen to work. We had Professors, Vice Chancellors, and other big 
shots in the society. Of course, we formed another committee, were called it interface, exchange, 
where we brought in Christian and Muslim leaders together. In fact, the head of CAN then – I 
don’t know whether Makinde or so attended the event. The Sultan because of flight problems from 
Sokoto down to Abuja could not attend but that was how far we were able to draw the very big 
and mighty in society to come together. At each stage, each platform, the idea was to have a code 
of ethics that these leaders could pass on their members, associations, people and say this is how 
you should behave and this is what not just how to behave but also to help Nigeria understand that 
the depth of corruption and the damage that corruption, because there is also that lack of 
understanding in many place. The impact of corruption on the country: how to link corruption with 
the poor health delivery services, how to link corruption to the poor quality of education, the poor 
quality of graduates that we, for example the bad roads we have and untimely the accidents and 
deaths that occur on the road, it was very important for us to make that linkage between corruption 
not just making the linkage but helping people understand properly how linkage has played out. 
That was what we have in mind, in making this information for the different groups and 
associations in the country. 
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Q. What has happened from 2006 till now? Has there been any improvement? 
A. Well, I don’t know, this might come as a surprise since I left the commission, I haven’t 
been a keen follower other that from the perspective of a columnist and writer. I write about what 
I see based on my interaction with people, based on report and so on. I’m no longer an insider; it 
will be about difficult to make a proper assessment in terms of what, but considering what is going 
on in social media and the press. I think there is a bit of disenchantment with the way the anti-
corruption movement has operated in the last six, seven, perhaps eight years. People are no 
particularly enthusiastic but also part of the problem is the feeders from the government itself, the 
kind of things the action and in –action of government, so called body language of the government. 
We can be specific talk about the president himself, there is so many things that I have heard in 
the last five or six years that have not shown only the disinterest of the current administration in 
fighting corruption but also some level of incompetence in fighting corruption. We have seen cases 
where people who were convicted for all kinds of criminal acts bordering on financial, economic 
crimes have been pardoned and others have been elevated to high public office and so on. There 
have been cases of ministers under the present regime, who have been alleged to be involved in 
corrupt practices and so on, nothing has been done about them, so I think in its sense one can say 
Nigerians have really lost interest in both the regime and those who in a way are saddled with the 
responsibility of trying to deal with the situation. When I say situation I mean corruption and 
financial crimes and economic crimes. 
Q. Sir there was this controversy of recent, on whether stealing is corruption or 
corruption is stealing, may I know from your perspective, there is any difference between 
stealing and corruption? 
A: I think that statement is quite unfortunate on the part of the government, the president this time 
around because it doesn’t matter for a president to come out publicity to say, I mean stealing is a 
crime punishable by law, corruption is a crime punishable by law, so I just can’t understand the 
reason behind the statement both are crimes but to help put this in proper perspective, of course 
they don’t necessarily mean the same thing but one entails the other, so stealing does not entail 
corruption, so you could go and steal a goat or a cow which is a crime and punishable by the law 
of this country. That’s not corruption, corruption entails stealing. Corruption means the misuse of 
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power to give yourself something you are not entitled to because of your position. So in a way, 
you are stealing. Corruption entails stealing. Stealing does not entail corruption but stealing of 
course is one of the different components of corruption. You could sign away contracts to your 
cronies, you may not benefit, so in essence, you may not have stolen but to have also through this 
act can be said to be corrupt because you signed away contact or lands to your cronies for your 
own. Invariably, you are benefiting from it one way or the other. I remember in 1995, when Abacha 
who was then the maximum leader of Nigeria, came out on his birthday anniversary, saying that 
he was fifty but he came out to say he felt like an eighty-year-old man and I remember talking 
about it with my editor then who said, look you have a story here, go and talk to clinical 
psychologist.  I went to University of Lagos to Speak with the Professor in the department of the 
Psychology. He gave a proper insight for a fifty years old man to be thinking or feeling eighty and 
so on perhaps it’s important for the media to get into the mind-set of the president in trying to 
understand why the present will public want to make a distinction between stealing and corruption 
and make a case for those not just making the distinction but making a case for those that the public 
accuse of being corrupt and say no they are corrupt, they are just stealing it could be a dangerous 
mind-set that would explain in the long term where we are heading to as country or what we should 
really expect from the leadership. Even if you are in government and you steal public fund, let’s 
even throw away the word of corruption, do you have to be corrupt to be dealt with? If you steal 
public funds, if you steal your annual budget, if you divert it, is that not stealing? Is it not 
punishable? I mean, that also shows the level that Nigeria has sunken into the terms of the quality 
of leadership, in terms of the ideas that leaders throw up and the direction the country is going, 
you know, it’s understandable therefore when you see many of the things whether you are talking 
about the president not declaring his assets. I mean he declared it as Vice President but much later 
he came out to say he was forced, because the president then Yar’Adua had declared his assets and 
I remember my organization the centre, we actually took him to court on the assets but we could 
not pursue the matter due to financial setback. When the lawyer whom we expected to handle the 
case started requesting, we had raised money privately to file the case in court, you know 
subsequently we were supposed to follow-up the hearings and all that but we didn’t have money 
to pay the lawyer and we just left the case, but then we followed up at the level of the freedom of 
information Act. We actually wrote to the Code of Conduct Bureau to request the asset declaration 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     290 | P a g e  
 
 
details of the president and the Code of Conduct of people, they didn’t reply our letter and we 
could have gone to court if we had the resources but subsequently after that request was made the 
chair of the Code of Conduct came out publicly. Probably, in reference to our request I can’t say 
but he made that statement after we had sent the request to say that the president was not obliged 
to make public his asset declaration which is true constitutionally but also there is an existing law 
which now says that people have the right to request for public officers. So if president is not 
obliged to make his declaration public, he is obliged to submit it to the Code of Conduct but the 
citizens of Nigeria can make request based on the new to say we want this; but nothing came out 
of it. We have to leave it at that.    
Q. I want to ask you direct questions on ICPC, EFCC and Code of Conduct. How would 
you assess their usage of the media? 
A. Well, I can speak for the EFCC because I worked there and in a way I’ve been following 
their activities because I still know a handful of the people there and I do think that perhaps that 
can be used as a pointer or an insight into what the others agencies you mentioned the ICPC and 
the Code of Conduct are doing with the media. I think when I was at the EFCC, the media was a 
very valuable and very important aspect of the work that the commission did because there was 
the realization that it will be really useless if at end of you didn’t give the public a proper 
understanding of what the commission was doing, what the public itself needed to do, how about 
the commission and the public will synergize in terms of the fight against corruption but more 
importantly, the role of the media, not just reporting about the commission or informing the public 
about reporting corruption cases or informing the public about what’s going on but how the media 
could work with the commission in terms of investigating cases of corruption. This is very 
important and we realize that very early in the process and I mentioned it earlier that one of the 
cardinal things we did as the civil society unit was to explain the role of the media in supporting 
the fight against corruption. So we worked with groups different from media groups like the Wole 
Soyinka Centre for investigative journalism. We supported journalists who were doing 
investigative work. At the end of the day, the EFCC work is also basically investigation and who 
is better to do this work than the media people. So we realize earlier that the media was a vital 
component of this work. We worked with the media, we supported organization, and we actually 
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had programs because we were getting a lot of funding which the commission didn’t control. 
Unfortunately, not many people realized this and you know it’s one of the criticisms of the 
commission. You had so much money, you ate so much money and so on and so forth but a lot of 
this money that came from the development partners UNDP, the UN and the UNODC for training 
of journalists, for training of lawyers were also because we worked well with the NBA and I 
remember a big conference we had in Abuja, by allowing the lawyers and the judges to come to 
the table and give us their take because lawyers and judges are capable of placing a lot of obstacles 
in the prosecution of corruption cases. The whole fight again corruption would lead to involving 
every section of the society and for us the media was important and we used it well. We used it 
effectively. The media was willing to work with our organization; they provided insight in some 
cases. Where we could not go directly because politically exposed people are involved, we get the 
media involved, give them the facts and aid them to investigate and report and bring it to the public 
so that could become a basis for the EFCC to move in. it was almost like we saw the media as an 
extension of the investigate unit of the Commission. As I said in some case, this is what we hear 
about the people, there are facts you can out more. We as EFCC we can’t go and interview the 
person when we arrest him and you can’t arrest somebody unless have something and by the time 
you try to arrest him the person may begin to make noise in the press. But the journalist they have 
the constitutional right, they can go and talk to people and once the facts are out in the public the 
EFCC can now say okay, I invite you for questioning and continue the investigation. So, that was 
how we worked. I don’t know how much of that is done now. 
Q. Were the journalists willing to play that role? 
A. They were more than ready to play that role because we had already started some kind of 
partnership, we had invited into, to make them understand the role they would play and also how 
important that role was for the success of the anti-corruption thing both at the level of their own 
professional gathering like NUJ, NAWOJ, etc. it was a very interesting time because some of us, 
I mean myself and my immediate boss Dapo Olorunyomi who was the chief of staff of the 
commission. In fact, my joining the commission in 2006 was the first time I was coming back to 
Nigeria after I had left the country like 10 years earlier. So there was really this enthusiasm and 
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drive to do something but I think so much has changed with the removal of the chairman then and 
the coming of a different person who kind of relaxed so many of these. 
Q: In the course of interacting with the media, was there any particular impediment they 
complained while assisting your Commission then EFCC? Are there challenges that they 
faced in the course of carrying out their duties? 
A: Not really I don’t remember because I think before my coming and before the setting up of the 
unit we had heard reports that the media that the Commission didn’t have the access to the media. 
The reporter didn’t have proper access to the Commission getting important response to issues but 
with my coming in and the creation of Fix Nigeria, we helped created internal synergy between 
the media and the EFCC media unit was still signing out press releases being the spokesperson of 
the commission but what happened was that I had a kind of working relationship with the executive 
chairman and this didn’t go down well with a lot of the directors in the commission.  People were 
like, you shouldn’t go to Chairman directly, you have to pass through this person and that the 
Chairman will praise the work we are doing and sometimes he well calls every day we had an 
activity in the media, and anytime we did not have activity in the media he will call and say what 
is going on? What are you guys doing? So the media started relating with us more than the media 
department of the Commission. They participated in a lot of our programmes through which they 
got clarification. Sometimes they would come to me seek clarification and I had to in few occasions 
make some comments, but mostly, I represented the Chairman in a lot of things within and outside 
the country and I remember the Head of the Commission. It wasn’t something I did deliberately, 
sometimes you go out and represent the Chairman and present paper, then the media will pick what 
they think is valuable for them from the paper but I don’t remember, but we had a very good 
working relationship because as I said also we were not just saying who the media come to press 
conference, you give them like N10, 000 or N20,000 brown envelope. We thought that was not 
the way to go. So I thought that if you investigate a story, the commission will actually support 
you financially to investigate whatever you need to do is to come and brief us about your story so 
that way whatever you need in terms of facts and figures, the commission can supply you but 
commission can also facilitate that investigation. The commission gave out award to journalists 
for the work they are doing. Training of journalist in different aspect of reporting was also 
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encouraged training. Sometimes it took place in different parts of the country and those things 
were quite beneficial to them. So if for example, we are dealing with health reporters, we bring in 
experts who would help them in improving their writing skills but also people who teach them 
about investigating, how to understand what corruption in the health sector, where to look for or 
where to look at things like that, so that was the kind of synergy we had with the media then and 
it paid off greatly. 
Q: But sir there is this assertion in some quarters that even the media, the journalist, 
pressmen and their editors are implicated in some of these corrupt incidences they are 
talking about? 
A: Exactly, that is Nigeria for you; the media is an essential part of the society to a great extent. It 
is difficult to separate them. Even though they are expected to play a watchdog role, I think the 
media is an integral part of society so in a way whatever happens in the larger society, has a way 
of rubbing off in the media. A lot of their media homes are owned by politicians and even those 
that are owned by private businessmen they do not pay salaries and nobody hold them to accounts. 
Imagine having a family, you have to work for 3 or 6 months and no salaries. This practice is said 
to be very common in place like AIT, there was a time they were saying journalists who worked 
there for a whole year had not been paid and they all have homes in Abuja and some other 
prominent cities across the country and they drive some of best cars and they bring their cars to 
the office, and nobody ask question. So it almost looks like there is a tacit understanding that you 
have to find your way, that your meal ticket is not your salary but the ID you have, when I say it's 
not the job, you may not get paid as the end of the month. But you could use your ID as a meal 
ticket to getting what you want. I am not just being funny when i say that because I know that has 
been mentioned it. A lot of reference has been made to Thisday Newspaper.  I have heard the 
stories told a million times by either reporter there or people that are close to reporters that Nduka 
Obeagbuna, the publisher of the newspapers wouldn't pay salary and people had gone to him and 
complained about salary and he will say young men why are you asking me about salaries when I 
have given you an ID Card, so there is an unwritten rule that you have to use what you have to get 
what you want.  
Q. Do you believe that brown envelop is really affecting the anti-corruption war. 
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A. I think so, I still see it the media, the EFCC organize programmes for the media and still 
working with the media, I am not really an insider, I don't know how effective it is, but speaking 
broadly with what is happening in the country with the change in the media landscape, you know 
the media in this country and interestingly in what I am researching  on the dynamic are changing 
we used to have media pre-independence where the newspapers mainly that we had then were 
purposely out to even if they were used, they provided visibility for their owners or publishers, but 
they were mostly used as a platform for agitation to end colonial rule that was their agenda. Then 
there was a period where our newspapers were published to fight military dictatorship, but around 
that period, we also saw the emergence of newspapers, which were published because of the 
ego of the owners or because of the political interest of their owners and then fast forward to now 
where we have democracy so called, the trend really is been media that is owned by nationalists 
and then maybe of late, businessmen like the Ibrus and the owners of punch. We have come to a 
period where many of the newspapers we have in the country today are owned by 
businessmen/politicians, so those papers mostly protect the interests of their owners but not just 
the  interest of their owners but also the political interest of their owners for example, The Nation, 
one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the country is owned by Tinubu, Champion is 
owned by Iwuanyawu, if it still exists, The SUN and now the Telegraph is owned by the former 
governor of Abia-State, Tele-Independence by Ibru and so on, there is also in the electronic field 
a lot of politicians own FM Radio Stations, they are also venturing into TV as well as what you 
see in that the agenda of the media really has shifted from whether nationalist struggle or anti-
military struggle to defending purely and simply the interest of politicians and you know what that 
means in practical terms. So that even politicians who accused of corruption own their media and 
they fight their war through the media have they own 
Q. what do you expect from the editors’ media practitioner in the real sense that they 
can enforce the kind of probity and transparency in the country now? 
A. That is the expectation but in all honesty, I don't think the media can do much and I will 
give you a couple of reasons, because the media is part of the society, the media can't isolate 
itself from the society. 
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Q. In the course of my interaction with the former MD and editor in-chief of Nigerian 
Tribune, he argued that if it is possible for the media to have a group of media men 
to put resources together and own their own media houses maybe that will bring some 
sanity to the system and secondly he was looking at the possibility of maybe we can 
get a foreign partner to come and invest in the media sector in Nigeria maybe that 
will give us the kind of succour  for the media to do what is expected of them. 
A. Well, there are good  sounding observations but I don't think either has any prospect, I'm 
totally opposed to the idea of any foreign ownership became at the end of the day it is business so 
whoever own the media thing would have to survive to make profit, so it will be the interest of the 
foreign owners first and foremost to the detriment of the people of Nigeria and the interest of 
Nigerians. So that for me is really a no-brainer, rather it is something that ought not to, something 
we shouldn't even begin to think about. But the issue of also journalists and media professional 
coming together, we've seen it happen now, in the case of the news magazine TELL even THE 
POS, then of course, COMET, these are papers owned by media men, but very few of them have 
managed to survive, so the point I'm making is that a lot depend on how the country is being run, 
how the country is being governed, became of you are in newspaper, you have to buy news print, 
you have to operate within the climate of no electricity, you have to depend on diesel, you have to 
depend on government for so many things and the environment, for so many things so as at the 
end of the day, you really find it hard to break through, then what of and this point is important, 
we saw, what happened THE NEXT beautiful paper, great reporting, great analysis, wonderful 
journalists, but how long did at last became there was conflict. We live in a country where the 
State in everything, the so called private sector unlike in the developed world where you have big 
businesses and institutions that don't depend on the state. Here even the private sectors you talk 
about, the richest men in Nigeria or the richest black man in Africa or around the world his business 
is more or less tied to the state whether it’s a case of giving import waivers or suppressing other 
people who are running same line of business with the person, so in the case of THE NEXT 
Newspaper because they were focusing on the corruption on government, Ministries and so on, 
the paper was starved of necessary support. There was not just an official response in terms of 
observation to Ministries and Agencies not to advertise in the papers, the body language of the 
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government or Ministries says a lot in terms of how things are done, so at the end of the day, my 
argument is that the press depends a lot on the state for survival, so even if private individuals 
come together, bring in resources to run these newspapers houses, you may break down when you 
cannot break even if you don't have advertisement. In this country, 70 to 80% of newspapers 
adverts come from government and its Agencies whether JAMB are taking 20 pages to advertise 
JAMB matriculation UME, Ministry of health, ministry of Education, Nigerian Army recruitment, 
sometimes you will see 20 or 30 pages of names of people who have been shortlisted for admission 
or recruitment in Nigeria Army or Police. These days each page is about half a million, so the state 
have a poorly developed private sector in Nigeria and that has really gone a long way in defining 
the kind of media we have today. I think really to answer your question, how to deal in a difficult 
one, it's a bit challenging, how do you develop society? Then how can we develop the media it's 
difficult but I think the starting point is really not the media but the society, if we have a functional 
society where there is electricity so even the cost of setting up a media house will be minimal, you 
don't have to spend all your income on diesel, it will minimal, telephoning, light is functional, 
communication, cost of newsprint, it’s within each reach organization, so if we have a very 
functional society, where with the help of a very good leader that would impact on the media so 
much, to take at the other way to say let's start with the media, its double if you have a media that 
is not just committed but can survive without the state and I don't see that happening, that's the big 
challenge. 
Q. Finally, how would you assess our democratic experiment in the last 15 years, has it 
impacted positively on the life of an average e Nigerian? 
 A. You have raised a very important question and actually may be I am working on this two 
part piece for my columns in punch and other newspapers and online publication and I have been 
thinking about it for months and I say to answer your question directly, democracy hasn't done 
anything for the masses of this country, there is a very funny statement that somebody made in 
reference to a statement that Malcolm made when he talked about the way Africa/Americans were 
being treated, when he said when they said planet rock was where a lot of the first immigrants in 
the US landed off the coast of Massachusetts and he said we didn't land on planet rock but planet 
rock landed on us. And somebody cannot Para-phrase it to say we haven't landed on democracy in 
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     297 | P a g e  
 
 
Nigeria, democracy landed on us which in away is quite true. The expectation has not been met, 
we were hoping that with eye sight and with what we have been through colonialism crisis and 
military rule, our politicians would put in their very best. In fact, there is lack of contentment on 
the part of our politicians. This lack of contentment was exemplified in something that has 
happened lately in Akwa-Ibom State and the governor who gave himself a very huge retirement 
package and I wrote about this in my last piece which was published in The Punch. Our leaders 
are like modern day buccaneers, they grab with other hands, they shoot and kill anything, that is 
around them, they appropriate, so a governor because you've been a governor in a state, that can't 
survive for three months beyond the ill money he gets from Abuja, no manufacturing concerned, 
no industry, nothing on ground and  the governor commits N100,000,000.00 as medical expenses 
after retirement for himself and when was challenged, he says what he has done is to put a peg on 
it, that the law that was there before was open ended so we should praise him for that really, then 
you have him pay N5 million a month for his domestic aides, this is a state where officially the 
minimum wage is N1,000 for those who can find jobs, so the questions now is how many domestic 
servants does this man need or feels he is entitled to after he has left office, N5m a month is N60m 
a year. In 10years, N600m in 20years it's N1.2billion to domestic staff alone. We have not talked 
about the houses, the cars, they will change every 3 years and all the medical expenses just for 
domestic staff and this man is 51 years old, so all things being equal, he could die tomorrow but 
he might as well live for the next 30 ears. So let's even say he lives for the next 20 years, he would 
have spent N1.2b on domestic staff. This amount for the medical treatment when they queried him, 
he said it's not as of the people are going to collect up front, that it will be paid to the health 
institution, have you seen anything like that in Nigeria. The day he lives office, the first day of the 
year unless maybe he has a problem of course, he will even ensure that his cronies will the one 
who wins, who will be able to pay this money. Let us look at the case of Abia state, where someone 
left office and collected N1000million or N2000million, the first day he is out of office This is 
what our democracy has turned into, of course it’s a big joke but what it has done in that it has 
legitimized for me corruption. What democracy has done in Nigeria is that it has legitimized face 
to face banditry, that’s it. So people are stealing but they are stealing under the cover of the law, 
they are legalizing their stealing, that is what democracy has done for the average person but I am 
not in no way is calling for an end to this system or asking the military to return, that is a different 
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argument, I would never support the military coming back, it’s left for Nigerians and the people 
to decide how they want to take over this country, make it a people republic, but what is pure and 
simple is that what democracy has done for us is legitimize face to face banditry. We still have the 
highest maternal mortality rate in the world 15 years after return to democracy, we still rank with 
some of the worst countries, I mean I don’t mean worst country in terms of person but in terms of 
activities like polio, the poverty rate in shooting off the roof, corruption, abuse of the rule of law, 
every impurity everything has worsened, the only thing perhaps even at that it may not be as visible 
is killing of people, journalists and attack and everything but in the true sense of it nothing has 
really changed in the last 15years. If anything, it has gotten worse because now people can hide, 
maybe in the case of the military was so bare faced that you could see it. Now it’s hidden under so 
many things. In the National Assembly, I was in a meeting or a discussion, with a member of the 
House of Reps who told me that some of his colleagues are like hunters, you know, once you are 
a director general or chairman of an agency and your coming to do your budget, they are ready to 
tear you apart and what they can get. They are not interested, if you have a budget of N1 billion 
half of it will first of all go to National Assembly members, then you have only half, and by the 
time you steal half of the remaining half for yourself and your directors and for everybody in your 
organization and at the end of the day you have nothing left to provide the basic service the 
organization was set up, this is the democracy we are having now It is sad that this is the fruit of 
our struggle for democratic rule. We talk about Boko Haram, militancy, kidnapping and violence, 
armed robbery and so on, in a sense there is an economic under-tone to the Nigerian crisis which 
itself is a fall-out of bad leadership but there is a lot that in wrong with Nigeria that is rooted in the 
structure of Nigeria, I’m one of those advocating restructuring of Nigeria. It is like people are 
feeding fat of this carcass until we, people want to turn Nigeria into a viable entity, we have to 
make people work for what they earn or work for what they want to earn, governors would need 
to devise creative ways for example, you are in a state where you don’t get all your allocation any 
month and you have to task your people, task cooperation, industries within your entity and state, 
you have to do you VAT and everything to N3b every month in every quarter to pay salaries you 
decided to steal N2b out of that money, your people would necessarily rise against you, but the 
current structure has made our teachers so indolent so unproductive everybody is just dependent 
on oil, nobody is interested in building industries, nobody is interest in technology or expanding 
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manufacturing or agriculture, sometime last year I went to Chief Audu Ogbe to present a copy of 
my book. I told him I was going to interview him and he agreed and said okay before you even, 
let me talk a bit about my dissatisfaction with the way things are happening in this country, we 
spoke for almost an hour or two, he told me everything that happened from 1983 when Buhari 
took over power, and the things that transpired lately, that month he said he had just returned from 
India, he went to China and India and he said he went to a state in India and in that state he 
mentioned that they were 30,000 tractors working daily in that state, and in the place he visited no 
arable land is left without being farmed on so I asked myself, when I came back I did a piece after 
that NIS employment fiasco I said lets even leave India, let’s look at our state, he said about 50,000 
or 30,000 tractors in just one state he visited so I said let’s take a state like Akwa-Ibom and ask 
ourselves, how many factory do they have there, in fact he told me that if you count the 19 states 
in Nigeria, you cannot find 10,000 tractors, so how do we expect to feed ourselves as a people, so 
I made the analysis, let’s say every state in Nigeria we have 20,000 tractors working, so we are 
looking at one state, each tractor will have 5 and 6 people working around it, the mechanic, the 
driver whenever the tractor does either people picking tomatoes or people around so on the 
average, this tractor can provide employment for a 100,000 people.  We need to ask what is wrong 
with our leaders, we have the land, we have the resources but nobody is willing, they will just be 
shutting between their states and Abuja, then go to Dubai and London for medical service. They 
prefer that their wives want to have babies they will go have it in Dubai or London, they want to 
die they will go and die in Germany, the amount of money we spend on medical tourism in country 
is so much. This is a challenge Nigeria must take seriously and not until we are able to break this 
circle in country. The people must  have to take charge of their responsibilities as citizens, remove 
the dependence on oil as a means of livelihood and people who think their lives depend on it are 
fighting tooth and nail to protect the present structure so any attempt to say let’s restructure  this 
country in such a way that everybody will benefit from it  is always thwarted and until we do, 
nothing is going to happen, that Boko-Haram exists today in the outcome of years of corruption, 
money meant for security, law enforcement has gone down the drain, so our soldiers are one of 
the worst trained in the world, they are the most corrupt our military. Our military are joining 
hands with militants in the Niger Delta doing bunkering and selling oil, soldiers are involved in all 
kinds of thing, police are involved in all kind of things it’s like and we come to a conclusion that 
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there is no way out so everybody become a country on its own, if you are a teacher you can use 
your office to steal, harass female students if you are a judge you do your own etc, everybody does 
their own till the day the country will collapse, then everybody to your tents oh Israel. My take is 
that this country cannot survive for too long the way it’s being run no country that run the way 
Nigeria is being run will survive, my fear is that we would not be able to prevent it disintegrates 
and I don’t think it’s going to disintegrate into a purely ethnic society maybe like Oduduwa 
Republic or Biafra. No, what we are going to have will  resemble the state of things in Somalia 
where there in complete breakdown of law, order and anarchy. An OPC man maybe in controls a 
portion of Lagos Tinubu can control a portion of Lagos like dependency in the balance of faces, 
anywhere you just see a Militia, just controlling. There is no central governor or the central 
government is so weak. Book Haram has vertically taken over a section of the country, I heard 
people from the North who say that Boko Haram people have taken over about or 6 or 7 local 
governments in Borno State, every week or so they go to the market and collect like task from the 
people and market women and then who sell, like their contribution, they are the government of 
the place, so before you know it two weeks ago Biafra people went to Enugu and tried to hijack 
the government house before then three weeks ago they now went to take over a radio station.  If 
the government can’t deal with Boko Haram imagine two other or three Boko Harams incident 
repeating it say, one in the East, West, the middle belt, how are they going to cope, the country 
will just slide into anarchy, and all of this has been the result of bad leadership that has allowed 
corruption, indiscipline and everything to foster so for me. It is s a bid challenge how we’re going 
to survive it, we have one of the most incompetent persons in-charge of the government, it is not 
worsen, under the military even if Abacha with brutal and mean and in competent but at least he 
was in-charge of the country he did what he though was right in his own stupid way, but this man, 
he’s just not in-charge and everybody is taking advantage of him both in lack of strength and 
incompetence, anything can happen, so it’s just as many people say we keep going and keep 
praying to God. 
3.INTERVIEW WITH FELIX ADENAIKE – A JOURNALIST 
Q. Good morning Sir, I would like you to introduce yourself Sir. 
 My name is Felix Adenaike, a journalist. 
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Q. Can I know more Sir? 
Well, I was Chief Executive; of course i started as a reporter, and then graduated through the 
stages. I worked in various media organisations, at least four or five. Daily Times, where i started, 
West Africa Magazine in London, Sketch which i was M.D then Nigerian Tribune where i retired 
from as Editor-In-Chief. 
Q. How have the Anti-Corruption agencies, notably the ICPC, EFCC, and CCB used the 
media in their campaign? 
You see, they use the media to propagate the findings of their investigations into alleged corrupt 
practices by public officers and others. So to that extent they use the media, and the media has 
been collaborative in that regard since the establishment of the anti-corruption agencies, notably, 
ICPC, EFCC, of course the Police, but they didn’t do it well, because if they did it well, the ICPC 
and EFCC wouldn’t have come. 
Q. What role do you envisage for the media and other non-state actors in the anti-corruption 
war in Nigeria? 
Well, the first thing the practitioners of the media should do is to be above board. Well I dare say 
they are not. Many of media practitioners are also involved in graft. If you cannot clean your own 
act, you cannot expose other people. To that extent they are hampered. But by and large they have 
been effective in their exposing corrupt practices in society, acts of corruption particularly in public 
sector and the private sector too. So they have been effective, but they would have been more 
effective if they had cleaned their own act. 
Q. So do you think the level of graft within the industry itself or among the practitioners has 
affected their investigative and watchdog role? 
Yes, you cannot perform a watchdog role if you are not above board, if you yourself demand and 
take bribes. They are hampered to that extent in their effectiveness of performing their watchdog 
role. 
Q. why do you think journalists in Nigeria engage in corrupt acts and taking bribes? 
They are members of the larger society and a lot of people migrate into journalism to make money 
but they got their focus wrong from the beginning; they think, it is a glamorous job, so i can as 
well make money. So they got their focus wrong. The larger society is corrupt and journalists are 
not staying outside this larger society which they should police and clean up. They succumb to the 
dangling of money. They are part and parcel of the society above which they cannot stay and which 
makes them vulnerable. If the larger society is corrupt and they are part and parcel of the larger 
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society, and they are not strong morally to stay outside the corruption, they are corrupt; and to the 
extent which they are corrupt, they can’t do their job. 
Q. so what is the solution? 
The solution has always been that simple but individuals have to make up their minds on what to 
do. I, Felix Adenaike will not be corrupt. I have not been corrupt after 47years in the profession 
and I don’t think i will be corrupt for the rest of my life. It is not possible, it is unlikely. So it is 
individuals who have to subscribe to the ethics of the profession, first and foremost. When you 
subscribe to it, you live by the ethics of your profession and then you are above board. But if you 
have an inclination of if you cannot beat them you join them then you are finished. That Journalists 
would stand/gather as a whole and say, ‘we won’t do this or we won’t do that’ is a waste of time. 
Nigerian journalists won’t do that. It is individual Journalists who would make up their minds that 
they won’t be corrupt and they won’t be corrupt. The profession itself would be clean and can 
therefore go ahead to clean the society. 
Q. Sir, some of the excuses given by professionals have to do with the level of salaries and 
allowances. In fact, they are some organisations said to be owing their staff 15months 
salaries, some have not even received salaries for years, yet you want them to be above board. 
How do you reconcile that? 
A corrupt person is a corrupt person. Low pay, low wages, poverty have always been with 
humanity, since God made man. Otherwise I am a Christian, and in the Bible we talk about poor 
people. It means poor people have been there all along. So the fact that you are poor does not 
dispose you to dishonour. The honour of a person is paramount. Some people are better able to 
resist temptation; no doubt about that. But if you are a thief no matter what, you will still. What 
about those people who steal billions? Do you need billions to survive in this country? N14billion, 
N2billion, N40billion, N100billion, do you need that to survive in this country? So it is greed. A 
thief is a thief no matter how much he makes, he wants more. 
You see, a Journalist is a missionary; you are out there to clean society, to be a watchdog, to hold 
society and those who operate in the society; government, corporate bodies and individuals to hold 
them to the laws of the land. So to hold people as such, you have to obey. If you are a corrupt 
person, you can’t excuse yourself that your pay is low. Live within your means. Many people don’t 
want to live within their means; they say, my classmate is in an oil company. Why didn’t you go 
there? My classmate is in the bank; why didn’t you go there? If you are a fit and proper person to 
work in the oil industry, you are qualified to work in the financial services industry, why didn’t 
you go there in the first instance? Why mourn your circumstance? Accept your place in the scheme 
of things. You are a journalist by choice not for want of better things to do. You are not a journalist 
if you don’t have a sense of mission. If you are a journalist because you don’t have other things to 
do, then you are not a professional. So you can’t subscribe to the ethics of the profession. 
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Q. Sir what of the other non-state actors like the religious sector, even the traditional 
institution, the labour; have they done credibly well? 
You see, Nigeria is a corrupt society. What that means is that all elements operating in that society 
have been, except the strong ones who have focus as to what they came into this world to do and 
those people who accept their situation. But those people who are chasing money irrespective of 
where they are stationed in life; traditional, clerical, religious and whatever, they are still human 
beings first and foremost; they will be corrupt because they are part and parcel of society. People 
who are not eligible to ascend traditional thrones bribe their way through. They foul the law up so 
that they can be made traditional rulers. So if you spend so much money, you will want to make 
the money back. You now subordinate your throne to the vagaries, to the whims and caprices of 
politicians. 
Q. I have been interacting with some members of the older generation of Nigerians and they 
say, Nigeria was not like this. So where did we miss it? 
Nigeria is an extremely materialistic society and we were not this many in those days. Everybody 
chases money now; that is the money ethics. It comes; we are subject to the internal influences and 
external influences. People want to drive the latest car; they want to wear the best dress, the best 
shoes, and most expensive wrist watches without having the ability to afford all these things. So 
money ethics is there; that is where we got it wrong. Everybody chases money now. There is this 
report i read a while ago, in a class of pupils in an elementary school, they were asked what 
profession they would want to choose later in life; they wanted to be politicians; politics is the 
shortest course to unearned income. We are not in politics in Nigeria for public service. We are 
not even in the traditional civil service for public service; we are there to make money. Civil 
servants live in houses they cannot afford to build. They didn’t take any loan; their salaries cannot 
afford to build such houses from their pay; they drive expensive cars; they want to live like kings; 
they want to be like oil sheiks.  
The fact that an increasingly larger number of people want to be things God didn’t make them to 
be, that is now what is responsible for the bastardization of our values. People no longer care about 
family names as long as they have money. But money is not everything. You have to seek 
contentment. If you are a contented person, of course whatever amount of income you have, you 
will manage it. You cut your cot according to your cloth. The family values have broken down. 
Parents no longer look after their children. They concern their children to house helps, housemaids 
and so on. They no longer parent their children. So by that, they can pass the values of the family 
to the next generation.  
Q. As a veteran Sir, does the present crop of journalist in Nigeria perceive if they have any 
role to play in the anti-corruption war in Nigeria? 
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They do, but they don’t make up their minds to join the anti-corruption campaign. They know they 
want to do it but they can’t bring themselves to do it because of corruption. They also are prone to 
corruption. 
Q. Finally Sir, there has been a lot of growing link between the political class and the media 
of late, do you think that this linkage has affected the level of watchdog 
You see, you hold the politician accountable, but if you go to the politician and ask for money, of 
course you have joined them. You now can no longer hold the politicians accountable to the 
electorates. I am not suggesting by any means that journalists should antagonise the political class. 
They belong in the same society. If you don’t have political contacts, you cannot have political 
information that you publish and analyse; you can’t have tips that you can investigate. But my 
experience has been that, i am a journalist, i am guarding my thoughts. You are in politics 
promising the public/electorate certain things. No matter how close you are to me, i will hold you 
accountable to your promise. At elections time, they issue manifestoes that they do not keep. We 
now have a situation in which media people sign on to work for politicians while they are 
running their media. They work for them; they take money from them; they are on their payroll. 
How can you watch them? And if you watch them, how can you hold them accountable to the 
electorate? 
Q. I spoke some time ago with former Chairman of ICPC and he was suggesting a public 
quoted media that would not be controlled by individual politicians so that there would be 
some freedom and objectivity. What do you think about that? 
I do not agree with that point of view. You see, we are in a mixed economy and we are running a 
democratic government; it is not perfect but that is what the constitution says. So it allows me to 
own property, including setting up a media outfit.  
In the post-independence Nigeria the government came into the ownership of the media, and these 
media outfits were propaganda organs for political parties and government so they died a natural 
death. No government owned media is doing well now. But the private media are doing well. 
The thing is, when people still money in public office, they launder it in setting up media 
organisation. You have to prevent that; prevent them from stealing money. But come to think of 
it, why do people have the propensity of stealing money? Because nothing happened to those who 
stole money yesterday, last year, 10years ago, 40 years ago; they work free and they enjoy their 
loot. But if they had been punished, I don’t see why people should still be corrupt. You have to 
first clean up society. When you clean up the society, the media organisations work in the society. 
If I want to set up a media outfit to protect my business interest, the country shouldn’t get on my 
way. That is not what sponsors corruption. What sponsors corruption is money, money, money! 
People have the appetite for unlimited amount of money. So if I have my money and I want to 
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invest in a course, and I need a media outfit to do that, no law should stop me from doing that.  
Then the law of the media should be clear. There should be a law of the land to regulate business 
activities; not to out breach press freedom. If a man is riding a car which you suspect he cannot 
afford to purchase from legitimate means, that person should be questioned; he should be stopped. 
We should have a system to find out, is the parson paying due tax? We can’t just watch you in 
conspicuous consumption of resources you didn’t make legitimately. Your neighbour is driving a 
Rozroiz; you know it is a custom built car and is very expensive; you can’t pick it from a shop but 
you order it and it is manufactured for you. Where did you come about that money? Where is your 
factory? 
So if you are making some secret money, how much is it? How much do you make per year? Have 
you paid due tax? These are the things that are wrong; so everybody exploits these loopholes. The 
laws are not being enforced nobody enforces the law. You didn’t need the ICPC, you didn’t need 
EFCC. You have the special branch in the police; you have the anti-fraud unit in the police. But 
once you take on them they look the other direction. Nobody gets punished, so people flaunt these 
things which have terrible implications for the morals of the society; for the morals of the young 
generations and the coming ones. 
Q. Sir, do you think we can win this war against corruption? 
Yes, we can! All you need is a good government. One good President would bring down 
everybody. Of course it can happen. You can’t get the National Assembly as constituted at present 
to make laws, to execute economic saboteurs, because the place if filled up with people who 
shouldn’t be there. They are there because they have money to win elections. So you can’t expect 
them to make laws for the good governance of Nigeria or of the States. Those who are there are 
the highest bidders. They bribe their way into the National Assembly and to the State Assemblies. 
So they cannot make laws terminating their own interests. So we are expecting the impossible. We 
have to clean the Assemblies and make sure good people go there. We also need to have a good 
constitution. Now an amendment is being proposed that we should have independent candidates 
but we had that in the first republic. People who won’t be nominated by their parties because they 
have money can win elections from their local constituencies. Their people will vote them in. so 
they will go and make a difference in the Assembly; either national or state. But if you have to go 
through a corrupt practice system of the highest bidder, then good people won’t come into politics. 
Our constitution must be such as to attract good people to take a carrier in politics. That was the 
way it used to be in the first republic. So that is the way to clean up society by legislation. 
If you don’t punish those who have been exposed and established to be corrupt, then the anti-
corruption agencies are bulldogs; toothless bulldogs at that. They are not empowered financially 
to cope. You rely on the Nigerian Bar Association to do prosecution for you free of charge. So the 
government is not serious. If the executive at any level wants to fight corruption they can do it. 
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One, you live by example, you live above board, transparently, then you can enforce the anti-
corruption rules. There is nothing as effective as personal example. We don’t show personal 
example; we just talk and preach. The Pastors preach, the Malams preach but they live 
extravagantly and scandalously. You can’t change society like that. Parents must show their 
children that it is possible and practicable to live within your means and live a decent live. When 
you should be living in a room, why do you want to live in a flat? Why should a university graduate 
buy a jeep as his first car? He cannot run it unless he is stealing, and that is the vogue. Some 
undergraduates in one of the universities wanted to buy Hummer Jeeps as their first cars. They  
  
Oluwasina Abidemi Babasola, University of Westminster (2017)     307 | P a g e  
 
 
made money through crooked means and they were arrested by the car dealers, handed over to the 
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Police and we never heard anything since then. 
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